Content Type: Article

  • Avoiding Pitfalls – What an Early-Stage Life Science Startup CEO Needs to Know

    ARTICLE

    Avoiding Pitfalls – What an Early-Stage Life Science Startup CEO Needs to Know

    January 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Albert Sokol co-authored this paper presented in San Francisco at the January 2017 RESI Conference (and subsequently at the Bioequity conference in Paris later that year). Rather than treating startup issues as an academic topic, Mr. Sokol distilled practical advice into useful take-aways for company executives to use in real-world situations.

    In depth
    Authors

    Albert Sokol

    Counsel

    Boston

    More insights

  • Government Appeal of Alta Wind Supports Decision to File Suit Now

    Government Appeal of Alta Wind Supports Decision to File Suit Now

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Government Appeal of Alta Wind Supports Decision to File Suit Now

    January 30, 2017

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Several taxpayers have sued the federal government because they believe they were underpaid under the Section 1603 grant program. Indeed, the taxpayer in the Alta Wind case was successful in convincing the court that the government had inappropriately reduced the amount of its 1603 grant by approximately $200 million. We have been following these cases, and believe that the grant applicants have strong arguments in their favor. As expected, right before the New Year, the government appealed the Alta Wind case, asking the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to overturn that decision.

    In depth

    As you may know, several taxpayers have sued the federal government because they believe they were underpaid under the Section 1603 grant program. Indeed, the taxpayer in the Alta Wind case was successful in convincing the court that the government had inappropriately reduced the amount of its 1603 grant by approximately $200 million. For more information about the Alta Wind case, see our previous On the Subject, “Act Now to Preserve Your Section 1603 Grant.” We have been following these cases, and believe that the grant applicants have strong arguments in their favor. As expected, right before the New Year, the US government appealed the Alta Wind case, asking the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to overturn that decision.

    Taxpayers with the same or similar legal issue need to make a decision of what to do. We strongly recommend that you file your case immediately against the government seeking redress for the inappropriate reduction in the amount of the 1603 grant that the government paid to you. If you file suit, we expect the court will stay your case pending the outcome of the Alta Wind appeal. Nevertheless, we believe that this is the best course of action for the reasons outlined below:

    • First, filing suit now will toll the statute of limitations on your claims. Every case must be filed within the statute of limitations. If you do not file your suit within the statute of limitations, you will not be permitted to file suit in the future. Appeals can take years to resolve. If you wait until the court rules on the Alta Wind appeal you risk losing your claim because the statute of limitations may have expired by the time that case is fully decided. Filing your claim now will stop the limitations period from running, preserving your ability to have your claims heard by the court.
    • Second, we expect that the appeals court will affirm the taxpayer’s win in Alta Wind. If you have a pending case in court when that occurs, you will be in a better position than those taxpayers who wait to file suit because the government will have to address your case immediately after the appeal is decided and the stay is lifted. Moreover, filing suit and “getting in line” early will be especially important if the government tries to settle the claims against it because you will be able to argue that you should be entitled to a greater percentage of your claim than if you had filed after the appellate court rules against the government.
    • Lastly, filing suit now will increase your ability to withstand any attempts by the US Department of the Treasury to retroactively change the 1603 grant program. The new administration has taken over, and it is possible that it could implement rules for the Section 1603 grant program that are harmful to your claim and try to implement them retroactively. That is an issue that would have to be litigated, but your argument would be easier to make if you have a pending case at the time the rules are implemented.

    We estimate that the cost of filing your suit will be very low, but the benefits can be very important to positioning yourself for the best possible outcome.

    Additionally, we would encourage you to join forces with other taxpayers that have the same or similar issue, and file an amicus (“friend of the court”) brief in the pending Alta Wind appeals case. We are in the process of assembling a coalition of taxpayers to file an amicus brief. The amicus brief would, of course, be in support of the taxpayer’s case and legal theory, which could also improve your case in court.

    Please contact us if you would like to discuss this matter further.

    Authors

    Joshua David Rogaczewski

    Partner & Deputy General Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Philip Tingle

    Partner

    Miami

    More insights

  • National Taxpayer Advocate 2016 Report – Penalties

    ARTICLE

    National Taxpayer Advocate 2016 Report – Penalties

    January 26, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Laura Gavioli wrote this bylined article assessing a 2016 report by the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS) regarding when the IRS chooses to assert penalties —one of the most policy-driven decisions that agency can make. Ms. Gavioli wrote how the TAS made a number of important observations and recommendations related to three of the most commonly asserted types of penalties—accuracy-related penalties, failure-to-file and failure-to-pay penalties, and the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Communications That Are Consistent with FDA-Required Labeling

    FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Communications That Are Consistent with FDA-Required Labeling

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FDA Issues Draft Guidance on Communications That Are Consistent with FDA-Required Labeling

    January 26, 2017

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This On the Subject reviews the US Food and Drug Administration’s recently released draft guidance on promotional materials and communications that are consistent with FDA-required labeling. The guidance provides a three-factor test for determining if communications about information not contained in the FDA-required labeling are consistent with FDA-required labeling; explains what evidentiary support companies must include in their communications so that they are not false or misleading; and provides recommendations on how to develop communications that would comply with the draft guidance so as not to mislead the recipients of the communications. Though the draft guidance provides many examples of communications that would meet its recommendations, FDA encourages firms to seek a legal, regulatory and medical review by qualified personnel before disseminating such communications.

    In depth

    In the waning days of the Obama administration, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) released a draft guidance on promotional materials entitled Medical Product Communications that are Consistent with the FDA-Required Labeling – Questions and Answers. The guidance is narrowly tailored and limited to communications about approved or cleared uses of a drug, biological product or device that are consistent with, but are not included in, FDA-required labeling. The agency defines “FDA-required labeling” as either: labeling that FDA has reviewed and approved or, if a product is not subject to premarket approval, labeling that provides adequate directions for use and other information required to appear in the labeling. As a result, the guidance does not address the types of off-label communications discussed in Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. US FDA— truthful and non-misleading promotion of an approved or cleared medical product for an unapproved use.

    The guidance explains how manufacturers, packers, distributors and their representatives may communicate information in promotional materials and data about approved or cleared uses that are not included in FDA-required labeling. The guidance sets forth a three-factor test that FDA will use to determine if a drug, biological product or device firm is communicating information about its product consistent with FDA-required labeling. The factors are summarized as follows:

    • Does the communication provide information that differs from, or is in conflict with, the information about the conditions of use in the FDA-required labeling (i.e., a different indication or patient population or conflicting handling directions, dosage or strength)?
    • Will the information in the communication increase the potential for harm to health, when compared to the information in the FDA-required labeling?
    • Do the directions for use in the FDA-required labeling enable the product to be safely and effectively used under the conditions discussed in the communication?

    The agency will apply the three-factor test to evaluate express and implied claims in product communications and make a fact-specific determination as to whether a communication is consistent with FDA-required labeling.

    The guidance emphasizes that communicating information in a manner consistent with the FDA-required labeling is not enough to avoid enforcement action. Firms also must ensure their communications do not provide false or misleading information that would misbrand the product. For example, a true statement may be misleading if the communication as a whole omits material facts or obscures relevant contextual information regarding the statement. FDA will review communications to determine if they provide “scientifically appropriate and statistically sound” evidentiary support for any representations or suggestions in the communication. Firms must reveal material facts and risk information in such communications, base representations on facts and science, and provide appropriate context. FDA notes, however, that the agency will not determine that a communication is false or misleading based solely on the communication’s failure to provide information that would meet FDA’s evidentiary standards for clearance or approval, since the agency has already approved or cleared the product based on evidence provided in the premarket review or device classification process.

    The guidance clarifies that if a communication with information not included in FDA-required labeling is consistent with FDA-required labeling, the agency will not rely on the communication alone as evidence of a new intended use. FDA indirectly regulates the content of communications through the agency’s intended use regulations. For example, FDA may examine a tweet, press release or statement made by, or on behalf of a manufacturer to determine the intended use of a product. The guidance also states that a communication that is consistent with FDA-required labeling will not be viewed as failing to comply with the statutory requirement that the product’s labeling contain adequate directions for use.

    FDA recommends that firms have qualified legal, medical and regulatory personnel review their promotional materials prior to dissemination. The guidance also provides three recommendations on how firms may develop non-misleading communications that are consistent with FDA-required labeling:

    • Communications should accurately depict study results, data and information (i.e., disclose material aspects of study design, methodology and material limitations related to the design, methodology and results).
    • The communication should disclose unfavorable or inconsistent findings, so relevant information is presented in context and accurately characterized.
    • The communication should include data from the FDA-required labeling, if the FDA-required labeling is related to the data discussed in the communication, so as to provide appropriate context.

    The guidance is notable for the types of promotional communications it did not address. FDA declined to tackle off-label communications regarding information that is not consistent with FDA-required labeling, such as the treatment of a different disease or different strengths, dosages, or routes of administration. Firms interested in making such communications should refer to existing draft and final guidance documents on off-label promotion and risk information: FDA’s draft guidance on responding to unsolicited requests for off-label information about prescription drugs and medical devices; the agency’s final guidance on good reprint practices for disseminating publications on unapproved new uses of approved or cleared products; and a draft guidance on distributing publications on risk information for approved drugs and biological products.

    Drug, biological product and device manufacturers, packers, distributors and their representatives should consider submitting comments on the draft guidance by the date listed in the Federal Register notice of availability announcing the guidance—April 19, 2017.

    Authors

    Michael W. Ryan

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • President Trump and the Affordable Care Act: What Happens Now?

    President Trump and the Affordable Care Act: What Happens Now?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    President Trump and the Affordable Care Act: What Happens Now?

    January 25, 2017

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Hours after being sworn in as the 45th president of the United States, President Donald Trump signed an executive order directing the various heads of governmental agencies to ease the financial burden of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”).

    Specifically, the order directs these agencies to “exercise all authority and discretion available to them to waive, defer, grant exemptions from, or delay the implementation of any provision or requirement of the [Affordable Care] Act that would impose a fiscal burden on any State or a cost, fee, tax, penalty or regulatory burden on individuals, families, healthcare providers, health insurers, patients, recipients of healthcare services, purchasers of health insurance, or makers of medical devices, products or medications.”

    The executive order certainly sends a strong message that President Trump intends to make good on his campaign promise to repeal and replace the ACA. However, the order itself, at least for the near future, has little effect on much of the law’s impact. This is because the majority of the ACA’s market reforms, including the popular ban on pre-existing condition exclusions and the extension of coverage to dependent children up to age 26, are codified in statutes and regulations, which cannot be undone by a mere executive order. Congressional approval is necessary to repeal the law’s market reforms.

    What can happen now, with the president’s blessing, is that the agencies responsible for administering the ACA, including the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), can exercise broader latitude when enforcing some of the law’s fiscal provisions, most notably the individual mandate. For example, HHS could broaden the categories of individuals who qualify for hardship exemptions from the individual mandate, which would allow more people to remain uninsured without paying a penalty.

    The president’s executive order comes on the heels of the new Senate approving a bill intended to begin the repeal process. In a 51-48 vote, the Senate approved a budget reconciliation bill, which is legislation pertaining to revenue and the budget and, under Congressional procedural rules, is filibuster-proof. The Senate started with a reconciliation bill because Republicans do not hold enough Congressional seats to have a supermajority in the Senate. Without a supermajority, Senate Democrats could filibuster the Republicans’ attempt(s) to outright repeal the law. The Senate’s reconciliation bill effectively nullifies the revenue-related provisions of the ACA (e.g., tax subsidies for certain low-income individuals who purchase insurance through the Exchanges) without repealing the ACA’s market reforms (e.g., the prohibition on pre-existing condition exclusions).

    So what does this all mean for the future of the ACA, and the employers and other plan sponsors who have spent the last six years implementing its provisions?

    For starters, and most importantly, the executive order specifically states that its directives can be carried out only “to the maximum extent permitted by law.” This means that everyone — government agencies, plans, plan sponsors, employers and health insurers — must continue to comply with the ACA’s provisions until new regulations or other regulatory guidance is issued. This also means that the health plans and policies that are currently in effect will likely remain unchanged, at least for the current plan year.

    Second, the executive order directs governmental agencies to stop issuing regulations under the ACA and freeze any pending regulations. This means that unregulated sections of the law, including the extension of nondiscrimination rules to fully insured health plans and the Cadillac Tax, remain dormant, potentially indefinitely.

    But what choices will employers and plan sponsors face if the ACA is repealed?

    Depending on the replacement legislation (if any), the answer may depend on whether an employer sponsors a fully insured or self-insured plan. Employers that sponsor fully insured plans likely will first need to look to their state insurance laws to see what changes can be made, if any. For example, in New York, many of the ACA’s market reforms have been codified in the New York State Insurance Law and Public Health Law. And health insurers in states that have not codified the ACA’s market reforms had to approve policies that already incorporated these provisions. If states are granted the discretion to choose what market reforms are mandatory for policies issued under their laws, it is possible that employers that sponsor fully insured plans in states like New York may continue to be required to offer the benefits first required under the ACA.

    Employers that sponsor self-insured plans, which are not subject to state insurance laws, may have more discretion with respect to their plan design.

    Regardless of the kind of plan an employer sponsors, all employers will need to consider their plan design options not only in light of what is required or permissible under federal and state law, but also from an employee hiring and retention perspective. Many employers may choose to retain the plan provisions originally required by the ACA, even if these provisions are no longer required by federal or state law, simply because they benefit their employees and are now considered “market” within their industries.

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ian L. Levin and Melissa J. Sandak.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, or if you would like assistance with questions as to how the ACA or Trump’s proposed legislation affects your plans, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Second Circuit Reverses District Court in Marblegate, Making It Easier to Restructure Bonds Outside of a Chapter 11 Case

    Second Circuit Reverses District Court in Marblegate, Making It Easier to Restructure Bonds Outside of a Chapter 11 Case

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Reverses District Court in Marblegate, Making It Easier to Restructure Bonds Outside of a Chapter 11 Case

    January 25, 2017

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Jan. 17, 2017, in a closely watched dispute surrounding Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated decision in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp. (the “Decision”).[1] In a 2-1 ruling reversing the District Court,[2] the Court of Appeals construed Section 316(b) narrowly, holding that it only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and does not protect noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[3]

    In the ruling, the Second Circuit considered the issue arising in the recent Southern District of New York District Court decisions in Marblegate and two cases relating to Caesars Entertainment (“BOKF/MeenhanCombs”)[4] as to when an out-of-court debt restructuring may violate Section 316(b) of the TIA. Some, but not all, of the cases before and after them that have dealt with the issue have treated Section 316(b) as providing a narrow and specific protection for noteholders: requiring noteholder unanimity to alter the legal right to repayment under the terms of an indenture and the right to sue to enforce that right, but not protecting the practical right to receive payment.

    The Marblegate and BOKF/MeenhanCombs District Court decisions, however, construed Section 316(b) as a broad protection of noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment. The potential implications of those decisions were not insignificant — under those holdings, any out-of-court restructuring that deprived dissenting noteholders of assets against which to recover could violate Section 316(b), even absent any formal amendments to the indenture’s payment terms. According to counsel for EDMC and its secured creditors, more noteholder actions for Section 316(b) violations were filed in the wake of the District Court decision in Marblegate than in the preceding 70 years since the enactment of the TIA, despite a significant decrease in the number of out-of-court restructurings.

    The Second Circuit in Marblegate rejected the District Court’s broad reading of Section 316(b), construing it as prohibiting only the actual amendment of an indenture’s payment terms or right to sue for payment.

    What Happened in Marblegate

    Marblegate involved a dispute between Education Management Corp., a for-profit education company, and its affiliates (“EDMC”), and one of its noteholders, Marblegate Asset Management LLC (“Marblegate”), regarding an out-of-court restructuring designed to incentivize all of EDMC’s creditors to accept an exchange offer by the company.

    The transaction contemplated two scenarios: (i) if all noteholders consented to the proposed restructuring, then the notes would be converted into equity of the issuer’s parent guarantor; however, (ii) if there were any dissenting noteholders, then there would be an alternative transaction under which the secured lenders would foreclose on substantially all of EDMC’s assets and release the EDMC parent guarantee of the notes. Although the transaction did not formally amend the actual terms of the unsecured notes, it was structured to ensure that dissenting noteholders would be left only with claims against a subsidiary with no assets.[5] Marblegate, the sole dissenting noteholder, sued to enjoin the restructuring transaction on the ground that it violated TIA Section 316(b).

    The District Court Proceedings: Marblegate I and II

    The core issue in Marblegate was whether the “right … to receive payment” is to be read narrowly, as a legal entitlement to demand payment, or broadly, as a substantive right to actually obtain such payment.

    EDMC argued the former — that Section 316(b) only prohibits nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms, and that the transaction was outside the purview of Section 316(b) because it did not amend any terms of the indentures. Marblegate, on the other hand, argued the latter — that Section 316(b) should be broadly construed as a protection against any impairment to a noteholder’s practical ability to receive payment, even absent any formal amendments to the indenture’s payment terms. According to Marblegate, the transaction violated Section 316(b), since it stripped the issuers of their assets and removed the parent guarantee, effectively preventing payments to the dissenting noteholders.

    The District Court adopted Marblegate’s broader reading and construed Section 316(b) as a broad protection of noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment.[6] In the District Court’s view, Section 316(b) may be violated whenever a transaction “effect[s] an involuntary debt restructuring” — even where the payment terms of an indenture are not explicitly amended by the transaction.[7] Because the transaction at issue, while not directly amending the indenture’s payment terms, impaired dissenting noteholders’ ability to be repaid, the District Court held that it violated Section 316(b). Although it so held, the District Court denied the preliminary injunction sought by Marblegate because it concluded there was no irreparable harm.

    Thereafter, EDMC proceeded with the restructuring, but refrained from releasing the parent guarantees of Marblegate’s notes, in light of the Marblegate I decision. Instead, EDMC filed a counterclaim, seeking a declaration that the parent guarantees of Marblegate’s notes could be released without violating Section 316(b). The District Court rejected EDMC’s claims and, abiding by its earlier decision in Marblegate I, permanently enjoined EDMC from releasing the parent guarantees.[8] EDMC appealed the judgment.

    The Second Circuit Decision

    In a decision written by Judge Raymond Lohier Jr., in which Judge José Cabranes joined, the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court’s judgment, rejecting the District Court’s broad reading of Section 316(b). The Court adopted a narrow reading of Section 316(b), holding that Section 316(b) only prohibits “non-consensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms” and not the practical ability to receive payment.[9] As such, the Court concluded that the transaction at issue, which “did not amend any terms of the Indenture” or “prevent any dissenting bondholders from initiating suit to collect payments due on the dates specified by the Indenture,” did not violate Section 316(b).[10]

    The Court began by reviewing the language of Section 316(b), which is entitled “Prohibition of impairment of holder’s right to payment” and provides as follows:

    Notwithstanding any other provision of the indenture to be qualified, the right of any holder of any indenture security to receive payment of the principal of and interest on such indenture security, on or after the respective due dates expressed in such indenture security, or to institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment on or after such respective dates, shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder, except as to a postponement of an interest payment consented to as provided in paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of this section, and except that such indenture may contain provisions limiting or denying the right of any such holder to institute any such suit, if and to the extent that the institution or prosecution thereof or the entry of judgment therein would, under applicable law, result in the surrender, impairment, waiver, or loss of the lien of such indenture upon any property subject to such lien.

    15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (emphasis added). Focusing on the terms “right,” “impaired” and “affected,” the Court — like the District Court — concluded they were ambiguous, and did not resolve the question of whether they prohibited only the amendment of an indenture’s terms or a more broadly proscribed interference with an issuer’s ability to pay.[11] The Court also concluded that the structure of the TIA did not provide the answer either.[12]

    Despite finding Section 316(b) ambiguous, the Court noted what it believed were the “improbable results and interpretive problems” that would result from a broad interpretation of the relevant terms.”[13] “Among other things,” the Court observed, “interpreting ‘impaired or affected’ [in Section 316(b)] to mean any possible effect would transform a single provision of the TIA into a broad prohibition on any conduct that could influence the value of a note or a bondholder’s practical ability to collect payment.”[14] The Court also said that if the “right … to receive payment” meant “a bondholder’s practical ability to collect payment,” it would embrace — and therefore render superfluous — the “right  … to institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment,” which Section 316(b) also expressly protects.[15]

    The Court then turned to the legislative history of Section 316(b).[16] Reviewing the testimony and reports leading up to and immediately following the enactment of the TIA, the Court determined that “Congress sought to prohibit formal modifications to indentures without the consent of all bondholders, but did not intend to go further by banning other well-known forms of reorganization like foreclosures.”[17] Specifically, the Court noted that, contrary to the District Court’s contention that Congress did not contemplate the use of foreclosures as a method of reorganization at the time that Section 316(b) was drafted, “[t]he authors of the 1936 SEC Report (and by inference the drafters of the TIA) were clearly aware that corporate reorganizations could be achieved through foreclosure.”[18] Notwithstanding such awareness, however, the reports leading up to and immediately following the enactment of Section 316(b) “exclusively addressed formal amendments and indenture provisions like collective-action and no-action clauses,” but did not prohibit foreclosure-based reorganizations, even if they may affect a bondholder’s ability to receive full payment.[19] As such, the Court concluded that it was Congress’ intent that Section 316(b) would only be directed at “reorganization by contract” and would only prohibit amendments to core payment terms.[20] The Court also relied on previous testimony of the drafters of Section 316(b), the House and Senate Reports on the final version of the TIA, a subsequent report by the SEC, and certain textual changes to Section 316(b) through its enactment in 1939 — all of which the Court found to support a narrow construction of the provision.[21]

    Judge Lohier then discussed what he viewed as the unworkability of the District Court’s broad interpretation of Section 316(b). According to the Court, the broad interpretation would “require[ ] that courts determine in each case whether a challenged transaction constitutes an ‘out-of-court debt restructuring … designed to eliminate a non-consenting holder’s ability to receive payment’,” and thus, under that interpretation, liability under Section 316(b) would “turn[ ] on the subjective intent of the issuer or majority bondholders, not the transactional techniques used.”[22] That, the Court believed, would “undermine uniformity in interpretation” by requiring courts to “interpret[ ] boilerplate indenture provisions based on the relationship of particular borrowers and lenders or the particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture” — an approach that the Second Circuit has “expressed a particular distaste for.”[23]

    Finally, the Court said that its narrow interpretation of Section 316(b) “will not leave dissenting bondholders at the mercy of bondholder majorities” because such holders still could “pursue available State and federal law remedies” and/or “insist on credit agreements that forbid transactions” like the one at issue.[24]

    The Dissenting Opinion

    Judge Chester Straub, in a dissenting opinion, focused on the text of Section 316(b).[25] Contrary to the majority panel and the District Court, however, he did not find the provision to be ambiguous. Relying on the “plain text of the statute,” he concluded that “an out-of-court debt restructuring ‘impairs’ or ‘affects’ a non-consenting noteholder’s ‘right to receive payment’ when it is designed to eliminate a non-consenting noteholder’s ability to receive payment, and when it leaves bondholders no choice but to accept a modification of the terms of their bonds.” [26]

    Judge Straub was “cognizant of the parade of horrors that Appellants predict will result from interpreting the TIA” as he did.[27] However, he concluded that “threatening dire commercial consequences” did not provide a sufficient basis to “override the correct interpretation of the law” by reading the statute in a manner inconsistent with its plain meaning, inasmuch as “making law is the job of the legislature and not of the courts.”[28] Therefore, he concluded that even though “[c]ertain undesirable consequences might well arise from the fact that Section 316(b) prohibits actions such as those taken by EDMC in this case,” the resolution of such consequences is for Congress and not the courts.[29]

    Further Proceedings

    It appears that the appellees next intend to seek en banc review of the Second Circuit panel’s decision by the entire Court — inasmuch as they submitted an unopposed motion to extend their time to do so until Feb. 7, 2017, and their motion has recently been granted by the Court.[30] Such review is generally granted only in particularly significant cases, which Marblegate is, but even in such instances it is the exception rather than the rule.

    Conclusion

    The Second Circuit’s ruling is of significant import, as it provides guidance — at least in the Second Circuit — on the scope of Section 316(b), holding that out-of-court debt restructurings, even if they may impair noteholders’ practical ability to receive payment, do not fall within the purview of Section 316(b).

    Assuming the Second Circuit’s decision stands and is either affirmed by the Supreme Court or is otherwise followed in other circuits, the decision will make it far easier for companies with TIA registered bonds (or “private for life” bonds that include a clause comparable to Section 316(b)) to implement an out-of-court restructuring with the support of a majority of the bondholders, such as debt exchanges with coercive features, like releasing guarantees and stripping covenants, designed to induce minority hold-outs to participate. So long as the restructuring does not violate the express terms of the applicable indenture or result in nonconsensual modifications to the indenture’s “core payment terms,” minority hold-outs would lose their leverage under the TIA to block the restructuring with the threat of litigation.

    Authored by Alan R. Glickman, David M. Hillman, Ronald B. Risdon and Minji Reem.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.

     

    [1] No. 15-2124-CV(L), 2017 WL 164318 (2d Cir. Jan. 17, 2017).

    [2] Marblegate Asset Management v. Education Management Corp., 75 F.Supp.3d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Marblegate I”); Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Corp., 111 F.Supp.3d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“Marblegate II”).

    [3] Decision at *1.

    [4] BOKF, N.A. v. Caesars Entertainment Corp., 144 F.Supp.3d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); MeehanCombs Glob. Credit Opportunities Funds, LP v. Caesars Entm’t Corp., 80 F.Supp.3d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  

    [5] Despite that, because EDMC was able to reduce its debt burden through the very transaction to which Marblegate objected, EDMC apparently now actually has the assets to pay on Marblegate’s notes. Decision at *4. However, that did not play any role in the Court’s decision.

    [6] See Marblegate I, 75 F.Supp.3d at 614.

    [7] Id.

    [8] See Marblegate II, 111 F.Supp.3d at 556-57.

    [9] Decision at *1.

    [10] Id. at *12.

    [11] Id. at *4-5.

    [12] Id. at *5.

    [13] Id.

    [14] Id. (emphasis in original).

    [15] Id.

    [16] Among other things, the Court reviewed an eight-part report published by the SEC, entitled “Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel, and Functions of Protective Reorganization Committees,” which examined the role of protective committees in reorganizations (“SEC Report”). See id. at *6 n.5 (citing Securities and Exchange Comm’n, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel, and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Committees, Pts. 1, 6, 8 (1936‐1940)).

    [17] Decision at *10.

    [18] Id. at *8.

    [19] Id. at *7 (emphasis in original). 

    [20] Id. at *8.

    [21] See id. at *8-11.

    [22] Id. at *11 (citation omitted).

    [23] Id. (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). As an example of a case where the court applied this “particular[ly] distaste[ful]” mode of interpretation, the Court cited BOKF, where the district court, while adopting Marblegate’s interpretation of Section 316(b), “sen[t] to the factfinder the question of whether the ‘overall effect’ of the transactions at issue was a ‘debt restructuring or a series of routine corporate transactions’.” See Decision at *11 n.17 (quoting BOKF, 144 F.Supp.3d at 474-75 & n.86).

    [24] Decision at *12.

    [25] See id. at *12-16.

    [26] Id. at *15.

    [27] Id. at *16.

    [28] Id.

    [29] Id.

    [30] Order, Marblegate, No. 15-2124 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2017).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • FDA Outlines Substantially Revised ‘Possible Approach’ to the Regulation of Laboratory-Developed Tests

    FDA Outlines Substantially Revised ‘Possible Approach’ to the Regulation of Laboratory-Developed Tests

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FDA Outlines Substantially Revised ‘Possible Approach’ to the Regulation of Laboratory-Developed Tests

    January 25, 2017

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On January 13, 2017, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) posted a “discussion paper” in which the agency outlines a substantially revised “possible approach” to the oversight of laboratory-developed tests (LDTs). The discussion paper explicitly states that it is not a final version of the July 2014 draft guidance, and that it does not represent the agency’s “formal position.” Rather, the document represents the latest iteration of the agency’s thinking on LDTs, which the agency posted to “spur further dialogue.

    In depth

    Historically, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has exercised enforcement discretion with respect to most laboratory-developed tests (LDTs), and not required the laboratories that furnish LDTs to comply with the agency’s requirements for medical devices (e.g., registration and listing, premarket review, medical device reporting). In July 2014, the FDA published draft guidance in which it outlined its intent to end enforcement discretion and impose a risk-based regulatory framework for most LDTs. The agency received substantial stakeholder feedback on the draft guidance and ultimately decided not to publish a final version of the guidance prior to the end of the Obama administration.

    On January 13, 2017, however, the FDA posted a “discussion paper” in which the agency outlines a substantially revised “possible approach” to the oversight of LDTs. The discussion paper explicitly states that it is not a final version of the July 2014 draft guidance, and that it does not represent the agency’s “formal position.” Rather, the document represents the latest iteration of the agency’s thinking on LDTs, which the agency posted to “spur further dialogue.”

    Key principles articulated in the discussion paper include the following

    Scope of oversight

    • Currently marketed LDTs would be “grandfathered”—i.e., not expected to comply with most or all FDA regulatory requirements (e.g., premarket review, Quality System Regulation (QSR), registration and listing)—“unless necessary to protect the public health.” The agency would focus its oversight on “new and significantly modified” high and moderate risk LDTs.
    • Several categories of new and significantly modified LDTs would also be exempt from agency’s premarket review, QSR, and registration and listing requirements, unless necessary to protect the public health. Under the discussion paper, (1) low risk LDTs; (2) LDTs for rare diseases; (3) traditional LDTs (i.e., LDTs that use components that are legally marketed for clinical use, whose output is the result of manual interpretation by a qualified laboratory professional, and do not use automated instrumentation or software for intermediate or final interpretation); (4) LDTs intended solely for public health surveillance; LDTs used in CLIA-certified, high-complexity histocompatibility labs; and (5) LDTs intended solely for forensic use would not be expected to comply with such requirements. LDTs for “unmet needs” would, however, be subject to premarket submission within 90 days after offering the LDT and certain additional regulatory requirements.
    • Notwithstanding the above, the FDA expressly retains its ability to enforce its regulatory requirements to the extent required to protect patients from harmful tests. FDA would take enforcement action against LDT developers if an LDT is not analytically or clinically valid; if there is an absence of data to support the LDT’s analytical or clinical validity; if the LDT’s developer is engaged in deceptive promotion; or if there is a reasonable probability that the LDT will cause death or serious adverse health consequences.

    Timeline for Implementation

    • Premarket review of new and significantly modified LDTs would be phased in over four years. The FDA would focus first on the tests for which the consequences of a false result are known to have the highest risk to the patient, with an additional two years to meet QSR requirements. The phase-in would occur as follows:
      • Year one—serious adverse event and malfunction reporting for LDTs (except traditional LDTs, LDTs solely for public health surveillance, histocompatibility LDTs and LDTs solely for forensic use)
      • Year two—premarket review for new/modified LDTs with the same intended use as an in vitro diagnostic device (IVD) approved under a premarket approval (PMA) application
      • Year three—premarket review for new/modified LDTs with the same intended use as a Class II IVD subject to the premarket notification (510(k)) requirement
      • Year four—premarket review for new/modified LDTs that do not fall into the above categories

    Tests introduced between the effective date of the framework and its phase-in date could continue to be offered for clinical use during the period of premarket review.

    Evidence Standards

    • With respect to analytical validity, FDA anticipates that laboratories that conduct “appropriate” evaluations would not need to collect data beyond that required to establish performance characteristics of an LDT under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA). The agency also intends to consider how third-party proficiency testing programs, accepted reference standards and/or certification programs may be leveraged.
    • With respect to clinical validity, FDA anticipates that labs may be able to establish clinical validity using literature, well-curated databases and other appropriate sources.The agency also notes that once an LDT’s clinical validity has been established, laboratories with subsequent tests could generally, in accordance with applicable regulations, leverage prior evidence when factors such as indications for use, technology and standardization are the same.
    • These approaches are consistent with the FDA’s proposed approach for analytical and clinical validity for next generation sequencing (NGS) molecular diagnostics.

    Modifications

    • FDA would review prospective change protocols that outline specific types of anticipated changes, the procedures that will be followed to implement them and the criteria that will be met prior to implementation. Modifications could be made in accordance with the change protocol without the need for a new submission. Premarket review of modifications to an already marketed test would be limited to those modifications that significantly change performance specifications or intended use of the test and are not made in accordance with the test’s approved change protocols.

    Quality Systems

    • FDA would focus its QS assessment on three specific QS requirements—design controls, acceptance activities, and procedures for implementing corrective and preventive actions (CAPA). Otherwise, FDA would rely on a laboratory’s certification to CLIA QS requirements. Initial inspections would be educational in nature.

    Adverse Event Reporting

    • Laboratories would be required to report serious adverse events for all tests except traditional LDTs, LDTs intended solely for public health surveillance, certain histocompatibility LDTs and LDTs intended solely for forensic use. In the future, it may be possible to decrease or eliminate certain reporting requirements by leveraging real-world data.

    Analysis

    The policies set forth in the discussion paper represent a substantial shift from—and would generally result in less extensive oversight of LDTs as compared to—the draft guidance. However, substantial uncertainty remains with respect to several aspects of the discussion paper framework, including the following

    • How would FDA decide whether a test is an LDT? In the draft guidance, the FDA states that a test is only an LDT insofar as it is designed, manufactured and used within a single clinical laboratory. Certain stakeholders criticized this definition as overly narrow, and noted that many tests currently offered as LDTs would not fit this definition (e.g., because the test incorporates key components that were manufactured by a third party). The discussion paper does not specifically address whether the agency intends to retain this narrow definition, or if the agency may be willing to adopt a broader definition of the term to bring additional tests within the scope of continued enforcement discretion.
    • How would FDA decide whether agency oversight of a previously marketed (and therefore, potentially grandfathered) LDT is “necessary to protect the public health”? The agency’s willingness to consider any “grandfathering” of previously marketed LDTs represents a significant shift in the agency’s position. That being said, the agency does not provide any guidance on how it will decide whether agency oversight of a previously marketed LDT is “necessary to protect the public health.” For example, would the agency only take action against LDT developers if it has evidence of actual patient harm (e.g., from adverse event reports)? Or could the agency take the position that oversight of any test with certain high-risk intended use(s) is necessary to protect the public health, regardless of evidence of actual harm?
    • In practice, what would an LDT developer need to do to avail itself of the “unmet needs” pathway? Under the discussion paper, laboratories would have up to 90 days after first offering an LDT for an unmet need to send a premarket submission to the FDA or an accredited third-party reviewer, and could continue to offer the test during the review of such submission. It is unclear, however, whether the agency intends to allow retain this flexibility in all circumstances. For example, what if the developer submits a 510(k), but the agency believes that a PMA is required? Or what if the developer’s submission relies almost entirely on retrospective registry data, while the agency believes that prospective data are required?
    • How would the phase-in period apply to LDTs that do not have the same intended use as any approved or cleared IVD? As currently written, the framework would require LDTs that have the same intended use as an IVD approved under a PMA to submit a PMA two years after the finalization of the proposal, and for LDTs that have the same intended use as an IVD cleared under a 510(k) to submit a 510(k) three years post-finalization. As such, LDTs that do not have the same intended use as an approved or cleared IVD do not appear to be subject to the premarket submission until four years post-finalization. The extent to which the agency intends to follow this timeline is unclear, however, particularly insofar as LDTs for unmet needs are often precisely the tests about which FDA has expressed significant regulatory concerns and these require premarket submission within 90 days after first offering.
    • What guidance would be available for laboratories required to comply with QSR requirements? Under the discussion paper, laboratories that develop LDTs would only be subject to a subset of FDA’s QSR requirements (i.e., design controls, acceptance activities, and corrective and preventive actions). That being said, clinical laboratories have not historically been subject to such requirements, and as such, may find it difficult to come into compliance with such requirements (particularly design controls). It is unclear, however, the extent to which the agency will provide laboratories with additional guidance to facilitate their compliance with such requirements.
    • How stringent will FDA’s requirements be with respect to prospective change protocols? Historically, the agency has taken the position that many changes to an FDA-approved or cleared kit would require a submission to the agency; as such, allowing laboratories to make modifications to LDTs without requiring a new submission if the change is made under a pre-approved protocol would represent a substantial change in the agency’s position. That being said, insofar as a laboratory would be required to comply with the requirements set forth in a pre-approved protocol, this revised position will only meaningfully enhance patient access to modified tests if the requirements of the protocol are reasonably achievable for test developers. The agency does not, however, describe or provide examples of what it would require in such a protocol.
    • How will FDA address the practical issues associated with regulating LDTs as medical devices? Unlike an IVD test kit, an LDT is not a physical item that is transferred in interstate commerce. Therefore, what is the regulated “device” within the laboratory test operation? To whom would LDT labeling be addressed—the performing laboratory or the ordering physician? And perhaps most importantly, how will FDA find the resources necessary to timely review the additional submissions that would come in under the framework?

     

    Authors

    Paul W. Radensky , MD

    Counsel

    Washington, DC, Miami

    Michael W. Ryan

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 1

    IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 1

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 20, No. 1

    January 2017

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • IRS Appeals and Alternative Dispute Resolution

    ARTICLE

    IRS Appeals and Alternative Dispute Resolution

    January 24, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Andrew Roberson and Kevin Spencer wrote this bylined article about the diminished use of the IRS alternative dispute resolution program. Endorsing a report by the Taxpayer Advocate Service (TAS), the authors wrote that “a team of dedicated and truly independent ADR professionals could have a profound effect on the system and the number of case both at the IRS and in the courts.”

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Report on Proposed Section 2801 Regulations

    ARTICLE

    Report on Proposed Section 2801 Regulations

    January 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael D. Shapiro co-authored this report on proposed regulations under Section 2801 of the New York State Tax Code relevant to subject gifts or bequests made by a covered expatriate to a US person. Ellen Harrison and Carlyn McCaffrey, on behalf of the American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, contributed.

    In depth
    Authors

    Carlyn S. McCaffrey

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Carol A. Harrington

    Senior Counsel

    Chicago

    More insights