Content Type: Article

  • Managing the Antitrust Risks of Nonprofit Investor Relations

    ARTICLE

    Managing the Antitrust Risks of Nonprofit Investor Relations

    June 16, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael Peregrine and Stephen Wu wrote this bylined article on the “over-disclosing” antitrust compliance risks facing large nonprofit hospital systems that communicate with public bondholders. The authors wrote that, given increased antitrust enforcement, “investor communications could be construed (fairly or unfairly) as unfair methods of competition or actual collusion,” especially if the health system leaders know that competitors can access the communication.

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    Authors

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Supreme Court Holds Puerto Rico Recovery Act Preempted by Bankruptcy Code

    Supreme Court Holds Puerto Rico Recovery Act Preempted by Bankruptcy Code

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Supreme Court Holds Puerto Rico Recovery Act Preempted by Bankruptcy Code

    June 15, 2016

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act is barred by § 903(1) … of the Bankruptcy Code,” held the U.S. Supreme Court on June 13, 2016. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 2016 WL 3221517, *11 (U.S. June 13, 2016) (5-2). Affirming the First Circuit, the court reasoned that Code § 903(i) “preempts state bankruptcy laws [enabling] insolvent municipalities to restructure their debts over the objections of creditors [and] instead requires municipalities to restructure [their] debts under Chapter 9 of the Code.” Id., at *2. According to the court, “Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ for purposes of this preemption provision.” Id.

    The court also rejected Puerto Rico’s argument that “Chapter 9 no longer applies to it” because of a 1984 Congressional Amendment to Code § 101(52) excluding Puerto Rico “for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under Chapter 9.” Id. In the court’s view, “Puerto Rico remains a ‘State’ for other purposes related to Chapter 9, including that chapter’s preemption provision,” barring the Commonwealth “from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme … .” Id.

    Relevance

    Puerto Rico is a U.S. “territory” that retains some level of self-governance. Its legislature may pass laws that govern the island without Congressional approval. To go further, however, it must become a State or independent nation. Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that a “territory” such as Puerto Rico is subject to the “power [of Congress] to … make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory … belonging to the United States.” U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 3. In a sense, therefore, a territory such as Puerto Rico is “property” of the federal government. Id.

    Puerto Rico’s legislature decided to act on its own two years ago by passing a debt-recovery law that would provide alternative ways for its local public utilities to restructure their debt so as to allow them to continue operating. Bondholders of the territory’s electric utility, however, dissatisfied with the new legislation, sued, arguing that the legislation conflicted directly with a provision of Chapter 9 that limits how local government agencies can deal with creditors.

    Facts

    Puerto Rico has more than $20 billion of debt shared by three “government-owned public utility companies.” Id. at *3. The Commonwealth’s government-owned bank had provided financing “to enable utilities to continue operating without defaulting on their debt obligations,” but became unable to continue funding the more than $800 million of operating losses sustained by the utilities in 2013.

    In addition, Puerto Rico’s “access to capital markets [had] also been severely compromised [when] ratings agencies downgraded Puerto Rican bonds, including the utilities, to non-investment grade in 2014.” Id.

    Puerto Rico “responded to the fiscal crisis by enacting” a so-called “Recovery Act” in 2014, enabling its “public utilities to implement a recovery or restructuring plan for their debt.” Id. Essentially, “Chapter 3 of the Recovery Act … mirrors Chapters 9 and 11 of the … Code by creating a court-supervised restructuring process intended to offer the best solution for the broadest group of creditors…. Creditors holding two-thirds of an affected class of debt must participate in the vote to approve the restructuring plan, and half of those participants must agree to the plan.” Id. “The debt modification [would thus] bind … all creditors …” Id.

    The Lower Courts

    A group of investment funds sued Puerto Rico and various government officials to enjoin enforcement of the Recovery Act. They alleged, among other things, “that the … Code prohibited Puerto Rico from implementing its own municipal bankruptcy scheme.” Id. The district court and First Circuit “concluded that the preemption provision in [Code § 903(1)] precluded Puerto Rico from implementing the Recovery Act and enjoined its enforcement.” Id. at *4. According to the First Circuit, “it was up to Congress, not Puerto Rico, to decide when the government-owned companies could seek bankruptcy relief.” Id.

    The Supreme Court

    The Statutory Text. The court first analyzed three relevant provisions of the Code. The so-called “gateway” provision, § 109(c) (2), requires a Chapter 9 debtor to be an insolvent municipality that is “specifically authorized” by a State “to be a debtor.” The applicable preemption provision, § 903(1), bars States from enacting municipal bankruptcy laws. Finally, Code § 101(52) defines State, as amended in 1984, to include “… Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under Chapter 9.” The federal bankruptcy power is based on Act I, § 8, cl. 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which “empowers Congress to establish ‘uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.’”

    Puerto Rico, reasoned the court, “is not a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway provision, so it cannot perform the single function of the ‘State[s]’ under that provision: to ‘specifically authorize’ municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief.” Id. at *7. Thus, “Puerto Rico’s municipalities cannot satisfy the requirements of Chapter 9’s gateway provision until Congress intervenes.” Id. The “amended definition of ‘State’ unequivocally excludes Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway provision.” Id. at *8.

    But the “exception [in Code § 109(c)] excludes Puerto Rico only for purposes of the gateway provision.” Id. Indeed, “Puerto Rico is no less a ‘State’ for purposes of the preemption provision than it was before Congress amended the definition.” Id. Thus, by enacting the preemption provision in § 903(1), Congress “prohibited States and Territories defined as ‘States’ from enacting their own municipal bankruptcy schemes … .” Nothing “in the text of the amended definition” of Code § 109(c) suggests otherwise. Id.

    The court rejected Puerto Rico’s argument that it would be essentially excluded from Chapter 9 and barred from passing its own restructuring law. In other words, Puerto Rico argued that it was in a “no man’s land,” with its only remaining option to persuade Congress to make Chapter 9 available to it. The court accepted the plaintiff bondholders’ narrower reading that the Code’s gateway provision only precludes Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief and that the other provisions of Chapter 9 still apply. “A State’s only role under the gateway provision [§ 109(c)(2)] is to provide that ‘authoriz[ation]’ to file.” Id., at *9.

    The “preemption provision then imposes an additional requirement: The States may not enact their own municipal bankruptcy schemes. A State that chooses not to authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief under the gateway provision is no less bound by that preemption provision.” Id. at *9. Indeed, “if it were Congress’ intent to also exclude Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes of that pre-emption provision, it would have said so.” Id.

    The court rejected the dissent’s “faulty assumption that Puerto Rico is ‘by definition’ excluded from Chapter 9.” Id. at *10. Although Puerto Rico may not authorize its municipalities to seek Chapter 9 relief, it is still “a ‘State’ for purposes of § 903’s introductory clause and its proviso,” which “are neither ‘irrelevant nor meaningless,’” as the dissent argued. Id. In short, the Code may “preclude … Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to seek relief under Chapter 9,” but “it does not remove Puerto Rico from the scope of Chapter 9’s preemption provision. Federal law, therefore, preempts the [Puerto Rico] Recovery Act.” Id. at *11.

    The Dissent

    The dissent reasoned that “[b]ecause Puerto Rican municipalities cannot access Chapter 9’s federal bankruptcy process, … a non-federal bankruptcy solution is not merely a parallel option; it is the only existing legal option for Puerto Rico to restructure debts that could cripple its citizens.” Id. at *11. Accordingly, it reasoned that “a preemption provision in Chapter 9 should not apply to Puerto Rico.” Id. In short, argued the dissent, “Congress excluded Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 for all purposes – it shut the gate and barred it tight.” Id. at *16. In the dissent’s view, Code “§ 903 is directed to states that can approve their municipalities for Chapter 9 bankruptcy.” Id. at *16.

    Comment

    The court’s majority relied on the Constitution’s “Supremacy Clause,” contained in Article 6, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, making federal law supreme and preempting state law. A dominant federal interest in debt restructuring precludes the enforcement of any state law on the same subject.

    Until 1984, Puerto Rico, like the states, could authorize municipalities to obtain federal bankruptcy relief. In 1984, however, Congress amended § 101(52), defining state to include Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9. According to the court’s majority in Franklin, however, the Code’s definitional change was not meant to transform the force of Code § 903(1), which expressly preempts the Puerto Rican Recovery Act. See MSR Exploration, Ltd. v. Meridian Oil, Inc., 74 F.3d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1996) (“… adjustment of rights and duties within the bankruptcy process itself is uniquely and exclusively federal. It is very unlikely that Congress intended to permit the super-imposition of state remedies on the many activities that might be undertaken in … the management of the bankruptcy process.” Id. at 914). See generally National Hockey League v. Moyes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153262, *12-*16 (D. Ariz. 2015) (“to the extent that the [plaintiff] alleges that the [defendants] aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty by causing the debtors to file bankruptcy, the claim is preempted.” ); In re Astor Holdings, Inc. v. Roski, 325 F. Supp. 2d 251, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (when plaintiff sued defendant for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, alleging that defendant “induced a third party to file for bankruptcy, harming the plaintiff,” held, any misuse of bankruptcy process “governed exclusively” by Bankruptcy Code.).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Left Swinging: Why Mickelson Went Uncharged For Insider Trading

    Left Swinging: Why Mickelson Went Uncharged For Insider Trading

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Left Swinging: Why Mickelson Went Uncharged For Insider Trading

    June 15, 2016

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Securities and Exchange Commission recently revealed details of an insider trading case against a gambler named William Walters, who allegedly engaged in insider trading based on information he obtained from Thomas Davis, a former member of the board of dairy company Dean Foods. More notable than the announcement of formal charges against Walters, however, was the government’s failure to pursue charges against two individuals who allegedly received and traded on the information Walters received from Davis—investor Carl Icahn and professional golfer/celebrity Phil Mickelson. Was the Newman decision a basis for why Mickelson was not charged?

    In depth

    The Securities and Exchange Commission recently revealed details of an insider trading case against a gambler named William Walters, who allegedly engaged in insider trading based on information he obtained from Thomas Davis, a former member of the board of dairy company Dean Foods. More notable than the announcement of formal charges against Walters, however, was the government’s failure to pursue charges against two individuals who allegedly received and traded on the information Walters received from Davis—investor Carl Icahn and professional golfer/celebrity Phil Mickelson. News outlets clamored at the failure to charge the celebrity defendant who allegedly earned nearly a million dollars based on the inside information he purportedly received from Walters about Dean Foods. Instead, Mickelson was named as a “relief defendant,” which is an alleged recipient of illicit profits to which that person had no legitimate claim. Essentially, the relief defendant is encouraged by the SEC to return the ill-gotten money, which in Mickelson’s case, was an alleged $931,000. The obvious question is: Why not charge Mickelson?

    The answer can be found in the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decision US v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert denied, 136 S.Ct. 242 (2015). The so-called Newman decision was actually a series of decisions that culminated in an opinion from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on December 10, 2014.

    The decision focuses on what is commonly referred to as “tipper/tippee” liability under Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934—a type of “insider trading” liability. The “tipper” is a person who is an insider or misappropriator of material nonpublic information who then discloses the information to an outsider (a “tippee”) who then trades on the basis of the information before it is publicly disclosed. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 446. In this case, Walters is an alleged tipper, and Mickelson is an alleged tippee. In order to find Mickelson liable for insider trading under Newman, however, the government needed to show that the alleged tipper, Walters, and the company insider, Davis (also an alleged tipper), received a personal benefit for passing material nonpublic information to the tippee, and that the tippee was aware that Davis and Walters both received such a benefit. See id. at 450.

    In the SEC’s complaint, Mickelson allegedly received information from Walters about a spinoff of Dean Foods that was to occur in 2012. Allegedly armed with this material nonpublic information, Mickelson was said to have traded on this information and bought over two million dollars in Dean Food’s stock—netting him nearly a million dollars in profits when the spinoff was announced publicly. The allegations indicate that shortly thereafter, Mickelson purportedly paid back debts he owed to Walters with a portion of his earnings. Prior to Newman, these allegations alone would be sufficient to bring insider trading charges against Mickelson. However, in light of the heightened proof requirements under Newman, the allegations would not pass muster. Why? The government does not allege that Mickelson knew of any personal benefit Davis received from Walters in exchange for the inside information. Therefore, the government likely could not prove that Mickelson had knowledge that Walters and Davis received personal benefits in exchange for the material nonpublic information Walters provided to Mickelson. Without allegations to this effect, Mickelson could not be liable as a tippee for insider trading.

    When asked in a May 19, 2016, press conference if the Newman decision was a basis for why Mickelson was not charged, US Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, said “I will repeat what I’ve said many times: If the Newman decision stands, it has an impact on our investigations . . . . Conduct we think is nefarious, and that undermines faith in the markets and the fairness of the markets, will not be able to be prosecuted because of the Newman decision.”

    Before Newman, the definition of a “personal benefit” that a tipper received in exchange for the material nonpublic information could be something as ambiguous and seemingly insignificant from an economic perspective as a friendship with the tippee. Similarly, the tippee could be found liable for insider trading if the tippee knew, or should have known, about the breach of fiduciary duty by the tipper. Post-Newman, the government must prove that the tipper received a personal benefit that is akin to a quid pro quo, which is a much higher burden than showing, for example, a tip based merely on a favor to help a friend. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. The decision made it much harder to prosecute tippees as the government must prove that the tippee had actual knowledge that the insider disclosed material nonpublic information in exchange for a personal benefit. See id., at 450. Requiring proof of knowledge of this kind, however, becomes more difficult as tippees get more and more remote from the source of the confidential information. Applying this legal framework to the Mickelson situation clarifies the difficulties faced by the government and provides a potential explanation as to why he was not charged.

    So how did Mickelson get out of this situation without being charged with insider trading? The answer seems to be that the government likely did not have evidence that Mickelson knew of the personal benefit that his tipper received and the personal benefit that the tipper conferred on the insider, i.e. the quid pro quo between the tipper (Walters) and Davis of Dean Foods. Without that information, there was likely not enough evidence to charge Mickelson, and he was instead named as a relief defendant in an attempt to recover the profits he allegedly obtained from the insider information. One thing the government has shown in its recent activity involving insider trading is that if it had sufficient evidence to charge Mickelson, it likely would have. In this case, we have seen the highest-profile effect of the Newman decision: the frequency of prosecutions of tippees will likely decrease in the Second Circuit. Not only did Newman increase the facts that the government must prove, but it also discouraged charges against tippees—even in cases where the behavior and timing of trading activity indicates “nefarious” conduct by those tippees. The result of this case may look like special treatment to a celebrity, but it is more likely the product of the Newman decision scaling back prosecution of tippees, and refocusing insider trading charges on insiders like Davis, and their immediate tippees, like Walters. The SEC Complaint can be found in SEC v. Walters, et al., 16-cv-03722 (S.D.N.Y 2016).

    Authors

    Steven S. Scholes

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Are U.S. Millennial Men Just as Sexist as Their Dads?

    ARTICLE

    Are U.S. Millennial Men Just as Sexist as Their Dads?

    June 15, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrea Kramer co-authored this article, which reviewed a body of research showing that Millennial men typically do not see women as workplace equals. “This information raises a serious concern that unless something is done soon to change Millennial men’s attitudes toward women, these men ascending to the C-suite may hinder — rather than advance — current efforts to reduce the discriminatory effects of gender bias,” the authors wrote.

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  • FinCen Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami

    FinCen Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami

    ARTICLE

    FinCen Takes Aim at Real Estate Secrecy in Manhattan and Miami

    Spring/Summer 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Keith Pattiz and Gregg Fierman wrote this bylined article about new Treasury Department rules for reporting on all-cash, high-end real estate transactions in Manhattan, New York, and Miami-Dade County, Florida. Because the rules are intended to uncover money laundering or other fraudulent schemes, the authors wrote that for “law-abiding real estate purchasers, there should not be cause for concern regarding the new reporting requirement.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Gregg H. Fierman

    Partner

    Miami

    Keith M. Pattiz

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Letters to the Editor: Article on New York Qui Tam Lawsuits Missed the Point

    ARTICLE

    Letters to the Editor: Article on New York Qui Tam Lawsuits Missed the Point

    June 13, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Peter Faber wrote this letter to the editor criticizing an article that endorsed the role of False Claims Act whistleblowers in enforcing tax law. “Departments of revenue are perfectly capable of administering the tax laws and should have exclusive responsibility for doing so,” Mr. Faber wrote, urging states “not to allow individual vigilantes or the attorney general to get into the act.”

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  • Investigation and Sanctioning of Antitrust Infringements: The Long Arm of Competition Authorities

    ARTICLE

    Investigation and Sanctioning of Antitrust Infringements: The Long Arm of Competition Authorities

    June 13, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Louise Aberg and Jacques Buhart wrote this bylined article on the extraterritorial application of antitrust law and the issue of extradition for persons from countries where participating in a cartel is not a crime. “In the modern globalized world neither business nor crime are restricted by national borders, and it is clear that regulation of those areas must be similarly extraterritorial in order to be effective,” the authors wrote.

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  • Employer Steps for ACA Nondiscrimination Compliance

    ARTICLE

    Employer Steps for ACA Nondiscrimination Compliance

    June 13, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Amy Gordon, Susan Nash, Todd Solomon and Angela Stockbridge wrote this bylined article on new HHS regulations which provide explicit protections from discrimination on the basis of gender identity under the Affordable Care Act. Employers and other covered entities can be subject to investigation and civil litigation for violations, so the authors urged them to take “immediate action to ensure compliance” with the rule.

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    Todd A. Solomon

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • McDermott International Legal Highlights

    ARTICLE

    McDermott International Legal Highlights

    June 2016

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Using Telehealth to Accelerate Clinical Trials and Biomedical Discovery: Navigating

    Using Telehealth to Accelerate Clinical Trials and Biomedical Discovery: Navigating

    ARTICLE

    Using Telehealth to Accelerate Clinical Trials and Biomedical Discovery: Navigating

    June 9, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lisa Mazur, Bernadette Broccolo, Sarah Kitchell and Shelby Buettner wrote this bylined article on the impact of state and federal laws regarding telehealth use in clinical trials and biomedical discovery. “It will be more important than ever for the PI [principal investigator] and his/her research team, institutions, IRBs [institutional review boards], and sponsors to understand and develop strategies to comply with these legal and regulatory issues,” the authors wrote.

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    Authors

    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

    Sarah Kitchell

    Partner

    Boston

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