Content Type: Article

  • New Proposed Regulations Would Revise the Application of Section 163(j) to CFCs

    New Proposed Regulations Would Revise the Application of Section 163(j) to CFCs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Proposed Regulations Would Revise the Application of Section 163(j) to CFCs

    August 12, 2020

    Read time: 17 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), section 163(j) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) provides that a taxpayer’s interest expense is deductible only to the extent of the sum of: (i) the taxpayer’s interest income; (ii) 30% of the taxpayer’s adjusted taxable income (ATI); and (iii) the taxpayer’s floor plan financing interest. On December 28, 2018, the US Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released an initial set of proposed regulations under section 163(j) (former proposed regulations). Among the former proposed regulations was Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-7, which provided rules for applying section 163(j) to controlled foreign corporations (CFCs). On July 28, 2020, the Treasury and the IRS finalized portions of the former proposed regulations but issued a new set of proposed regulations, including a revised version of Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-7 (new proposed regulations).

    In depth

    Although the provision from the former proposed regulations confirming the general applicability of section 163(j) to CFCs was finalized in Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-7 (final regulations), the new proposed regulations otherwise made substantial changes to the mechanics of applying section 163(j) to CFCs. These mechanics, as well as their differences in the two sets of proposed regulations, are discussed below.

    General Application of the CFC Group Election under the Former Proposed Regulations

    The former proposed regulations generally provided that section 163(j) applied in determining the taxable income of a CFC in the same manner as it applied in determining the taxable income of a domestic corporation. Thus, in determining a CFC’s taxable income, the CFC’s interest expense deductions are subject to section 163(j) limitation. However, the former proposed regulations recognized that applying section 163(j) to CFCs could lead to inappropriate results in the context of interest payments between related CFCs. To ameliorate this problem, the former proposed regulations provided that a group of related CFCs could make a “CFC group election,” which applied as follows.

    • If a CFC group election was made, then a single amount, the “net business interest expense,” was calculated for the group. Net business interest expense was generally equal to the sum of the interest expense of all of the CFCs in the group, reduced by the sum of the interest income of all of the CFCs in the group. Since any interest between CFCs in the group would result in offsetting amounts of interest income and interest expense, net business interest expense measured the total amount of interest expense paid by the members of the CFC group to third parties.
    • Once net business interest expense for the CFC group was determined, each CFC in the group was allocated a portion of the net business interest expense. The allocable share was determined by multiplying net business interest expense by a fraction, the numerator of which was the interest expense (net of interest income) incurred by the CFC and the denominator of which was the interest expense (net of interest income) incurred by the CFC group (in both cases taking intercompany interest into account). Once the allocable share with respect to a CFC was determined, the allocable share was the amount of interest expense that the CFC was deemed to have paid for purposes of applying section 163(j).

    These basic principles were illustrated in an example in the former proposed regulations. The example involved three sister CFCs: CFC1; CFC2; and CFC3. Each CFC had $100 of ATI. CFC1 paid $90 of interest to a third party on an external obligation, and CFC2 and CFC3 each paid CFC1 $50 of interest on intercompany obligations.

    • Section 163(j), applied without a CFC group election, would not have limited the deductibility of CFC1’s interest expense because CFC1’s $90 of interest expense was less than its $100 of interest income (from CFC2 and CFC3). However, CFC2 and CFC3 would each have had a section 163(j) limitation of $30 (30% of $100 of ATI). Therefore, CFC2 and CFC3 would each have had $20 of their $50 of interest expense disallowed under section 163(j), for a total disallowance of $40 of interest expense.
    • If the three CFCs made a CFC group election, then the total interest expense of the group would have been $190 and the total interest income of the group would have been $100, for net business interest expense of $90. CFC1 would not have been allocated any of this amount, because its interest income was greater than its interest expense. However, CFC2 and CFC3 each would have been allocated half of the net business interest expense and would have been treated as having incurred $45 of interest expense for purposes of applying section 163(j). Therefore, each would have had $15 of interest expense disallowed under section 163(j), for a total disallowance of $30 of interest expense rather than $40.

    It should be noted that, although the former proposed regulations mitigate the problem of intercompany obligations in applying section 163(j) to CFCs, the former proposed regulations still fundamentally provide that section 163(j) is applied to a group of CFCs on a separate basis—each CFC has its own ATI, its own section 163(j) limitation and its own allocable share of net business interest expense that is subject to the limitation.

    General Application of CFC Group Election under the New Proposed Regulations

    In response to the former proposed regulations, several commentators had argued that section 163(j) should not apply to CFCs at all or should only apply to CFCs in a limited fashion. The Treasury and the IRS rejected these comments and finalized the portion of the former proposed regulations, stating that CFCs were generally subject to section 163(j) in determining interest expense deductions. The Treasury and the IRS noted that the taxable income of a CFC is generally determined under the Code in the same manner as the taxable income of a domestic corporation, including the application of section 163(j), and that the TCJA did not specifically exempt CFCs from the application of section 163(j).

    However, the Treasury and the IRS were receptive to the argument that the former proposed regulations would impose significant complexity and administrative burdens on taxpayers in determining the taxable income of CFCs, particularly in the case of multinational taxpayers with hundreds of CFCs in the corporate structure. As a result, the new proposed regulations, while reiterating that section 163(j) generally applied to CFCs, substantially revised the consequences of making a CFC group election, as follows.

    • As noted, if a CFC group election was made under the former proposed regulations, section 163(j) was still fundamentally applied on a separate basis to each CFC in the group, albeit with certain modifications.
    • However, under the new proposed regulations, if a CFC group election is made, section 163(j) generally applies on a group-wide basis—the CFC group as a whole has a group-wide ATI, a group-wide amount of interest income, a group-wide section 163(j) limitation and a group-wide amount of interest expense that is subject to the limitation. Generally, the CFC group’s ATI, interest income and interest expense is the sum of each CFC’s ATI, interest income and interest expense, respectively, and the group’s section 163(j) limitation is equal to the group’s interest income plus 30% of the group’s ATI and the group’s floor plan financing interest.

    To illustrate the difference between the former proposed regulations and the new proposed regulations, consider the example above.

    • Under the former proposed regulations, the CFC group was able to eliminate $10 of disallowance under section 163(j), but $30 of interest expense deductions were still disallowed.
    • Under the new proposed regulations, the CFC group would have group ATI of $300 and group interest income of $100, which would result in a group section 163(j) limitation of $190. The group would also have $190 of interest expense. Because the group’s interest expense does not exceed its section 163(j) limitation, no interest deductions would be disallowed under section 163(j) at all. This difference is due to the fact that, under the new proposed regulations, CFC1’s $100 of ATI is taken into account in determining the group’s section 163(j) limitation. By contrast, under the former proposed regulations, CFC1’s ATI was only relevant to CFC1, and all of the group’s interest expense was deemed to have been incurred by CFC2 and CFC3.

    It should be noted that, even under the new proposed regulations, individual CFCs are still allocated shares of group-wide items. For example, to the extent that group-wide interest expense exceeds the group-wide section 163(j) limitation, the group’s disallowed interest expense carryforward is allocated to each member based on the rules that apply to consolidated groups under Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-5, subject to certain modifications. These allocations are necessary because allocable shares of such items are still relevant under the new proposed regulations in certain contexts, such as in the situation where a CFC leaves or joins the group.

    New Proposed Regulations Would Remove Excess Taxable Income “Roll-Ups” to Higher-Tier CFCs

    In addition to mitigating the effect of intercompany obligations, the CFC group election under the former proposed regulations included a “roll-up” provision which enabled certain income of lower-tier CFCs in the group to be included in the ATI of higher-tier CFCs in the group, thereby increasing the higher-tier CFCs’ section 163(j) limitation. Specifically, under a CFC group election, a higher-tier CFC generally could include in its ATI the “excess taxable income” of its lower-tier CFCs. “Excess taxable income” was generally defined as the lower-tier CFC’s ATI, multiplied by the percentage of the lower-tier CFC’s section 163(j) limitation that was not consumed by the lower-tier CFC’s allocable share of net business interest expense.

    An example in the former proposed regulations illustrated the application of the roll-up provision. In the example (simplified somewhat here), a higher-tier CFC, CFC1, owned all of the stock of two lower-tier CFCs, CFC2 and CFC3. CFC1 had $0 of ATI and $5 of interest expense. CFC2 and CFC3 each had $100 of ATI, and their interest expense was $15 and $40, respectively.

    Applying section 163(j) on a separate basis, CFC2 and CFC3 each had a separate $30 section 163(j) limitation. Because CFC3’s interest expense ($40) was greater than its section 163(j) limitation, $10 of CFC3’s interest expense was disallowed and CFC3 did not have any excess taxable income. However, CFC2 only used half ($15) of its section 163(j) limitation, so its excess taxable income was $50 (i.e., 50% of its $100 of ATI). Therefore, CFC1—which otherwise would have had no ATI—was deemed to have $50 of ATI and a $15 section 163(j) limitation. This meant that CFC1 would be able to deduct its $5 of interest expense that otherwise would not have been deductible.

    Because the CFC group election under the new proposed regulations generally applies section 163(j) to CFCs on a group-wide basis, individual CFCs generally do not have separate ATIs or separate section 163(j) limitations. Consistent with this change, the new proposed regulations remove the roll-up provision with respect to higher-tier CFCs, because there is no need under the new proposed regulations for a provision that adjusts an individual CFC’s separate ATI.

    To illustrate, consider the example above. Under the new proposed regulations, the three CFCs would have $200 of group-wide ATI, a $60 group-wide section 163(j) limitation and $60 of group-wide interest expense. Thus, all of the group’s interest expense would be deductible. In particular, CFC1’s interest expense would be fully deductible, as under the former proposed regulations, and CFC3’s interest expense—$10 of which would still have been disallowed under the former proposed regulations—would also be fully deductible.

    New Proposed Regulations Would Retain Excess Taxable Income “Roll-Ups” to US Shareholders

    In addition to a roll-up provision that adjusted the ATI of higher-tier CFCs, the former proposed regulations also contained a roll-up provision that adjusted the ATI of US shareholders of a CFC group by a portion of the income inclusions attributable to the CFCs. Although the new proposed regulations removed the roll-up provision as applied to higher-tier CFCs, they retain, in slightly modified fashion, the roll-up provision as applied to US shareholders. It should be noted that, under both the former and new proposed regulations, the roll-up to US shareholders generally applies only if a CFC group election is in effect, and any increase to the ATI of US shareholders does not take into account any section 78 gross-up inclusions.

    Under the former proposed regulations, a US shareholder’s ATI was increased by the “eligible CFC group ETI” of the highest-tier CFC in the CFC group. Eligible CFC group ETI was generally defined as the highest-tier CFC’s excess taxable income (which took into account lower-tier CFCs’ excess taxable income pursuant to the CFC roll-up provision) multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which was the total amount of income inclusions taken into account by the US shareholder with respect to the CFCs in the CFC group, and the denominator of which was the total taxable income of the CFCs in the CFC group. In other words, a US shareholder’s ATI was increased by the rolled-up excess taxable income of the CFC group, in proportion to the extent that the taxable income of the CFC group was included in the income of the US shareholder (i.e., as subpart F or global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) inclusions). Note that the denominator of the fraction is taxable income, not ATI (i.e., interest expense is taken into account).

    The former proposed regulations provided an example of the roll-up as applied to US shareholders. In the example (simplified for convenience), a domestic corporation, USP, owned all of the stock of CFC. CFC had $100 of ATI and $20 of interest expense. Furthermore, 50% of CFC’s income constituted subpart F income, and 50% of its interest expense was allocable to the subpart F income. Thus, USP had a $40 subpart F inclusion with respect to CFC.

    The former proposed regulations provided that USP’s ATI was increased by $16.66. Specifically, the CFC’s excess taxable income was $33.33, because it did not use one-third of its $30 section 163(j) limitation. Furthermore, USP’s income included half ($40) of CFC’s $80 of taxable income as a subpart F inclusion. Because USP’s income included half of CFC’s taxable income, USP was entitled to increase its ATI by half of CFC’s excess taxable income. Therefore, USP’s ATI was increased by $16.66, resulting in a $5 increase in its section 163(j) limitation. Note that this $5 represents half of CFC’s unused section 163(j) limitation—in other words, the roll-up provision under the former proposed regulations generally permitted US shareholders to take advantage of its CFCs’ excess section 163(j) limitation, in proportion to the extent that the CFCs’ taxable income was actually included in the income of the US shareholder.

    The new proposed regulations generally retain the roll-up to US shareholders while modifying the formula. Under the new proposed regulations, a US shareholder’s ATI is increased, with respect to a given CFC in the CFC group, by the amount of income inclusions taken into account by the US shareholder multiplied by a fraction, the numerator of which is the CFC’s excess taxable income and the denominator of which is the CFC’s ATI. In other words, the new proposed regulations use the CFC’s income inclusions as the base and adjust the base proportionally with respect to the CFC’s excess taxable income in relation to its ATI. By contrast, the former proposed regulations used excess taxable income as the base and adjusted the base proportionally with respect to the CFC’s income inclusions in relation to its taxable income (taking interest expense into account).

    To illustrate the difference in result from the two approaches, consider the above example.

    • Under the former proposed regulations, USP’s ATI was increased by $16.66, which represented CFC’s $33.33 of excess taxable income multiplied by 50%, the proportion of CFC’s taxable income that constituted a subpart F inclusion.
    • Under the new proposed regulations, USP’s ATI is increased by $40 (USP’s subpart F inclusion) multiplied by 33%, the proportion of CFC’s ATI that constitutes excess taxable income, for a total increase of $13.33.

    Miscellaneous Changes Made by the New Proposed Regulations

    In addition to the major changes made to CFC group elections, the new proposed regulations made various supplementary additions and changes to the application of section 163(j) to CFCs as follows:

    • Five-year binding election: The former proposed regulations provided that no formal statement was required to make a CFC group election and that a taxpayer was deemed to have made the CFC group election simply by applying section 163(j) accordingly. However, the former proposed regulations also provided that a CFC group election, once made, was generally irrevocable. By contrast, the new proposed regulations require a formal statement making a CFC group election and generally provide that a CFC group election, once made, is binding for five years.
    • Determination of CFC group and related rules: Because the new proposed regulations apply section 163(j) on a group-wide basis in a manner similar to a consolidation regime, the new proposed regulations contain extensive rules regarding the determination of the CFCs included in a CFC group and associated issues. For example, the new proposed regulations provide rules for determining the period with respect to which section 163(j) is applied to the CFC group, rules for determining when and how a CFC is deemed to join or leave the CFC group, and rules for determining the extent to which a joining CFC’s pre-group disallowed interest expense carryforwards can be used by the group and the extent to which a departing CFC is allocated disallowed interest expense carryforwards of the group.
    • Safe harbor: The new proposed regulations contain a safe harbor election, pursuant to which a CFC group is not subject to the section 163(j) limitation. The safe harbor election is available only if a CFC group election is in effect, and unlike the CFC group election, the safe harbor election is an annual election. Generally, a CFC group is eligible to make a safe harbor election if the group’s interest expense is less than or equal to 30% of the lesser of: (i) the sum of the taxable income of the CFCs in the group determined without regard to section 163(j); and (ii) the sum of the subpart F and GILTI inclusions with respect to the CFCs in the group. However, roll-ups of excess taxable income to US shareholders is not permitted with respect to CFC groups for which a safe harbor election is in effect.
    • Provisions to conform to the Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security (CARES) Act: The CARES Act made changes to section 163(j) to provide taxpayer relief in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The changes generally increased the ATI percentage from 30% to 50% in calculating the section 163(j) limitation for 2019 and 2020, and permitted taxpayers to use 2019 ATI to determine the section 163(j) limitation for 2020. The new proposed regulations contain various provisions designed to incorporate these changes, such as provisions to implement the changes in the context of a group of CFCs having different taxable years.
    • Stand-alone CFCs: The former proposed regulations only applied to groups of CFCs, so the roll-up to US shareholders did not apply in the context of a US shareholder with a single CFC. The new proposed regulations modify the roll-up to permit its application to stand-alone CFCs.
    • Anti-abuse rule: The new proposed regulations contain an anti-abuse rule addressing situations where taxpayers may be incentivized to affirmatively plan to have interest expense deductions disallowed under section 163(j), with the intent to use the resulting carryforwards in a future year. Such a situation could arise if the negative effect of a CFC’s interest expense disallowance (e.g., an increase in tested income) does not result in increased US federal income tax liability (e.g., due to excess GILTI foreign tax credits that can offset the increase). The anti-abuse rule generally provides that, in such situations, the ATI of the CFC paying the interest is increased such that the interest expense paid pursuant to such a plan is not limited by section 163(j).

    The final regulations stating that CFCs are generally subject to section 163(j) apply to taxable years beginning on or after the date that is 60 days after the recently finalized section 163(j) regulations are published in the Federal Register. The new proposed regulations apply to taxable years beginning on or after the date that is 60 days after the finalized version of the new proposed regulations are published in the Federal Register. However, taxpayers generally can apply both the final regulations and the new proposed regulations to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, and before their respective applicability dates, provided that the section 163(j) regulations are applied consistently.

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  • 9 Best Practices for ‘Remote’ Witness Interviews During Internal Investigations in COVID-19 Era

    9 Best Practices for ‘Remote’ Witness Interviews During Internal Investigations in COVID-19 Era

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    August 6, 2020

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    Matthew L. Knowles

    Partner

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    Elizabeth Rodd

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    Boston

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  • Knock It Off, Knock-Offs? Ninth Circuit Affirms Trade Dress Rights but Not Fame

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    Knock It Off, Knock-Offs? Ninth Circuit Affirms Trade Dress Rights but Not Fame

    August 11, 2020

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    Sarah Bro

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  • Illinois Federal Court Dismisses ERISA Claims Against 401(k) Fiduciaries

    Illinois Federal Court Dismisses ERISA Claims Against 401(k) Fiduciaries

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    Illinois Federal Court Dismisses ERISA Claims Against 401(k) Fiduciaries

    August 11, 2020

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    J. Christian Nemeth

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    Chicago, Miami

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  • The Hidden Value of Assets in the United Kingdom: Are You Making the Most of Your Real Estate?

    The Hidden Value of Assets in the United Kingdom: Are You Making the Most of Your Real Estate?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The Hidden Value of Assets in the United Kingdom: Are You Making the Most of Your Real Estate?

    August 11, 2020

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Traditional trading businesses naturally focus primarily on their operating business, but often are unaware of the relatively simple options available to ensure they are making the most of their real estate assets. In a competitive and recovering market we are aware of the pressure to extract the most value from existing real estate interests or portfolios, once again taking into account the effect of COVID-19 on businesses as a whole. “Property companies” (companies whose primary business involves making money out of their real estate) are, of course, well-versed in maximising their financial position through their property portfolio. However, “non-property businesses” (where their real estate may not be the primary driver of the business, albeit they own or lease properties for the purpose of undertaking their business) are not as focused on taking advantage of their real estate assets to generate income and maximise their financial position. Below, we explore opportunities for companies to extract additional value from their real estate assets, both from an active asset management perspective as well as by leveraging their properties.

    Each of the value extraction options discussed below may have tax implications, and specialist tax advice should be sought before implementation.

    In depth

    Sale and Leaseback

    Implementing real estate sale and leasebacks as an alternative financing tool has been on the rise in recent years for corporates of all sizes and across a range of industries. This is likely to hold true in the post COVID-19 landscape as cash strapped companies seek to unlock cash currently tied up in their real estate.

    A sale and leaseback transaction involves the sale of an owner-occupied property to a third party investor for a lump sum payment. Immediately after the sale, the investor leases the property back to the seller for an agreed period in return for the payment of rent by the seller. In other words, the investor immediately becomes the seller’s landlord. For the investor, the advantage is in purchasing a let property already generating income. For the seller, the arrangement can unlock more equity than a conventional finance whilst typically also being in a stronger position to negotiate more favourable lease terms for the property than the average tenant. A sale and leaseback also has the advantage of allowing the seller to focus on its core business without bearing the risks of property ownership.

    This arrangement is adaptable to all industry sectors including corporate offices, logistics warehouses, retail units and alternative assets classes such as manufacturing plants and petrol stations.

    Unutilized Land, Development and Change of Use

    Many companies are unaware of the vast potential of owned land which could, through creative thinking and decisive action, become an income producing asset and significantly increase the market value of the property. Even “non-property companies” should take stock of their real estate portfolio and identify any under-utilised land. This could include vacant land, occupied land with a potential for redevelopment or simply identifying land which may not be integral to the functioning of the company’s business and is ideal to be repurposed. The market value of land can dramatically rise by obtaining planning permission for a different use (such as residential or a mixed use development) and with a surge in e-commerce over recent months, certain plots of land may have the potential to be redeveloped to take advantage of the increasing need for industrial and logistic space. Alternatively, companies could consider renting out vacant space or making such space available for “pop-ups” or “click and collect” providers to bring in additional base revenue and increase footfall. The options are endless and a little ingenuity could go a long way.

    OPCO/PROPCO

    Although it is possible to raise debt against a business which owns real estate, some debt providers will not lend to an operating business primarily because it has more unsecured creditors, employees and potential pension exposure. A more efficient financing method is to split the real estate asset from the business creating an OpCo/PropCo structure where the property is put in a clean SPV owner and then a lease granted back to the operating business. This opens up the opportunity to obtain debt at lower pricing from the traditional real estate debt providers who want to take security over the real estate from a clean SPV property owning company without the direct operating risk of the business. Care does need to be taken not to expect to put too much additional debt through the Opco if this method is adopted.

    Ground Rent

    Using ground rent leases as a financial tool is also a potential yield arbitrage play. The ground rent mechanism involves the sale of the asset itself (usually to a high income fund, or pension fund) followed by an immediate lease back of the premises on a long term lease at a fixed rent which provides the buyer of the freehold with long-dated, secure and inflation-protected income.

    Ground rents can be a compelling proposition for institutional investors. In addition to providing attractive cash flows that rise in line with inflation, they incorporate very low default risk because the lease payments represent such a small outgoing for the tenant. Like a sale and leaseback, an investor in commercial ground rents owns the freehold outright.

    However, the long investment horizons of ground rents means lease payments form the majority of these assets, while the low rent level gives the investor a great deal of certainty over the cash flow for the long term. Since ground rents are valued based on the discounted value of their expected future cash flows, this means in practice the residual value of the real estate makes up a much smaller component of the value of these assets. They are valued almost entirely on the basis of their expected cash flows.

    Financing the Asset

    The real estate that your business owns can be one of your most valuable assets. Many non-real estate businesses have substantial real estate assets in order to run their business. These can be used to raise debt against the real estate as collateral, in particular, business expansion by acquiring additional operating sites. Debt is available in many forms from investment to development and general working capital secured on the real estate and can be implemented conventionally or, if your business is Sharia compliant, using Islamic finance techniques. Pricing and risk will, of course, depend on a number of variables from considering lower leveraged senior debt, mezzanine finance for higher loan-to values or even equity style investments with investors coming in as preferred equity using debt instruments. For a business which generates long term stable income, the capital markets can produce interesting products to provide longer-term financing needs.

    Re-Gears

    In the current market, many businesses are focusing on assessing and protecting existing assets, rather than investing in new stock.

    The main focus for many companies is therefore to extract value from their current property interests, specifically via asset management, lease re-gears, possible changes of use, and of course talking to their lenders. These types of ‘conservative’ work-streams are likely to continue to be the main areas of attention for the remainder of this calendar year.

    Conclusion

    In the current environment, companies who may not consider themselves to be “property businesses” should still look to evaluate their real estate assets. The options outlined above carry differing advantages and disadvantages and of course, each business or portfolio of businesses will have their own operational procedures and commercial drivers for consideration.

    Authors

    Rosemary Tulloch

    Senior Associate

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • The GILTI High-Tax Exclusion and the Tested Unit Standard: New Administrative Burdens Await for Taxpayers

    The GILTI High-Tax Exclusion and the Tested Unit Standard: New Administrative Burdens Await for Taxpayers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    The GILTI High-Tax Exclusion and the Tested Unit Standard: New Administrative Burdens Await for Taxpayers

    August 10, 2020

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On July 23, 2020, the US Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) published final regulations addressing the global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) high-tax exclusion (85 FR 44620) (the “Final Regulations”). One notable development in the Final Regulations is the adoption of a new standard for determining whether items of income generated by controlled foreign corporations (CFCs) or their separate business units qualify as high-taxed. The 2019 proposed regulations addressing the GILTI high-tax exclusion (REG-101828-19) (the “Proposed Regulations”) adopted a regime where transactions engaged in by qualified business units (QBUs) of CFCs would be tracked to determine eligibility for the high-tax exclusion. The Final Regulations replace the QBU-based regime with a regime that tracks transactions of “tested units.” The new tested unit regime is intended to be more administrable than the QBU regime (in part because the determination of QBU status—a section 989 concept—is itself fraught with uncertainties under current law). Ironically, however, the tested unit rules introduce significant additional layers of complexity and levels of recordkeeping and reporting burdens for taxpayers.

    In depth

    The New “Tested Unit” Standard

    The Proposed Regulations applied a QBU-by-QBU approach to identify the relevant items of income that may be eligible for the GILTI high-tax exclusion, which aimed to minimize the “blending” of income subject to different foreign tax rates and more accurately identify income subject to a high rate of foreign tax. For this purpose, a “QBU” is any separate and clearly identifiable unit of a trade or business of a taxpayer that maintains separate books and records, and whether certain activities constitute a “trade or business” is generally based on a facts and circumstances analysis.

    The Final Regulations replace this QBU-by-QBU approach with a new “tested unit” standard, which applies to the extent an entity, or the activities of an entity, are actually subject to foreign tax, either as a tax resident of a permanent establishment under foreign law. According to the Preamble of the Final Regulations, the tested unit standard is “a more targeted measure than the QBU standard and will be more easily applied to the GILTI high-tax exclusion than the QBU standard.”

    In so adopting the tested unit standard, Treasury and the IRS cited comments to the Proposed Regulations asserting that reliance on a facts and circumstances test under the QBU-by-QBU approach may have created uncertainty and inconsistency, and that taxpayers may have engaged in affirmative tax planning to avoid the QBU rule by bifurcating operations of a single large QBU into smaller components. In addition, the Preamble indicates that, while the QBU standard was a proxy for an entity or operations being subject to foreign tax, the tested unit standard more closely tracks whether an entity or activities are actually subject to foreign tax.

    The Final Regulations provide that the following categories qualify as tested units: (1) a CFC; (2) a partnership or disregarded entity held directly or indirectly by a CFC, provided that the pass-through entity is either a tax resident of a foreign country or is treated as a corporation for purposes of the CFC’s tax law; and (3) a branch that gives rise to a taxable presence in the country in which the branch is located or under its owner’s tax law (which provides an exclusion for income attributable to the branch).

    Grouping of tested units is generally permitted—and, in fact, is mandatory—only where a CFC has multiple tested units that are tax residents in the same foreign country; however, grouping is not permitted for nontaxed branches. This tested unit concept is similar to, but not the same as, a number of other concepts used for separately tracking sub-units involving foreign operations—”separate units” for dual consolidated loss purposes, QBUs and foreign branches, for example.

    Separate “Books and Records” for Each Tested Unit

    For purposes of computing the GILTI high-tax exclusion, the Final Regulations require taxpayers to maintain a “separate set of books and records” for determining income attributable to a tested unit, a standard defined by cross-reference to the standards required for a QBU.

    Notwithstanding this cross-reference to books and records of a QBU, taxpayers will likely be forced to maintain two sets of books and records for each QBU—one for section 987 purposes (maintained in local currency) and one for GILTI high-tax exclusion purposes (maintained in USD)—due to the inherent complexities associated with reconciliation of section 987 transactions with transactions among and between tested units.

    The IRS and Treasury apparently believe that maintaining books and records for tested units may not be unduly burdensome because taxpayers are already required in many cases to keep similar records to file foreign tax returns. Moreover, taxpayers currently can avoid any such new US filing burdens by simply refraining from electing the GILTI high-tax exclusion. However, the Final Regulations, together with new proposed regulations on the Subpart F income high-tax exception under section 954(b)(4) (REG-127732-19), issued on the same date as the Final Regulations, as well as proposed foreign tax credit regulations issued in December 2019 (REG-105495-19) indicate that the government intends to extend tested unit concepts more broadly in future guidance.

    In fact, the proposed Subpart F high-tax regulations, which would conform the Subpart F high-tax exception to the GILTI high-tax exclusion (rather than the reverse, as commentators requested), would both adopt the tested unit regime and further modify it. These proposed regulations would replace the “separate set of books and records” standard with an even newer standard that would require taxpayers instead to track items of gross income attributable to the “applicable financial statement” of a tested unit. Unlike the “books and records” standard, the “applicable financial statement” standard would be based on separate entity (or separate branch) financial statements that are independently maintained.

    Adjustments to Reflect Disregarded Payments

    The Final Regulations also require taxpayers to make adjustments for disregarded payments between tested units to associate the income with the tested unit in which it is subject to tax. Specifically, if a tested unit makes a disregarded payment to another tested unit, taxpayers must reduce the payor tested unit’s gross income to the extent of such payment, and must increase the payee tested unit’s gross income by the same amount.

    This principle—that taxpayers must “regard” disregarded transactions for purposes of computing the GILTI high-tax exclusion—is consistent with other recent guidance issued by Treasury and the IRS requiring taxpayers to take disregarded payments into account for certain US tax purposes, which itself may be indicative of a larger trend. For example, a similar approach was taken in final regulations promulgated under section 904 for purposes of determining foreign branch category income, and proposed foreign tax credit regulations would apply to the same types of disregarded payments between CFCs and their branches and other units (which conceivably could be determined under a tested unit regime if these proposed regulations are finalized). Similarly, taxpayers are required to “regard” disregarded entities for purposes of determining a related party for purposes of the anti-hybrid rules under section 267A.

    Expansion of Administrative Burdens

    Applying the tested unit concept to determine whether to elect the GILTI high-tax exclusion will be a complex process. Taxpayers must now examine each CFC, identify tested units within each CFC (including the CFC itself), account for disregarded transactions, and group tested units in the same country. Because the GILTI high-tax exclusion must be made “all or nothing” (i.e., for the entire group or none of the group), taxpayers must examine their worldwide structure and engage in the detailed accounting necessary to determine whether each tested unit is highly taxed on an annual basis. For taxpayers with more complex ownership structures, or with CFCs with multiple unrelated owners, there may be further complications in determining which CFCs are in the same CFC group for purposes of the all-or-nothing application of the GILTI high-tax exclusion.

    With this new requirement to track tested units (under both the books and records standard and the applicable financial statement standard), and also to make adjustments to reflect disregarded payments, taxpayers must grapple with an ever-expanding list of units of account (and the associated administrative burdens) with respect to tracking and reporting income earned abroad, including those obligations arising from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). This could include:

    • Tested income and qualified business asset investment (QBAI) for GILTI purposes
    • Foreign branch tracking for basketing purposes
    • Extraordinary reduction accounts under section 245A
    • Hybrid deduction accounts under section 245A(e)
    • Specified payments under section 267A
    • Adjusted taxable income for purposes of section 163(j)

    Taxpayers should also consider the administrative burdens in existence prior to the TCJA, including:

    • Measuring current and accumulated E&P for each CFC
    • Maintaining separate books and records for section 987 QBUs
    • Tracking attributes of foreign branches for purposes of certain Subpart F rules
    • Tracking and reporting of splitter arrangements under section 909
    • Tracking “separate units” for dual consolidated loss purposes

    In addition, the proposed regulations on the Subpart F income high-tax exception would further increase taxpayers’ reporting obligations by requiring that US shareholders maintain specific contemporaneous documentation to substantiate their Subpart F income high-tax exception computations and to report such information on Form 5471. Such additional information reporting appears to be part of a trend of increased international information reporting (e.g., Forms 8992 and 8993 for GILTI and the section 250 deduction, respectively; additional reporting on Form 8949 (to report the section 961(d) loss disallowance attributable to the section 245A DRD)).

    The Road Ahead

    The adoption of the tested unit standard in the Final Regulations may impact how taxpayers approach information collection and retention. That taxpayers must track information on a more granular level, and must even make adjustments for disregarded payments, may push taxpayers to revisit their internal recordkeeping systems on a holistic level in order to properly identify tested units for purposes of computing the GILTI high-tax exclusion. Making these detailed calculations on a worldwide basis, annually, will be no small task. And as with anything TCJA-related, broad generalizations and assumptions about the impact of the rules may prove incorrect, and modeling is king.

    Authors

    Timothy S. Shuman

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Michael J. Wilder

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • CMS Proposes Further OPPS Reductions to 340B Drug Reimbursement Rates

    CMS Proposes Further OPPS Reductions to 340B Drug Reimbursement Rates

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS Proposes Further OPPS Reductions to 340B Drug Reimbursement Rates

    August 7, 2020

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 4, 2020, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) released its CY 2021 Medicare Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS) proposed rule. CMS proposes to reduce OPPS payments for 340B drugs from Average Sales Price (ASP) minus 22.5% to ASP minus 28.7%. CMS will accept public comments on the proposed rule until October 5, 2020.

    In depth

    On August 4, 2020, CMS released its CY 2021 Medicare Hospital OPPS proposed rule. The proposed rule includes further reductions to the Medicare OPPS payment rate for 340B drugs, which have generally been reimbursed at ASP minus 22.5% since 2018. Using the results of its recent 340B drug acquisition cost survey, CMS proposes to adopt a rate of ASP minus 34.7%, with an add-on amount for overhead and handling costs of 6% of ASP, for a net proposed rate of ASP minus 28.7% for 340B drugs.

    Alternatively, CMS is considering continuing the current rate of ASP minus 22.5% for 340B drugs, in light of the recent US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit opinion supporting CMS’s authority to set that rate.

    As in past years, rural sole community hospitals, children’s hospitals and OPPS-exempt cancer hospitals would be exempt from payment cuts to 340B drugs and would continue to be paid at ASP plus 6%. Also as in past years, the 340B payment cuts would be implemented in a “budget neutral” manner, with the payment cut amounts being used to increase OPPS payments on all other services to all hospitals paid under OPPS.

    CMS will accept public comments on the proposed rule until October 5, 2020.

    Background

    In CY 2018, CMS reduced the Medicare payment rate for drugs purchased through the 340B program from ASP plus 6% to ASP minus 22.5%, based on a 2005 Medicare Payment Advisory Committee report that calculated hospitals’ average acquisition costs for 340B drugs to be approximately ASP minus 22.5%. CMS continued this payment policy through 2019 and 2020, despite litigation challenging the reduction as beyond CMS’s statutory authority.

    A key question in the litigation turned on whether CMS had authority to make such reductions under at least one of two separate but related statutory provisions relating to reimbursement for covered outpatient drugs. The first provision provides that reimbursement for such drugs must be equal to the average acquisition cost for the drug, as determined by the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) based on a survey that meets certain requirements. The second provision provides that, if hospital acquisition cost data is not available, reimbursement must be equal to ASP plus 6%, as adjusted, if necessary, by HHS.

    In December 2018, the US District Court for the District of Columbia sided with the hospital litigants and found that CMS had exceeded its authority in making the reductions, partly because CMS did not have the acquisition cost data necessary under the first statutory provision, and because the dramatic reduction was greater than a mere “adjustment” to the ASP under the second statutory provision.

    On July 31, 2020, the DC Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that CMS had the authority to make the payment reductions for 340B drugs reimbursed under OPPS, where CMS had adjusted the reimbursement rates to more closely reflect hospitals’ acquisition costs for 340B drugs, as estimated by the Medicare Payment Advisory Committee. Our prior On the Subject, “DC Circuit Upholds OPPS Reimbursement Reductions for 340B Drugs,” provides an overview and analysis of the DC Circuit’s decision.

    Prior to the DC Circuit’s decision, CMS launched a drug acquisition cost survey to collect information regarding 340B hospitals’ net acquisition costs for 340B-purchased drugs, as described in our previous On the Subject, “CMS Releases 340B Drug Acquisition Cost Survey, Responses Due May 15, 2020.” The survey appeared to be an administrative fallback process intended to provide CMS with a pathway to continue its reduced reimbursement rates under the first statutory provision in the event that the DC Circuit sided with the hospitals and the district court to decide that the reduction was far greater than a mere “adjustment” under the second statutory provision.

    Analysis and Key Considerations

    CMS is required to calculate the reimbursement rate for specified covered outpatient drugs (SCODs) in one of two ways. First, under Section 1833(t)(14)(A)(iii)(I) of the Social Security Act (SSA), which we will refer to as “Subclause (I),” CMS may use the “average acquisition cost for the drug,” which may vary by hospital group, taking into account certain hospital acquisition cost survey data. Alternatively, under Section 1833(t)(14)(A)(iii)(I) of the SSA, which we will refer to as “Subclause (II),” if average acquisition cost data are not available, CMS must use “the average price for the drug,” which may be adjusted as necessary “for purposes of this paragraph.” CMS presents two potential reimbursement rates in the proposed rule, one based on Subclause (I) and the other based on Subclause (II).

    The ASP Minus 28.7% Rate

    Subclause (I) states that CMS may conduct a hospital acquisition cost survey and set payment to equal the average acquisition cost for each SCOD. Although the DC Circuit upheld the ASP minus 22.5% payment cut based on Subclause (II), the proposed 2021 rate of ASP minus 28.7% is justified by CMS under Subclause (I) based on the data available from the 340B drug acquisition cost survey conducted earlier this year. Taking the results of that survey, CMS made several adjustments to arrive at its proposed net rate of ASP minus 28.7% for 340B drugs. Notably, CMS mentions in its proposed rule that some hospitals provided drug acquisition cost data that exceeded 340B ceiling prices. CMS states that it kept that data in its calculations, excluding outliers, because hospitals may have been overcharged for their drug acquisition costs and could have accurately reported acquisition costs greater than the Health Resources and Services Administration ceiling price.

    However, the survey instructions had stated that hospitals were to report the “sub-ceiling price after all applicable discounts,” suggesting that any prices reported were to be at or below the 340B ceiling prices and that any hospitals that reported pricing in excess of the 340B ceiling price would not be completing the survey as instructed. The language in the survey instructions indicating that only 340B ceiling or sub-ceiling prices could be reported, coupled with the burden of completing the full survey (particularly during the COVID-19 public health emergency), may have caused some hospitals to opt for the “quick survey,” which indicated that the hospital had acquired all 340B drugs at the 340B ceiling price. Thus, hospitals may have been deterred from submitting the more detailed survey that could have reflected the above-ceiling costs for certain drugs. In the end, only 7% of hospitals submitted a detailed survey response.

    The proposed rule indicates that CMS analyzed the survey results and applied various statistical methodologies to determine an “approximate average” or “typical” amount by which to reduce ASP that would approximate hospital acquisition costs for 340B drugs. The agency stated that it “generally” chose methodologies that yielded the most conservative reduction to ASP, which involved analyses of multiple measures of central tendencies (arithmetic mean, median, geometric mean), the effect of including penny priced drugs, mapping of multi-source NDCs to a single HCPCS code, weighing values by volume/utilization, and applying trimming methodologies to remove anomalous or outlier data. Commenters likely will scrutinize CMS’s calculations, assumptions and overall methodology, although it will not be possible for stakeholders to access the data necessary to validate CMS’s methodology, because of the statutory requirement that 340B ceiling prices be kept confidential.

    The ASP Minus 22.5% Rate

    Section 1847A of the SSA generally sets a default rate of ASP plus 6% for SCODs. However, under Subclause (II), CMS is permitted to adjust that rate “as necessary for purposes of this paragraph.” The recent DC Circuit opinion interpreted the “purposes of this paragraph” to mean for the purpose of “approximating hospital acquisition cost.” Thus, the DC Circuit concluded that CMS was permitted to set the rate at ASP minus 22.5% because it was an approximation of the hospitals’ acquisition costs of the drugs.

    The language of Subclause (II) states that it applies “if hospital acquisition cost data are not available.” Given that CMS has conducted a survey to obtain hospital acquisition cost data, the statute indicates that CMS may use that data to set payment rates as long as the survey met the statute’s survey requirements. However, certain stakeholders have indicated in comments submitted to CMS that the acquisition cost survey may not have been properly conducted, which may lead to litigation if CMS adopts a rate based on the survey results. CMS may be including the ASP minus 22.5% reimbursement option as a fallback option in the event commenters raise strong arguments that the ASP minus 28.7% rate is likely to be successfully challenged in litigation.

    Implications Outside of 340B

    While the proposed rule would only reduce payment rates for 340B drugs, CMS might attempt to apply the payment-adjusting techniques set forth in the proposed rule to non-340B hospital outpatient drugs in the future. For example, CMS may seek to deploy an acquisition cost survey nationwide (or to a particular group of hospitals) and establish hospital outpatient drug reimbursement rates across the board (or for a particular group of hospitals) based on reported acquisition costs. Alternatively, if CMS identifies a relatively reliable estimate of comparatively low acquisition costs for a particular group of hospitals, it may seek to “adjust” these hospitals’ outpatient drug reimbursement rates downward to reflect more closely the hospitals’ acquisition costs.

    Such maneuvers may be tempting as another strategy to further the Trump Administration’s overarching goal of reducing drug costs to both the government and beneficiaries. While CMS may choose to limit these reductions to 340B drugs because the structure of the 340B program inherently reduces covered entity hospitals’ acquisition costs, CMS may also choose to take a more bullish approach to expanding these reductions beyond the 340B program, as the agency’s authority waxes in the wake of the DC Circuit opinion.

    Authors

    Emily Jane Cook

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Washington, DC

    Steven J. Schnelle

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Cathy Ren

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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  • Sanctions Update: OFAC Regulations, Advisories and Enforcement Actions: November 2019 through July 2020

    Sanctions Update: OFAC Regulations, Advisories and Enforcement Actions: November 2019 through July 2020

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: OFAC Regulations, Advisories and Enforcement Actions: November 2019 through July 2020

    August 7, 2020

    Read time: 39 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The first half of 2020 has seen unprecedented change throughout the country and the world as industries and individuals grapple with novel challenges spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these challenges, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has continued to remain active, issuing regulations and guidance, and reaching settlements in an array of enforcement actions. Summarized below are the key updates from November 2019 through July 31, 2020 (“Review Period”).[1]

    Updates to Country-Specific Sanctions Programs

    Turning first to country-specific sanctions programs, OFAC’s attention was most focused on Venezuela, Iran and North Korea. In addition, there were some developments in the Russia/Ukraine, Syria, Mali, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe sanctions programs.

    Updates to the Venezuela Sanctions Program

    2019 saw a ramp-up in U.S. sanctions targeted against the Government of Venezuela (“GOV”), including Petróleos de Venezuela SA (“PdVSA”), a state-owned entity on OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals List (“SDN List”).[2] At the end of 2019, OFAC issued several general licenses (“GLs”) designed to clarify the sweeping sanctions against the GOV issued earlier in the year.[3] The end of 2019 also saw clarification from OFAC on the Venezuela sanctions program through the publication of FAQs addressing the ability to sue blocked or designated persons in U.S. courts and the process by which a U.S. person with a writ of attachment on shares of a GOV entity may auction or sell the shares.[4]

    Throughout the first half of 2020, OFAC also continued to refine the Venezuelan sanctions program, issuing a number of general licenses and other regulatory updates designed to clarify the scope of the sanctions program. We note, in particular, the following actions with broad applicability:[5]

    • On March 12, 2020, OFAC issued amended GL 16C, which authorizes otherwise prohibited transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary to maintaining, operating or closing U.S. persons’ accounts in certain Venezuelan financial institutions, including Banco de Venezuela; S.A. Banco Universal (Banco de Venezuela); Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo, de la Clase Obrera, Mujer y Comunas; Banco Universal C.A. (Banco Bicentenario del Pueblo); or Banco del Tesoro, C.A. Banco Universal (Banco del Tesoro).[6]
    • On April 10, 2020 and July 15, 2020, OFAC issued GLs 5C and 5D, which extend the effective date of earlier GLs 5A and 5B to Oct. 20, 2020, so that certain transactions related to the provision of financing for and other dealings in the PdVSA 2020 8.5% bond remain prohibited until Oct. 20, 2020 but thereafter become permissible.[7] In an FAQ, OFAC clarified that this GL is designed, on the effective date, to remove Executive Order (“E.O.”) 13835 as an obstacle to holders of the PdVSA 2020 8.5% bond gaining access to their collateral, including CITGO shares that serve as such collateral.[8] GL 5D extends the effective date of the authorization provided by GL 5C and its predecessors, meaning that transactions related to the sale or transfer of CITGO shares and other collateral in connection with the PdVSA 2020 8.5% bond remain prohibited until Oct. 20, 2020.

    The first half of 2020 also saw the continuation of a campaign by the U.S. government to put economic pressure on the Maduro regime and its supporters. That pressure has intensified, resulting in imposition not only of primary sanctions, but also secondary sanctions directed at, for example, various maritime entities alleged to have provided support to the Maduro regime.[9]

    While the pressure on the Maduro regime intensified in the latter part of 2019 and the first half of 2020, the State Department issued a framework that outlines an avenue through which the United States would lift certain sanctions on Venezuela. Unsurprisingly, this framework calls for Maduro to step down and permit free and fair presidential elections, among other structural changes within the government.[10]

    Updates to the North Korea Sanctions Program

    OFAC issued several amendments to regulations, designations and advisories relevant to the North Korea sanctions program in the first half of 2020. The amended regulations implement laws that broaden the scope of the sanctions program, and the designations and advisories address particular risks posed by North Korea.

    Turning first to amendments, on April 9, 2020, OFAC issued amendments to the North Korea Sanctions Regulations, “to further implement the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016, as amended by the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.” Among other things, the changes identify additional categories of persons the Secretary of Treasury is permitted to designate as SDNs and expand the applicability of the sanctions program to entities owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions.[11] Under these regulations, entities owned or controlled by U.S. financial institutions that are established or maintained outside the United States may not knowingly engage in a transaction with the North Korean government nor with any person or entity currently sanctioned under the U.S. or United Nations North Korea sanctions programs.[12]

    The early half of 2020 also saw a focus on illicit exportation of labor and cyber-related threats posed by North Korea. In January, for example, OFAC announced two North Korea-related designations targeting “a North Korean trading corporation and a China-based North Korean lodging facility that facilitate North Korea’s practice of sending laborers abroad.”[13] And, on March 2, 2020, OFAC sanctioned two Chinese nationals involved in laundering stolen cryptocurrency from a 2018 cyber intrusion on a North Korean state-sponsored cryptocurrency exchange. In the press release announcing the March designations, OFAC pointed to the Financial Action Task Force’s amended standards that require all countries to regulate cryptocurrency service providers and mitigate the risks of theft stemming from cryptocurrency transactions, noting that the United States is particularly concerned about “platforms that provide anonymous payment and storage functionality without transaction monitoring, suspicious activity reporting or customer due diligence, among other obligations.”[14]

    Shortly thereafter, on April 15, 2020, OFAC, in conjunction with the FBI, the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security, published an advisory outlining the cyber threat that North Korea poses, providing guidance on mitigating the risks of North Korea’s malicious cyber activities to the international financial system.[15] This advisory outlines common tactics by North Korean state-sponsored cyber actors, such as cyber-enabled financial theft, money laundering, extortion campaigns and cryptojacking. The advisory additionally sets forth measures to counter these cyber threats: (1) raising awareness of the DPRK cyber threat; (2) sharing technical information concerning such threats; (3) implementing and promoting cybersecurity best practices; (4) notifying law enforcement; and (5) strengthening anti-money laundering, countering the financing of terrorism and counter-proliferation financing compliance.

    Updates to the Iran Sanctions Program

    The Iran sanctions program also underwent significant developments at the end of 2019 and beginning of 2020.

    In late 2019, OFAC issued a number of Iran-related FAQs designed to clarify certain aspects of the Iran sanctions program.[16]

    • FAQ 303 was updated on Nov. 27, 2019 to clarify that the provision of insurance, reinsurance or underwriting services to non-Iranian persons on OFAC’s SDN List is generally not a sanctionable activity under section 1246(a)(1) of the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 212. The provision of these services is, however, prohibited under this section if the services are provided to an Iranian person designated as an SDN, to or for a person designated as an SDN in connection with Iran’s support for international terrorism or WMD proliferation, or for any activity with respect to Iran for which sanctions have been imposed (e.g., certain activities relating to petroleum or petroleum products).[17]
    • FAQ 804 was updated on Nov. 27, 2019 to clarify that sanctions on COSCO Shipping Tanker (Dalian) Seaman & Ship Management Co. (“COSCO”) only applied to COSCO and any entities in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest. Sanctions did not apply to its parent (COSCO Shipping Corporation Ltd.) or to its other affiliates or subsidiaries, provided such entities are not owned 50% or more by one or more blocked persons.[18] The sanctions against COSCO were subsequently lifted on Jan. 31, 2020.
    • FAQ 805 was added on Nov. 27, 2019;[19] it explains that non-U.S. persons are generally not subject to sanctions if they provide goods or services to, or transact with, non-Iranian persons sanctioned under section 3 of E.O. 13846, which allows the Secretary of State to impose menu-based sanctions[20] relating to the Iranian automotive, petroleum and petrochemical sectors.[21] However, in the same FAQ, OFAC clarified that non-U.S. persons should make sure that their activities with respect to such non-Iranian persons do not involve (i) prohibited transactions by U.S. persons or U.S.-owned or controlled foreign entities (unless otherwise authorized by OFAC); (ii) the knowing provision of significant support to an Iranian on the SDN List; or (iii) the “knowing facilitation of a significant transaction for a person on the SDN List that has been designated in connection with Iran’s support for international terrorism or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including designated Iranian financial institutions or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or other activity for which sanctions have been imposed with respect to Iran (e.g., knowingly engaging in a significant transaction for the purchase of petroleum from Iran).”[22]
    • FAQs 810 and 811, relating to Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”) and E-Sail Shipping Limited (“E-Sail”), were issued on Dec. 11, 2019. FAQ 810 explains that the State Department’s designation of IRISL and E-Sail under E.O. 13382, effective June 8, 2020, would result in those entities being subject to the prohibitions under both the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”), pursuant to which those entities were previously designated, and also the prohibitions in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations (“WMDPSR”), pursuant to which the State Department designation was made. FAQ 811 clarifies that, in light of IRISL’s and E-Sail’s designation under E.O. 13382, unless otherwise authorized, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions involving those entities, including transactions for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine or medical devices that would otherwise be authorized pursuant to the ITSR.[23]

    In addition to the foregoing, in mid-January, President Trump took steps to expand the Iranian sanctions program by issuing E.O. 13902, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose blocking sanctions on anyone operating in the “construction, mining, manufacturing, or textiles sectors of the Iranian economy.”[24] This E.O. further allows the Secretary of the Treasury to designate any other sector of the Iranian economy as subject to these sanctions. Importantly, this E.O. also exposes non-U.S. companies to secondary sanctions if they knowingly facilitate certain transactions in the identified sectors or materially assist or support blocked entities or persons. The E.O. also specifically provides that the Secretary of Treasury is authorized to prohibit foreign financial institutions (“FFIs”) from opening correspondent accounts or payable accounts in the United States, or to impose strict conditions on the maintenance of such accounts, if the Secretary determines that the FFI knowingly conducted or facilitated any significant financial transaction that violates the sanctions prohibitions described above. Following the publication of E.O. 13902, on Jan. 16, 2020, OFAC issued an FAQ authorizing a 90-day wind-down period for activities prohibited by the E.O., which ended on April 9, 2020.[25]

    In the wake of the expansion of the Iran sanctions program, OFAC and the Department of State made high-profile designations relating to Iran under various sanctions programs. Those designations targeted Iranian and non-Iranian companies and persons who facilitated Iran’s petroleum sales, including designations relating to persons and entities in the petroleum and petrochemical industries;[26] provided support to or acted for or on behalf of IRGC-QF;[27] acted as a sales agent for Iranian SDN Mahan Air, which in turn was supporting the regime in Venezuela;[28] engaged in serious human rights abuses;[29] and engaged or attempted to engage in activities that have materially contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction[30] or have deprived Iranians of free and fair elections.[31]

    In June, OFAC also designated a number of Iranian maritime-related entities and vessels.[32] Among the vessels that were sanctioned were vessels that were used to deliver Iranian gasoline to the Maduro regime in Venezuela.[33] In addition, OFAC took action against various steel, aluminum and iron companies operating within Iran’s metals sector, including German and UAE-based entities and sales agents.[34]

    Also in May, Secretary of State Pompeo announced the end of the sanctions waiver covering any remaining JCPOA-originating nuclear projects in Iran. According to the press release, the sanctions waiver ended on July 27, 2020, following a 60-day wind-down period.[35]

    In the first half of 2020, OFAC also took a number of steps to clarify the bounds of permissible humanitarian and other activity relating to, among others, the Iran sanctions program. On Feb. 27, 2020, OFAC issued GL 8, which authorizes certain humanitarian-related transactions and activities involving the Central Bank of Iran.[36] OFAC issued this general license and its related FAQs in conjunction with the formalization of the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement (“SHTA”), an agreement between the United States and Switzerland to allow humanitarian aid to Iranian citizens.[37] In addition, in April 2020, in response to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, OFAC issued a fact sheet clarifying that certain humanitarian efforts directed at Iran are permissible. The fact sheet, which addresses permissible humanitarian assistance and trade under OFAC sanctions relating to Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, Syria, Cuba and Ukraine/Russia, outlines that persons and entities may provide medicine and medical devices to Iran under existing exemptions, exceptions and authorizations (including general licenses).[38] Additionally, Iran-based persons manufacturing “medicines, medical devices, or products used for sanitation, hygiene, medical care, medical safety, and manufacturing safety, including soap, hand sanitizer, ventilators, respirators, personal hygiene products, diapers, infant and childcare items, personal protective equipment and manufacturing safety systems,” that are created to be used in Iran and not for export are excluded from E.O. 13902’s definition of operating in the manufacturing sector of the Iranian economy. Furthermore, persons transacting or facilitating transactions to provide or sell “agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices” to Iran are exempted from sanctions under the same E.O.[39]

    Updates to the Russia/Ukraine Sanctions Program

    The tail end of 2019 saw targeted action by the U.S. government focused on the Russian gas pipelines. In December 2019, the U.S. Senate passed a defense bill that imposed sanctions on companies installing pipes for particular Russian gas pipelines (Nord Stream 2 and Turkstream).[40] Simultaneously, OFAC issued an FAQ regarding the implementation of the wind-down period in the defense bill. OFAC clarified that parties that knowingly sold, leased or provided vessels that are engaged in pipe laying at 100 feet or below for the construction of Nord Stream 2 or Turkstream must ensure that such vessels immediately cease construction-related activity, but that good-faith wind-down exceptions may be made to avoid a risk to safety of people, property and the environment.[41]

    OFAC was not particularly focused on Russian sanctions in the first half of 2020, especially in comparison to its focus in previous years. However, in January, OFAC made designations relating to Russia’s continued aggression toward Ukraine and attempted occupation of Crimea.[42] And, in mid-July, OFAC designated as SDNs various entities and persons associated with financier Yevgeny Prigozhin under, among others, Ukraine-sanctions program-related E.Os.[43]

    In addition, OFAC issued amended Ukraine-related GLs 13N and 15H on March 20, 2020 and July 16, 2020,[44] as well as amended FAQs[45] relating to those amendments. GL 13N permitted certain transactions and activities until July 22, 2020 related to (i) the divesting or transferring of debt, equity and other holdings in GAZ Group or entities owned or controlled by GAZ Group to non-U.S. persons; (ii) the facilitation of such transactions by a non-U.S. person to another non-U.S. person through July 22, 2020; (iii) the divesting or transferring of debt, equity, or other holdings of GAZ Group, or in entities in which GAZ Groups owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest, that were issued by GAZ Auto plant; and (iv) the facilitation of transfer of such holdings by a non-U.S. person to another U.S. person. GL 13O further extended these authorizations to Jan. 22, 2021.

    GL 15H and 15I authorized until July 22, 2020 and Jan. 22, 2021, respectively, certain activities necessary to the maintenance or wind-down of operations or existing contracts with GAZ Group and any entity in which GAZ Group owns a 50% or greater interest and that were in effect prior to April 6, 2018. GL 15H also authorized transactions and activities ordinarily incident and necessary to (i) specified research and development and related activities; and (ii) the installation of occupant safety systems, in vehicles owned by GAZ Group or any entities in which GAZ Group owns a 50% or greater interest.[46] GL 15I also (i) authorized until Jan. 22, 2021 a whole host of transactions and activities ordinarily incident and necessary to the manufacture and sale of vehicles, components and spare parts, produced by GAZ Group or any entity in which GAZ Group owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater interest; and (ii) establishes reporting and certification requirements for GAZ Group, including monthly certification to OFAC that GAZ Group is not acting for or on behalf of Oleg Deripaska or any other person included in OFAC’s list of SDNs.  

    Updates to the Syria Sanctions Program

    There were several updates to the Syria sanctions program in the fall of 2019 and first half of 2020. Specifically, on Oct. 14, 2019, President Trump issued E.O. 13894, which was precipitated by the actions of the Government of Turkey in conducting a military offensive in northeast Syria.[47] This E.O. authorizes sanctions on persons who engage in actions or policies that further threaten Syria’s peace, security, stability and territorial integrity, as well as the commission of human rights abuses relating to Syria. It also authorizes sanctions on (i) any subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of the Government of Turkey; (ii) current or former members of the Turkish government; (iii) persons who operate in certain sectors of the Turkish economy as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury; (iv) persons who have materially assisted, sponsored or provided financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person who is blocked pursuant to this E.O.; or (v) persons who are owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, any person who is blocked pursuant to the E.O.

    On June 4, 2020, OFAC issued regulations to implement this E.O., which became effective June 5, 2020.[48] In connection with the issuance of the regulations, OFAC noted that it intends to supplement these regulations.[49]

    In addition to the foregoing regulatory developments, OFAC also made various designations pursuant to the Syria sanctions program, including various individuals and entities who “are actively supporting the corrupt reconstruction efforts of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.”[50]

    Updates to Other Country-Specific Sanctions Programs

    Mali. On Feb. 6, 2020, OFAC issued regulations to implement E.O. 13882, which blocks the property of, and suspends entry into the United States for, persons determined by the Secretary of Treasury to be  undermining democratic processes or institutions in Mali, as well as those that threaten the peace, security or stability of Mali.[51] These regulations incorporate E.O. 13882’s requirements by confirming the government’s ability to block property during an ongoing investigation and details the process through which persons can unblock funds or ask for reconsideration as blocked persons.[52]

    Nicaragua. OFAC also made a number of designations and issued various general licenses in March 2020 and July 2020 related to the relatively new Nicaragua sanctions program, which began in 2018. Specifically:

    • On March 5, 2020, OFAC designated as SDNs the Nicaraguan National Police (“NNP”), the primary law enforcement entity in Nicaragua, and three of its commissioners, on the grounds that they had committed serious human rights abuses.[53] Simultaneously with these designations, OFAC issued two General Licenses (GL 1 and GL 2) exempting U.S. government conduct from sanctions prohibitions and designating a wind-down period to May 6, 2020 of transactions involving the NNP (including salary payments to its employees).[54]
    • On July 16, 2020, OFAC amended the Nicaragua sanctions regulations to incorporate the Nicaragua Human Rights and Anticorruption Act of 2018 and to add a general license authorizing transactions that are for the conduct of official business of the U.S. government.[55]
    • On July 17, 2020, OFAC designated certain members of Nicaraguan President Ortega’s Inner Circle, including his son, and related entities who OFAC determined were used “to distribute regime propaganda and launder money.”[56]

    Zimbabwe. Finally, on May 21, 2020, OFAC published amended regulations regarding sanctions on Zimbabwe, which removed a GL authorizing transactions involving the Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe and Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe.[57] These two entities had been removed from the SDN List.

    Additional Regulatory and Guidance Updates

    In addition to making designations under various non-country specific sanctions programs in the first half of 2020, OFAC also issued a number of advisories and FAQs, and implemented and removed regulations with broad applicability. In addition, President Trump issued two new executive orders, one relating to the International Criminal Court and one relating to “Hong Kong Normalization.”

    1. Issuance of Broad Advisories
    1. COVID-Related Advisory

    On April 20, 2020, OFAC issued a statement regarding compliance with U.S. sanctions regulatory requirements during the COVID-19 global pandemic.[58] The statement acknowledged that the COVID-19 pandemic can cause “technical and resource challenges” for organizations and, while it does not eliminate regulatory obligations, signaled that OFAC will be flexible in enforcing sanctions regulations. Among other things, in the statement, OFAC encouraged persons (including financial institutions and other businesses) affected by the pandemic to contact OFAC at specific numbers and email addresses in the event the person believes it will experience delays in its ability to meet regulatory deadlines.

    1. Shipping Advisory

    On May 14, 2020, OFAC, along with the Department of State and the U.S. Coast Guard, issued a comprehensive and groundbreaking global advisory targeted to address illicit shipping and sanctions evasion practices.[59] This advisory provided robust guidance on common illicit shipping practices as well as best practices for many of the actors in the shipping industry, including annexes addressing recommendations specific to maritime insurance companies, flag registry managers, port control authorities, shipping industry associations, regional and global commodity trading, supplier and brokering companies, financial institutions, ship owners, operators and charterers, classification societies, vessel captains and crewing companies. The advisory identifies Iran, North Korea and Syria as countries with which there are heightened risks of sanctions evasion and other illicit shipping practices. Among other practices, the advisory identifies the following as common deceptive shipping practices: (1) disabling or manipulating the Automatic Identification System (“AIS”) on vessels, (2) physically altering vessel identification, (3) falsifying cargo and vessel documents, (4) ship-to-ship transfers, (5) vessel irregularities, (6) false flag and flag hopping, and (7) complex ownership or management. In addition to the guidance specific to certain actors in the shipping industry, OFAC provides general practices for effective identification of sanctions evasion. These practices include (1) institutionalizing sanctions compliance programs; (2) establishing AIS best practices and contractual requirements; (3) monitoring ships throughout the transaction lifecycle; (4) implementing know-your-customer and counterparty practices; (5) exercising supply chain due diligence; (6) incorporating best practices in contractual language; and (7) industry information sharing.

    1. Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory

    On July 1, 2020, the U.S. Departments of State, Commerce, Homeland Security and the Treasury issued an advisory regarding risks for businesses with supply chain exposure to entities engaged in human rights abuses perpetrated by the People’s Republic of China in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (“Xinjiang”). The advisory states that businesses with such exposure “should be aware of the reputational, economic, and legal risks of involvement with entities that engage in human rights abuses, which could include Withhold Release Orders (WROs) [formal orders prohibiting importation of goods made with forced labor], civil or criminal investigations, and export controls.”[60] The advisory identifies three primary types of exposure and urges businesses to “apply industry human rights due diligence policies and procedures to address risks.”

    1. Issuance of Non-Country Specific FAQs
    2. FAQs Relating to Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations

    Following the amendment in 2019 to the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (“RPPR”), on February 20, 2020, OFAC published two FAQs designed to clarify certain aspects of the amendments.[61] FAQ 819 states that U.S. persons and those subject to U.S. jurisdiction (including those that are not U.S. financial institutions) must comply with all of the RPPR requirements, including the requirement to report rejected transactions to OFAC within 10 business days. FAQ 820 addresses what information should be included in rejected transaction reports; specifically, OFAC expects U.S. persons and those subject to U.S. jurisdiction to include all information required under Section 501.604(b) of the RPPR in the filer’s possession, as well as “information regarding the submitter of the report, the date the transaction was rejected, the legal authority or authorities under which the transaction was rejected, and any relevant documentation received in connection with the transaction.”

    1. FAQs and Designations Relating to Counter Terrorism Sanctions Program

    In late 2019, OFAC issued a series of FAQs in the Counter Terrorism sanctions program concerning artwork that is the property of, or subject to a property interest of, Specially Designated Global Terrorists (“SDGTs”).[62] FAQ 812 explains that U.S. persons are prohibited from transactions or dealings in the property or property interests of SDGTs, including artwork.[63] This FAQ additionally notes that FFIs could be subject to secondary sanctions for engaging in, or facilitating, such transactions. FAQ 813 encourages art institutions and private collectors to develop a compliance program to ensure compliance with OFAC’s guidance on avoiding transactions with SDGTs.[64] FAQ 814 requires that anyone in possession of artwork in which an SDGT has an interest must ensure that access to the art is denied to the SDGT and must comply with OFAC regulations (such as third-party sale or transfer restrictions) regarding blocked entities, including the requirement to file blocked property reports.[65]

    1. Implementation of Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act

    On April 8, 2020, OFAC published amended regulations to implement the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended. This amended regulation “adjusts for inflation the maximum amount of the civil monetary penalties that may be assessed under relevant OFAC regulations.”[66]

    1. Issuance of New Executive Orders
    2. Executive Order Relating to International Criminal Court

    On June 11, 2020, President Trump issued a new executive order, E.O. 13928, relating to persons associated with the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The E.O. permits the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Treasury and the Attorney General, to block the property of (a) any foreign person who they determine has directly engaged in any effort by the ICC to investigate, arrest, detain or prosecute any U.S. personnel or any personnel of a country that is an ally of the United States without the consent of the United States or the U.S. allies; (b) any person who has materially assisted any such activity; or (c) any foreign person owned or controlled by, or purporting to act on behalf of, any person blocked under this E.O.[67] This E.O. was issued as a result of President Trump’s determination that the ICC had made illegitimate assertions of jurisdiction over the personnel and allies of the United States, thereby “threaten[ing] to infringe upon the sovereignty of the United States and impede the critical national security and foreign policy work of the United States Government and allied officials, and thereby threaten the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”

    1. Executive Order on “Hong Kong Normalization”

    On July 14, 2020, President Trump issued E.O. 13936 relating to Hong Kong. According to the E.O., in light of the People’s Republic of China’s (“China”) decision to unilaterally and arbitrarily impose national security legislation on Hong Kong, Hong Kong “is no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify differential” (and more favorable) treatment, as compared to the treatment given to China. The E.O. declares that going forward, it “shall be the policy of the United States to suspend or eliminate different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong to the extent permitted by law and in the national security, foreign policy, and economic interest of the United States.” The E.O. also suspends application of section 201(a) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 to various specified statutes, thereby suspending differential treatment of Hong Kong with respect to various matters relating to export controls, travel and immigration, law enforcement and scientific and educational cooperation.[68] The E.O. further calls for the “head of agencies” to “commence all appropriate actions to further the purposes of this order.” It remains to be seen what actions the head of agencies will undertake to comply with this E.O.

    1. Removal of Terrorism Sanctions Regulations

    Earlier in the year, OFAC removed the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations from the CFR based on the termination of the national emergency that formed the basis for the regulations.[69]

    OFAC Enforcement Actions

    OFAC announced 13 settlements and findings of violation in the Review Period. Below are a few observations and takeaways from these cases:

    • Failing to self-disclose generally results in substantially higher penalties and less favorable treatment by OFAC. In all but three of the 13 actions in the Review Period, the violations were self-disclosed, which OFAC noted and stated that it considered when arriving at the penalties imposed. With respect to the three actions where the companies did not self-disclose, one resulted in the highest penalty ($7.8 million) of any other settlement during the Review Period, by a significant margin.[70] In another action, OFAC settled with the company for a value approximately double the commercial value of the apparent violation.[71] In the third action, the company that committed the violations had since dissolved, so financial penalties could not be imposed. Nevertheless, OFAC issued a finding of violation in which it warned that, absent the dissolution, the facts “would have justified a strong civil monetary penalty.”[72]
    • Companies are not absolved of enforcement risk simply because the sanctions program at issue were dissolved after the alleged violations occurred. In two of the 13 enforcement actions during the Review Period, the sanctions programs had been repealed at the time the settlement was arrived at, and, in one case, the penalty imposed was more than $1 million.[73]
    • Continuing a trend from 2019, one of the most common country-specific sanctions programs identified in the settlements during the Review Period was the Cuban sanctions program,[74] with four of the 13 actions involving the Cuba sanctions program.[75] Companies and their subsidiaries who are at risk of Cuban sanctions violations ought, therefore, to take extra precaution to avoid running afoul of this sanctions program, which has been the subject of active enforcement in recent years.[76]
    • While country-based sanctions programs are the frequent subject of enforcement actions, non-country specific programs were also the subject of multiple enforcement actions in the Review Period, including the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations[77]. Accordingly, when assessing sanctions compliance, these programs ought to also be considered.
    • OFAC expects companies to do more than rely on contractual representations when dealing with counterparties. It expects companies to implement additional controls and engage in additional diligence to provide comfort that U.S. sanctions laws are being met.[78]
    • In at least three of the cases that resulted in settlements in the Review Period,[79] the sanctions compliance failure was attributed, at least in part, to automated screening system failures or deficiencies. These cases highlight the fact that companies that use automated sanctions screening tools for compliance must take steps to evaluate systemic vulnerabilities and to confirm that their compliance tools are functioning properly, in a manner that will identify, alert and/or interdict transactions that violate U.S. sanctions.
    • The fact that a company has applied for and is awaiting a determination on a specific license application might not be a defense to an enforcement action where the company continues to engage in the conduct that is the subject of sanctions while awaiting a determination on such license application. That is particularly true where the license application is ultimately denied.[80]
    • Non-U.S. persons who process financial transactions to, through or involving U.S. financial institutions that relate to commercial activity with an OFAC-sanctioned country, region or person, may be — and have been — penalized by OFAC for violating U.S. sanctions. This is true even where no entity or person subject to U.S. jurisdiction was involved in the underlying commercial activity. In short, it is OFAC’s view that “the inclusion of a U.S. financial institution in any payments associated with […] commercial activities [that violate U.S. sanctions] can result in or cause prohibited activity.”[81]
    • Companies that themselves operate, or who have subsidiaries who operate, in higher risk jurisdictions ought to be particularly attuned to sanctions compliance, including by keeping up to date on developments with sanctions regulations, making sure they understand the full scope of sanctions prohibitions, and dedicating sufficient resources to U.S. sanctions compliance.[82]

    In addition to the above observations, OFAC offers its own views of the specific takeaways from each action at the end of the settlement announcements. Those takeaways offer additional insight into OFAC’s enforcement priorities and the lessons to be gained from prior enforcement actions.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Jennifer M. Opheim, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Hannah M. Thibideau and AnnaLise Bender-Brown.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] For a summary of other key sanctions updates in 2019, see “Sanctions Update: Iran, Venezuela, Ukraine, Nicaragua and Cuba,” SRZ Alert, Oct. 11, 2019; “Sanctions Update: Venezuela and Ukraine/Russia,” SRZ Alert, June 6, 2018, available here; “Sanctions Update: Iran, Venezuela and Russia,” SRZ Alert, Nov. 13, 2018, available here; and “Sanctions Update: Venezuela,” SRZ Alert, April 4, 2019, available here.

    [2] Read more about this critical change in “Sanctions Update: OFAC Sanctions Venezuela’s State-Owned Oil Company,” SRZ Alert, Feb. 8, 2019, available here. OFAC followed this pronouncement with an amendment to the Venezuela sanctions regulations in November 2019, codifying six executive orders, adding a general license authorizing certain U.S. government activity in Venezuela, and inserting an interpretive provision regarding settlement agreements and other processes transferring, alerting or affecting property or interests in blocked property. U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), “Publication of Amended Venezuela Sanctions Regulations,” (Nov. 21, 2019), available here.

    [3] See GL 34A (Nov. 5, 2019) (permitting transactions with certain individuals that E.O. 13884 previously classified as part of the GOV), available here; GL 35 (Nov. 5, 2019) (permitting U.S. persons to conduct certain administrative transactions with the GOV, such as payment of taxes, fees and import duties), available here.

    [4] See FAQ No. 808 (Dec. 9, 2019) (stating that neither a U.S. person bringing suit nor a court hearing a case involving the GOV needs a specific license but a specific license would be needed to enter into a settlement agreement, lien, judgment or other enforcement that would affect block property or property interests), available here; FAQ No. 809 (Dec. 9, 2019) (clarifying that U.S. persons must obtain a specific license before holding an auction or sale or taking steps in furtherance of an auction or sale of a writ of attachment on shares of a blocked GOV entity), available here.

    [5] In addition to the actions set forth below, OFAC also issued a number of other general licenses, or amended general licenses, that (a) permit certain entities to engage in certain kinds of transactions with GOV or other entities designated pursuant to the Venezuela sanctions program, or (b) have expired or been revoked. See, e.g., GL 8F, available here (authorizing certain activities involving PdVSA for the following entities to Dec. 1, 2020: Chevron Corporation, Halliburton, Schlumberger Limited, Baker Hughes and Weatherford International); GL 15C, available here (authorizing transactions between MasterCard Incorporated, Visa, American Express, Western Union and MoneyGram International, on the one hand, and certain Venezuelan financial institutions, on the other hand); GL 20B, available here (authorizing a number of nongovernmental organizations, intergovernmental agencies, development banks, and international legal bodies to engage in certain otherwise prohibited transactions and activities with the GOV); and GL 36A, available here (authorizing wind-down operations pertaining Rosneft Trading S.A. or TNK Trading International S.A. until May 20, 2020). Moreover, on May 12, 2020, OFAC revoked GL 13E and issued amended GL 3H and GL 9G, as well as two accompanying FAQs, available here. These changes were in response to a corporate restructuring by Nynas AB, removing it from Petróleos de Venezuela SA’s control and ownership. As a result of this restructuring, GL 13E was no longer necessary, and the reference to Nynas AB was removed as unnecessary in GL 3H and 9G. And, on July 2, 2020, OFAC revoked GL 37, relating to Delos Voyager Shipping Ltd, Romina Maritime Co Inc., and other specified vessels, available here, which had been issued on June 18, 2020 and was scheduled to expire on July 21, 2020. Those entities, among others, had been added as SDNs on June 18, 2020, but were removed the same day GL 37 was revoked.

    [6] GL 16C (March 12, 2020), available here.

    [7] GL 5C (April 10, 2020), available here; GL 5D (July 15, 2020) available here.

    [8] FAQ No. 595 (April 10, 2020), available here.

    [9] See Treasury, “Treasury Targets Maritime Entities for Supporting Illegitimate Maduro Regime in the Venezuela Oil Trade,” (June 2, 2020), available here; Treasury, “Venezuela-related Designations and Designations Removals; Issuance of Venezuela-related General License and Frequently Asked Question,” (June 18, 2020), available here.  OFAC also designated as SDNs, for example, various individuals for providing support to Maduro’s son and “the corrupt activities of members of the illegitimate” Maduro regime. See Treasury, “Treasury Targets Individuals Supporting Illegitimate Maduro Regime’s Corruption,” (July 23, 2020), available here.

    [10] U.S. Department of State, “Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela,” (March 31, 2020), available here.

    [11] 31 C.F.R. § 510.214.

    [12] Id. In May 2020, to assist private parties in complying with this provision, OFAC added descriptive text to 490 SDNs on the SDN List with whom transactions are prohibited for persons owned or controlled by financial institutions.  

    [13] See Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Entities for Facilitating the Exportation of Workers from North Korea,” (Jan. 14, 2020), available here.

    [14] See Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Individuals Laundering Cryptocurrency for Lazarus Group,” (March 2, 2020), available here.

    [15] U.S. Department of State et al., “DPRK Cyber Threat Advisory,” (March 15, 2020), available here.

    [16] See Treasury, “Issuance of New and Amended Iran-related Frequently Asked Questions,” (Nov. 27, 2019), available here.

    [17] FAQ No. 303 (Nov. 27, 2019), available here.

    [18] FAQ No. 804 (Nov. 27, 2019), available here.

    [19] FAQ No. 805 (Nov. 27, 2019), available here.

    [20] OFAC terms certain sanctions “menu-based sanctions” when the applicable authority prescribes a menu of sanctions that the U.S. government may impose in response to certain conduct specified in the authority.

    [21] E.O. 13846, “Reimposing Certain Sanctions With Respect to Iran,” (Aug. 6, 2018), available here.

    [22] See FAQ No. 805, supra note 19.

    [23] See FAQ No. 810 (Dec. 11, 2019), available here; FAQ No. 811 (Dec. 11, 2019), available here.

    [24] E.O. 13902, “Imposing Sanctions With Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran,” (Jan. 10, 2020), available here.

    [25] FAQ No. 816 (Jan. 16, 2020), available here.

    [26] For example: (i) on Jan. 23, 2020, OFAC took action against international petrochemical and petroleum companies that had been involved in transferring hundreds of millions of dollars of exports from the National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”), see Treasury, “Treasury Targets International Network Supporting Iran’s Petrochemical and Petroleum Industries,” (Jan. 23, 2020), available here; and (ii) on March 19, 2020, OFAC took action against five United Arab Emirates-based companies that OFAC determined had facilitated Iran’s petroleum and petro-chemical sales, see Treasury, “Treasury Targets Companies Facilitating Iran’s Petroleum Sales,” (March 19, 2020), available here.

    [27] Treasury, “Treasury Designates Vast Iranian Petroleum Shipping Network That Supports IRGC-QF and Terror Proxies,” (Sept. 4, 2019), available here.

    [28] Treasury, “Treasury Designates China-based Mahan Air General Sales Agent,” (May 29, 2020), available here.

    [29] Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Iran’s Interior Minister and Senior Law Enforcement Officials in Connection with Serious Human Rights Abuses,” (May 20, 2020), available here.

    [30] U.S. Department of State, “Keeping the World Safe From Iran’s Nuclear Program,” (May 27, 2020), available here.

    [31] Treasury, “Treasury Designates Senior Iranian Regime Officials Preventing Free and Fair Elections in Iran,” (Feb. 20, 2020), available here.

    [32] Treasury, “Non-Proliferation Designations; Iran-related Designations Updates,” (June 8, 2020), available here.

    [33] Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Five Iranian Captains Who Delivered Gasoline to the Maduro Regime in Venezuela,” (June 24, 2020), available here.

    [34] Treasury, “Treasury Targets Major Iranian Metals Companies and Foreign Subsidiaries and Sales Agents,” (June 25, 2020), available here.

    [35] U.S. Department of State, “Keeping the World Safe From Iran’s Nuclear Program,” (May 27, 2020), available here.

    [36] GL 8 (Feb. 27, 2020), available here; see also FAQ No. 821 (Feb. 27, 2020), available here.

    [37] Treasury, “United States and Switzerland Finalize the Swiss Humanitarian Trade Arrangement,” (Feb. 27, 2020), available here.

    [38] Treasury, “Fact Sheet: Provision of Humanitarian Assistance and Trade to Combat COVID-19,” (March 16, 2020), available here (“COVID Fact Sheet”); see also FAQ No. 830 (June 5, 2020), available here.

    [39] COVID Fact Sheet at 4.

    [40] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92 (2019).

    [41] FAQ No. 815 (Dec. 20, 2019), available here.

    [42] Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Illegitimate Russian-Backed Crimean Officials and Railroad Company Linking Crimea to Russia,” (Jan. 29, 2020), available here.

    [43] Treasury, “Treasury Targets Financier’s Illicit Sanctions Evasion Activity,” (July 15, 2020), available here.

    [44] GL 13N (March 20, 2020), available here; GL 13O (July 16, 2020), available here.

    [45] See FAQ No. 570 (describing activities authorized by GL 13O), FAQ No. 571 (relating to GL 13O and blocked property), FAQ No. 586 (describing activities authorized by, and requirements of, GL 15I), FAQ No. 588 (relating to GL 15I and blocked property), FAQ No. 589 (relating to effect of GL 15I on sanctions under CAATSA), FAQ No. 590 (relating to effect of GL 15I on obligation to make payments to blocked accounts), FAQ No. 591 (relating to GL 15I and exportation of goods to GAZ Group), FAQ No. 592 (relating to GL 15I and permissibility of receipt of regularly scheduled payments, accelerated payments, and voluntary prepayments), and FAQ No. 625 (defining “maintenance” as the term is used in GL 15I).

    [46] GL 15H (March 20, 2020), available here; GL 15I (July 16, 2020), available here.

    [47] E.O. 13894, “Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Syria,” (Oct. 14, 2019), available here.

    [48] See 31 C.F.R. Part 569.

    [49] See Treasury, “Publication of Syria-related Sanctions Regulations,” (June 4, 2020), available here.

    [50] See, e.g., Treasury, “Treasury Continues to Pressure Investors and Companies Supporting the Assad Regime’s Corrupt Reconstruction Efforts,” (July 29, 2020), available here.

    [51] E.O. 13882, “Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Mali,” (July 26, 2019), available here.

    [52] 31 C.F.R. Part 555. When announcing the issuance of these regulations, OFAC expressed its intent to publish a more comprehensive set of regulations. See Treasury, “Publication of Mali Sanctions Regulations,” (Feb. 6, 2020), available here.

    [53] Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Nicaraguan National Police and Police Commissioners Involved in Human Rights Abuse,” (March 5, 2020), available here.

    [54] Treasury, “Nicaragua-related Designations; Issuance of Nicaragua-related General Licenses; ​Issuance of Nicaragua-related Frequently Asked Question,” (March 5, 2020), available here; GL 1 (March 5, 2020), available here; GL 2 (March 5, 2020), available here. On March 25, 2020, OFAC issued amended Nicaragua-related General Licenses 1A and 2A, “to make certain minor technical amendments to earlier versions of such general licenses.” See Treasury, ​”Issuance of Amended Nicaragua-related General Licenses,” (March 25, 2020), available here; GL 1A (March 25, 2020), available here; GL 2A (March 25, 2020), available here.

    [55] Treasury, “Amendment of Nicaragua Sanctions Regulations; Amendment of Ukraine-related General Licenses,” (July 16, 2020), available here; see 31 C.F.R. Part 582.

    [56] Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Members of Nicaragua President Ortega’s Inner Circle,” (July 17, 2020), available here.

    [57] Treasury, “Publication of Amended Zimbabwe Sanctions Regulations,” (May 21, 2020), available here. Earlier in the year, OFAC also made certain designations pursuant to the Zimbabwe sanctions program. See Treasury, “Treasury Sanctions Two Individuals for Human Rights Abuse in Zimbabwe,” (March 11, 2020), available here.

    [58] Treasury, “The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Encourages Persons to Communicate OFAC Compliance Concerns Related to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19),” (March 20, 2020), available here. For a fuller discussion of this advisory, see “Sanctions Update: US Sanctions Compliance During COVID-19,” SRZ Alert, March 24, 2020.

    [59] Treasury et al., “Sanctions Advisory for the Maritime Industry, Energy and Metals Sectors, and Related Communities,” (May 14, 2020), available here.

    [60] See Treasury, Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory, “Risks and Considerations for Businesses with Supply Chain Exposure to Entities Engaged in Forced Labor and other Human Rights Abuses in Xinjiang,” at 1-2 (July 1, 2020), available here. Consistent with the warnings in the Advisory, on July 31, 2020, OFAC designated as SDNs various individuals and an entity, Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (“XPCC”) pursuant to the Global Magnitsky sanctions program. See Treasury, “Global Magnitsky Designations; Issuance of Global Magnitsky General License, Issuance of Global Magnitsky Frequently Asked Question,” (July 31, 2020), available here. According to an FAQ that OFAC issued on the same day, XPCC was designated for its “connection to serious human rights abuse in the Xinjian Uyghur Autonomous Region.” See FAQ No. 835 (July 31, 2020),available here. Pursuant to Global Magnitsky GL 2, also issued on July 31, 2020, U.S. persons are allowed to engage in transactions that are ordinarily incident and necessary (i) to the wind-down of transactions involving any entity in which XPCC owns, directly or indirectly, a 50% or greater ownership interest (“Blocked XPCC Subsidiaries”); (ii) to divest or transfer debt equity, or other holdings in a Blocked XPCC Subsidiary to a non-US person; or (iii) to facilitate such transfers by a non-U.S. person to another U.S. person, all until Sept. 30, 2020. GL 2 does not authorize any transactions with XPCC itself. See GL 2 (July 31, 2020), available here.

    [61] Treasury, “Issuance of Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPPR)​-related Frequently Asked Questions,” (Feb. 20, 2020), available here; see FAQ No. 819 (Feb. 20, 2020), available here, and FAQ No. 820 (Feb. 20, 2020), available here.

    [62] Treasury, “Counter Terrorism Designations; Issuance of Counter Terrorism-related Frequently Asked Questions; Cyber-related Designations Removals,” (Dec. 13, 2019), available here.

    [63] FAQ No. 812 (Dec. 13, 2019), available here.

    [64] FAQ No. 813 (Dec. 13, 2019), available here.

    [65] FAQ No. 814 (Dec. 13, 2019), available here.

    [66] See 31 C.F.R. Part 501.

    [67] See E.O. 13928, “Blocking Property of Certain Persons Associated With the International Criminal Court,” (June 11, 2020), available here.

    [68] See E.O. 13936, “The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization,” (July 14, 2020), available here.

    [69] Treasury, “Removal of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations,” (March 9, 2020), available here.

    [70] See Treasury, “Enforcement Information For February 26, 2020,” (Feb. 26, 2020) (settlement with Société Internationale de Télécommunications Aéronautiques SCRL for $7.8 million for apparent violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations) (“SITA Settlement”), available here.

    [71] See Treasury, “OFAC Settles with Essentra FZE Company Limited with Respect to Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the North Korea Sanctions Regulations,” (July 16, 2020) (settlement with Essentra FZE for $665,112 for apparent violations of the North Korea sanctions regulations) (“Essentra Settlement”), available here.

    [72] See Treasury, “Aero Sky Aircraft Maintenance, Inc. Receives a Finding of Violation Regarding Violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations,” (Dec. 12, 2019) (finding of violations of the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations) (“Aero Sky Finding”), available here.

    [73] See Treasury, “Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Apollo Aviation Group, LLC,” (Nov. 7, 2019) (settlement for $210,600 relating to 12 apparent violations of sanctions relating to Sudan) (“Apollo Settlement”), available here; Treasury, “Enforcement Information For January 27, 2020,” (Jan. 27, 2020) (announcing settlement with Eagle Shipping International (USA) LLC for $1.25 million for 36 apparent violations of the now-repealed Burmese sanctions regulations) (“Eagle Shipping Settlement”), available here.

    [74] The violations in the enforcement actions related to violations of multiple sanctions programs, including sanctions programs relating to Iran, Sudan, Burma, Cuba, North Korea, the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations, among others.

    [75] See Treasury, “Settlements between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Allianz Global Risks U.S. Insurance Company, and, separately, Chubb Limited,” (Dec. 9, 2019), available here; Treasury, “Enforcement Information For December 9, 2019,” (Dec. 9, 2019), available here; U Treasury, “OFAC Settles with BIOMIN America, Inc. with Respect to Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations,” (May 6, 2020), available here; Treasury, “OFAC Settles with Amazon.com, Inc. with Respect to Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs,” (July 8, 2020), available here.

    [76] We also note that, on July 30, 2020, OFAC designated Havana International Bank, Ltd. pursuant to the Cuba sanctions program. See Treasury, “Cuba Designation Update,” (July 30, 2020), available here.

    [77] See Treasury, “Enforcement Information For November 25, 2019,” (Nov. 25, 2019) ($466,912 settlement with Apple, Inc. for apparent violations of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations) (“Apple Settlement”), available here; Aero Sky Finding, supra note 72 (violations of Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations); Treasury, “Enforcement Information For January 21, 2020,” (Jan. 21, 2020) (settlement with Park Strategies, LLC, a New York lobbying firm, for $12,150, as a result of negotiating and entering into a contract to provide lobbying services to, and received payments from, a Somalian SDGT, in violation of Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations), available here; SITA Settlement, supra note 70 (apparent violations of Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations); Treasury, “OFAC Issues a Finding of Violation to American Express Travel Related Services Company for Violations of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators Sanctions Regulations,” (March 30, 2020) (“American Express Settlement”), available here; Treasury, “OFAC Settles with Amazon.com, Inc. with Respect to Potential Civil Liability for Apparent Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs,” (July 8, 2020) (“Amazon Settlement”), available here.

    [78] See Apollo Settlement, supra note 73. In the Apollo matter, for example, Apollo had leased airplane engines to a UAE-based entity that were ultimately subleased and installed on a Sudan Airways plane, an SDN at the time the transactions took place.[78] The lease agreements contained provisions prohibiting the UAE entity from maintaining, operating, flying or transferring the engines to any countries subject to U.S. or UN sanctions, but OFAC nevertheless criticized Apollo for not “ensur[ing] the engines were utilized in a manner that complied with OFAC’s regulations” or taking steps to “periodically monitor or otherwise verify the lessee’s and sublessee’s adherence” to the contractual undertakings.

    [79] See Apple Settlement, supra note 77; American Express Settlement, supra note 77; Amazon Settlement, supra note 75. In the Amazon matter, for example, the sanctions violations at issue apparently stemmed from the fact that Amazon’s automated sanctions screening processes “failed to fully analyze all transaction and customer data relevant to compliance with OFAC’s sanctions regulations.” By way of example, the screening processes did not pick up variations of spellings of words, failed to identify shipments to the Embassy of Iran located in third countries, and, in several hundred instances, failed to flag correctly spelled names and addresses on OFAC’s sanctions list.

    [80] See Eagle Shipping Settlement, supra note 73.

    [81] See Essentra Settlement, supra note 71.

    [82] See Treasury, “Settlement Agreement between the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and Whitford Worldwide Company, LLC,” (July 28, 2020), available here.


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