Content Type: Article

  • New York State Attorney General Issues Guidance on the New York Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act

    New York State Attorney General Issues Guidance on the New York Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York State Attorney General Issues Guidance on the New York Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act

    April 11, 2011

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 17, 2011, the New York State Attorney General Charities Bureau released “A Practical Guide to the New York Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act” (the “Guidance”), which provides an overview of the New York Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (the “Act”) and is intended to assist charities and other institutions in complying with the Act’s requirements. The Guidance does not contain law, and the meaning and effect of the Act are ultimately matters for determination by the courts. Nonetheless, the Guidance provides important insight on how the Charities Bureau will enforce the law. For background on the Act, please see our previously issued client alert. Below is a summary of the Guidance; the full text can be found at http://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/NYPMIFA-Guidance-March-2011.pdf.

    Notice to Donors of Endowment Funds

    For gift instruments executed by donors before Sept. 17, 2010, the Act requires an institution to provide 90-days advance notice to the donor, if available, before appropriating from the endowment fund. The Act requires that notice be substantially in the form of boxes that the donor may check providing that (i) the institution may spend as much of the endowment gift as is prudent (Box #1), or (ii) the institution may not spend below the original dollar value of the endowment gift (Box #2). If the donor does not respond within 90 days from when the notice was sent, the institution will not be subject to the original dollar value[1] limitation. If the donor does respond, the institution must follow the donor’s direction.[2] 

    The Guidance provides that institutions which, acting in good faith, appropriated from endowment funds between Sept. 17, 2010 and the issuance of the Guidance, without giving the required notice, should promptly send the notice to donors. If the donor responds by checking Box #2, the institution must restore the fund to its historic dollar value if any pre-notice appropriation reduced the fund below that level. The Guidance further provides that notice is required even if an endowment fund is above historic dollar value and the institution has no present intention to appropriate below historic dollar value. The Guidance explains that although a particular endowment fund may be “above water” now, the fund may drop below the historic dollar value at some point in the future when the donor is no longer available to clarify or amend the terms of the gift. Delay would deprive the donor of the statutorily-mandated opportunity to clarify or amend the terms of the gift with regard to appropriations below historic dollar value. 

    The Guidance explains that once the notice is sent, the institution may appropriate income and net appreciation over the original dollar value during the 90 day donor response period, but the institution may not invade original dollar value during this period. The Guidance clarifies that if a donor checks Box #2, the institution may not appropriate below the historic dollar value, but the institution may spend income and appropriate the appreciation over the historic dollar value of the fund if it is prudent to do so. According to the Guidance, institutions may wish to add an assurance to donors that if Box #2 is checked, all decisions to appropriate from the fund must still be prudent under the Act and the endowment fund will remain subject to other provisions of the Act. Finally, the Guidance provides that to determine if a donor is “available” for purposes of a notice, an institution should make reasonable efforts to locate the donor, including conducting internet searches and contacting known associates of the donor. The institution should document the search even if it is not successful. 

    Contemporaneous Recording

    The Act provides that an institution may appropriate so much of an endowment as the institution determines, subject to the intent of the donor expressed in a gift instrument, is prudent for the uses, benefits, purposes, and duration for which the endowment is established. The Act lists eight factors for an institution to consider and requires that the institution keep a contemporaneous record describing consideration to each. The Guidance clarifies that the record-keeping requirement may be fulfilled through documentation in governing board or committee minutes, among other ways. If a factor is determined to not be relevant to the decision, the board or committee must document specifically how it reached that conclusion. The records of decisions to appropriate from endowment funds should be maintained as part of the permanent records of the institution. 

    The Guidance further provides that the governing board or committee may appropriate from multiple similarly-situated endowment funds simultaneously. The Guidance advises that the governing board or committee develop written procedures for determining when a group of funds is similarly situated. In determining if it is appropriate to treat multiple funds as similarly-situated, the Attorney General indicated that the board or committee should consider the purposes of the funds, the spending restrictions applicable to the funds, the durations of the funds, the financial condition of the funds, whether the funds are invested similarly and other such factors as may be relevant. 

    Release and Modification

    Under the Act, an institution may seek court release or modification of a restriction placed on a gift by a donor even if the donor is available, with notice to the attorney general and the donor. The Guidance suggests, however, that because a court proceeding can be expensive and time-consuming, an institution may first want to inquire whether a donor is available and willing to consent in writing to any proposed release or modification, in which case court approval would not be necessary. Although not required, the Guidance also suggests that if an institution wishes to seek court approval for release or modification of a restriction, that the institution first submit the petition to the Charities Bureau for review. The attorney general believes this will expedite the court approval process since the Act requires institutions to give notice to the attorney general when applying to the court for a release or modification.

    The Act also establishes a new procedure by which an institution may release or modify a restriction without court approval for a fund with a total value of less than $100,000, where more than 20 years have elapsed since the fund was established (so-called “small, old” funds). In such a situation, the Guidance suggests that the institution first inquire whether the donor is available and willing to consent to the release, thus avoiding the need to notify the attorney general. If the donor is not available or is unwilling to consent to the release, the institution may release the restriction, but only if the attorney general has received notice of the release and has not objected to such release within 90 days of receiving such notice. The Guidance details the documentation the institution must submit to the attorney general in connection with such notice. The Guidance also expresses the opinion that the exception in the Act that states that notice need not be given to donors of “small, old” funds if the gift instrument already limits the institution’s ability to appropriate below original dollar value is the result of a drafting error, most likely intended to provide an exception for funds that were received as a result of an institutional solicitation. The Guidance therefore recommends that, absent clarification by the Legislature, notification of a release or modification of a restriction of a “small, old” fund be given to any donor that is available, including a donor that created the fund in response to an institutional solicitation.

    Other Recommendations of the Charities Bureau

    In response to the Act’s requirement that institutions adopt a written investment policy, the Guidance suggests possible topics for inclusion, but emphasizes that the contents of the policy will depend on factors including the extent of the financial resources of the institution, the types of investments it holds, the charitable purposes of the institution, and the nature and scope of the institutions activities or programs. Suggested subjects include: general investment objectives; permitted and prohibited investments; acceptable levels of risk; asset allocation and diversification; procedures for monitoring investment performance; scope and terms of delegation of investment management functions; the investment manager’s accountability; procedures for selecting and evaluating external agents; processes for reviewing investment policies and strategies and proxy voting. 

    The Act further provides that appropriation in a year of greater than seven percent of the fair market value of an endowment fund, calculated on the basis of market values determined at least quarterly and averaged over a period of not less than five years immediately preceding the year of appropriation, creates a rebuttable presumption of imprudence. The Guidance provides that an endowment spending policy of seven percent or less per year in itself will not ensure that the presumption of imprudence will not be triggered. The seven percent standard is based on the fund’s fair market value averaged over at least five years immediately preceding the year in which the appropriation for expenditure is made. If, for example, the spending policy is based on fair market value averaged over a shorter period, the spending policy may result in appropriations that are presumptively imprudent. The Guidance suggests that a separate calculation may be necessary to determine whether a proposed appropriation is presumptively imprudent. 

    Finally, the Guidance interprets the Act’s requirement that institutions which use an external advisor or manager for investment decisions assess that agent’s independence. The Guidance provides that agents should be selected based on the agent’s competence, experience, past performance, and proposed compensation, and not on business or personal relationships between the agent and board members or other insiders. Before retaining an agent, the governing board should consider whether any business or personal relationships would reasonably be expected to interfere with the ability of the board to provide proper oversight. Although not required by the Act, it is the attorney general’s view that institutions should adopt policies that require full disclosure of relationships with outside agents and implement practices that ensure objective oversight by the board. At a minimum, institutions should have conflicts of interest policies which would include procedures for determining whether any of the institutions officers or directors have a financial interest in the agent or have any other material business or personal relationship with the agent, and if so, the policy should provide for reporting and should address abstention or recusal. 

    Authored by Mark E. Brossman and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The Guidance confirms that the attorney general views the terms “original dollar value” and “historic dollar value” as synonymous.

    [2] Donor notice is not required where: (i) the gift instrument already permits spending below historic dollar value; (ii) the gift instrument expressly limits spending in the manner set forth in 553(b) of the Act or (iii) the donor made the gift in response to an institutional solicitation but did not include a separate statement restricting use of the funds.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Expected to Consider Extending Registration Deadlines for Investment Advisers

    SEC Expected to Consider Extending Registration Deadlines for Investment Advisers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Expected to Consider Extending Registration Deadlines for Investment Advisers

    April 8, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a letter today to the North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., Robert E. Plaze, Associate Director of the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) stated that the Commission is expected to consider extending the deadline for investment advisers relying on the “private adviser exemption” under Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 until the first quarter of 2012. The letter from Mr. Plaze also states that the Commission expects to issue its final rules required by Title IV of Dodd-Frank, in advance of July 21, 2011, exempting advisers to venture capital funds and advisers to private funds with less than $150 million in assets under management in the US. In addition, the Commission expects to consider extending the deadline for investment advisers having between $25 million and $100 million of assets under management (“Mid-Sized Advisers”) that must transition from registration with the Commission to state registration. Mid-Sized Advisers are expected to receive a grace period to allow time to register with state regulators and come into compliance with applicable laws prior to withdrawing their registration with the Commission.

    A copy of the letter can be found at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2010/ia-3110-letter-to-nasaa.pdf.

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  • Update on Reorganization Financing

    Update on Reorganization Financing

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update on Reorganization Financing

    April 7, 2011

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Reorganization or debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing has become an increasing source of litigation. As shown in the recent case summaries below, courts are apparently becoming more sensitive to the rights of preexisting lenders. For a more detailed analysis of the law, e-mail us for a copy of our “Business Reorganization Financing” outline.

    1.  District Court Vacates Bankruptcy Court Superpriority Cash Collateral and Financing Orders that Primed Mechanics Liens

    The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, on July 14, 2010, effectively vacated cash collateral and financing orders that enabled term loan lenders (“Term Lenders”) to prime the liens held by mechanics lienors (“Statutory Lienholders”). See In re Fontainebleau Las Vegas Holdings, LLC, 434 B.R. 716, 759-60 (S.D. Fla. 2010). According to the District Court, the “bankruptcy court [had] erred in entering [these priming] orders over the Statutory Lienholders’ objections.” Id. at 759. It also failed “to ensure that the Statutory Lienholders’ interests were adequately protected” when permitting the debtor to use cash collateral to pay the Term Lenders and professional fees. Id. In remanding to the bankruptcy court, the District Court directed it to “craft a remedy consistent with this Order  . . . . Although the bankruptcy court cannot recover all the funds, it may and must recover the funds distributed to the Term Lenders, Examiner and the professionals pending a determination of the issue of priority [between the Statutory Lienholders and the Term Lenders] — not to exceed any amount the Statutory Lienholders have requested.” Id. at 760.

    Facts

      The Chapter 11 DIP, a resort developer, held cash subject to the liens of both the Term Lenders and Statutory Lienholders. While the Term Lenders and Statutory Lienholders litigated over the priority of their liens, the bankruptcy court authorized the DIP to use cash collateral to maintain the project and pay administrative expenses, including the fees of an examiner. The bankruptcy court’s cash collateral orders “deemed” that the DIP had repaid the cash to the Term Lenders and reborrowed it from them under Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) § 364(d), in order to grant the Term Lenders a priming lien on the project, with the Statutory Lienholders being subordinated. Id. at 725-26. These orders also required any third party DIP loan proceeds be used, first, to repay the Term Lenders the amount of cash collateral used by the DIP. Use of the cash collateral was necessary for administration of the Chapter 11 case, but there was no protection in the cash collateral orders for protection of the Statutory Lienholders’ interest in the project if the court later determined that their liens had priority over the liens of the Term Lenders. A good-faith lender subsequently advanced new funds to the DIP, who used the loan proceeds to pay the Term Lenders pursuant to the terms of the cash collateral orders.

    Court May Not Grant Priming Liens for Use of Cash Collateral

    According to the District Court, the bankruptcy court’s grant of priming liens to the Term Lenders for the DIP’s use of cash collateral was not “authorized” under “the plain language” of Code § 364(d)(1): “The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property . . . .” Id. at 757 (emphasis in original). “By their express terms, Sections 364(c) & (d) apply only to future — i.e., post-petition-extensions of credit.” Id. (citing In re Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1992)). The Term Lenders here had failed to “provide future or post-petition extensions of credit.” 434 B.R. at 758. Instead, the DIP merely “used cash collateral on which the Term Lenders” held a lien. Unlike a loan of new money from a third party, the DIP was “not trying to induce the Term Lenders to undertake risks inherent in providing postpetition financing to the estate” but was, instead, “trying to induce the Term Lenders to consent to the [DIP’s] use of the cash collateral, maintain the status quo, or both.” Id. There is simply no way for a lender to obtain a priming lien without advancing new money. Merely consenting to the use of cash collateral will not suffice, and the bankruptcy court’s “deemed” new loan did not work.

    The DIP was required to provide the Term Lenders with adequate protection for the use of cash collateral, but the District Court found that “[n]othing in the Bankruptcy Code . . . appears to authorize a bankruptcy court to prime a secured creditor as a kind of adequate protection for the use of cash collateral.” Id. In effect, the District Court rejected the bankruptcy court’s ignoring of the Statutory Lienholders’ property interests, the language of the Code, and applicable case law, and found that the bankruptcy court had erred in authorizing the use of the Term Lenders’ cash collateral on a priming basis, and in failing to ensure that the Statutory Lienholders interests were adequately protected. See id. at 759.

    2.  Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Bars Use of Postpetition Rents to Pay Chapter 11 Administrative Expenses

    The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) for the Sixth Circuit held on Dec. 23, 2010, that a Chapter 11 DIP had improperly sought to grant, as adequate protection, a replacement lien in after-acquired rents to its under-secured lender when the lender already had a prepetition lien on those rents. See In re Buttermilk Town Center LLC, 442 B.R. 558, 567 (BAP. 6th Cir. 2010). Reversing the bankruptcy court on this point, the BAP held that the non-consenting secured lender was not adequately protected by a purportedly new security interest in rents, over which it already had an independent security interest, in exchange for the DIP’s use of cash collateral (i.e., the rents). Seeid. at 566-67. Thus, a non-consenting secured lender must receive more than a replacement lien on previously encumbered rents if the DIP wishes to use that cash collateral to pay administrative expenses in the reorganization case (e.g., salaries and legal fees). Significantly, the DIP in that case, the owner and operator of a commercial real estate development, had no equity in the encumbered real estate.

    The lender, in the first instance, had unsuccessfully argued that the debtor had assigned the rents to it and that the rents were not even property of the estate. Id. at 562 (citing Jason Realty, L.P. v. First Fidelity Bank, N.A., (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423 (3d Cir. 1995) (rent assignment absolute under New Jersey law)). The BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding, however, that the rents were, in fact, part of the debtor’s estate under applicable Kentucky law. Although the lender argued that the language of the loan documents showed an absolute assignment, the BAP found the cited language to be “isolated” when the rent assignment agreement was read as a whole. Id. at 564. According to the BAP, the rent assignment showed that the parties intended the rents to serve only as “additional security.” Id. Aside from the debtor’s right to collect the rents, the lender could only apply those rents to reduce the underlying obligation of the debtor to the lender. Id. at 563. Most significant, the rent assignment agreement automatically terminated when the underlying debt had been satisfied. Id. In any event, the BAP found that, according to the Sixth Circuit, Kentucky law treated a rent assignment as secondary security. Id. at 564 (citing Green v. Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee (In re American Fuel & Power Co.), 151 F.2nd 470, 481 (6th Cir. 1945)).

    3.  District Court Affirms Bankruptcy Court’s Denial of Motion for Use of Cash Collateral

    The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on Jan. 20, 2011, held that a bankruptcy court had properly denied a DIP’s motion for use of cash collateral because the DIP had been unable to provide the lender with adequate protection. See Marcus Lee Associates L.P. v. Wachovia Bank N.A., 2011 WL 206126 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2011). After a two-day evidentiary hearing, the bankruptcy court had been “unable to determine the current value of the [debtor’s real property . . . .]”, reasoning that “there clearly [was] value to the raw land and in the 19 units [but that the DIP had] failed to provide the Court with a non-speculative basis for determining an actual current value of such assets” (emphasis in original). Id. Moreover, the “future value of the land and 19 units [was] the only evidence in the record before the Court on . . .value . . . .” (emphasis in original). Id. The DIP ultimately established only $950,000 in current value of the real property based on the existence of two model homes and an additional $300,000 in cash collateral. Id. The lender was owed more than $5.5 million. Id. According to the District Court, the Third Circuit had “reject [ed] the notion that development property is increased in value simply because a debtor may continue with construction which might or might not be profitable.” Id. (citing In re Swedeland Dev. Group,16 F.3d 552, 566 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (prepetition secured lenders owed more than $36 million, but their collateral worth only $18.495 million; proposed DIP financing would have subordinated them further with no protection against or compensation for this erosion of their collateral value)).

    4.  Court Limits Use of Superpriority Loan Proceeds

    The Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on March 11, 2011, held that a Chapter 11 DIP could not use proceeds from a $4 million postpetition superpriority loan to pay for (i) unquantified consulting service fees; (ii) previously performed services; (iii) services providing no or unknown benefit to the debtor’s estate; (iv) other expenses not shown to be necessary and reasonable; or (v) the reimbursement of an insider’s expenses. See In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 2011 WL 864924 at *13 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. March 11, 2011). Nevertheless, the court did grant the motion for a priming lien, authorizing the use of the loan proceeds “to the extent Debtor [had] not already obtained credit and to the extent the payee’s services [would] provide a benefit to the estate.” Id. at *12.

    Facts

      The single-asset real estate DIP sought court approval under Code § 364(d) for $4 million of superpriority postpetition financing to “fund steps to make its project more attractive to potential lenders and investors.” Id. at *3. The DIP intended to use the loan proceeds for payment of, among other things, outstanding real estate taxes, certain real estate development and engineering consultants, and for previously incurred professional fees. See id. at *4-7. To secure the new loan, the lender would receive a superpriority priming lien on the debtor’s assets — parcels of real estate in Chicago. See id. at *2. 

    To obtain a superpriority priming lien like the one here, the DIP had to show that (i) it was unable to obtain the financing elsewhere, and that (ii) it was “adequately protecting” the interest of the preexisting secured creditor who was being primed. See Code § 364(d). The debtor’s prepetition secured lender held a claim of approximately $49 million, secured by the debtor’s real property. During the case, the court found the real property to have a value of approximately $81 million, based on the “finding that the highest and best use of the property [would] be for a fine hotel.” 2011 WL 864924 at *2 The DIP thus had an equity cushion of roughly $30 million. Seeid.

    Equity Cushion Alone Not Enough for Priming Loan, but Can Be Adequate Protection

      Despite the equity cushion, the court explained, “[i]t is not enough to rely on a large equity cushion resting on expert opinions.” Id. at *9. “Given the inherent uncertainty of determining valuation through methods commonly used by experts in appraising real estate, some restraint is warranted in allowing priming liens based on equity cushions.” Id. at *10. Further “[a] debtor’s use of credit obtained through a priming lien must be likely to benefit the estate and improve the debtor’s ability to reorganize.” Id. at *9 (internal citations omitted). The prepetition lender had objected to the DIP’s financing request, arguing that its interest was not “adequately protected” and, further, that the proposed use of the funds would not advance the debtor’s reorganization. 

    The court first examined the prepetition lender’s “adequate protection” argument. Relying on In re Swedeland Development Group, 16 F.3d 552 (3d Cir. 1994), the lender had asserted that “its interest cannot be adequately protected because there [was] no tangible evidence that the financing [would] actually increase value of Debtor’s property.” Id. at *10. But Swedeland was “not appropriate,” reasoned the court, because the lender’s interest was protected here by the substantial equity cushion although the “possible increase in [debtor’s property] value [was] speculative and dependent on market factors.” Id. According to the Court, “[a]n equity cushion is not a debtor’s piggy bank”, but a large equity can still constitute adequate protection to a secured lender. Id. at *11.

    Future Benefit to Estate

      More important, the court analyzed whether the debtor’s proposed use of funds would benefit the debtor’s estate. Most of the proposed expenditures met the judicially established “business judgment” standard because they would enable the DIP to pursue its development of a hotel. Certain of the proposed expenditures, however, were inappropriate because the DIP’s borrowing “in exchange for a priming lien in order to pay past due expenses would be contrary to the plain language of the requirements under [Code] § 364(d).” Id. at *11. Thus, the court approved the debtor’s financing request only to the extent that the estate would benefit in the future. See id. at *11-12. 

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • European IP Bulletin – Issue 79

    ARTICLE

    European IP Bulletin – Issue 79

    April, 2011

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    PATENTS

    Gedeon Richter plc v Bayer Schering Pharma AG: “Obvious to Try” and “Fair Expectation of Success”

    In examining for invalidity on the grounds of obviousness Mr Justice Floyd looked at the “obvious to try” test.

    COPYRIGHT AND DATABASE RIGHT

    Football Dataco Ltd v Sportradar GmbH:  Copyright and Database Right Infringement and Jurisdiction

    The Court of Appeal of England and Wales has referred questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union in relation to the interpretation of infringement under the Database Directive.

    TRADE MARKS

    Annette Campbell and Bente Zaber v Catherine Hughes (IAN ADAM): Name of Recently Deceased Famous Individual and Bad Faith

    Overturning the decision of a hearing officer at the UK Intellectual Property Office, Geoffrey Hobbs QC has held that an application to register the name of the well known deceased voice coach Ian Adam by his former business associate had been made in bad faith.

    P Ferrero SpA v OHIM: Trade Mark Reputation and Existence Irrelevant in Assessing Likelihood of Confusion

    The Court of Justice of the European Union has upheld a decision of the EU General Court rejecting Ferrero’s invalidity action based on Ferrero’s earlier trade marks for KINDER against a figurative Community trade mark incorporating the words TiMi KINDERJOGHURT.

    CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

    Andrew Gray v News Group Newspapers Ltd: Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and Scope of “Intellectual Property” Exception

    In an action for misuse of confidential information and invasion of privacy, the scope of the intellectual property exception to the privilege against self incrimination is held to include proceedings for breach of confidence involving commercially confidential information.

    DATA PROTECTION

    “Your data, your rights: Safeguarding your privacy in a connected world”: The Four Pillars of Data Protection Reform

    In a speech entitled “Your data, your rights: Safeguarding your privacy in a connected world” delivered on 16 March 2010 to the EU Privacy Platform, Vice-President of the European Commission Viviane Reding outlined strict privacy rules for personal data held on the internet.

    COMMERCIAL

    OFT Market Study on Consumer Contracts

    The market study by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) on consumer contracts has considered the evidence on consumer problems with contracts. The report of the study sets out a framework for assessing harm from consumer contract terms, identifies how the existing legislation addresses those harms, and outlines contract problems of most concern to the OFT.

    MEPs Give European Parliament Mandate to Agree Draft Consumer Rights Directive: Distance Sales and Off-Premises Sales

    At the Brussels plenary session on 23 and 24 March, the European Parliament backed proposed amendments to the draft Consumer Rights Directive, strengthening consumer rights in distance sales and off-premises sales.

    AXA Sun Life Services plc v Campbell Martin Ltd: Effectiveness of Entire Agreement Clause and Exclusion of Set-Off Clause

    The Court of Appeal of England and Wales was asked to decide whether an entire agreement clause prevented the Respondents from bringing claims based on alleged misrepresentations, breach of collateral warranties, and/or implied terms. Practitioners should take note of the decision due to the general guidance provided on the use of entire agreement clauses to exclude liability for misrepresentation.

    Bribery Act 2010 Commencement, Interpretation and Guidance

    The Bribery Act 2010 comes into force on 1 July 2011. The UK Government has published guidance to help organisations understand the legislation and deal with practical issues that may arise. The Act creates offences of, inter alia, (i) offering or receiving bribes, (ii) bribing foreign public officials, and (iii) commercial organisations failing to prevent a bribe being paid on that organisation’s behalf. The aim of the Act is to tame corruption and update current domestic legislation.

    ADVERTISING AND MARKETING

    Kingspan Group plc v Rockwool Ltd: Unfair Comparative Advertising and Brand Denigration

    The High Court of England and Wales has held that a promotional campaign conducted by the Defendant was false and misleading and infringed the Claimant’s trade marks. The campaign attributed claims to the Claimant that they had not made and gave the “realistic” impression that the Claimant’s products were dangerous when they were not.

    E-COMMERCE, IT AND BANKING TECHNOLOGY

    Pierre-Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique v Président de l’Autorité de la Concurrence: Selective Distribution and Restrictions on Internet Sales

    Advocate General Ján Mazák has given his Opinion that an absolute ban on selling through the internet is a “hardcore restriction” under the Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Regulation.

    GENERAL

    Jones v Kaney: The UK Supreme Court Abolishes Immunity From Suit for Expert Witnesses.

    The UK Supreme Court has abolished the principle of immunity from suit for expert witnesses on the grounds that there is no public policy justification for upholding it. Accordingly, expert witnesses can now be sued for negligence in respect of opinions given both pre-trial and as evidence during legal proceedings.

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  • Treasury Clarifies FBAR Regulations for Private Investment Funds

    Treasury Clarifies FBAR Regulations for Private Investment Funds

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Treasury Clarifies FBAR Regulations for Private Investment Funds

    April 1, 2011

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 28, 2011, the Final Regulations, issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) relating to the filing of Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (“FBAR”) became effective. Notably, the Final Regulations do not require ownership interests in, or signing or other authority over, private investment funds, such as hedge funds and private equity funds, to be reported on FBARs, although Treasury will continue to study the issue.

    The Final Regulations apply to FBARs required to be filed by June 30, 2011 with respect to foreign financial accounts maintained in the calendar year 2010, and for all subsequent years. United States persons who deferred FBAR filings for prior reporting years in accordance with guidance issued by Treasury,[1] may apply the provisions of the Final Regulations in determining their FBAR filing requirements for any deferred reports due June 30, 2011.

    A revised FBAR form (Form TD-F-90-22.1) and General Instructions, which should be used for the June 30, 2011 filing deadline, were also recently released.

    Background Information Relating to FBARs

    Any United States person, who has a financial interest in, or signature or other authority over, any foreign financial accounts, including bank, securities, or other types of financial accounts in a foreign country, must report that relationship each calendar year by filing an FBAR with Treasury on or before June 30 of the succeeding year, if the aggregate value of these financial accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year.

    Final FBAR Regulations

    1. United States Person

    The Final Regulations define a “United States person” as a “citizen or resident of the United States, or an entity, including but not limited to a corporation, partnership, trust, or limited liability company, created, organized, or formed under the laws of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia, the Territories, and Insular Possessions of the United States, or the Indian Tribes.” The Preamble to the Final Regulations (the “Preamble”) clarifies that a U.S. grantor trust and a U.S. entity which is disregarded for tax purposes (such as a single member LLC) are United States persons which are required to file FBARs.

    2. Status of Investment Funds

    The Final Regulations define a “financial account” as including “an account with a mutual fund or similar pooled fund which issues shares available to the general public that have a regular net asset value determination and regular redemptions.” Therefore, offshore hedge funds and private equity funds which are not offered to the public will not constitute financial accounts reportable on FBARs. Owners of offshore private investment fund interests, and individuals with signature authority with respect to such interests, are not required to report these interests on FBARs. However, FBAR reporting is still required for any foreign financial accounts maintained by a private investment fund — e.g., a domestic fund’s interest in a foreign bank or brokerage account, and a U.S. investment adviser’s signature authority over an offshore fund’s foreign financial account are subject to FBAR reporting.

    Treasury stated that it will continue to consider the appropriate treatment of private funds for FBAR purposes. In addition, under new tax legislation an interest in an offshore private fund will be treated as a foreign financial account subject to new tax return reporting requirements for individuals.

    3. Signature or Other Authority

    The Final Regulations define “signature or other authority” as “the authority of an individual (alone or in conjunction with another) to control the disposition of money, funds or other assets held in a financial account by direct communication (whether in writing or otherwise) to the person with whom the financial account is maintained.” Where an entity (e.g., an investment management company, or a general partner entity) is given authority over a foreign financial account, the entity need not file an FBAR reflecting its signature authority. Only the individuals — the real people — who can exercise that authority are required to report the signature authority.

    In the Preamble, Treasury noted that “the test for determining whether an individual has signature or other authority over an account is whether the foreign financial institution will act upon a direct communication from that individual regarding the disposition of assets in that account.” Treasury explained that the phrase “in conjunction with another” is “intended to address situations in which a foreign financial institution requires a direct communication from more than one individual regarding the disposition of assets in the account.” 

    Although Treasury provided in the Final Regulations exemptions to the FBAR reporting requirements for officers or employees with signature authority over foreign financial accounts maintained by certain entities, Treasury made it clear that these exemptions generally do not apply to officers or employees of investment advisers of private investment funds because they are not included in the definition of “financial institutions” under the Bank Secrecy Act.[2]

    4. Special Rules to Simplify FBAR Filings

    The Final Regulations state that a United States person having a financial interest in 25 or more foreign financial accounts, or signature or other authority over 25 or more foreign financial accounts, need only provide the number of financial accounts and certain other basic information on the FBAR form. Detailed information concerning each account must be provided upon request. 

    The Final Regulations also provide that an entity that is a United States person and owns directly or indirectly more than a 50 percent interest in an entity required to report under this section will be permitted to file a consolidated report on behalf of itself and such other entities.

    Treasury also indicated its plans to allow electronic filing of FBAR forms at some point in the future.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Philippe Benedict, Shlomo C. Twerski and William I. Friedman.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] As a result of changes that were made to the FBAR Form instructions in October 2008, FBAR filing deadlines were extended for certain filers. See IRS Notice 2009-62 and IRS Notice 2010-23.

    [2] 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(n) (2010).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Philippe Benedict

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • SEC Issues Proposing Release to Readopt Beneficial Ownership Rules as They Relate to Security-Based Swaps

    SEC Issues Proposing Release to Readopt Beneficial Ownership Rules as They Relate to Security-Based Swaps

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Issues Proposing Release to Readopt Beneficial Ownership Rules as They Relate to Security-Based Swaps

    March 25, 2011

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 17, 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) issued a release (the “Release”) proposing to readopt, without change, the beneficial ownership rules with respect to security-based swaps, including portions of Rule 13d-3 and Rule 16a-1 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).[1] The purpose of the Release was to make clear that Section 766 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) would not supersede existing beneficial ownership rules relating to security-based swaps.

    Section 766 of the Dodd-Frank Act, effective on July 16, 2011, adds new Section 13(o) to the Exchange Act and provides that for purposes of Section 13 and Section 16 of the Exchange Act, security-based swaps confer beneficial ownership “only to the extent that the Commission, by rule, determines . . . . . that the purchase or sale of the security-based swap, or class of security-based swap, provides incidents of ownership comparable to direct ownership of the equity security, and that it is necessary to achieve the purposes of this section that the purchase or sale of the security-based swaps, or class of security-based swap, be deemed the acquisition of beneficial ownership of the equity security” (emphasis added). The SEC was concerned that the language of Section 766 could be interpreted to mean that in the absence of rule making by the SEC, no security-based swap would confer beneficial ownership under Section 13 or Section 16 of the Exchange Act.  Therefore, in order to preserve the application of the current beneficial ownership rules to persons who purchase or sell security-based swaps, the SEC is proposing to readopt the existing rules. 

    The Release reaffirms a number of relevant Section 13(d) beneficial ownership rules under which a party to a security-based swap may be deemed to have beneficial ownership of the equity security underlying the security-based swap, including: (i) where a security-based swap, by its terms or otherwise, gives a person voting or investment power over the underlying security[2]; (ii) where a security-based swap is used with the purpose or effect of divesting or preventing the vesting of beneficial ownership as part of a plan or scheme to evade the beneficial ownership reporting requirements[3]; and (iii) where a security-based swap, by its terms or otherwise, gives a person the right to acquire the underlying security within 60 days or the person holds such right to acquire with the purpose of effect of changing or influencing control of the issuer.[4] 

    Similarly, the Release proposes to readopt, without change, the relevant portions of the Section 16 rules, including: (i) Rule 16a-1(a)(1) which uses the beneficial ownership tests of Section 13(d) to determine whether a person is subject to Section 16 as a greater than 10 percent beneficial owner and (ii) Rule 16a-1(a)(2) in order to maintain the existing reporting obligations applicable to security-based swaps and the pecuniary interest and short-swing profit analysis related to them.

    The Release makes clear that the proposed readoption is intended only to preserve the “status quo” and is “neither intended nor expected to change any existing administrative or judicial application or interpretation of the rules.”[5] Accordingly, the Release does not address the decision inCSX Corp. v. The Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) L.L.P.[6] where the court found the defendants to have beneficial ownership of the equity securities underlying certain cash-settled, security-based swaps based on the evasion standard of Rule 13d-3(b). The SEC further notes in the Release that “[w]hile the use of security-based swaps has not been frequently disclosed in Schedule 13D and 13G filings, we are proposing to readopt Rules 13d-3(a), (b) and (d)(1) and the relevant portions of Rules 16a-1(a)(1) and (a)(2) to further the policy objectives of and foster compliance with these rules upon the effectiveness of Section 13(o).”[7] However, the Release does go on to remind Schedule 13D filers party to security-based swaps that they “remain subject to the obligation to comply with Items 6 (“Contracts, Arrangements, Understandings or Relationships With Respect to Securities of the Issuer”) and 7 (“Material to be Filed as Exhibits”) and provide disclosures relating to the security-based swap depending upon the security-based swap’s terms. In addition, beneficial owners who file a Schedule 13G pursuant to Rule 13d-1(b) or otherwise rely upon Rule 13d-1(b) to govern a future reporting obligation may be required to make disclosures on Schedule 13D instead based upon their purchase or sale of a security-based swap. See In the Matter of Perry Corp., Release No. 34-60351 (July 21, 2009).”[8]

    While the Release does not propose any current changes to Section 13, it discloses that the “staff is engaged in a separate project to develop proposals to modernize reporting under Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g).”[9]

    Release No. 34-64087 can be viewed in its entirety at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-64087.pdf.

    Authored by Eleazer Klein and Adriana Schwartz.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] SEC Release No. 34-64087 (March 17, 2011).

    [2] Rule 13d-3(a). 

    [3] Rule 13d-3(b).

    [4] Rule 13d-3(d)(1).

    [5] Release No. 34-64087 at note 8.

    [6] CSX Corp. v. The Children’s Investment Fund Management (UK) L.L.P., 562 F. Supp. 2d 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). See also, “Swaps and Section 16: Reporting and Liability Issues,”  SRZ Activist Investing Developments, Winter 2009.

    [7] Release No. 34-64087 at 20.

    [8] Release No. 34-64087 at note 55. For a discussion of In the Matter of Perry Corp, see also, “SEC Enforcement: Enhanced 13(d) Scrutiny and Merger Arbitrage,” SRZ Activist Investing Developments, Summer 2009. 

    [9] Release No. 34-64087 at 7.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Ele Klein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Expert Networks: New Commentary by SEC Officials About Insider Trading

    Expert Networks: New Commentary by SEC Officials About Insider Trading

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Expert Networks: New Commentary by SEC Officials About Insider Trading

    March 25, 2011

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The recent government investigations into insider trading involving the use of expert consultant networks — and the cases brought by the Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission arising from those investigations — has led to much speculation as to where the government believes the line is between permissible and impermissible use of such networks. Two SEC officials recently made comments that may shed some light on where federal regulators believe that line may be. In a March 21 speech made at the IA Watch Annual IA Compliance Best Practices Seminar, Carlo V. di Florio, director of the SEC Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, emphasized that contrary to some reports, the investigations and cases relating to expert networks:

    [D]o not represent some inherent hostility by the Commission toward expert networks, nor do they indicate that the Commission is seeking to undermine the mosaic theory, under which analysts and investors are free to develop market insights through assembly of information from different public and private sources, so long as that information is not material nonpublic information obtained in breach of or by virtue of a duty or relationship of trust and confidence.

    He indicated that investment firms that utilize expert networks “should address any increase to their compliance risks that expert networks may pose, and build appropriate controls around information obtained from expert networks, at both the front end and the back end.” Those controls could include the following:

    Front-end controls

    • Reviewing the terms of any agreement with an expert network firm;
    • Having the adviser’s staff read and acknowledge the adviser’s insider trading policies;
    • Pre-approving every conversation with an expert;
    • Evaluating any controls in place at the expert networks;
    • Compliance monitoring of conversations between an expert and the adviser’s staff; and
    • Where an expert is employed at a public company, extra controls, or prohibiting such consultations altogether.

    Back-end controls

    • Obtaining certifications from the adviser’s staff who utilize expert networks that they are not trading on insider information,
    • Identifying any trades made by the adviser following a conversation with an expert and testing at least some of those trades against publicly available information, and
    • Monitoring personal trading by the adviser’s staff who may have access to material nonpublic information.[1]

    Mr. di Florio’s remarks were echoed by those made by Rob Khuzami, director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, during a March 23 panel discussion following his speech to the SIFMA Compliance and Legal Society Conference.[2] During the panel discussion, Mr. Khuzami expressed the view that there is nothing inherently wrong with utilizing expert networks and that the SEC has no interest in undermining the mosaic theory or preventing market participants from obtaining “market color.” He characterized the recent cases filed by the SEC in this area as involving conduct that was “clearly over the line” and noted that the SEC does not pursue cases where the conduct is in the “gray area.” He did recommend that advisers perform adequate due diligence on expert networks before utilizing them, and that they should adopt policies and procedures governing the use of such networks that may include taping calls, using blackout periods and not paying public company employees to provide information on the companies that employ them. 

    Although comments by SEC officials only represent their own views and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or other staff members, these recent statements do provide insight with respect to how regulators view these important issues.

    SRZ attorneys routinely advise clients on how to approach and analyze issues associated with the use of expert networks and how the client’s compliance policies and procedures should address such use, including use of the above-referenced controls. A Dec. 17, 2010 SRZ Client Alert entitled “Government Ratchets Up Investigation Into Insider Trading Involving Expert Networks” discusses insider trading issues related to the use of expert networks.

    Authored by Marc E. Elovitz and David K. Momborquette.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] A complete copy of the remarks made by Mr. di Florio at the March 21 seminar can be found at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch032111cvd.htm.

    [2] A complete copy of that speech can be found at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch032311rk.htm.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Buyer Beware: Purchaser of Assets in UCC Article 9 Foreclosure Sale May Be Subject to Claims of Debtor’s Unsecured Creditors

    Buyer Beware: Purchaser of Assets in UCC Article 9 Foreclosure Sale May Be Subject to Claims of Debtor’s Unsecured Creditors

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Buyer Beware: Purchaser of Assets in UCC Article 9 Foreclosure Sale May Be Subject to Claims of Debtor’s Unsecured Creditors

    March 22, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a secured creditor who purchases a debtor’s assets in an out-of-court foreclosure sale under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) and continues to operate the debtor’s business may be liable for the debtor’s debts. Call Center Technologies, Inc. v. Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Publishing Corporation, Interline Travel & Tour, Inc., Docket No. 09-1224 (2d Cir. Mar. 11, 2011) (“Interline“). The Second Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the foreclosing lender because the issue of successor liability is fact-specific and the lower court erred by granting judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 1. A foreclosure conducted in accordance with the UCC will not automatically insulate the purchaser, as a matter of law, from a state law successor liability claim, even though under Section 9-617 of the UCC a sale of collateral after default discharges the security interest of the foreclosing creditor and “any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien.” UCC Section 9-617(a)(3). This decision means that a potential asset purchaser in an out-of-court foreclosure sale (whether it be the secured creditor through a credit bid or other independent party) must consider whether an unsecured creditor may seek to collect unpaid liabilities of the debtor from the purchaser, on the grounds that “the purchaser is a ‘mere continuation’ of the seller.”

    In depth
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  • New York Supreme Court Upholds Accelerated Enforceability of “Bad Boy” Guaranty in CMBS Case

    New York Supreme Court Upholds Accelerated Enforceability of “Bad Boy” Guaranty in CMBS Case

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Supreme Court Upholds Accelerated Enforceability of “Bad Boy” Guaranty in CMBS Case

    March 18, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 8, 2011, Justice Melvin L. Schweitzer of the New York State Supreme Court granted a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint filed by UBS Commercial Mortgage Trust 2007-FL1, Commercial Mortgage Pass-through Certificates, Series 2007-FL1 (“UBS”), and Normandy Reston Office LLC (“Normandy,” together with UBS, collectively, “Plaintiffs”), enforcing the obligation of Garrison Special Opportunities Fund LP (“Garrison”), the guarantor under a “bad boy” guaranty, to pay the full amount of the outstanding loan after Borrowers filed for bankruptcy protection. Summary judgment in lieu of complaint is an accelerated procedure available in New York that allows a plaintiff to seek summary judgment without the delays caused by filing a complaint as long as the underlying contract at issue is an instrument for the payment of money only. Relying in part on the express terms of the guaranty and the relative sophistication of Garrison, the Court held in pertinent part that (1) a summary judgment motion may be granted to enforce the “bad boy” guaranty even though the guaranty contains provisions that are not directly related to the payment of money, (2) “bad boy” guaranties are not “unenforceable penalties” and (3) enforcing “bad boy” guaranties is not against public policy.

    In depth
    Authors

    Robert J. Ward

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Julian M. Wise

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • FinCEN, OFAC, the UN, EU and UK Issue Advisories, Freeze Orders, Other Measures Related to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia

    FinCEN, OFAC, the UN, EU and UK Issue Advisories, Freeze Orders, Other Measures Related to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    FinCEN, OFAC, the UN, EU and UK Issue Advisories, Freeze Orders, Other Measures Related to Libya, Egypt and Tunisia

    March 17, 2011

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    As a result of the recent unrest in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has issued a series of advisories to remind financial institutions of their obligations under the USA PATRIOT Act to apply enhanced scrutiny for private bank accounts held by or on behalf of senior foreign political figures and to monitor transactions and file Suspicious Activity Reports involving transfers that may represent misappropriated or diverted state assets, proceeds of bribery or other illegal payments, or other public corruption proceeds. The FinCEN advisories draw particular attention to the fact that the recent instability in the area creates a heightened risk that senior foreign political figures (also known as politically exposed persons) in the Libyan, Egyptian and Tunisian governments may attempt to move misappropriated government funds out of their respective countries.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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