Content Type: Article

  • Epic Punitive Damages Award Violates Due Process

    Epic Punitive Damages Award Violates Due Process

    ARTICLE

    Epic Punitive Damages Award Violates Due Process

    Sep 3, 2020

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Addressing the appropriateness of three separate damages awards totaling $520 million, the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of $140 million in compensatory damages, but found that $280 million in punitive damages does not meet the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Epic Systems Corp. v. Tata Consultancy Services Ltd., Case Nos. 19-1528, 19-1613 (Aug. 20, 2020) (Kanne, J.).

    Epic Systems is a leading developer of electronic health record software, which it licenses to top hospitals in the United States. Each customer-licensed module is specific to the customer’s needs and can be customized to ensure proper integration with the customer’s systems. In order to facilitate customization and updates to the software, Epic provides a web portal called “UserWeb,” which provides access to various resources including administrative guides, training materials, software updates and forums. UserWeb also contains confidential information about the health-record software itself, and as such, Epic restricts access to the UserWeb portal via credentialed logins. Those with access are also required to keep all UserWeb information confidential.

    In 2003, Kaiser Permanente—the largest managed healthcare organization in the United States—obtained a license to use Epic’s software. Due to the size and complexity of integrating and maintaining the software, Kaiser hired Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) to help with updates and integration. TCS has its own electronic health record software, Med Mantra, which was known to Epic. Accordingly, Kaiser imposed numerous rules for TCS to follow in order to maintain the confidentiality of Epic’s software. TCS employees claimed that they could perform their required tasks faster if they had full access to UserWeb, which Kaiser repeatedly asked Epic to grant to TCS. Epic repeatedly declined this request.

    Undeterred, TCS was able to find another way into Epic’s UserWeb. TCS hired an employee who had full access to UserWeb, which he gained from working for a different organization that also helped manage Kaiser’s integration of Epic’s software. While in his previous position, the employee had falsely claimed to be a Kaiser employee, thus allowing him full access to UserWeb. The employee shared these credentials with numerous TCS employees, who then had unfettered access to UserWeb, which contained confidential information relating to Epic’s healthcare software.

    TCS used this information to generate a “comparative analysis” document, an 11-page spreadsheet that compares TCS’s software, Med Mantra, to Epic’s software. TCS wanted to sell Med Mantra directly to Kaiser, and the first step was to be sure that “key gaps” in the Med Mantra software were addressed before the attempted sale. After viewing a presentation that included the comparative analysis document, one TCS employee alerted Kaiser and Epic to the existence of the document and the fact that TCS had gained access to UserWeb.

    A few months later, Epic filed suit against TCS, alleging that TCS used fraudulent means to access and steal Epic’s trade secrets and other confidential information. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Epic on all claims. During the damages trial, Epic’s expert calculated the benefit received by TCS by determining the costs to Epic in developing the specific software modules described in the comparative analysis, less costs that did not benefit TCS and technology decay over time. TCS claimed that this methodology was flawed because it failed to account for reduced labor costs in India. The jury initially returned a $940 million damages award to Epic: $140 million in compensatory damages based on the use of the comparative analysis, $100 million in compensatory damages for “other uses” of Epic’s confidential information and $700 million in punitive damages. The district court reduced the punitive damages award to $280 million based on a Wisconsin statutory cap on punitive damages and struck the $100 million compensatory damages award. Both sides appealed.

    On appeal, TCS argued that no reasonable jury could find that the $140 million compensatory damages award was warranted based on what TCS identified as a “stale marketing document” because the calculation was based on Epic’s costs rather than TCS’s benefit. The Seventh Circuit made it clear that “avoided research and development costs have been awarded when the defendants gained a significant head start in their operations,” as was the case here. Thus, the jury could have based its award on the benefit to TCS from avoided research and development costs, not the cost Epic incurred when creating the same information. Furthermore, Epic’s expert presented evidence that TCS received a $200 million benefit and the jury could have factored in the reduced labor costs in India—which TCS’s expert calculated at a 30% reduction—to arrive at the $140 million compensatory damages number. Thus, the Court affirmed the jury’s award of $140 million in compensatory damages for use of the comparative analysis document. Despite this award, the Court found that the $100 million compensatory damages award based on “other uses” was the result of speculative evidence and therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling striking this portion of the award.

    TCS also contested the $280 million punitive damages award for various reasons, one being that the award was not in line with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court identified three “guideposts” for determining whether there is a due process violation with respect to punitive damages awards: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the disparity between the actual harm suffered and the punitive award and (3) the difference between the award authorized by the jury and the penalties imposed in comparable cases. The Seventh Circuit explained that the first of these guideposts is the most important and contains five factors for consideration: Whether the harm caused was physical or economic, whether there was reckless disregard for the safety of others, whether the target was financially vulnerable, whether the conduct involved repeated actions or an isolated incident, and whether the harm was the result of malice, trickery or deceit. The Court found that while the first three factors favored TCS, the final two weighed in favor of Epic, as TCS’s conduct was a repeated course of wrongful acts and TCS had access to Epic’s confidential information for years without Epic’s knowledge. Thus, the first guidepost justifies a punitive damages award of some form.

    The Seventh Circuit next analyzed the second and third guideposts: The disparity between actual harm suffered and the damages award and comparison to other cases. The Court found that determining the harm is difficult because the $140 million compensatory damages award is based on benefit to TCS, not harm to Epic. However, the Court noted that in these instances, “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages will satisfy due process.” Furthermore, when compensatory damages are substantial, as is the case here, “a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.” Thus, the Court limited the punitive damages to a 1:1 ratio with the $140 million compensatory damages award and remanded to the district court to amend the award accordingly.

    Practice Note: With respect to the second guidepost, the Court noted that TCS made no argument that there should be another number, other than the $140 million in compensatory damages, in the denominator of the ratio equation. Thus the Court seemed to infer that parties should additionally consider introducing evidence of the actual harm to the plaintiff, even in unjust enrichment cases, in the event that punitive damages are ultimately awarded by the jury.

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  • OCC Now Open to Receiving National Payments Charter Applications, But State Banking Regulators Mull a Legal Challenge

    OCC Now Open to Receiving National Payments Charter Applications, But State Banking Regulators Mull a Legal Challenge

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OCC Now Open to Receiving National Payments Charter Applications, But State Banking Regulators Mull a Legal Challenge

    September 3, 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    According to an Aug. 31, 2020 article published by Politico,[1] acting comptroller of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) Brian Brooks has indicated that the OCC is ready to begin processing applications for what is being referred to as the OCC’s “payments charter.” The payments charter is presumably being offered as a new type of special purpose national bank (“SPNB”) charter, and would be expected to gain interest from state-licensed money transmitters as well as payment processors and financial technology (“fintech”) companies that do not seek to take deposits or lend money. In the article, Mr. Brooks is quoted as saying, “We’ve satisfied ourselves that we don’t need a new regulation or a new statute [to offer the payments charter].” These recent comments and developments have elicited negative reaction from state banking regulators across the country, including the New York State Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”), which last year won a U.S. District Court case blocking the OCC from granting its previously proposed SPNB charter for fintechs, better known as the “fintech charter.”[2] That case is currently on appeal.[3]

    As provided in our June 29, 2020 Alert,[4] Mr. Brooks previously indicated that there would be two versions of the payments charter — Version 1.0 would be a “national version of a state money transmission license” and Version 2.0, which could be rolled out approximately 18 months later, would involve chartered companies having direct access to the Federal Reserve System (“Fed”). While his recent comments do not explicitly touch upon there being two distinct versions of the payments charter, Mr. Brooks told Politico that he would expect it to take one to two years of Fed supervision before the Fed would be comfortable granting such companies direct access.

    In response to Mr. Brooks’ recent comments, John Ryan, President and CEO of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”), the national trade association which represents the nation’s state banking regulators, issued a press release stating that CSBS is opposed to the OCC moving ahead with its payments charter.[5] In its release, CSBS emphasized that state banking regulators are opposed to the OCC’s “unconstitutional expansion of power” and noted that the payments charter “is no different than the [previously proposed] fintech charter already rejected in federal court and subject to a nationwide order preventing the OCC from accepting applications from a company that does not take deposits.” Margaret Liu, deputy general counsel at CSBS, also told Politico that the state banking regulators believe that the OCC is stepping outside its authority by trying to charter non-depository institutions.

    These developments have also specifically drawn the attention of the NYDFS. As noted above, the OCC has been blocked from granting any fintech charters while it appeals the judgment rendered against it by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Mr. Brooks acknowledged the ruling to Politico, but noted that it does not apply on a nationwide basis. A few hours after the Politico article was published, NYDFS Superintendent Linda Lacewell retweeted the following post made by Graham Steele, director of the Corporations and Society Initiative at Stanford Graduate School of Business, regarding Mr. Brooks’ comments: “A few months into his service in an acting capacity, a bank regulator (and former cryptocurrency lawyer) pushes ahead with a legally dubious plan to give tech companies banking charters.” In her retweet, Superintendent Lacewell also pointed out that the OCC’s appeal is “fully briefed and pending in the Second Circuit.”

    Such opposition does not appear to deter Mr. Brooks, who noted that it “seems really weird” to him that the OCC “can supervise the payments activities of JPMorgan, but [it] can’t supervise the payments activity of Square.” Mr. Brooks also told Politico he is “increasingly thinking of [the OCC] as an activities regulator, not an entity regulator.” Mr. Brooks’ recent comments are likely to continue to keep the interest of both industry stakeholders and regulators. In the meantime, it is likely that, as with the fintech charter (which was originally proposed in 2016 and finalized in 2018, but has not elicited a single applicant), potential payments charter applicants will be deterred until the Supreme Court definitively rules on whether the OCC has the power to grant such non-depository charters.

    Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Joseph P. Vitale, Kara A. Kuchar and Adam J. Barazani.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See https://www.politico.com/news/2020/08/31/currency-comptroller-reshape-banking-406393.

    [2] Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182934 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2019).

    [3] On appeal as Lacewell v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, case number 19-4271, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

    [4] See /insights/occ-now-open-to-receiving-national-payments-charter-applications/.

    [5] See /insights/occ-now-open-to-receiving-national-payments-charter-applications/.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam J. Barazani

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Off-Duty Conduct: COVID-19 and Social Media Ranting – What’s an Employer to Do?

    ARTICLE

    Off-Duty Conduct: COVID-19 and Social Media Ranting – What’s an Employer to Do?

    September 2, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Brian Mead

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • AML Update: FinCEN Issues First-Ever Enforcement Guidelines and Federal Banking Agencies Update Enforcement Guidance

    AML Update: FinCEN Issues First-Ever Enforcement Guidelines and Federal Banking Agencies Update Enforcement Guidance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    AML Update: FinCEN Issues First-Ever Enforcement Guidelines and Federal Banking Agencies Update Enforcement Guidance

    September 2, 2020

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Aug. 18, 2020, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) issued a statement describing its approach to enforcing the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”) and its implementing regulations (“FinCEN Statement”),[1] marking the first time that FinCEN, which administers the BSA, has issued such a statement. The FinCEN Statement is notable because it provides regulated financial institutions with a better understanding of how FinCEN exercises its enforcement authority and the key factors that FinCEN weighs when deciding how to resolve an enforcement action.

    The FinCEN Statement follows an Aug. 13, 2020 joint statement by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (collectively, the “Agencies”) setting forth the Agencies’ policy on the issuance of mandatory cease-and-desist orders to depository institutions to address noncompliance with Bank Secrecy Act/anti-money laundering (“BSA/AML”) compliance obligations (“Joint Statement”).[2] though the Joint Statement does not formally apply more broadly to other enforcement actions that the Agencies may take, such as the issuance of civil money penalties, it is nonetheless notable because it, too, provides depository institutions with additional guidance related to the issues the Agencies consider in resolving BSA/AML-related enforcement actions.[3]

    FinCEN Statement

    The FinCEN Statement provides valuable insight and guidance into FinCEN’s enforcement approach — it explains some background information on BSA compliance, generally; identifies the actions FinCEN may take to resolve actual or possible violations of the BSA or its implementing regulations; and details the factors that FinCEN considers when evaluating an appropriate disposition of an enforcement action.

    The FinCEN Statement makes clear that FinCEN may take enforcement action, including imposing civil money penalties, against any “financial institution” as covered by the BSA and its implementing regulations, nonfinancial trades or businesses and any other persons that violate the BSA, including partners, directors, officers or employees of such financial institutions or businesses that participate in BSA violations. It states that “[r]egulated parties will be afforded an opportunity to respond to and contest factual findings or legal conclusions underlying any FinCEN enforcement action.” Importantly, the FinCEN Statement also confirms that FinCEN’s enforcement actions “seek to establish a violation of law based on applicable statutes and regulations,” and that FinCEN will not consider noncompliance with standards set forth solely “in a guidance document as itself a violation of law.”[4]

    The FinCEN Statement identifies the following actions that FinCEN may take in resolving an enforcement action:

    • No Action. FinCEN may close a matter with no additional action. FinCEN may reopen the matter if FinCEN obtains new material information concerning the matter or becomes aware of additional or subsequent violations.
    • Warning Letter. FinCEN may issue a warning through a supervisory letter or similar communication.
    • Equitable Remedies. FinCEN may seek an injunction or equitable relief to enforce compliance when FinCEN believes an entity or individual has violated, is violating or will violate the BSA or any BSA regulation or order.
    • Settlements. As part of a settlement, FinCEN may require both remedial undertakings and civil money penalties.
    • Civil Money Penalties. FinCEN may assess a civil money penalty.
    • Criminal Referral. If circumstances warrant, FinCEN may refer a matter to appropriate law enforcement agencies for criminal investigation and/or criminal prosecution.

    FinCEN will also consider whether to impose “compliance commitments” to ensure full compliance with BSA obligations.

    Finally, the FinCEN Statement enumerates the following, non-exhaustive list of the factors that it considers when evaluating how to resolve an enforcement action:

    • Nature and seriousness of the violations, including the extent of possible harm to the public and the amounts involved.
    • Impact or harm of the violations on FinCEN’s mission to safeguard the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering and promote national security.
    • Pervasiveness of wrongdoing within an entity, including management’s complicity in, condoning or enabling of, or knowledge of the conduct underlying the violations.
    • History of similar violations, or misconduct in general, including prior criminal, civil and regulatory enforcement actions.
    • Financial gain or other benefit resulting from, or attributable to, the violations.
    • Presence or absence of prompt, effective action to terminate the violations upon discovery, including self-initiated remedial measures.
    • Timely and voluntary disclosure of the violations to FinCEN.
    • Quality and extent of cooperation with FinCEN and other relevant agencies, including as to potential wrongdoing by its directors, officers, employees, agents and counterparties.
    • Systemic nature of violations. Considerations include, but are not limited to, the number and extent of violations, failure rates (g., the number of violations out of total number of transactions) and duration of violations.
    • Whether another agency took enforcement action for related activity. FinCEN will consider the amount of any fine, penalty, forfeiture and/or remedial action ordered.

    The FinCEN Statement provides that FinCEN “strives for proportionality, consistency, and effectiveness” and “[t]he weight given to any factor” depends on “the relevant facts and circumstances of a case.”

    Unlike enforcement guidelines issued by some other agencies, such as the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”),[5] the FinCEN Statement does not ascribe any numerical significance to these various factors. Nevertheless, although none of the factors should come as a surprise, FinCEN’s delineation of the factors provides a useful framework for institutions and individuals under threat of an enforcement action to assess their potential exposure and engage in a dialogue with enforcement officials.

    Joint Statement by Banking Agencies

    The Joint Statement focuses on the issuance of mandatory cease-and-desist orders to address noncompliance with certain BSA/AML obligations. As the Joint Statement explains, the Agencies are required by statute to issue cease-and-desist orders when a depository institution either (1) fails to establish and maintain a compliance program designed to meet the requirements of the BSA (“BSA/AML Compliance Program”) or (2) fails to correct a problem with their BSA/AML Compliance Program that was previously reported to the institution by their regulator.[6]

    Although the previously issued Agencies’ 2007 statement focused on cease-and-desist orders for failures related to the four pillars required to establish an effective BSA/AML Compliance Program — internal controls; independent testing; a BSA compliance officer; and training (each, a “Pillar”) — the Joint Statement now also addresses failures by a financial institution relating to the recent “fifth” Pillar regarding risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence.[7]

    The Joint Statement provides that the Agencies evaluate the fifth Pillar and other BSA reporting and recordkeeping obligations as part of the “internal controls” component of the BSA/AML Compliance Program.

    Failure to Establish and Maintain a BSA/AML Compliance Program

    The instances where the Agencies will issue mandatory cease-and-desist orders for BSA/AML compliance program failures include when a depository institution:

    • Fails to have a written BSA/AML Compliance Program, including a customer identification program, that adequately covers the Pillars;
    • Fails to implement its BSA/AML Compliance Program to adequately address the Pillars;[8] or
    • Has defects in one or more Pillars of its BSA/AML Compliance Program that indicate that either the written program or its implementation is ineffective.[9]

    In clarifying the first instance, the Agencies write that an institution may be subject to a cease-and-desist order if its internal controls, such as suspicious activity monitoring, fail with respect to a high-risk area or multiple lines of business that impact the BSA/AML Compliance Program. An institution may also be subject to a cease-and-desist order if it has deficiencies in required testing or another Pillar, coupled with evidence of highly suspicious activity, creating a potential for significant money laundering or other illicit transactions.

    Next, the Agencies describe when an institution may fail to implement its BSA/AML Compliance Program. Such failures include, for example, when an institution rapidly expands its business relationships through its foreign affiliates or businesses without identifying its money laundering risks, without an appropriate system of internal controls to verify customers’ identities, without providing sufficient resources to the BSA/AML Compliance Program, with deficiencies in independent testing, and without adequate training for relevant personnel.

    Third, the Agencies write that other types of deficiencies in a BSA/AML Compliance Program, or in implementing one or more of the Pillars, will result in an issuance of a cease-and-desist order when the deficiencies are so severe or significant as to render the BSA/AML Compliance Program ineffective as a whole.

    Finally, the Agencies clarify that they will consider the application of the institution’s BSA/AML Compliance Program across its business lines and activities when making their evaluations. For example, if a deficiency only affects some of its business lines, then the deficiency may not be so severe or significant as to mean the institution does not have an effective overall BSA/AML Compliance Program.

    Failure to Correct a Previously Reported Problem with a BSA/AML Compliance Program

    Beyond the above, the Agencies may also issue cease-and-desist orders for a failure to correct a previously reported problem with a BSA/AML Compliance Program. To warrant a cease-and-desist order, the previously reported problem (1) must be substantially the same as that previously reported to the depository institution; (2) must have been communicated in a report of examination or other supervisory communication (e.g., supervisory letter) to the depository institution’s board of directors or senior management as a violation of law or regulation or matter that must be corrected (e.g., MRA/MRIA); and (3) will typically involve substantive deficiencies in any of the BSA/AML Compliance Program Pillars.

    The Joint Statement clarifies that a cease-and-desist order will not be issued in situations where certain problems are not correctable before the next examination, or within planned timeframes due to unanticipated or other issues.

    Other Enforcement Actions

    The Joint Statement further addresses how the Agencies evaluate violations of individual Pillar requirements. The Agencies may pursue enforcement actions based on individual Pillar violations or unsafe or unsound practices that may impact individual Pillars. The structure of such an enforcement action will depend on the severity of the concern or deficiency, the capability and cooperation of the depository institution’s management and the Agency’s confidence that the depository institution’s management will take appropriate and timely corrective action.

    Finally, the Joint Statement notes that the Agencies may take formal or informal enforcement actions to address violations of BSA/AML requirements that relate to problems other than the institution’s BSA/AML Compliance Program or Pillar requirements. These enforcement actions may investigate, among others, violations of customer due diligence, beneficial ownership, foreign correspondent banking, suspicious activity reporting and currency transaction reporting. Notably, violations of any of these requirements that are determined by an Agency to be isolated or technical will generally not result in an enforcement action.

    Takeaways

    The FinCEN Statement and the Joint Statement collectively provide financial institutions with valuable guidance concerning federal regulators’ authority to pursue enforcement actions for BSA/AML violations, as well as the factors that play into enforcement decision-making. They may also signal an increased focus on enforcement in the BSA/AML area.[10]

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Joseph P. Vitale, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, Jennifer M. Opheim, Hannah M. Thibideau and Nicholas A. Wilson.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] “Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) Statement on Enforcement of the Bank Secrecy Act,” Aug. 18, 2020, available here.

    [2] “Joint Statement on Enforcement of Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Requirements,” Aug. 13, 2020, available here.

    [3] The Joint Statement supersedes a prior interagency statement issued in July 2007. “Interagency Statement on Enforcement of Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Requirements,” July 19, 2007, available here.

    [4] Although it may appear self-evident that guidance does not rise to the level of a legal requirement, at least one court has recently taken an opposing view in the context of an SEC enforcement action. In SEC v. Alpine Sec. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 3d 396, 417-19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2018), the court relied upon FinCEN guidance in the context of allegations relating to defendant clearing broker’s failure to comply with BSA suspicious activity report (“SAR”) filing requirements. The court noted that FinCEN guidance cited by the Securities and Exchange Commission “give[s] content to a broker-dealer’s obligation to file SARs” and that “it has long been established that an agency’s guidance documents receive deference when they reasonably interpret an agency’s ambiguous regulation.”

    [5] Final Rule, Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,593 (Nov. 9, 2009), available here.

    [6] 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) (depository institutions); 12 U.S.C. § 1786(q) (credit unions). See Joint Statement, at 1.

    [7] For additional information related to the fifth Pillar, see “FinCEN’s Customer Due Diligence Final Rule: Highlights of the Long-Awaited Requirements,” June 2016.

    [8] The Joint Statement notes that policy statements issued by the financial institution alone are insufficient. The program must be consistent with the financial institution’s written policies, procedures and processes.

    [9] For example, where deficiencies couple with aggravating factors such as (i) suspicious activity creating a risk of significant money laundering, terrorist financing or other illicit financial activity; (ii) patterns of structuring to evade reporting requirements; (iii) significant insider complicity; or (iv) systemic failures to file currency transaction reports, suspicious activity reports or other required BSA reports.

    [10] We note that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has not, as of yet, issued comparable AML enforcement guidance.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2020 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • First Court Decision in Germany on Rent Payment Obligations of Retail Tenants During Lockdown

    First Court Decision in Germany on Rent Payment Obligations of Retail Tenants During Lockdown

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    First Court Decision in Germany on Rent Payment Obligations of Retail Tenants During Lockdown

    September 1, 2020

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Since the beginning of the Coronavirus crisis and the associated temporary official closure of retails stores in Germany (lockdown), real estate investors and retail tenants have discussed whether tenants are entitled to partly withhold rent payments or demand rent reductions for the duration of the official closure of the rental premises. We have reported on the details and open questions in our previous client alert, “COVID-19 – FAQ’s for Landlords and Tenants in Germany.” Now the first court decision regarding this particular question has been published. In this case, the Regional Court Heidelberg ruled that, despite the temporary closure of the relevant retail store, the rent was payable in full. The decision is not yet legally binding. Read the full article in German.

    In depth
    Authors

    Frank Müller

    Partner

    Frankfurt

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  • OCR Issues New HIPAA Guidance for Covered Entities Contacting Recovered COVID-19 Patients for Plasma Donations

    OCR Issues New HIPAA Guidance for Covered Entities Contacting Recovered COVID-19 Patients for Plasma Donations

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    OCR Issues New HIPAA Guidance for Covered Entities Contacting Recovered COVID-19 Patients for Plasma Donations

    August 28, 2020

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights (OCR) recently issued updated guidance on contacting former COVID-19 patients about blood plasma donation in light of the privacy protections contained in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and its implementing regulations, each as amended (HIPAA). The Guidance explains that a covered entity healthcare provider or health plan may use protected health information (PHI) to identify and contact individuals who have recovered from COVID-19 to provide them with information about donating blood plasma that could be used to help patients with COVID-19, so long as such communications are not used for marketing purposes.

    In depth

    In newly issued Guidance, the OCR explains that the HIPAA Privacy Rule generally does not prohibit a HIPAA covered entity from contacting an individual who has recovered from COVID-19 about donating blood plasma that could be used to help patients with COVID-19, with certain exceptions and attendant cautions regarding prohibited marketing activities.

    The HIPAA Privacy Rule permits HIPAA covered entities (or their business associates on the covered entities’ behalf) to use or disclose PHI for treatment, payment and healthcare operations, among other purposes, without the individual’s authorization. Healthcare operations include case management activities and other care coordination that do not meet the definition of “treatment” under HIPAA. When using or disclosing PHI for healthcare operations, the covered entity must make reasonable efforts to limit the use or disclosure of PHI to the minimum necessary to accomplish the intended purpose. According to the Guidance, using PHI to identify and contact individuals who have recovered from COVID-19 to inform them about how to donate blood plasma is a permitted healthcare operations activity, for which individual authorization is not required, to the extent that facilitating the supply of donated blood plasma would be expected to improve the covered entity healthcare provider’s or plan’s ability to conduct case management activities for patients or beneficiaries that have or may become infected with COVID-19.

    However, the Guidance warns covered entities against using or disclosing PHI for “marketing” (as defined by HIPAA) purposes and against providing such information to third parties who may in turn use the information for marketing purposes. Generally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits the use or disclosure of PHI for marketing purposes without an individual’s authorization. Accordingly, when using or disclosing PHI in accordance with the Guidance, a covered entity should be careful not to encourage any individuals to use a particular third party’s blood or plasma donation center. Similarly, a covered entity should not disclose PHI to a third party, including another covered entity, for the third party to make marketing communications about the third party’s products or services without the individual’s authorization. For instance, a covered entity should not disclose to a third-party donation center, for the donation center’s marketing purposes, PHI about an individual who has recovered from COVID-19.

    As defined by HIPAA, prohibited “marketing” activity does not include descriptions by a covered entity of its own health-related products or services, and the Guidance does not itself limit a covered entity’s ability to inform its own patients about its own blood or plasma donation centers.

    If you have questions about the newly issued OCR Guidance or this OTS, please contact the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer.

    Authors

    Ryan S. Higgins

    Partner

    Chicago

    Stacey L. Callaghan

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Federal Circuit Confirms that Colour Marks of a Certain ‘Character’ Can Be Inherently Distinctive for Product Packaging

    ARTICLE

    Federal Circuit Confirms that Colour Marks of a Certain ‘Character’ Can Be Inherently Distinctive for Product Packaging

    August 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

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  • Performance-Based Sourcing Law Remix: Costly Taxpayer Win

    Performance-Based Sourcing Law Remix: Costly Taxpayer Win

    ARTICLE

    Performance-Based Sourcing Law Remix: Costly Taxpayer Win

    August 27, 2020

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Chambers & Partners – Doing Business In… 2020

    Chambers & Partners – Doing Business In… 2020

    ARTICLE

    Chambers & Partners – Doing Business In… 2020

    August 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In the world impacted by COVID-19, the latest edition of Chambers “Doing Business In…” Guide serves as a reference and helpful tool for lawyers and investors alike, planning their international business and looking to understand the basic principles guiding the legal system of the contemplated jurisdictions.

    The guide, co-edited by McDermott partners Jacques Buhart and Nicolas Lafont, offers a comparison of 46 jurisdictions worldwide, with easy to digest sections, covering local legal systems, foreign investment, corporate vehicles, employment law, tax, competition law, intellectual property and data protection.

    Our lawyers provide insight into five jurisdictions: France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the United States.

    In depth

    Doing Business in France

    Authors: Laurent Ayache, Nicolas Lafont, Lionel Lesur, Jilali Maazouz, Laura Morelli, Sabine Naugès, Romain Perray and Antoine Vergnat

    France is a civil law jurisdiction where most laws are codified. In the administrative law sphere, case law is paramount as legal precedents are established by judges. In judicial matters, judges also have an important role to play in the sense that they interpret and apply the law – they do not, however, create new laws. The judiciary, which is independent from the other powers exist¬ing in France (ie, executive and legislative powers), comprises two main branches: the judicial branch and the administrative branch. The judicial branch comprises civil and criminal courts, which deal with civil and criminal matters, respectively, while the administrative branch comprises administrative courts, which deal with administrative and public law disputes. Read More…

    Doing Business in Germany

    Authors: Mirjam Büsch, Dr. Thomas Gennert, Dr. Tobias Koppmann, Christian Krohs, Dr. Kian Tauser, Deniz Tschammler, Dr. Wolfgang von Frentz and Steffen Woitz

    Germany is a federal, parliamentary, representative democratic republic with a multiparty system. The legal system in Germany is a civil law system. The legislative power is exercised in the federal parliament and the federal council. The 16 federal states have their own legislative bodies with responsibility for certain areas set out in the German constitution (Grundgesetz, GG), which is the ultimate source of German law. Read More…

    Doing Business in Italy

    Authors: Emidio Cacciapuoti, Ettore Scandale, Fabrizio Faina and Davide Massiglia

    The Italian legal system is based on civil law. The Italian judicial order is divided into ordinary and special jurisdictions, and it is based on multiple tiers of judgments. The ordinary jurisdiction can be broken down into two sectors: (i) civil jurisdiction, whose purpose is to protect rights related to relations between private persons or between private persons and the public administration when the exercise of its duties adversely affects the civil law rights of another person; and (ii) criminal jurisdiction, referring to decisions taken as a result of the prosecution of an individual for criminal liabilities. Read More…

    Doing Business in the UK

    Authors: David Henry, Gary Howes, Paul McGrath, James Ross and Eleanor West

    England and Wales operate a common law legal system. This means that the law develops by way of both statutory legislation and case law, which are regarded as equally weighted. For example, in England and Wales the laws of tort and contract are not grounded, for the most part, in statutory legislation and instead are established and developed in case law. It is important to note that there is no unified legal system across the UK. Distinct from England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland operate separate legal systems. Read More…

    Doing Business in the USA

    Authors: David Grimes and G. N. Smith Alpert

    The US legal system is composed of several coexisting layers of laws that work in concert with each other. As a federation comprised of 50 states, the District of Columbia and several self-governing territories, the USA has two primary levels of governance and legal systems that exist in parallel: (i) the federal government that establishes laws for all of the USA and its peo¬ple, and (ii) the state governments that govern their respective geographical area and residents. In other words, the USA has a federal government under which each state has the authority to autonomously enact and enforce laws that do not conflict with those of the federal government. Read More…

    Authors

    Laurent Ayache

    Partner

    Paris

    Jilali Maazouz

    Partner

    Paris

    Sabine Naugès

    Partner

    Paris

    Antoine Vergnat

    Partner

    Paris

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    Christian Krohs, LL.M. (Aberdeen)

    Partner

    Düsseldorf, Cologne

    Dr. Kian Tauser

    Partner

    Frankfurt

    Ettore Scandale

    Partner

    Milan

    Fabrizio Faina

    Partner

    Milan

    Eleanor West

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

    Smith Alpert

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Attorney’s Fees Properly Awarded in Unsuccessful Trade Secret Misappropriation and Civil Theft Suit

    Attorney’s Fees Properly Awarded in Unsuccessful Trade Secret Misappropriation and Civil Theft Suit

    ARTICLE

    Attorney’s Fees Properly Awarded in Unsuccessful Trade Secret Misappropriation and Civil Theft Suit

    August 26, 2020

    Read time: 5 min

    The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a take-nothing judgment and an attorney’s fees award against plaintiffs in a trade secret misappropriation and civil theft suit under Texas law, finding that the fee award did not need to be segregated to various claims. ATOM Instrument Corp. v. Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P., Case Nos. 19-29151, -20371 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2020) (Southwick, J.). The Court also remanded for an additional award of appellate attorney’s fees.

    Olstowski was a consultant for Petroleum Analyzer Co., L.P. (PAC), during which time he developed a krypton-chloride-based excimer lamp to detect sulfur with ultraviolet fluorescence. Although he developed the lamp independently, he used PAC resources to test the technology. Olstowski and PAC negotiated but failed to agree on licensing. Olstowski founded ATOM Instrument to assist him in the licensing discussions. Subsequently, PAC filed a declaratory judgment action in Texas court alleging that it owned the lamp technology. The state court ordered the claim to arbitration. The arbitration panel declared Olstowski the owner of the technology and enjoined PAC from using it. The state court confirmed the arbitral award, and a Texas appellate court upheld the confirmation order.

    PAC thereafter developed a new sulfur-detecting excimer lamp called MultiTek that also used krypton-chloride with UV fluorescence. Olstowski and ATOM filed in state court for contempt of the injunction, but the state court denied the contempt motion as moot because PAC had ceased selling MultiTek.

    ATOM filed for bankruptcy the following year. Olstowski and ATOM initiated a district court proceeding against PAC alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, unfair competition and civil theft. After holding a bench trial, the court found that MultiTek did not practice Olstowski’s technology and therefore entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of PAC. The district court also awarded attorney’s fees to PAC under a provision of the Texas Theft Liability Act (TTLA) that awards fees to prevailing parties. Olstowski and ATOM appealed both issues, and PAC sought an award of its appellate attorney’s fees.

    As to liability, ATOM argued that the district court erred in finding that the MultiTek lamp did not practice Olstowski’s technology. ATOM characterized the error as a legal one regarding interpretation of the arbitral award, but the Fifth Circuit held that “whether one company used another’s protected technology” is a factual question for which Olstowski and ATOM had failed to carry the burden of proof at trial. ATOM further argued that the district court had ignored the alleged law of the case in deviating from the scope of technology defined in the arbitral award, but the Court again rejected ATOM’s argument because the district court had explicitly stated that the description of Olstowski’s technology in the arbitral award remained in effect.

    As to the award of attorney’s fees, ATOM argued that the district court had not appropriately segregated fees related to the TTLA claim from those related to other claims. Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit affirmed that the TTLA claim was sufficiently related to the other claims in the case that the fees need not have been segregated. Accordingly, it affirmed the award of $1.3 million in attorney’s fees to PAC.

    Turning to PAC’s request for appellate attorney’s fees, the Fifth Circuit noted that under Texas law, a statutory award of attorney’s fees to a prevailing party extends to appellate fees. ATOM argued that PAC had waived appellate attorney’s fees because it had failed to seek such fees in the trial court, citing a Texas rule that requires a prevailing party to move for such fees as a placeholder in advance of appeal. The Court rejected ATOM’s argument, holding that the Texas rule is a procedural one not applicable in federal courts, and further, that PAC had properly sought fees under the Fifth Circuit’s local rules. Accordingly, it remanded to the trial court for an initial determination of appellate attorney’s fees to be further awarded to PAC.

    Practice Note: Pleading more claims is not always better, although it may have been risk-free as a practical matter in this case. While the plaintiffs’ choice to plead civil theft under the TTLA has nominally cost them $1.3 million and counting, PAC’s practical ability to recover is uncertain given ATOM’s bankruptcy.

    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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