Content Type: Article

  • One Year Later: The Yates Memo, False Claims Act and Director & Executive Liability

    ARTICLE

    One Year Later: The Yates Memo, False Claims Act and Director & Executive Liability

    October 11, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Tony Maida and Rebecca Martin wrote in this bylined article that recent government settlements with corporate executives, and statements stressing individual accountability, support the so-called Yates Memo holding individuals responsible for illegal corporate conduct. Noting that lawyers have “watched for telltale signs of whether the Yates Memo is really changing the way federal enforcement does business,” the authors concluded, “that change may be here.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Ten Years of AGG – An Assessment

    ARTICLE

    Ten Years of AGG – An Assessment

    October 7, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Paul Melot de Beauregard wrote this bylined article assessing Germany’s General Equal Treatment Act (AGG) a decade after its passage. “Ten years later, a first interim balance can be drawn with regard to the sense and nonsense of the AGG as social reality,” he wrote. “It is clear that all must continue to live with the fact that protection against discrimination is at the top of the agenda for both the German and the European legislatures.”

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  • An Overview of the New Section 457(f) Regulations

    ARTICLE

    An Overview of the New Section 457(f) Regulations

    Autumn 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Ralph DeJong and Joseph Urwitz wrote this bylined article on the “long-awaited” proposed IRS regulations under Internal Revenue Code Section 457(f), which harmonize deferred compensation plans of tax-exempt organizations with similar arrangements under Section 409A By addressing severance pay, non-competes and vesting dates, the authors wrote, “After nine years, the proposed regulations [present] unexpected changes and opportunities.”

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  • Engaging Board and Corporate Leaders About New Avenues for Officer and Director Exposure Under the Stark Law and False Claims Act

    ARTICLE

    Engaging Board and Corporate Leaders About New Avenues for Officer and Director Exposure Under the Stark Law and False Claims Act

    October 6, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael Peregrine, Rebecca Martin and Tony Maida wrote this bylined article on how recent DoJ and OIG Stark Law and False Claims Act complaints and settlements targeting individual executives merit counseling for healthcare industry officers and directors on their exposure. “This message should not be presented in a ‘sky is falling’ perspective, but rather in a rational, contextual discussion of the possible risks,” the authors wrote.

    In depth
    Authors

    Tony Maida

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Rules That Reclassify Passive Basket Income as General Basket Income

    ARTICLE

    Rules That Reclassify Passive Basket Income as General Basket Income

    September/October 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article in which he examined the general and passive “income baskets” for calculating the foreign tax credit limitation and concluded that “an item of income that is passive income under the general definition of FPHCI [foreign personal holding company income] can be reclassified as general basket income.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Germany: The New Hub of Europe’s Real Estate Market

    ARTICLE

    Germany: The New Hub of Europe’s Real Estate Market

    Fall, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jens Ortmanns and Kian Tauser wrote this bylined article on the factors that make the German real estate market “an extremely attractive target for both domestic and foreign investors,” including developments regarding investment structures, transfer taxes, written form German lease agreements, and sustainability and green building trends.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Jens Ortmanns

    Partner

    Düsseldorf, Cologne

    Dr. Kian Tauser

    Partner

    Frankfurt

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  • Don’t Let Your Color Trade Dress Protection Fade Away

    ARTICLE

    Don’t Let Your Color Trade Dress Protection Fade Away

    October 5, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lynne Boisineau wrote this bylined article on a Tenth Circuit ruling that reaffirmed the availability of trade dress protection for inherently distinctive colors. “To show inherent distinctiveness of a color mark,” Ms. Boisineau wrote, “proprietors should try to link it to a unique pattern, shape or design” or show secondary meaning that the color mark “is recognized as a source of origin indicator,” such as through advertising.

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  • Modern Family Drafting and Planning

    ARTICLE

    Modern Family Drafting and Planning

    October 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Bobbi Bierhals wrote this bylined article for CLE training, in which she noted that “evolving social norms and new technological advances have challenged the traditional notions of family relationships.” Ms. Bierhals wrote that this development, as expressed in how such terms as marriage or spouse are defined, “can have a dramatic impact on an estate plan by defining terms more inclusively or restrictively in a will or a trust.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Bobbi J. Bierhals

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Managing the Transition to Transformation: Quality and Payment Reform: Who Is Asking for What and Why?

    Managing the Transition to Transformation: Quality and Payment Reform: Who Is Asking for What and Why?

    ARTICLE / MANAGING THE TRANSITION TO TRANSFORMATION

    Managing the Transition to Transformation: Quality and Payment Reform: Who Is Asking for What and Why?

    September 29, 2016

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    McDermott’s Managing the Transition to Transformation series is designed to help health systems and other health care industry leaders address the many challenges presented by the transformation in payment and care delivery models. The goal of this series is to help organizations prepare so that they are not only competitive, but can also thrive under alternative payment models (APMs) and quality-based reimbursement models (QBRs). This article discusses the key stakeholder groups and perspectives involved in quality and payment reform.

    In depth

    Linking payment for health care services to quality, value and outcomes rather than the mere provision of the services themselves has been a feature of health reform proposals in one form or another for decades. However, only now has the link been forged with an alliance of purpose among payors—federal health care programs, private insurers and consumers—and providers whose participation in such programs holds the promise of sharing in incentive programs designed to reward high quality over high volume.

    Federal Health Care Programs

    Over 55 million Americans are Medicare beneficiaries. National spending on Medicare grew 5.5 percent to $618.7 billion in 2014, while Medicaid spending grew 11 percent to $495.8 billion in the same time period. Health spending over the next ten years is projected to grow at an average rate of 5.8 percent per year, which will outpace the growth in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 1.3 percentage points. The costs for health care attributable to Medicare, Medicaid and other federal health care programs, and the volume of beneficiaries, have put these programs front and center in the shift to predicating payment on achieving quality and outcomes measures.

    The largest of the federal health care programs, Medicare has implemented and continues to pilot numerous quality-focused payment reform programs that move payment ever further from fee-for-service (FFS) models. Among those programs specifically targeting hospital payments, the Hospital Readmissions Reduction Program, the Hospital VBP (value-based purchasing) Program and the Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) Reduction Program are designed to improve the quality of care, promote improved clinical outcomes and enhance patient safety. The mechanism for improvement is essentially negative reinforcement, as each program functions to reduce reimbursement to hospitals that fail to meet certain performance and quality metrics and reporting requirements. As these programs have been rolled out more fully, hospitals have debated whether they adequately factor in regional differences and variability in patient populations, the impact of which are said to unfairly penalize hospitals, or if the metrics at issue adequately measure quality. While there may eventually be modifications to the programs to account for such factors, the trend in linking reimbursement to achieving quality and clinical outcomes goals is anticipated to grow.

    In addition to programs targeted at hospitals, the link between quality and payment is also being forged in relation to physician payments. The Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) legislation will repeal the Sustainable Growth Rate that directly impacts physician payments and instead link physician payments to quality and value for services, rather than volume of services provided. MACRA will also consolidate existing value-based payment initiatives, including the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) into a single program called the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). MIPS is designed to factor elements like quality of care, improvements in clinical care and use of resources into the payment formula.

    Likewise, in the post-acute care space, the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 endeavors to improve care for Medicare beneficiaries through the implementation of quality metrics and resource utilization tracking by post-acute care providers, bringing these quality-based principles to the continuum of care.

    Private Insurers

    Private insurers have also forged ahead with efforts to tie quality to payment. While risk-based contracts are still less common, some of the largest companies have formed working groups and task forces with regional health care systems to help plan for the insurance companies to meet with goal of shifting 75 percent of their business by 2020 to contract types that incentivize providers to meet quality and cost metrics. Private insurers have also increased efforts to partner with health care systems and hospitals to coordinate care with the aim of delivering higher quality at lower costs. For example, private insurers have worked with health systems to develop programs to more fully engage patients with chronic conditions or complex diagnoses in their health care, allowing physicians and other health care providers to more closely monitor treatment, help them manage their condition and prevent further complications. Such programs bring together the interests—and can yield positive results—for private insurers, providers and patients.

    The cumulative effect of these actions by federal health care programs and private insurers is that almost all providers will be subject to, and need to keep pace with, the varying demands of such programs in addition to the burden of existing regulatory requirements.

    Patients/Consumers

    Patients have historically been the most forgotten part of the health care equation. Indeed, they are not referred to as consumers as they are in other industries; rather, health care is something that happens to patients. However, there has been a growing trend over the past several years to make patients the focus of the health care encounter. Patient-centered care is one of the primary goals of CMS and, when it passed MACRA, CMS explained that it created both the Alternative Payment Model (APM) requirement and MIPS to drive patient-centered healthcare and continue the development of patient engagement as a fundamental component of health care.

    Patients have long desired greater transparency in health care settings. Imagine walking into a store, being told that a particular item is what you must take, and then leaving the store with the clerk saying, ‘We will figure out what that costs for you in particular and bill you later.’ This is precisely what happens any time a patient without a fixed co-pay insurance product (as more and more Americans are opting for) visits a hospital in the fee-for-service model. Unlike other industries, patients rarely know what they will pay for services until after they have received them. Given the immediacy with which a consumer can price almost any product or service, it is critical that the medical industry begin viewing patients as consumers and treating them accordingly.

    In addition to transparency on costs, patients would of course like the actual costs to be lower. In 2016, the health care costs for an average American family of four covered by an employer sponsored preferred provider plan rings up at $25,826, triple what it cost in 2001 according to the Milliman Medical Index.

    From a patient perspective, payment reform tied to quality metrics would link lower costs with higher quality services and better outcomes, giving patients more of a voice and ability to act like consumers in any other industry segment.

    Physicians/Providers

    The shift from a fee-for-service model to a quality- and value-based model is being driven by forces far beyond the control of the average physician. Physicians appear to be caught in the machinations of this shift and are seemingly unprepared for the vast impact that MACRA will have on them. Indeed, a recent national survey of 523 primary care and specialty physicians found the following:

    • Fifty (50) percent of surveyed physicians have never heard of MACRA and 32 percent recognize it by name but are not familiar with its requirements;
    • Eight-in-ten of surveyed physicians say they prefer traditional FFS or salary-based compensation as opposed to value-based payment models, some of which qualify under MACRA’s APM track; and
    • Seventy-four (74) percent of surveyed physicians believe that performance reporting is burdensome and 79 percent do not support tying compensation to quality, both requirements under MACRA.

    Despite the preferences of physicians, MACRA will directly affect how CMS pays physicians for services provided to Medicare beneficiaries by substantially linking such payments to performance metrics and incentivizing physicians to reduce hospital utilization and to participate in alternative payment models that bear substantial financial risk. MACRA will undoubtedly create incentives that reshape how physician services are provided, including encouraging physicians to consolidate into larger groups, entering into arrangements with physician specialty management companies, or, most likely, becoming employed by or otherwise contractually aligned with health systems in order to have access to the information technology and other care management infrastructure that they will need to achieve the MACRA metrics.

    The key question to consider is whether physicians will ultimately prefer the new system to the fee-for-service model. Under the fee-for service model, physicians are constantly overtaxed and have limited time to spend with each patient. Indeed, 40 percent of patients feel rushed during their actual visit with the average office visit lasting only twelve minutes. Much of the allure of practicing medicine probably quickly dissipated for most new doctors upon graduation once they realized the sheer volume of patients they would need to see on a daily basis.

    Part of the promise of MACRA is that both physicians and patients will receive a benefit. Ideally, physicians will get a significant benefit by being able to practice medicine in the thoughtful way they originally sought to, with the quality of their work determining their pay instead of the sheer number of patients seen. From the patient perspective, if MACRA is properly implemented, it can promote more flexible care that is tailored to the needs of patients.

    Conclusion

    Federal health care programs and legislative changes are leading the paradigm shift toward quality-focused payment reform. By tying payments to quality metrics, federal health care programs (through legislation such as MACRA), aim to create the necessary incentives to realize their goal of making patient-centered care the new standard in the health industry. Involvement of and collaboration by private insurers, physicians and consumers will continue, and together these constituencies will help further the transition to transformation of health care.

    Authors

    Sandra M. DiVarco

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Third Circuit Blocks Hospital Merger in Key Victory for FTC on Geographic Market Definition

    Third Circuit Blocks Hospital Merger in Key Victory for FTC on Geographic Market Definition

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Third Circuit Blocks Hospital Merger in Key Victory for FTC on Geographic Market Definition

    September 28, 2016

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On September 27, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit handed an important victory to the Federal Trade Commission and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a closely watched hospital merger case. The decision provides clear guidance on the appropriate tests for determining geographic markets in hospital merger cases, while also suggesting that efficiencies claimed in many hospital transactions may face increased scrutiny in future cases.

    In depth

    On September 27, 2016, the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit handed an important victory to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in a closely watched hospital merger case involving two Harrisburg-area health systems: Penn State Hershey Medical Center (Hershey) and PinnacleHealth System (Pinnacle). Earlier in 2016, the US District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the FTC’s motion to enjoin the proposed merger pending conclusion of an administrative proceeding. The lower court held that the agency failed to define a relevant geographic market and thus could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as required for the grant of an injunction.

    The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court erred in both the formulation and the application of the proper legal test to determine the relevant geographic market. The court’s decision was based on its conclusion that geographic markets in hospital merger cases are to be defined based principally on evidence from payors, and that payors had made clear that Hershey and Pinnacle needed to remain separate to ensure competitive bidding for payor contracts. The court further found that the government met its burden for a preliminary injunction and that the defenses advanced by the merging parties were inadequate to overcome the presumption that the merger would be anticompetitive. The decision provides clear guidance on the appropriate tests for determining the geographic markets in hospital mergers, while also suggesting that efficiencies claimed in many hospital transactions may face increased scrutiny in future cases.

    Background

    Hershey and Pinnacle (collectively, the Hospitals) both operate in the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, area. Hershey, located in the town of the same name, is an academic medical center that offers basic care but also provides more advanced, specialized services. Pinnacle is a three-campus health system, with two facilities located in Harrisburg and a third in Mechanicsburg. It provides primary and secondary services and a limited range of more complex services. The two systems notified the FTC of their proposed merger in April 2015.

    Following an eight-month investigation, the FTC filed an administrative complaint alleging that the proposed merger would substantially lessen competition for general acute care services sold to commercial insurers in a four-county area surrounding Harrisburg (the Harrisburg Area). Together with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the agency subsequently filed suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania seeking a preliminary injunction pending the resolution of the FTC’s administrative proceeding.

    Following five days of hearings, the district court concluded that the government failed to properly define the relevant geographic market. Instead of focusing, as the government did, on the location of hospitals to which commercial health plans turn to create their provider networks, the district court emphasized the substantial in-migration of patients from counties outside the Harrisburg Area. Given this broad patient draw area and the district court’s view that patients in rural central Pennsylvania will typically travel significant distances for services, the court concluded that the government’s proposed geographic market was too small and unreasonably excluded important competitors.

    Although this failure to define a relevant geographic market was itself fatal to the government’s motion, the district court also opined on several other arguments raised by the parties. First, the court described long-term contracts with two key insurers as “extremely compelling” evidence of the merger’s potential effects on competition. The district court stated it “simply [could not] be blind to this reality when considering the import of the hypothetical monopolist test advanced by the Merger Guidelines.” Second, the district court found that repositioning by other health systems would constrain the merging health systems. Finally, the district court credited various efficiencies claimed by the merging parties, including capital savings from a planned bed tower that would no longer be needed and an improved ability to engage in risk-based contracting.

    After the district court denied the government’s motion for a preliminary junction, the government timely appealed to the Third Circuit.

    Analysis

    Three Flaws in the District Court’s Geographic Market Analysis

    The Third Circuit soundly rejected the district court’s geographic market analysis. Noting that the definition of the relevant geographic market is an essential prerequisite of any merger analysis, the Third Circuit observed that one common method—and the standard agreed upon by the district court, government and Hospitals—used to define geographic markets is the hypothetical monopolist test, as described in the Merger Guidelines. Under this test, if a hypothetical monopolist could impose a small but significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) in the proposed market, then the market is properly defined. Although the district court properly identified this test, the Third Circuit concluded that the lower court erred in both its formulation and its application of the test. Reasoning that a district court commits legal error where it applies an incomplete economic analysis or an erroneous economic theory to the facts that constitute the relevant geographic market, the Third Circuit reviewed the district court’s analysis de novo.

    The court identified three distinct errors in the district court’s analysis. First, the district court failed to formulate the hypothetical monopolist test correctly. According to the district court, the key analysis was to delineate the geographic area where “few patients leave . . . and few patients enter.” This attention to patient flows explains the emphasis in the district court’s decision on the substantial in-migration to Hershey from counties outside the Harrisburg Area. However, as the Third Circuit held, this focus was “inconsistent with the hypothetical monopolist test. Rather it [was] one half of a different test utilized in non-healthcare markets to define the relevant geographic market: the Elzinga-Hogarty test.” While the court acknowledged that many courts formerly used this test, subsequent empirical research had discredited the test for determining geographic markets in the hospital sector. The court also noted that even if patient flow data were consistent with the hypothetical monopolist test, the district court did not consider patient outflow data. Undisputed evidence presented by the government showed that 91 percent of Harrisburg residents receive general acute care services in the Harrisburg Area.

    Second, the district court ignored the “commercial realities” of the health care market when it focused on patient, rather than insurer, reactions to a SSNIP. Acknowledging the views of the FTC and other courts, the Third Circuit agreed that health care markets are characterized by a two-stage model of competition. First, hospitals compete to be included in a health insurer’s provider network; second, in-network providers compete to attract members of an insurer’s plans. The court found that insured patients are relatively insensitive to price fluctuations in contracts between hospitals and insurers, and cited the Hospitals’ own study showing that only 2 percent of respondents considered out-of-pocket costs in choosing a hospital. As a result, the Third Circuit found that an analysis of the effect of the SSNIP must ordinarily focus on health insurers. While the court cautioned that analysis of patient reactions may be appropriate in some circumstances, it held that the district court erred in completely disregarding the role that insurers play in the health care market.

    Finally, the district court erred by basing part of its analysis of the relevant geographic market on the long-term contracts (at pre-merger prices) that the Hospitals entered into with health insurers. The Third Circuit clarified that the relevant test is not “‘the contractual constraints binding a particular plaintiff,’ but . . . whether a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a SSNIP.” The court held the Hospitals’ long-term agreements with insurers “have no place in the relevant geographic market analysis.” The Third Circuit also rejected the district court’s reluctance to make predictions about potential future anticompetitive effects, saying that this is “exactly what we are asked to do.”

    Assessing the Government’s Likelihood of Success on the Merits

    After rejecting the district court’s analysis, the Third Circuit examined whether the government met its burden to define a relevant geographic market. The court credited extensive testimony by insurers that they could not market health plans in the Harrisburg Area that did not include at least one of the merging hospitals, and that they do not consider hospitals in neighboring counties to be suitable alternatives to Harrisburg-area hospitals. The court also highlighted a natural experiment involving an insurer that unsuccessfully marketed a network that excluded the merging hospitals. Based on this evidence, the court concluded that the government had demonstrated that a hypothetical monopolist could profitably impose a SSNIP in the Harrisburg Area and that the government had properly defined a relevant geographic market. Within this geographic market, the court found a high level of market concentration, resulting in a presumption of anticompetitive effects.

    The court also rejected the Hospitals’ argument that payors have sufficient bargaining leverage to defeat a SSNIP because payors can threaten to exclude the Hospitals from their networks. The court argued that whatever leverage the payors have after the merger, they have now, and that the relevant inquiry is whether the merger will cause a significant increase in the Hospitals’ bargaining leverage such that they could profitably impose a SSNIP.

    The court next considered whether the Hospitals could rebut this presumption by refuting the existence of anticompetitive effects or demonstrating that any such effects would be offset by extraordinary efficiencies.

    The court’s assessment of anticompetitive effects focused on alleged repositioning by competitors. Although the court acknowledged that repositioning within the Harrisburg Area lessened some of the concern posed by the proposed merger, it ultimately held that this would not constrain post-merger pricing. Health insurer testimony concerning the viability of networks that excluded the Hospitals was critical in this analysis.

    With respect to alleged efficiencies enabled by the proposed merger, the court expressed substantial skepticism about the very availability of an efficiencies defense. The court nevertheless acknowledged that the Merger Guidelines and other courts of appeal have held that the defense is cognizable. Without taking a position on the availability of the defense, the court concluded that the Hospitals failed to present efficiencies that meet the requirements articulated in the Merger Guidelines.

    The Hospitals claimed that the merger enabled them to avoid the expense associated with construction of a 100-bed tower necessary to alleviate capacity constraints. The court agreed that capital savings may play a role in an efficiencies defense but commented that they must “be verifiable and must not result in any anticompetitive reduction in output.” On this measure, the claimed efficiency failed. The court found that Hershey’s own efficiencies analysis showed it required only 13 additional beds to address capacity constraints. Perhaps more importantly, the court found that the ability to forego building the new tower was a reduction in output. Citing the Merger Guidelines, the court found that the FTC will not consider efficiencies that arise from anticompetitive reductions in output or service.

    The Hospitals also claimed that the merger would enhance their risk-based contracting efforts. The Third Circuit also rejected this efficiency. First, it noted that the district court concluded that each system was already capable of engaging in risk contracting and therefore the efficiency was not merger-specific. Second, the Third Circuit found that, even if the merger enhanced the Hospitals’ ability to engage in risk-based contracting, they still had to “demonstrate that such a benefit would ultimately be passed on to consumers. It is not clear from the record how this would be so beyond the mere assertion that it would save the hospitals money and such savings would be passed on to consumers.”

    Key Takeaways

    This decision is a very strong win for the FTC. The Third Circuit largely adopted the agency’s analytical methods and arguments. Moreover, the decision underlines the importance of market definition and market concentration in litigated merger cases. Once the Third Circuit ruled that the geographic market was much narrower than that suggested by the district court, the Hospitals faced a presumption that their proposed transaction was anticompetitive based on market concentration statistics, and they were unable to rebut this presumption.

    The Third Circuit’s opinion offers obvious guidance on geographic market definition in the health care setting. The clarity is significant given the uptick in agency enforcement activity in recent years. In two prior hospital merger cases litigated by the FTC, geographic market definition was uncontested. Yet some recent cases also saw the adoption and elaboration of the agency’s two-tier model of competition, with its emphasis on the importance of health insurers as the “purchasers” of general acute care services. While the Third Circuit emphasized that, in the health care context, considering the effects of price increases on patients may be appropriate, the decision provides very clear guidance on the importance of focusing first on the role of health insurers.

    Between announcement of the merger and the litigation, the Hospitals concluded long-term agreements with key payors that restricted the merged system’s ability to engage in anticompetitive practices. While the Third Circuit chastised the district court for weighing the effect of these contracts in its assessment of the relevant geographic market, it offered no guidance as to whether such agreements may mitigate the potential anticompetitive effects of a proposed merger. Health systems pursuing mergers in the future will likely continue to examine contracting options with payors that address upfront potential allegations by the FTC or others that their transaction will lead to anticompetitive effects.

    The Third Circuit’s decision may also present challenges for efficiencies defenses in the future. Capital avoidance efficiencies, such as the Hershey bed tower, are common in many health care mergers, but the court’s approach may encourage other courts to view decisions to avoid new construction as an output reduction rather than an efficiency. Similarly, health systems that wish to argue that a merger enhances their ability to engage in risk-based contracting likely will need to demonstrate concrete consumer benefits in order to gain credit for such efficiencies.

    Authors

    Ashley M. Fischer

    Partner

    Chicago

    Daniel Powers

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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