Content Type: Article

  • Distressed Energy: Midstream Agreements — 10 Questions After Sabine’s ‘Unspeakable Quagmire’

    Distressed Energy: Midstream Agreements — 10 Questions After Sabine’s ‘Unspeakable Quagmire’

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Distressed Energy: Midstream Agreements — 10 Questions After Sabine’s ‘Unspeakable Quagmire’

    March 10, 2016

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    While a recent federal bankruptcy court ruling provides some clarity as to how midstream gathering agreements may be treated in Chapter 11 cases involving oil and gas exploration and production companies (“E&Ps”), there are still many questions that remain. This Alert analyzes and answers 10 important questions raised by the In re Sabine Oil & Gas Corporation decision of March 8, 2016.[1]

    1. Does the Sabine decision apply to all midstream contracts?

    No. Judge Shelley Chapman’s holding in Sabine is very fact-specific and applies only to the gathering agreements with Nordheim and HPIP (the midstream counterparties in Sabine) that contain dedications of production. Judge Chapman did not articulate a blanket rule of law for all midstream contracts —though her ruling is instructive for analyzing the provisions of gathering agreements with production dedications.

    2. What impact will this have for Quicksilver? 

    Quicksilver [2] varies from Sabine in that the Quicksilver gathering agreements, unlike those at issue in Sabine, do not contain express language to the effect that the dedications create covenants running with the land. Additionally, the Quicksilver debtors have a final “free and clear” sale order that has already been entered for the sale of substantially all of their assets to BlueStone Natural Resources II. While Crestwood Midstream Partners (the Quicksilver midstream counterparty) has a reservation of rights in the sale order to object to the rejection of its agreements, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Laurie Silverstein questioned at oral argument whether Crestwood’s failure to object to the sale constituted a waiver or consent. Crestwood is also grappling with many of the same issues that midstream gatherers Nordheim and HPIP did (albeit unsuccessfully) in Sabine. In summary, Crestwood is likely fighting an uphill legal battle, especially after the Sabine decision.

    3. Do other courts need to follow Judge Chapman’s decision?

    No. A bankruptcy court’s decisions are not binding on other bankruptcy courts, though they may be given some precedential value. Even other bankruptcy judges in the Southern District of New York are not bound by Judge Chapman’s decision because bankruptcy courts are only bound by the decisions of higher federal courts (i.e., district and circuit courts). That said, this is a “white hot” issue for which there is very little case law. Judge Chapman’s Sabine decision thus will likely inform the decisions of other courts examining similar issues.

    4. How will this play out in situations in which the midstream contracts are governed by the laws of a state other than Texas?

    It depends on how similar the state’s laws are to those of Texas. A bankruptcy court must analyze contractual issues in accordance with applicable state law, and the laws applicable to midstream contract disputes vary from state to state. The Sabine decision was based on an analysis of Texas law, and the laws of many other oil- and gas-producing states (e.g., Oklahoma) are similar to Texas law regarding covenants running with the land and mineral estates. For example, Oklahoma also requires that for a covenant to run with the land, there must be privity and the covenant must “touch and concern” the land. An Oklahoma mineral estate also contains four “distinct incidents” that are nearly identical to the “sticks” in the bundle of rights that compose a Texas mineral estate: (1) the power to lease; (2) the right to receive bonuses; (3) the right to receive delay rentals; and (4) the right to receive royalties (Texas has a fifth stick: the right to develop).

    Accordingly, one might expect bankruptcy judges applying Oklahoma law to find, as Judge Chapman did in applying Texas law, that dedications of produced oil and gas are not covenants running with the land. On the other hand, the laws of other states, such as North Dakota, are less similar to Texas with respect to these issues. Under North Dakota law, covenants running with the land are generally defined by statute rather than by common law (as in Texas and Oklahoma), and a “mineral interest” in North Dakota typically includes: (1) the right to sell all or part of the estate; (2) the right to explore and develop the estate; (3) the right to execute oil and gas leases; and (4) the right to create fractional shares of the mineral estate. As a result of these variations in state law, a bankruptcy court’s disposition of a midstream contract and any dedication therein will be highly state-specific, making it difficult to generalize regarding future outcomes.

    5. What is the status of Quicksilver and Magnum Hunter?

    The dispute surrounding the Quicksilver debtors’ motion to reject certain gathering agreements has been fully briefed and was argued before the court on March 4, 2016. Judge Silverstein has not provided a time frame for her ruling.

    In Magnum Hunter,[3] the debtors filed a motion to reject a specific transaction confirmation under a gathering agreement with Eureka Hunter Pipeline LLC. The Magnum Hunter rejection motion raises a new issue that was not addressed in Sabine or Quicksilver — contract severability. The Magnum Hunter debtors are seeking to reject only a specific transaction agreement pertaining to the Eureka gathering agreement. In bankruptcy, a contract may only be assumed or rejected in its entirety. Only if the agreement sought to be rejected is found to constitute a separate contract can it be rejected separately. The Magnum Hunter dispute has not yet been briefed or argued.

    6. What are the critical dates for Quicksilver and Magnum Hunter?

    As noted above, Judge Silverstein has not provided a time frame for her ruling in Quicksilver, but there is a looming March 31 deadline for consummation of the debtors’ sale of substantially all of their assets to BlueStone. As to Magnum Hunter, the objection deadline with respect to the debtors’ rejection motion is March 24, 2016 at 4:00 p.m., and a hearing is scheduled for March 31, 2016 at 10:00 a.m., though it is impossible to predict whether U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross will rule at that time.

    7. What about the Chesapeake/Williams midstream agreements?

    The Sabine gathering agreements contained dedications limited to oil and gas produced. The court, in a non-binding ruling, found that they were dedications of personal property and thus were not covenants running with the land. In contrast, a number of the publicly filed Chesapeake Energy Corporation and Williams agreements contain dedications of interests in oil, gas and/or minerals in place. It is likely that these dedications will be interpreted differently because in Texas, as well as various other states, interests in oil and gas in the ground are recognized interests in real property. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the gathering agreements between Chesapeake and Williams could not be rejected (as discussed further below).

    8. If a dedication covers the mineral estate, does that mean the midstream agreement cannot be rejected?

    No. Under Texas law, a “dedication” is not a recognized means of conveying an interest in the mineral estate because a transfer of an interest in real property cannot be effected via dedication. Even a dedication of a mineral interest (as opposed to a dedication of production) may not qualify as a covenant running with the land because horizontal privity still may not be present. Horizontal privity requires “a property owner reserving by covenant, either for itself or another beneficiary, a certain interest out of the conveyance of the property burdened by the covenant,” according to Sabine. The presence — or absence — of horizontal privity may be the critical question for a court in evaluating whether a covenant running with the land exists with respect to a dedication covering the mineral estate.

    9. Did Judge Chapman find that the Sabine dedications were not covenants running with the land?

    While approving the debtors’ rejection of the Nordheim and HPIP gathering agreements, for procedural reasons, Judge Chapman bifurcated the motion on the legal issue of whether the dedications in the agreements were covenants running with the land — an area of law that she referred to as an “unspeakable quagmire.” Nevertheless, Judge Chapman issued a non-binding ruling by which she made clear her view that the dedications contained in the agreements are not covenants running with the land.

    10. How does Sabine apply to equitable servitudes?

    An equitable servitude operates similarly to a covenant running with the land. Judge Chapman held that the dedications are not equitable servitudes because, similar to covenants running with the land, an equitable servitude requires any such restriction to “concern the land or its use or enjoyment.” For the same reason the Sabine dedications did not “touch and concern” real property, the court found that they did not contain all of the elements of an equitable servitude.

    On March 8, 2016, SRZ and Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co. co-sponsored the event “Distressed Energy: Midstream Agreements — Impact on E&P Creditor Recovery.” Materials from the event are available on SRZ’s website. To join SRZ’s midstream contract analysis client group, please contact David J. Karp or Lawrence V. Gelber.

    SRZ Associate Parker J. Milender assisted in the preparation of this Alert. 


    [1] (Case No. 15-11835) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Dkt. 872). For an overview of the legal issues that may arise with respect to midstream gathering agreements in an E&P’s bankruptcy, please refer to our recent publication, co-authored with Tudor, Pickering, Holt & Co., Distressed Energy: Midstream Agreements — Impact on E&P Creditor Recovery .

    [2] In re Quicksilver Resources Inc. (Case No. 15-10585) (Bankr. D. Del.).

    [3] In re Magnum Hunter Resources Corp. (Case No. 15-12533) (Bankr. D. Del.).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.  

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  • CFPB Targets Online Payment Platform in First Enforcement Action on Cybersecurity

    CFPB Targets Online Payment Platform in First Enforcement Action on Cybersecurity

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Targets Online Payment Platform in First Enforcement Action on Cybersecurity

    March 9, 2016

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) broke new ground last week with its Consent Order against Dwolla Inc. (“Dwolla”), an online payment platform, for deceiving consumers about its information security practices.[1]  

    The Consent Order alleges that Dwolla made public statements regarding the efficacy of its data security system and failed to fulfill those promises. The enforcement action is especially striking because the CFPB imposed a $100,000 civil monetary penalty on Dwolla despite the lack of any evidence that the payment processor experienced a data breach or any kind of cybersecurity incident, and also because the CFPB imposed significant — and expensive — new compliance obligations beyond what other federal regulators have demanded in similar situations. Most notably, the Consent Order provided that Dwolla must perform regular risk assessments and retain an independent third party to perform an annual cybersecurity audit for the next five years.

    In effect, the Consent Order warns entities subject to CFPB regulation to give particular attention to any representations they make on a website or in direct communications with consumers regarding information security. Entities seeking to evaluate the accuracy of any such representations or to improve their own information security practices should take note of the CFPB’s allegations as well as the corrective action that the CFPB imposed on Dwolla.

    The CFPB’s Allegations

    The Consent Order alleges that Dwolla made materially deceptive statements to consumers when Dwolla represented, among other things, that it: (1) complied with the Data Security Standard promulgated by the Payment Card Industry (“PCI”) Security Standards Council; (2) “encrypted and stored securely” “100%” of consumers’ information and “all sensitive information that exists on its servers,” including both “data in transit and at rest”; and (3) “exceed[ed] industry standards” for information security.[2]

    According to the CFPB, Dwolla’s transactions, servers and data centers were not, in fact, PCI compliant; Dwolla did not “encrypt all sensitive consumer information in its possession”; and Dwolla “failed to employ reasonable and appropriate measures to protect data obtained from consumers from unauthorized access.”[3] To the contrary,”[i]n numerous instances, [Dwolla] stored, transmitted, or caused to be transmitted … without encrypting … : “first and last names”; “mailing addresses”; “Dwolla 4-digit PINS”; “Social Security numbers”; “[b]ank account information”; and “digital images of driver’s licenses, Social Security cards and utility bills.”[4]

    The CFPB also criticized Dwolla for failing to take action or educate its employees after they performed poorly in a penetration test that simulated an email phishing attack — that is, an attack in which employees were sent deceptive emails designed to trick them into clicking on a suspicious link.[5] In fact, the CFPB noted with disapproval that, although the penetration test was conducted in 2012, “Dwolla did not conduct its first mandatory employee data-security training until mid-2014.”[6]

    Interestingly, however, one thing the CFPB did not claim was that Dwolla’s failure to maintain adequate data security measures to protect consumer information was an “unfair” practice.[7] Rather, the CFPB based its action entirely on Dwolla’s alleged failure to keep its promises regarding information security.

    The Remedy

    The Consent Order restrains and enjoins Dwolla from making misrepresentations, both expressly or by implication, regarding its data security practices, including its encryption practices or PCI compliance, and requires Dwolla to pay a $100,000 civil penalty. The Consent Order also imposes many other requirements on Dwolla, including that the company:

    • Develop and maintain a written, comprehensive data security plan;
    • Designate a qualified person to coordinate and be accountable for the data security program; 
    • Conduct data security risk assessments twice annually, and adjust the data security program in light of those assessments;
    • “Conduct regular, mandatory employee training on a) the Company’s data-security policies and procedures; b) the safe handling of consumers’ sensitive personal information; and c) secure software design, development and testing”;
    • Develop, implement and maintain an appropriate method of customer identity authentication at the registration phase and before effecting a funds transfer; and
    • “[O]btain an annual data-security audit for the five-year term of the Consent Order from an independent, qualified third-party, using procedures and standards generally accepted in the profession.”[8]

    The Order also provides that the third-party data security auditor be “acceptable to the CFPB’s Enforcement Director.”[9]

    Implications and Analysis

    “Deceptive” Acts, Not “Unfair” Acts. In announcing the Consent Order, the CFPB stated that the action “builds off advances made by several other agencies.”[10] The CFPB’s decision to confine this enforcement action to “deceptive” acts and practices is therefore notable given that the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has taken a markedly different approach. For example, in its action against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, a hotel company, the FTC alleged that inadequate security practices exposing the payment information of consumers were “unfair” in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.[11] In its action against Dwolla, the CFPB attacked Dwolla’s deceptive statements, rather than its cybersecurity practices directly, and declined to claim that the failure to maintain an adequate cybersecurity program is an “unfair” practice. However, given the CFPB’s desire to “build off” other agencies’ “advances,” it is possible the CFPB may attempt to do so in future actions, pursuant to its power to enforce the Dodd-Frank Act’s prohibition against “unfair” and “abusive” practices.[12]

    The Birth of the Required Outside Audit on Cybersecurity. Other federal agencies, such as the FTC and the Securities Exchange Commission, have been more active in cybersecurity enforcement to date, but in some respects, the CFPB order, which will last five years unless it is extended due to a violation by Dwolla, is more aggressive than actions these other federal regulators have taken. In addition to requiring that Dwolla pay a significant civil money penalty ($100,000), adopt a written data security plan and implement a mandatory employee training program, all of which are steps that have been required or advised by other regulators in enforcement actions[13] or general industry guidance,[14] the CFPB’s Consent Order also ordered Dwolla to undertake semi-annual risk assessments, to retain an independent third party to perform an annual cybersecurity audit for the next five years, and to submit documents to the CFPB for the review or non-objection of the enforcement director. These demands exceed the requirements of the PCI Data Security Standard,[15] as well as the requirements of any federal privacy regime.

    The CFPB as Interpreter of PCI Standards. To be sure, it was Dwolla’s misrepresentations, not its noncompliance with the PCI Data Security Standard per se, that the CFPB attacked. Examining compliance with the PCI Data Security Standard, however, is not a role that has been delegated to or traditionally occupied by the CFPB. Further, by determining that Dwolla’s statements regarding PCI compliance were deceptive, the CFPB necessarily made itself an arbiter of PCI compliance. Entities regulated by the CFPB should take note that it is willing to interpret PCI standards when entities have promised to meet those standards.

    The CFPB as Interpreter of Cybersecurity “GAAP.” When the Consent Order demands that Dwolla “obtain an annual data-security audit” from a third party, it does so in a way that suggests the existence of a kind of cybersecurity GAAP. See Consent Order ¶ 52.c.x (“Respondent must … obtain an annual data-security audit from an independent, qualified third-party, using procedures and standards generally accepted in the profession.”).

    Practical Measures for Regulated Entities. The CFPB suggests what it believes the components of a “reasonable and appropriate” cybersecurity program are through its criticism of Dwolla’s cybersecurity practices, as well as the remedial measures that the Consent Order mandates. Entities seeking to evaluate or improve their own cybersecurity practices should strongly consider adopting components such as: (1) a written data security plan to govern the collection, maintenance or storage of consumers’ personal information; (2) data security policies and procedures reasonable and appropriate for the organization; (3) regular risk assessments and other measures to identify reasonably foreseeable security risks; (4) regular outside cybersecurity audits; (5) prompt corrective action in response to adverse findings during risk assessments and audits; (6) employee training; (7) participation of the board of directors and appointment of a qualified person to be accountable for the program; (8) developments of procedures to select and retain qualified third-party service providers; (9) secure software design, development and testing; and (10) use of encryption technology to properly safeguard consumer information. These components are similar to the CFPB’s existing requirements for a compliance management system.[16]

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Donald J. Mosher, Michael L. Yaeger or Melissa G.R. Goldstein.


    [1] See In re Dwolla, Inc.,CFPBNo. 2016-CFPB-007 (Mar. 2, 2016) (“Consent Order”). Dwolla’s payment network “is used for retail purchases, peer to peer transactions, online businesses, and donations for charities/non-profits. It enables users to use phone, computer, social networks, and physical locations to send and receive cash. The company was founded in 2010 and is based in Des Moines, Iowa.” Company Overview of Dwolla Corp. (last visited Mar. 6, 2016). Dwolla neither admitted nor denied the substance of the CFPB’s allegations.

    [2] Consent Order ¶ 20.

    [3] Id. ¶¶ 23-29.

    [4] Id. ¶ 38.

    [5] Id. ¶¶ 34-36.

    [6] Id. ¶ 36.

    [7] See 12 U.S.C. § 5531, 5536.

    [8] Consent Order ¶ 52.

    [9] Id. ¶ 53, 57.

    [10] Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB Takes Action Against Dwolla for Misrepresenting Data Security Practices (Mar. 2, 2016).

    [11] See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, et al., No. 14-3514 (3d Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).

    [12] See 12 U.S.C. § 5531 (“The Bureau may take any action…to prevent a covered person or service provider from committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice.”).

    [13] See In the Matter of R.T. Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 4204, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-16827 (SEC) (Sept. 22, 2015), at 2.

    [14] See Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Investment Management, IM Guidance Update (April 2015), No. 2015-02, “Cybersecurity Guidance” (“Guidance Update”).

    [15] Annual audits by an independent third party, bi-annual risk assessments and certain other corrective actions required by the CFPB’s Consent Order against Dwolla are not necessarily required for PCI compliance. See PCI Security Standards Council, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) Version 2.0 (Oct. 28, 2010).

    [16] Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPBSupervision and Examination Manual, Version 2, Compliance Management Review (October 2012).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
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    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Social and Constitutional Law Limits to the Design of Key Substance Targets in Regional Target and Review Agreements

    ARTICLE

    Social and Constitutional Law Limits to the Design of Key Substance Targets in Regional Target and Review Agreements

    March, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Deniz Tschammler authored the article “Sozial- und verfassungsrechtliche Grenzen der Ausgestaltung von Leitsubstanzzielen in regionalen Ziel- und Prüfvereinbarungen” (with Prof. Dr. Dirk Uwer),  featured in PharmR 2016, p. 69-75. in March, 2016.

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  • Strike – No Damages to Third Parties

    ARTICLE

    Strike – No Damages to Third Parties

    March 4, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    In depth

    Paul Melot de Beauregard wrote this bylined article on the BAG (German Federal Labor Court) decision regarding a lawsuit over the air traffic controllers’ union strike at the Stuttgart and Frankfurt airports. The suit sought damages from the unions for cancelled flights. However, the BAG found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages as they were not parties to the labor dispute.

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  • Deference to IRS Interpretations and the Challenges of Auer Deference

    ARTICLE

    Deference to IRS Interpretations and the Challenges of Auer Deference

    March 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Andrew Roberson and Jeffrey Glassman wrote this bylined article about the deference principles which apply to the tax laws. Noting that there are different levels of deference to tax authority action, the authors wrote that “which level of deference potentially applies to an agency’s interpretation depends on a variety of factors, including the medium in which the interpretation is expressed, the opportunity for outside parties to participate in the process, and the agency’s intent behind the interpretation.”

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  • Comment on Sec. 33-34a ARC, in: Busche/Röhling

    ARTICLE

    Comment on Sec. 33-34a ARC, in: Busche/Röhling

    2016

    Read time: 1 min

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    Christian Krohs, LL.M. (Aberdeen)

    Partner

    Düsseldorf, Cologne

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  • Data Protection: Tougher EU Laws on the Horizon

    ARTICLE

    Data Protection: Tougher EU Laws on the Horizon

    March 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Paul McGrath and James Noble wrote this bylined article about the new European General Data Protection Regulation, which updates the existing rules and eliminates inconsistencies. The authors noted criticism “that the necessary focus on technological advancements has led to insufficient regard for data processing in the employment context,” adding that under the new regulation “a door is left ajar in this respect for member states to provide for ‘more specific rules’ governing the processing of employee data.”

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  • IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 3

    IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 3

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 19, No. 3

    March 2016

    Read time: 1 min

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    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Fifth Circuit Reverses Officer’s Release in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

    Fifth Circuit Reverses Officer’s Release in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT / US POLICY

    Fifth Circuit Reverses Officer’s Release in Chapter 11 Reorganization Plan

    March 1, 2016

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The release provisions in a corporate debtor’s Chapter 11 plan were “not sufficiently specific to release” a plaintiff’s Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) claim against the debtor’s president (“P”), held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Jan. 6, 2016. Hernandez v. Larry Miller Roofing, Inc., 2016 WL 67217, at *4 (5th Cir. Jan. 6, 2016). Relying on established precedent to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit against P, the Fifth Circuit stressed that P “is not identified by name in any of the release language.” Id. at *6.

    Statutory Context

    Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) Section 524(a) provides in relevant part that “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.” Thus, the discharge obtained by the corporate debtor in Hernandez would not ordinarily “affect the liability of any entity other than the debtor.” 4 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 524.01, at 524-17 (16th rev. ed. 2009). But the plaintiff (“H”) never objected to the plan’s release provision or appealed from the bankruptcy court’s plan confirmation order.

    Relevance

    Courts have split over whether the provisions of a Chapter 11 reorganization plan may override Code Section 524(e). According to some courts, the Code’s express limitation on a debtor’s discharge cannot be undermined by the provisions of a reorganization plan. Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (“court has no power to discharge the liabilities of a nondebtor [with] the consent of creditors as part of a reorganization plan”); In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); In re Western Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir. 1990). Other courts will permit third-party release provisions when individual creditors sign releases. In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1993). And the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit takes a case-by-case approach. In re Continental Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Establishing … a blanket rule prohibiting all non-consensual releases and permanent injunctions of non-debtor obligations … would be ill-advised when we can rule on Plaintiffs’ appeal without doing so”; on facts of case, third-party release “does not pass muster under even the most flexible tests. … The hallmarks of permissible non-consensual releases — fairness, necessity to the reorganization, and specific factual findings … — are all absent here.”). Of course, individual creditors who simply acquiesce in third-party release provisions and fail to challenge the plan or to appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order confirming the plan may not later attack release provisions. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009).

    The Fifth Circuit avoided the overarching statutory issue in Hernandez. Instead, it applied principles of contract interpretation to the terms of the reorganization plan to determine whether it released P. 2016 WL 67217, at *3-4. As a practical matter, therefore, if the plan provided no release of P by its precise terms, H would be free to pursue him.

    Facts

    The plaintiff sued his former employer, the corporate debtor and P, its president, prior to bankruptcy, alleging a failure to pay overtime wages in violation of the FLSA. While the suit was pending, the corporate debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, resulting in the stay of the FLSA litigation in the district court. The plaintiff later filed a claim in the corporate bankruptcy case, alleging $47,698 in unpaid wages. The debtor filed a reorganization plan. H accepted the plan, and the court confirmed it.

    In relevant part, the plan provided that a creditor’s receipt of a distribution on its claim would deem the claims to have been “paid in full, including the release of rights to enforce or collect such Claims against non-debtor parties … . The Debtor, Reorganized Debtor, the officers and directors of the Debtor and the shareholders shall be discharged and released from any liability for Claims … except for obligations arising under this Plan.” Id. at *1-2. H received a 30-percent distribution on his claim for unpaid wages — $14,309.40.

    The District Court

    H later continued his FLSA suit in the district court against P individually. P moved for summary judgment, arguing that “the FLSA claim against him was discharged under the Plan and that, in the alternative, the doctrine of res judicata precluded [H] from advancing the claim,” citing the provisions of the plan. The district court agreed, granted summary judgment in favor of P and dismissed the complaint. When H argued on a motion for rehearing “that bankruptcy courts lacked the authority to discharge the debts of non-debtor third parties, such as [P],” the district court rejected his argument, reasoning that it was “an impermissible collateral attack on the judgment of the bankruptcy court [i.e., the order confirming the Chapter 11 Plan].” Id. at *2.

    The Court of Appeals

    The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that “principles of contract interpretation” should “determine the meaning of the Plan.” But it reversed the district court’s holding that the plan had released P. Id. at *4.

    First, it explained, the applicable federal law makes “a corporate officer with operational control” liable as “an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable … for unpaid wages.” Id. at *3, citing Donovan v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1984). Thus, because the corporate debtor and P were “jointly and severally liable for any FLSA violation that may have occurred,” the language of the reorganization plan was key. Id.

    The court avoided the application of Code Section 524(e) because H had not challenged the plan or appealed from the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order. 2016 WL 67217, at *4, citing In re Applewood, 203 F.3d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, reasoned the court, “once the time for objecting to, or directly appealing, a plan has passed, parties may not challenge particular provisions of the plan as exceeding the bankruptcy court’s authority.” Id. at n.4. As the court noted, H did not have to “address whether confirmation of the Plan was beyond the authority of the bankruptcy court under” Code Section 524(e). Id.

    The court then examined “the specificity of the release provisions” to determine whether they were “sufficiently specific to release [H’s] FLSA Claim against [P].” Id. at *4. It explained the “specificity test” it had developed in earlier cases. Id. at *5. In Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1987), the court found “clear and unambiguous” language that “expressly released a third party from liability on a guaranty.” 815 F.2d at 1047, 1050. There, the order confirming the reorganization plan expressly stated that it released “any guarantees given to a creditor of the Debtor, which guarantees arose out of the Debtor’s business dealings with any creditor of the Debtor.” The language was included in the plan at the request of the guarantor who had agreed to release funds in exchange for the release. Id. at 1049. Although the creditor had failed to object to the plan or to appeal directly, the Fifth Circuit held the plan’s release to be “specific enough to discharge [the defendant] guarantors of liability.” 2016 WL 67217, at *4.

    But the Fifth Circuit refused to enforce a release against a third-party guarantor in the Applewood case when the reorganization plan contained no “specific discharge of the indebtedness of the third party.” 203 F.3d at 920. In that case, the release provision “did not specifically release the guarantor, who was also an officer, from his personal guaranties.” 2016 WL 67217, at *5. But seeFOM P.R. S.E. v. Dr. Barnes Eyecenter Inc., 255 F. App’x 909, 912 (5th Cir. 2007) (plan release provisions held to bar creditor’s claims; “release of claims was an integral part of the bankruptcy order”; “release of claims was not simply boilerplate language that was inserted into the [reorganization plan], but rather a necessary part of the [reorganization plan] itself”; language “explicitly mention[ed] [guarantor] as an entity that benefit[ed] from the release”).

    Applying its “specificity test” in Hernandez, the Fifth Circuit held that the release provisions were not “specific enough to release [H’s] FLSA claim against [P].” 2016 WL 67217, at *6. First, the release language did not identify P “by name.” Also, while P was “an officer of” the debtor, “a party’s status as an officer combined with boilerplate release language is not sufficiently specific.” Further, “nowhere does the Plan mention anything related to a FLSA claim or employment law violations more generally.” “The language in the Plan is, if anything, generic,” concluded the court. Id.

    H was therefore not barred from suing P “simply because he has already received compensation from” the debtor under the plan for “the underlying FLSA violation.” Id. at *7. Under Code Section 524(e), the debtor’s discharge in the plan did not affect the liability of P for the remaining balance of H’s claim. Of course, the court was not deciding whether any FLSA violation had occurred, but only whether H could pursue his claim in the district court.

    Comments

    The lesson for creditors from Hernandez: object to any third-party release in a proposed reorganization plan, and appeal if unsuccessful. See In re Gentry, 2015 WL 8117969, at *4 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 2015) (reversed lower courts; individual Chapter 11 debtors’ guaranty liability not affected by their corporation’s discharge under Chapter 11 plan; corporate debtor’s discharge “does not affect a guarantor’s liability” under Code Section 524(e); in any event, language of guarantees contained unconditional promise to pay, waiver of defenses and agreement not to assert deductions by way of setoff or counterclaim).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or the author.

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  • Significant Telehealth Expansion Proposed in Bipartisan Senate Bill

    Significant Telehealth Expansion Proposed in Bipartisan Senate Bill

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Significant Telehealth Expansion Proposed in Bipartisan Senate Bill

    February 29, 2016

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Earlier this month, a bipartisan group, led by U.S. Senator Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), introduced a bill in the Senate focused on promoting cost savings and quality care under the Medicare program through the use of telehealth and remote patient monitoring (RPM) services, and incentivizing such digital health technologies by expanding coverage for them under the Medicare program. The bill, Creating Opportunities Now for Necessary and Effective Care Technologies (CONNECT) for Health Act (S. 2484 and H.R. 4442), has received statements of support from over 50 organizations, including the American Medical Association, the American Heart Association, the American Telemedicine Association, the American Association of Retired Persons, Anthem, Intel and Kaiser Permanente. An independent study suggests that the bill will save the government approximately $1.8 billion over a 10-year period.

    In depth

    Background on Medicare Coverage of Telehealth Services

    Medicare has historically provided coverage for telehealth services in those instances where patients would otherwise be geographically distant from appropriate providers. Section 1834(m) of the Social Security Act provides that telehealth services are covered if the beneficiary is seen: (a) at an approved “originating site” (e.g., physician offices, hospitals, skilled nursing facilities) that is located within a rural Health Professional Shortage Area (HPSA) that is either outside of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or in a rural census tract, or a county outside of a MSA; (b) by an approved provider (e.g., physicians, nurse practitioners, clinical psychologists); (c) for a defined set of services, including consultations, office visits, pharmacological management, and individual and group diabetes self-management training services; and (d) using certain telecommunications technologies.

    As discussed below, the CONNECT for Health Act removes certain barriers to Medicare coverage—which may encourage providers to increase the types of telehealth services provided to Medicare beneficiaries, including RPM services—and reflects the broader phenomenon of the gradual movement of digital health tools from the sidelines into every day care and a recognition that such tools are essential to achieving the goals of health reform. Key aspects of the CONNECT for Health Act are summarized below:

    Opportunities for Telehealth and RPM “Bridge” Demonstration Waivers and APM Participants

    The bill creates a telehealth “bridge” demonstration program that provides waivers to eligible applicants (e.g., physicians, physician assistants, nurses, practitioners, clinical nurse specialists, nurse anesthetists and alternative payment model (APM) participants) who are furnishing telehealth or RPM services that are consistent with the goals of the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), including goals of quality, clinical practice improvement, resource utilization or the incentive payments for participation in eligible APMs.

    If granted, the applicant will not be subject to certain restrictions applicable to other telehealth providers under section 1834(m) of the Social Security Act, including originating site restrictions, geographic limitations and any limitation on the type of provider who may furnish telehealth services.

    To ensure compliance with the CONNECT for Health Act’s requirements, demonstration program participants must annually submit information requested by the Secretary of Health and Human Services for evaluation of the demonstration program, including information on utilization and expenditures for telehealth or remote patient monitoring services, and data regarding the preceding year’s quality measures. Additionally, demonstration program participants must submit to random audits of claims to ensure that waivers are being used as intended. (Qualifying APM participants will not need to participate in such audits.)

    Notably, the bill does not address whether payment for these services will be determined by the physician fee schedule or some other schedule to be created by Secretary Burwell.

    Expansion of RPM Services for Individuals with Chronic Conditions and Recent Hospitalizations

    Medicare currently does not reimburse for RPM services. The CONNECT for Health Act proposes to provide reimbursement for RPM services for certain patients with chronic conditions (i.e., patients with two or more covered chronic conditions and a history of two or more hospitalization or emergency room visits related to covered chronic conditions in the preceding 12 months). Rural health clinics and federally qualified health centers are named in the bill as eligible providers of RPM services for such patients.

    Notably, the bill separately defines telehealth and RPM, the effect of which is to exempt RPM services from the current Medicare restrictions applicable to the coverage of telehealth services. However, the bill includes its own set of restrictions on coverage for RPM services, such as limiting its use to the treatment of patients with chronic conditions (as defined above).

    Stroke Evaluation Sites and Native American Health Service Facilities as Sites Eligible for Telehealth Reimbursement

    Medicare reimbursement for telehealth services is currently limited to a narrow list of originating sites in specific geographic areas. Under the bill, any site (without geographic restriction) may serve as the originating site for purposes of acute stroke evaluation or management. However, eliminating the originating site restrictions may have limited effect due to the fact that the most common current procedural terminology (CPT) codes used for stroke (99291 and 99292) are currently not reimbursable telehealth codes, and the CONNECT for Health Act does not address the need for additional CPT codes for the treatment of acute stroke.

    In addition, the bill permits any site to be reimbursed if it is a facility of the Indian Health Service authorized under the Native Hawaiian Health Care Improvement Act, regardless of geography.

    The bill excludes newly permitted originating sites from receiving the facility fee paid to originating sights under section 1834(m)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act.

    Medicare Advantage Changes

    The CONNECT for Health Act proposes changes to Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, such that an MA plan may elect to use telehealth or RPM services to provide benefits under the original Medicare fee-for-service program option, including items or services furnished to treat medical or behavioral health conditions. The MA plan will not be subject to certain restrictions under section 1834(m) of the Social Security Act, including originating site restrictions, geographic limitations and any limitation on the type of provider who may furnish telehealth services.

    The bill requires MA plans that elect to provide telehealth services to enrollees to annually submit data on expenditures and utilization.

    * * *

    While the CONNECT for Health Act does not eliminate the barriers to Medicare reimbursement, it does represent a significant step by the government away from the broadly restrictive Medicare reimbursement requirements. In addition, the incorporation of APM participants is a reflection of the potential value that digital health tools bring to population health management and value-based purchasing strategies.

    Authors

    Jennifer S. Geetter

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

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