Content Type: Article

  • Update on Alter Ego and Successor Liability Claims

    Update on Alter Ego and Successor Liability Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update on Alter Ego and Successor Liability Claims

    November 23, 2015

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    An unsecured creditor had “adequately alleged a de facto merger” between a corporate defendant and a purported asset acquiror, held the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York when refusing to dismiss the defendants’ “alter ego and de facto merger claims.” John Deere Shared Services Inc. v. Success Apparel LLC, 2015 WL 6656932, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2015) (Furman, J.). According to the court, the corporate defendants’ owner (“G”) could also be personally liable for the entity’s debt because of her “domination and control.” Id. Nevertheless, reasoned the court, because the creditor had failed “to plead that it was injured by any of the [selling entity’s] allegedly fraudulent” transfers, the creditor’s fraudulent transfer claims had to be dismissed. Id.

    Relevance

    Alter ego, successor liability and fraudulent transfer claims are regularly litigated in bankruptcy courts. Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015), held, when reversing the Seventh Circuit, that bankruptcy courts could hear a trustee’s state law alter ego claim. In that case, the trustee, on behalf of creditors, alleged that assets purportedly held by the debtor in trust for a third person were, in fact, the debtor’s property. See also In re Johnson, 960 F.2d 396, 400-02 (4th Cir. 1992) (bankruptcy court could determine whether property belonged to debtor’s estate under state law); In re Eufaula Enters., 565 F.2d 1157, 1160-62 (10th Cir. 1999) (court found property held by debtor’s alter ego was property of estate).

    The unsecured creditor in Deere also asserted a successor liability claim against a successor corporation (“A”) in the corporate defendant’s ostensibly routine asset sale. Courts have been wrestling with the application of state law successor liability issues in the bankruptcy context over the past 15 years. See In re Motors Liquidation Co., f/k/a General Motors Corp., 529 B.R. 510, 564-68, 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (referring to the “fundamental principle of bankruptcy law that a buyer of assets cannot be required to take on liabilities it doesn’t want”; claimants who were denied adequate notice could file late claims against estate, but court stayed successor liability claims against asset purchaser), appeal docketed, No. 15-2844 (bk) (2d Cir. 2015); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2003) (discrimination claims by employees of debtor not assertable against acquiror of debtor’s assets because of sale order in “free and clear” sale); In re Grumman Olson Inds., Inc., 467 B.R. 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (bankruptcy court sale order could not extinguish claims against asset purchaser based on successor liability).

    Facts

    The plaintiff unsecured creditor (“Deere”) had a license agreement with Success. When Success failed to pay royalties under the license agreement, Deere sued it, G and A, the entity that acquired the assets of Success. Under the asset purchase agreement, certain employees of Success would continue working for A, and A would make a cash payment plus “earn-out payments” in connection with the asset sale.

    Success had also entered into an agreement with its secured lender (“L”), which held a lien on all of its assets, including those sold to A. L consented to the sale and released its lien in exchange for receiving the purchase price for the assets plus the earn-out payments made by A. According to the complaint, Success made only a few payroll, fringe benefit, travel and entertainment expense payments to G and another employee “for little or no consideration.”

    Deere asserted fraudulent transfer claims against Success and A; contract claims against Success and A “on the theory that [A] is liable as Success’s successor”; a fraudulent transfer claim against A; and a contract claim against G “on the theory that she was liable as Success’s alter ego.” 2015 WL 6656932, at *2. The defendants moved to dismiss the fraudulent transfer, alter ego and successor liability claims.

    Alter Ego

    “[A] court may pierce the corporate veil and hold a corporation owner’s liable for its debts when ‘(1) the owner exercised such control that the corporation has become a mere instrumentality of the owner, who is the real actor; (2) the owner used this control to commit a fraud or “other wrong”; and (3) the fraud or wrong results in an unjust loss or injury to the plaintiff.’” Id. at *5, quoting In re Vebeliunas, 332 F.3d 85, 91-92 (2d Cir. 2003).

    Deere essentially alleged that G had “dominated Success and — through payments to herself or [another insider] that were disguised as corporate expense payments … siphoned off Success’s assets, rendering the company insolvent and unable to meet its obligations, including the royalty payments due to [Deere] under the License Agreement.” Id. According to Deere’s complaint, G not only owned “at least an eighty percent interest in Success while her children owned a minority interest[, but also] failed to observe corporate formalities[,] co-mingled personal and corporate funds[,] personally guaranteed Success’s debt to [L ] [and] was the only employee of Success when she fraudulently transferred to herself … corporate assets in the form of expense payments … ; and the transfer [to G] made Success unable to meet its financial obligations to [Deere].” Id. If true, reasoned the court, these allegations “are sufficient to plausibly allege that [G] exercised domination and control over Success to commit a wrong that injured Deere.”

    Successor Liability

    New York law insulates the buyer of a corporation’s assets from the seller’s liabilities. Cargo Parker AG v. Albatrans, Inc., 352 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2003). But the so-called “de facto merger doctrine … provides an exception to that rule.” Id. When a purported asset sale “is in substance ‘a consolidation or merger of seller and purchaser,’” courts will treat it as a de facto merger. 2015 WL 6656932, at *6, quoting Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 59 N.Y. 2d 239, 245 (1983). Moreover, “continuity of ownership is a necessary precondition to finding a de facto merger.” Id.

    As the acquiror of Success’s assets, A was allegedly “subject to successor liability because the [purported asset transfer] was not an asset purchase, … but a de facto merger.” Id. Deere sufficiently alleged a de facto merger, found the court. “Success conveyed all or substantially all of its corporate assets to [A] … ; … [A] took over and continued the business operations of Success … ; [A] and [Success] share the same vendors and customers, as well as the same management and personnel … ; [and] after the de facto merger, ‘Success promptly ceased operations’ and fired all staff save for [G] and [one other employee].” Id. On these alleged facts, the court held that Deere’s “allegations are sufficient to survive” the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

    Fraudulent Transfer Claim

    The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Deere’s fraudulent transfer claim because of its failure to show any prejudice to itself as a result of the de facto merger. According to the court, “for an unsecured creditor to make out a fraudulent [transfer] claim, the creditor ‘must first plead … that … some portion of the debtor’s assets would have been available to satisfy the unsecured creditor’s claims had there been no conveyance.’” Id. at *4, quoting Chemtex, LLC v. St. Anthony Enters., Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 536, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). See also Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., 99 F. App’x 274, 281 (2d Cir. 2004) (liability requires “some prejudice to a creditor of … transferor”); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 640 n.10 (2d Cir. 1995) (no liability unless transfer “prejudices … complaining creditor”).

    Deere failed, reasoned the court, “to allege that Success’s assets exceeded the value of its secured debt to [L].” Also, Deere failed “to explain how [L’s] taking a new lien on some of the assets sold to [A] says anything, one way or another, about the remaining amount of Success’s [secured] debt … as compared to the overall, true value of Success’s assets.” Moreover, Deere’s argument about future non-payment “is simply too conjectural and remote to satisfy the injury requirement.” Id. Finally, “if the value of Success’s assets were less than, or equal to, its debt to [L], then it would not matter what consideration Success received from [A]; whether it was adequate or not, the assets would not have been available to satisfy the unsecured debt to” Deere. In short, Deere failed “to allege that Success’s assets exceeded the value of its secured debt to [L].” Id. at *4.

    Comments

    Transferees in bankruptcy cases have avoided successor liability claims by relying on Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) Section 363(f), which permits a trustee to sell a debtor’s assets “free and clear of any interest,” including the debtor’s pre-existing liabilities. See, e.g., In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 292-93 (3d Cir. 2003) (without protection given by Code Section 363(f), buyer might “have offered a discounted bid” for debtor’s assets, resulting in plaintiffs’ receiving greater distributions than other creditors, contrary to the “Code’s priority scheme”); In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2009) (Code “§363(f) permitted the bankruptcy court to authorize the Sale free and clear of appellants’ interest in the [debtor’s] property”); judgment vacated and appeal dismissed as moot, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009); In re Ormet Corp., 2014 WL 3542133, at *4 (Bankr. D. Del. July 17, 2014) (“[T]he Congressional policy favoring multi-employer pension plans in ERISA and MPPAA does not trump the express provisions of the … Code permitting the sale of the Debtor’s assets free and clear of the Trust’s liability claim.”).

    A persuasive fact pattern, though, can convince a court to override Code Section 363. See, e.g., Grumman Olson Inds., 467 B.R. at 708 (“Enforcing the Sale Order against the [claimants] to take away their right to seek redress under a state law theory of successor liability when they did not have notice or an opportunity to appear … would deprive them of due process.”), citing Schwinn Cycling and Fitness Inc. v. Benonis, 217 B.R. 790, 797 (N.D. Ill. 1997); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 600 F.3d 135, 153-54, 158 (2d Cir. 2010) (party who does not receive adequate notice cannot be bound by bankruptcy court order); In re Savage Inds., Inc., 43 F.3d 714, 720, 722-23 (1st Cir. 1994) (rejecting argument that enforcing “free and clear” provision of asset purchase agreement and sale order would “‘chill’ Chapter 11 asset bidding”); Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159, 163 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[N]o one believes … that … a bankruptcy court enjoys a blanket power to enjoin all future lawsuits against a buyer at a bankruptcy sale in order to maximize the sale price [or] that it could … extinguish the rights of … future tort claimants, without notice to them or (as notice might well be infeasible) any consideration of their interests.”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Income Tax Aspects of Subordination in Acquisitions and Renovations

    ARTICLE

    Income Tax Aspects of Subordination in Acquisitions and Renovations

    November 2015

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Kian Tauser

    Partner

    Frankfurt

    More insights

  • Treasury Finalizes Regulations on the Varying Interests Rule Under §70

    Treasury Finalizes Regulations on the Varying Interests Rule Under §70

    ARTICLE

    Treasury Finalizes Regulations on the Varying Interests Rule Under §70

    November 17, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Kevin Feeley wrote this bylined article on new tax rules for determining the partners’ distributive shares of partnership items when a partner’s interest varies during the taxable year. “Fortunately, the final regulations generally permit the selection of methods, conventions or additional extraordinary items to be made by a person authorized to make that selection under state law or in the partnership agreement,” Mr. Feely wrote. Read the full article.

    In depth
    Authors

    Kevin J. Feeley

    Counsel

    Chicago

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  • Meaningful Use Stage 3 Final Rules Encourage Providers to Engage Patients in their Health Care

    Meaningful Use Stage 3 Final Rules Encourage Providers to Engage Patients in their Health Care

    CLIENT ALERT / INTEROPERABILITY

    Meaningful Use Stage 3 Final Rules Encourage Providers to Engage Patients in their Health Care

    November 12, 2015

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

     

    In depth

    On October 16, 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services published the Meaningful Use Stage 3 final rule (MU Final Rule) and the 2015 Edition Health Information Technology Certification Criteria (2015 Edition Certification Criteria) final rule (2015 Certification Final Rule) in the Federal Register. Together, the final rules (Stage 3 Final Rules) incentivize eligible acute care hospitals (EHs), critical access hospitals (CAHs), and physicians and other professionals (EPs) eligible for the Medicare and Medicaid electronic health record (EHR) incentive programs to engage patients in the management of their care outside traditional clinical settings and encourage technology vendors to develop mobile health and wellness applications and other software to support such efforts.

    Background

    The Meaningful Use Stage 2 Core Measure for Patient Electronic Access required EHs, CAHs and EPs (collectively, Eligible Providers) to encourage patients to view, download and transmit their health information through online “patient portals” in order to achieve meaningful use and earn EHR incentive payments or avoid Medicare reimbursement penalties. Once logged into a patient portal, a patient could view their health information, download it in electronic form or transmit it to third party. Signing onto a patient portal for the first time, however, often required a patient to take multiple steps outside of the provider’s office or facility. Additionally, since most EHR systems have their own portal, patients typically need to access multiple portals to interact with health information from each of their health care providers and lack a composite, patient-centric view of their health information. These issues reduced the user-friendliness of the portals and frustrated patient engagement goals of providers and the Medicare and Medicaid EHR incentive programs.

    Introduction of APIs

    To address the frustrations with patient portal technology and spur patient engagement efforts, the 2015 Certification Final Rule requires certified EHR technology (CEHRT) to include an application programming interface (API), and two of Stage 3 Meaningful Use measures under the MU Final Rule require Eligible Providers to make EHR data available through an API which a patient may access through a properly configured online or mobile application of their choice.

    An API is a similar concept to a power outlet. By creating a common set of electric principles, a common type of outlet and plugs, any number of different electronic devices can use a power outlet to “plug in” to the power grid and receive the electricity needed to power the device. Like the power outlet, an API consists of a common set of programming principles that allows websites and mobile applications to “plug in” and receive computable information. By requiring EHR vendors to create APIs, CMS and ONC’s goal is that any number of websites and mobile applications could “plug in” to the EHR at a patient’s request, receive health information from the EHR and provide a service to the patient. According to CMS, APIs will allow a patient to collect health information from multiple providers so that they can potentially incorporate their health information into a single portal, application, program or other software.

    The 2015 Edition Certification Criteria establish the requirements for CEHRT (2015 CEHRT) that Eligible Providers seeking to achieve Meaningful Use Stage 3 in 2018 will need to adopt. To be included in 2015 CEHRT, an API would need to meet three different functional requirements. First, the API will need to be able to query for identification or other token of a patient’s record to execute data requests for that record. Second, the API will need to support requests and responses for EHR data by data category. Third, the EHR’s API will need to support requests and responses for all EHR data. The API will also need to meet ONC’s privacy and security certification framework by demonstrating the capability to establish a trusted connection with the application requesting patient data, authorize the user to request data and log all interactions with the data source.

    Notably, ONC elected to not create specific standards requirements for the API, with the goal of allowing EHR vendors to meet the above functional requirements in innovative ways. Without common technical standards for the API, however, EHR vendors may adopt varying programming principles for their APIs. This may make it difficult for developers to build applications that can interact with multiple EHRs’ APIs and frustrate efforts to promote the exchange of health information among providers that use different EHR systems.

    ONC indicated that it may use future rulemaking to establish required standards for APIs. In light of the bipartisan disappointment about barriers to interoperability among EHR systems, we expect ONC to re-visit its decision to not establish standards.

    Stage 3 Meaningful Use Objectives Focused on Patient Engagement

    The Meaningful Use Stage 3 measures for the “Patient Electronic Access” and “Coordination of Care through Patient Engagement” Meaningful Use objectives establish the key patient engagement steps that Eligible Providers must take in order to achieve Stage 3 Meaningful Use beginning in 2018 (or at their option beginning in 2017).

    Stage 3 Patient Electronic Access MU Objective

    To achieve the Patient Electronic Access objective, EPs must meet the following two measures:

    • For more than 80 percent of all unique patients seen by the EP—
      • The patient (or the patient’s authorized representative) is provided timely (i.e., within 48 hours of a patient visit) access to view online, download and transmit the patient’s health information; and
      • The provider ensures the patient’s health information is available for the patient (or patient-authorized representative) to access using any application of their choice that is configured to meet the technical specifications of the API in the provider’s CEHRT.
    • The EP must use clinically relevant information from CEHRT to identify patient-specific educational resources and provide electronic access to those materials to more than 35 percent of unique patients seen by the EP during the EHR reporting period.

    EHs and CAHs must provide the same capability as summarized above for EPs to at least 80 percent of their patients within 36 hours of a patient’s discharge (rather than within 48 hours of a patient visit). In the proposed Meaningful Use Stage 3 rule, CMS would have allowed Eligible Providers to either offer view, download and transmission capabilities through a patient portal or offer an API instead. In the MU Final Rule, however, CMS requires Eligible Providers to offer both patient portal and API functionalities to 80 percent of their patients to meet this measure.

    Stage 3 Coordination of Care through Patient Engagement Objective

    To achieve the Coordination of Care through Patient Engagement objective beginning in calendar year 2018, Eligible Providers must encourage patient engagement in all three of the following ways, but only achieve the percentage thresholds in two of the three:

    • At least 10 percent of unique patients seen during the calendar year (or other applicable EHR reporting period) must engage with the Eligible Provider’s CEHRT by
      • Viewing, downloading, or transmitting their health information through a patient portal
      • Accessing their health information through the use of an API that can be used by applications chosen by the patient and configured to the API in the provider’s CEHRT, or
      • A combination of the portal and API. The 10 percent threshold represents a marked reduction from the 25 percent threshold proposed by CMS in the Meaningful Use Stage 3 proposed rule, but still doubles Meaningful Use Stage 2’s current five percent threshold;
    • The Eligible Provider sends a secure message to patients or responds to secure messages sent from patients or their representatives for more than 25 percent of all unique patients seen during the applicable EHR reporting period; or
    • The Eligible Provider incorporates patient-generated health data or data form a non-clinical setting into the CEHRT from more than five percent of all unique patients seen during the applicable EHR reporting period. CMS intends the sources of this non-clinical data to include mobile applications for tracking health and nutrition, home health devices and wearable devices, such as activity trackers or health monitors. While these non-clinical applications have proliferated rapidly in the past several years, health care providers are only beginning to interact with the data created by these applications. CMS’ goal in creating this new measure is to incentivize the sharing of this information to improve care coordination and overall patient wellness outside of the care setting.

    Joining of Provider-Generated Health Data and Patient-Generated Health Information

    CMS’ and ONC’s decision to encourage the development of APIs and interaction between EHRs and third-party web and mobile applications reflects a shift in the EHR incentive programs. Previously, EHRs represented a separate informational ecosystem dis-connected from consumer technology used in non-clinical settings. While patients could view their health information from the EHR through the patient portal, the “download” and “transmit” functionalities were focused mainly on the transmission of the information to another health care provider or EHR system. The expected proliferation of APIs has the potential to facilitate the gathering of data from multiple EHR systems and consumer fitness, nutrition and wellness applications into a patient-centric personal health and wellness record, and could also further fuel the explosion of “big data” analytic tools for care improvement and personalized medicine both at the bedside and in the connected, outside world. For technology developers, it may create opportunities to create new innovative patient engagement solutions that leverage a rapidly expanding treasure trove of health data and other personal information.

    Implications for Value-Based Payment Initiatives

    These innovative patient engagement solutions can also help providers participating in new governmental and commercial payers’ value-based payment arrangements that require providers to share risk for patient outcomes and incentivize quality improvement and cost reduction. The successful use of patient engagement technology to collect health and wellness data from patients, aggregate the data into sophisticated data warehouses, and analyze the data with cognitive computing and analytic tools will help providers to identify the need for care (or lack thereof) between patient visits and calibrate the quantity of care to patient need.

    The Stage 3 Final Rules are subject to a 60-day comment period, which was added to account for the passage of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) after CMS had already issued a proposed rule for Meaningful Use Stage 3. MACRA will sunset the Medicare EHR Incentive Program for EPs in 2019 in favor of mandatory participation in certain alternative payment models (such as accountable care organizations) or the new Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) that emphasize value-based payment rather than fee-for-service. While MACRA included the adoption and use of CEHRT as required criteria for evaluating EPs’ participation in alternative payment models and MIPS, CMS will need to engage in additional rulemaking to clarify whether and how the Stage 3 Meaningful Use requirements will apply when MACRA becomes effective for EPs. Interested parties may submit comments to CMS prior to December 15, 2015.

    Authors

    Daniel F. Gottlieb

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Distribution Fees for Public Broadcasting Programs

    ARTICLE

    Distribution Fees for Public Broadcasting Programs

    November 12, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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    Overview

     

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  • New York City Commission on Human Rights Issues Enforcement Guidance on Fair Chance Act and Clarifies Credit Check Law Exemption

    New York City Commission on Human Rights Issues Enforcement Guidance on Fair Chance Act and Clarifies Credit Check Law Exemption

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York City Commission on Human Rights Issues Enforcement Guidance on Fair Chance Act and Clarifies Credit Check Law Exemption

    November 11, 2015

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The New York City Commission on Human Rights (the “Commission”) recently released enforcement guidance on the Fair Chance Act (the “FCA”), which took effect on Oct. 27, 2015.[1] The FCA prohibits New York City employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal record prior to extending a conditional offer of employment. The Commission’s guidance provides clarity as to how the Commission will enforce the new law. Separately, the Commission clarified how it will interpret the exemption to the Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act (“SCDEA”) for positions involving responsibility for funds or assets worth $10,000 or more.[2]

    Job Advertisements and Pre-Offer Inquiries

    It is a violation of the FCA for an employer to “[d]eclare, print or circulate … any solicitation, advertisement or publication, which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, or specification in employment based on a person’s arrest or criminal conviction.” The Commission explains that including in job advertisements or job applications phrases such as “no felonies,” “background check required” or “must have clean record” violates the FCA “even if no adverse action follows.”

    The Commission provides clarity about what types of background checks an employer can conduct before extending a conditional offer of employment. An employer can still review an applicant’s background so long as the employer does not attempt to discover an applicant’s criminal history during this process.[3] An employer who inadvertently discovers an applicant’s criminal history during this process will not be subject to liability, so long as the employer does not consider the information until after a conditional offer of employment has been given.

    Inquiries Following a Conditional Offer of Employment

    The FCA permits criminal background checks following a “conditional offer of employment,” which the Commission defines as “[a]n offer of employment that can only be revoked based on: (1) the results of a criminal background check; (2) the results of a medical exam in situations in which such exams are permitted by the Americans with Disabilities Act; or (3) other information the employer could not have reasonably known before the conditional offer if, based on the information, the employer would not have made the offer and the employer can show the information is material to job performance.” The Commission’s definition of “conditional offer of employment” could be interpreted to mean that an employer must complete all other pre-employment screening procedures (e.g., reference checks, drug screening) before making an offer conditioned on a criminal background check.

    If an employer’s inquiry reveals a criminal conviction,[4] the employer must perform the required analysis under Article 23-A of the New York State Correction Law (“Article 23-A”) prior to revoking a conditional offer of employment. Article 23-A prohibits an employer from denying employment based on a criminal conviction unless the employer can show a “direct relationship between one or more of the criminal offenses” and the “employment sought or held by the individual” or if employing the applicant “would involve an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety or welfare of specific individuals or the general public” and sets forth eight factors that an employer must consider in making this determination.[5]

    If, after evaluating the applicant under Article 23-A, the employer wishes to revoke the offer, an employer must follow what the Commission has termed the “Fair Chance Process”:

    • The employer must disclose to the applicant “a written copy of any inquiry it conducted into the applicant’s criminal history.”
    • The employer must provide the applicant a written copy of the employer’s Article 23-A analysis. The Commission has issued a form that employers can use to document this analysis.[6]
    • After providing the applicant with the above, the employer must give the applicant at least three business days from receipt to respond before revoking the conditional offer of employment.

    Exemptions

    The FCA contains limited exemptions that permit employers to conduct pre-offer criminal background checks on certain employees. The Commission explains that employers “have the burden of showing that an exemption applies.” According to the Commission, the exemptions “are to be construed narrowly.”

    The FCA does not apply to actions employers take pursuant to “state, federal or local law that requires criminal background checks for employment purposes or bars employment based on criminal history.” The Commission has interpreted this provision to mean that employers are exempt from the FCA’s requirements in instances in which the law places “mandatory barriers” to employment for applicants with certain convictions. Employers will not be exempt from the FCA if the law permits the employer discretion as to whether to deny an applicant employment due to certain criminal convictions.

    According to the Commission, the FCA does not apply when employers are complying with “industry-specific rules and regulations promulgated by a self-regulatory organization.” For asset managers,[7] this exemption may not be as useful as it appears at first blush. It is unlikely that asset managers will be deemed to be exempt from the FCA because the Investment Advisers Act and the Commodity Exchange Act registration regimes generally do not impose per se registration disqualifications for individuals with criminal convictions.[8]

    The Commission has set out certain procedures that an employer must follow when the employer believes an exemption applies. The Commission instructs employers to inform applicants of the exemption and to create an exemption log, which should be maintained for a period of five years from the date an exemption is used.

    Employers may be required to share their exemption logs with the Commission, and promptly doing so may “help avoid a Commission-initiated investigation into employment practices.”

    New York City employers should carefully review the Commission’s enforcement guidance and make adjustments to hiring processes as necessary to ensure that they are in compliance with all of the FCA’s requirements.

    Update on the SCDEA

    Separately, the Commission updated the FAQs[9] on its website to clarify the exemption from the SCDEA for positions involving responsibility for funds or assets worth $10,000 or more. The SCDEA prohibits New York City employers from requesting or using the credit history of applicants and employees when making employment decisions.

    • Positions with signatory authority over third-party funds of $10,000 or more are exempt from the SCDEA.
    • Positions that are required to “verify that a transaction of more than $10,000 is settled” are exempt from the SCDEA, even if such positions do not have “signatory” authority over the funds.
    • Employees who receive corporate credit cards that are paid directly by the employer and can be used for amounts above $10,000 without any preliminary or subsequent approval are exempt from the SCDEA. Given that most employers require employees with corporate credit cards to submit receipts to verify transactions, it is likely that few positions will be considered exempt on the basis of the employee in such position having a corporate credit card.

    Authored by
    Mark E. Brossman
    ,
    Ronald E. Richman
    ,
    Holly H. Weiss
    ,
    Scott A. Gold
    and
    Adam B. Gartner
    .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1]  The enforcement guidance, “Legal Enforcement Guidance on the Fair Chance Act,” is available on the New York City Commission on Human Rights’ website.

    [2] For a complete overview of the Commission’s guidance on the Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act, see our Alert, “New York City Commission on Human Rights Issues Enforcement Guidance on Credit History Law.”

    [3] The Commission defines “criminal history” as a “previous record of criminal convictions or non-convictions or a currently pending criminal case.”

    [4] The Commission reminds employers that they “must never inquire about or act on non-conviction information.”

    [5] The eight factors are: “(a) The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses; (b) the specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought or held by the person; (c) the bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities; (d) the time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses; (e) the age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses; (f) the seriousness of the offense or offenses; (g) any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct; (h) the legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.”

    [6] The form is available on the Commission’s website. Employers may adapt the Commission’s form to their “preferred format” but may not change the “material substance” of the form. 

    [7] Note that the analysis for broker-dealers may differ from that for investment advisers.

    [8] Of course, the regulators can and do impose civil and administrative industry bars and there are regulations, such as the so-called “Bad Actor Rule” — i.e., SEC Rule 506(d), which can have significant adverse effects on asset managers employing officers with criminal convictions — but these kinds of situations generally are not within the FCA’s “industry-specific rules” exemption (although they may be within Article 23-A).

    [9] The FAQs are available on the Commission’s website.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • CMS and OIG Finalize Waivers of Fraud and Abuse Laws Applicable to Medicare ACOs

    CMS and OIG Finalize Waivers of Fraud and Abuse Laws Applicable to Medicare ACOs

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CMS and OIG Finalize Waivers of Fraud and Abuse Laws Applicable to Medicare ACOs

    November 10, 2015

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    On October 29, 2015, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) published a final rule regarding the waiver of several federal health care fraud and abuse laws with respect to arrangements involving accountable care organizations (ACOs) participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), their participating providers and certain other non-participating providers, and the Medicare beneficiaries assigned to the ACO (each described below). CMS and OIG generally adopted the waivers that the agencies previously promulgated pursuant to an interim final rule published on November 2, 2011, with a few notable exceptions and clarifications identified in this article. McDermott previously published a white paper on the interim final rule, “ACOs Get Broad Waivers from the Fraud & Abuse Laws.” In addition, based on the interim final rule, the authors previously published in AHLA Connections magazine a detailed analysis of the so-called participation waiver—the most powerful waiver available to MSSP ACOs (described below). We refer the reader to this prior analysis as a resource for understanding the mechanics and benefits of the participation waiver. In this article, we describe any material updates to our analysis of the participation waiver stemming from the final rule, as well as highlight significant changes or clarifications that apply to all of the waivers generally.

    Waiver Overview

    CMS and OIG finalized the following five waivers in the final rule:

    • A waiver of the federal Stark law (the Stark Law) and federal anti-kickback statute (the Anti-Kickback Statute) that applies to ACO-related start-up arrangements in anticipation of participating in the MSSP, subject to certain limitations, including limits on the duration of the waiver and the types of parties covered (the Pre-Participation Waiver)
    • A waiver of the Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute that applies broadly to ACO-related arrangements during the term of the ACO’s participation agreement under the MSSP and for a limited period of time thereafter (the Participation Waiver)
    • A waiver of the Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Statute that applies to distributions and uses of shared savings payments earned under the MSSP (the Shared Savings Distributions Waiver)
    • A waiver of the Anti-Kickback Statute for ACO arrangements that implicate the Stark Law and satisfy the requirements of an existing exception (the Compliance with Stark Law Waiver), and
    • A waiver of the civil monetary penalties law provisions addressing inducements to Medicare beneficiaries (the Beneficiary Inducements CMP) and the Anti-Kickback Statute for medically related incentives offered by ACOs or their participating providers under the MSSP to Medicare beneficiaries to encourage preventive care and compliance with treatment regimes (the Patient Incentives Waiver)

    The Waivers No Longer Waive the Gainsharing CMP

    In the interim final rule, CMS and OIG included a waiver of the civil monetary penalties law provisions addressing hospital payments to physicians to reduce or limit services (the Gainsharing CMP) in the Pre-Participation, Participation, Shared Savings Distribution, and Compliance with Stark Law Waivers. In the final rule, the agencies removed the waiver of the Gainsharing CMP with respect to such waivers. At the time CMS and OIG published the interim final rule, the Gainsharing CMP prohibited hospitals from making payments to physicians to induce the physicians to reduce or limit medical services, including medically un-necessary services. CMS and OIG stated that the agencies included a waiver of the Gainsharing CMP in the interim final rule explicitly to permit hospitals to make payments to physicians to reduce medically un-necessary services. In 2015, Congress amended the Gainsharing CMP to remove the prohibition on inducements to reduce or limit the provision of medically un-necessary services. In light of this statutory change, CMS and OIG removed the Gainsharing CMP from the waivers because, from the agencies’ perspective, the original need for waiving the Gainsharing CMP no longer exists. But CMS and OIG made clear that they believe that this change to the waivers will not affect the ability of parties to enter into arrangements that previously fit into a waiver of the Gainsharing CMP in the interim final rule. As the agencies explained, “[p]ayments from hospitals to physicians to reduce or limit medically necessary services are not, and never have been, consistent with the purposes of the [MSSP], were not protected by the waivers in the [interim final rule], are not permitted by the amended Gainsharing CMP, and are not protected by the waivers in this final rule.” The agencies’ admonishment fails to recognize the grey area between medically necessary and medically un-necessary services. ACOs that sought to mitigate the risk associated with such grey area by qualifying certain gainsharing arrangements for protection based on an interpretation that the waiver of the Gainsharing CMP was a blanket waiver of the law must now verify that their arrangements are compliant with the amended Gainsharing CMP in all respects.

    CMS and OIG Determined that the Waivers Adequately Protect Beneficiaries and the Federal Health Care Programs

    In the interim final rule, CMS and OIG stated that they “plan to narrow the waivers . . . unless . . . information gathered through monitoring or other means suggests that such waivers have not had the unintended effect of shielding abusive arrangements.” That is, in the absence of affirmative evidence that there is no abuse, CMS’s and OIG’s stated intention was to narrow the waivers. In the final rule, CMS and OIG confirmed that the “information available to [them] suggests that the waivers are adequately protecting beneficiaries and federal health care programs . . . . In this final rule, we are not narrowing the waivers.” This statement is helpful to industry participants generally, and in particular to those that may have been waiting for CMS and OIG to publish the final rule prior to entering into arrangements requiring waiver protection out of the fear that it would need to un-wind these arrangements if the agencies significantly narrowed the waivers in the final rule. The agencies’ confirmation that any future modifications of the waivers would be implemented through notice-and-comment rulemaking provides an additional level of certainty to such cautious stakeholders, because they will have the ability to obtain notice of, and participate in the development of, any waiver modifications.

    Although CMS and OIG did not narrow the waivers, the agencies “underscore[d] that the waivers have never been intended to, and will not, cover arrangements unless all criteria for the applicable waiver are met. . . . [T]here is no retroactive protection.” This statement seems potentially at odds with one statement in the final rule regarding, under the Pre-Participation and Participation Waivers, for bona fide governing body approval. In particular, with respect to that requirement, CMS states that one factor they “would consider when evaluating whether the ACO governing body’s determination is bona fide would be the proximity in time between the establishment of the arrangement … and the ACO governing body’s corresponding determination and authorization. For example, a significant passage of time between the establishment of the arrangement and the ACO governing body’s determination might indicate that the ACO governing body did not make a bona fide determination.” This seems to suggest that the waiver requirements could be satisfied, in some cases, even if the governing body determination occurred after the implementation of the arrangement. Whether this is the case or not, ACOs would be well-advised to secure all necessary requirements prior to the effective date of the arrangements for which they seek waiver protection including, with respect to the Participation Waiver for example, ACO governing body approval and the associated documentation (e.g., written resolution), and documentation of the arrangement (e.g., signed written agreement).

    Free Transportation Programs Offered to Medicare Beneficiaries Qualify for Protection Under the

    Patient Incentives Waiver

    Although CMS and OIG received no public comments on the issue, the agencies took the opportunity to clarify to stakeholders that nothing would preclude local transportation arrangements from being an in-kind item or service under the Patient Incentive Waiver. Therefore, transportation provided by an ACO or one of its participating providers to a beneficiary would be protected like other in-kind items and services if the parties satisfy the relevant waiver requirements. The agencies clarified that transportation provided to a patient for purposes of getting to a medical appointment or to pick up prescriptions could be protected, but transportation to attend entertainment or recreational events, or to run errands un-related to the medical care of the beneficiary, could not. The agencies also clarified that, because the waiver only protects in-kind incentives, ACOs may not give beneficiaries cash reimbursement for transportation costs, but may be give them prepaid vouchers redeemable solely for transportation services pursuant to a written contract between the ACO / ACO participant and the transportation provider.

    Authors

    Charles R. Buck

    Partner

    Boston

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  • Update on Bankruptcy Fee Shifting

    Update on Bankruptcy Fee Shifting

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update on Bankruptcy Fee Shifting

    November 10, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Each litigant [in the U.S. legal system] pays [its] own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.” Baker Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLP, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (6-3), quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252-53 (2010). A majority of the U.S. Supreme Court purported to follow this so-called “American Rule” against “fee shifting” in ASARCO, holding on June 15, 2015 that the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) “does not permit bankruptcy courts to award compensation for … fee-defense litigation [i.e., the cost of a professional’s defending against an objection to its fees].” Other recent bankruptcy cases, though, confirm that: (1) the Code does permit fee shifting in specific cases; (2) courts will ignore the American Rule in the right cases; and (3) more bankruptcy fee disputes continue to be litigated.

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  • On-Demand Companies Spur Workers’ Suits

    ARTICLE

    On-Demand Companies Spur Workers’ Suits

    November 9, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Kristin Michaels and Anne Harris wrote this bylined article about how new “on-demand” companies such as Uber change employment relationships by classifying their workers as independent contractors rather than employees under state and federal labor law. “A recent slew of lawsuits filed in multiple jurisdictions challenging these workers’ independent-contractor status has threatened these startup business models and left even traditional businesses questioning whether their classification of workers as independent contractors will similarly be subject to challenge,” the authors wrote.

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  • U.S. Regulators Adopt Final Rule on Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps — What Investment Managers Need to Know

    U.S. Regulators Adopt Final Rule on Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps — What Investment Managers Need to Know

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    U.S. Regulators Adopt Final Rule on Margin Requirements for Non-Cleared Swaps — What Investment Managers Need to Know

    November 9, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Oct. 22, 2015 a group of five banking regulators (the “prudential regulators”) adopted a Final Rule establishing minimum margin and capital requirements for non-cleared swaps and non-cleared security-based swaps. The Final Rule, which does not begin phasing in until September 2016, applies to swaps executed by swap dealers, major swap participants, security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap participants for which one of the federal agencies is the prudential regulator. Although most investment managers and other buy-side firms are already margining non-cleared swaps under ISDA master agreements and credit support annexes, the Final Rule imposes material obligations on swap dealers that diverge from current industry practice. This likely will require amendments to current trading documentation and result in increased costs for many market participants.

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    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Sean D. Locklear

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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