ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Congress Takes Step Toward Site-Neutral Medicare Payments in Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
October 29, 2015
Read time: 8 min
On November 2, 2015, legislation was enacted that substantially alters how and how much Medicare pays for outpatient services furnished by hospitals. The legislation, known as the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, principally reflects and implements a two-year federal budget and debt limit compromise negotiated between President Obama and congressional Republicans that diminishes many of the harshest spending reductions wrought by sequestration, and avoids a potential default on U.S. debt obligations. Nonetheless, the legislation is drawing heightened scrutiny by, and concern within, the health care community— not because of the central purposes of the bill, but rather because of a handful of Medicare and Medicaid related provisions also included in the legislation.
Of perhaps greatest significance to the health care community is a provision (Section 603) that provides that effective January 1, 2017, Medicare payments for most items and services furnished at an off-campus department of a hospital that was not billing as a hospital service prior to the date of enactment will be made under the applicable non-hospital payment system. This “site neutrality” provision begins to address concerns raised by certain policymakers in recent years that Medicare should not be paying different amounts for the same services based on the location or type of provider, and that hospitals may be improperly incentivized to acquire and label physician practices and ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) as hospital outpatient departments due to higher rates available for services furnished in hospital outpatient settings.
Site Neutrality Provision
Background
Medicare utilizes several different payment systems to pay for services furnished to beneficiaries on an outpatient basis. Generally speaking, when a Medicare beneficiary receives a physician office service in a physician’s office, Medicare pays for that service pursuant to the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS). If that Medicare beneficiary receives the same service in a hospital setting, Medicare also pays a facility fee under the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System (OPPS). When Medicare pays both a professional fee (under the MPFS) and a facility fee (under the OPPS), the total payment is typically higher than if Medicare makes just one payment to the physician under the MPFS. Similarly, if a beneficiary receives a surgical service in an ASC, the Medicare payment is always less than if the beneficiary receives that same service in a hospital setting.
Policymakers and watchdogs, most notably the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, have expressed concerns for years that these disparities are not justified and incentivize hospitals to acquire physician practices and ASCs to capture the higher payment for furnishing the services in a hospital setting. In recent years, there has been increasing criticism that these incentives have led to widespread vertical integration and increased Medicare expenditures.
New Payment Limits
Under Section 603, effective January 1, 2017, when an item or service is furnished at an off-campus outpatient department of a hospital, unless that location was billing as a department of a hospital prior to the date of enactment, Medicare will pay for that service under either the MPFS or ASC fee schedule, as applicable to the service provided. Notably, this limitation will not apply to dedicated emergency departments (as defined by 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(b)).
Analysis
This limitation begins to address concerns about site-driven payment disparities and the behaviors they motivate, but it is much less onerous than alternative solutions that could have advanced. First, the limitation applies only prospectively. As such, any arrangement billing as a hospital outpatient department service prior to the date of enactment will be exempt from this limitation, and will be able to continue to bill and be paid by Medicare under the OPPS. Nonetheless, hospitals should be prepared for the possibility that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which will be responsible for implementing this provision, may seek to stretch its authority and add further limitations that effectively “freeze” the size and scope of the existing location.
Second, the limitation applies only to items and services furnished off-campus. Under existing Medicare regulations at 42 C.F.R. § 413.65 governing provider-based status, the term “campus is defined as the physical area immediately adjacent to the provider’s main buildings and other areas and structures that are not strictly contiguous to the main buildings but are located within 250 yards of the main buildings” (plus, other areas determined on an individual case basis by CMS). Locations not on the “campus” are deemed “off campus.” Consequently, this limitation technically applies only to those entities not meeting this definition of “campus,” although how a provider has positioned a location as on or off campus with CMS will be just as important. Under the statutory amendment, services furnished at remote locations of a hospital will be considered on campus.
Third, the limitation will not apply to payments for items and services until January 1, 2017, although it will apply to any location not billing as a hospital outpatient department as of the date of enactment.
Fourth, the limitation applies only to items and services furnished by a hospital department. Under those same regulations, an entity is considered a hospital department (as opposed to freestanding or a provider-based entity) if it is, among other things, furnishing services “of the same type as those furnished by the main provider.” Accordingly, this change applies to physician and ASC services, which are of the same type as those furnished by a hospital, and will not, for example, appear to apply to rural health clinic services.
Also of note, the statutory language does not provide a specific mechanism for implementation of the site-neutral payments, but does suggest that CMS consider identifying services furnished at new off-campus outpatient locations through claim modifiers or information reporting during the Medicare enrollment process. Therefore, it remains uncertain how this provision may impact hospital Medicare enrollment and cost reporting obligations for off-campus outpatient locations and could have possible implications for hospital survey and certification requirements.
Finally, there is a discrepancy between the actual text of the legislation and a published summary of the legislation, which states that an off-campus hospital outpatient department executing a provider agreement (rather than billing as a department of a hospital) after the date of enactment will not be eligible for OPPS reimbursement. Not only does the summary language differ from the legislative text, it is inconsistent with current CMS rules, which do not require hospitals to enter into new provider agreements to add off-campus hospital departments.
Potential 340B Program Impact
This change also has potential implications for hospital participation in the 340B Program, the federal program that permits certain safety net providers, including hospitals, to obtain outpatient drugs for dispensing to eligible patients at a significant discount. Depending on how the statutory change is implemented by CMS and interpreted by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), the federal agency that administers the 340B Program, it could impact 340B eligibility for off-campus outpatient departments created after the date of enactment of the provision. Current 340B Program policy extends access to 340B discounts to only those outpatient locations of an eligible hospital that are reported as Medicare-reimbursable outpatient locations on the hospital’s Medicare cost report. If CMS implements the statutory change in a manner that changes the way new off-campus outpatient locations are reported on the Medicare cost report, or if HRSA otherwise opts to consider such locations not part of the 340B-eligible hospital entity, outpatient drugs prescribed or dispensed at such locations could be ineligible for 340B discounts.
Other Provisions
The legislation has over three-dozen distinct sections, only a few of which affect health care items and services.
Sequestration
The legislation also extends the across-the-board sequestration of Medicare payments for an additional year into fiscal year 2025. Under current law, Medicare payments for all items and services are, and will continue to be, cut two percent through 2023, and then four percent for the first six months of 2024. Congress has in recent years turned to the sequestration as an easy and distant mechanism for achieving measureable budget savings with minimal political implication. Congress chose that path again here.
Part B Premiums
The legislation avoids an anticipated spike in Part B premiums for a select cohort of beneficiaries beginning in 2016, but largely pays for this relief by increasing Part B premiums for a broader set of beneficiaries by a smaller amount.
Medicaid Rebates from Generic Drugs
There have been a number of hearings and congressional inquiries in 2015 concerning the rapidly rising price of generic drugs. This legislation partially addresses these concerns through the rebates that are due to Medicaid for generic drugs. Currently, manufacturers of single source and innovator multiple source drugs pay an additional rebate if the price of the drug has increased faster than inflation (CPI-U). Generic drugs are not subject to the inflation-based rebate. This legislation will apply the inflation-based rebate to generic drugs.
Next Steps
Hospitals considering (or in the process of) acquiring or developing new off-campus outpatient locations should evaluate the impact of the payment change in Section 603 on Medicare payment for such locations. Hospitals, with particular attention to those participating in the 340B Program, should carefully monitor future CMS guidance implementing Section 603.
View From McDermott: Will You Marry Me? The Future of Benefits for Same-Sex Spouses and Partners
ARTICLE
View From McDermott: Will You Marry Me? The Future of Benefits for Same-Sex Spouses and Partners
October 29, 2015
Read time: 2 min
Brian Tiemann wrote this bylined article on how the US Supreme Court same-sex marriage rulings “have significantly changed employers’ options and obligations with respect to benefit coverage for employees’ same-sex spouses and partners.” Mr. Tiemann advised employers to review benefit plans for compliance with same-sex spousal rights and to align them with applicable state and federal tax treatment. He also noted that employers offering benefits to unmarried partners must decide whether or not to continue them. Read the full article.

Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Good Involuntary Petition for Bad Faith
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Third Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Good Involuntary Petition for Bad Faith
October 29, 2015
Read time: 11 min
“[B]ad faith provides an independent basis for dismissing an involuntary [bankruptcy] petition” despite the creditors’ having met all of the “statutory requirements,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on Oct. 16, 2015. In re Forever Green Athletic Fields, Inc., 2015 WL 6080665, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 16, 2015). As the court stressed in this rarely litigated type of case, even when creditors file an otherwise valid petition, “that doesn’t mean the bankruptcy court can’t dismiss the case.” Id. at *4.
An involuntary bankruptcy petition “is an extreme remedy with serious consequences to the alleged debtor,” explained the Third Circuit. Id. at *5. This appellate decision is important because the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) provides no “standard for evaluating bad faith,” “courts have applied a dizzying array of standards,” and most cases in this context deal with “post-dismissal damages.”[1]
Facts
The debtor sued one of its competitors (“P”) in the Pennsylvania courts in 2005 for diverting $5 million of corporate assets. If the debtor prevailed in the Pennsylvania action, “D,” the owner of P and a former sales representative of the debtor, would be personally liable. In 2005, D and his wife also sued the debtor for unpaid commissions in Louisiana. After years of litigation, the Louisiana court entered a consent judgment in favor of D for $300,000, but the debtor has not “paid a penny on this judgment.” 2015 WL 6080665, at *1.
The parties in the debtor’s Pennsylvania action — P and the debtor — agreed to arbitrate their dispute, but once D attained a consent judgment in Louisiana, he moved to terminate the arbitration, arguing that the debtor was insolvent and noting his unsatisfied $300,000 judgment against the debtor. D then started to enforce his Louisiana judgment against the debtor’s advance deposit paid to the arbitrator.
During the course of a deposition, D stated that he intended to “[f]ind any available asset that [the debtor] may have and to use the [judgment] lien to seize it.” The debtor tried to reinstate the arbitration, noting that “[D] and his counsel had ‘threatened to put [the debtor] into bankruptcy’ if [the debtor] did not agree to terminate the arbitration.” Id. D’s counsel stressed that until the debtor satisfied P’s judgment, the arbitration would be stayed indefinitely. When the Pennsylvania court scheduled a briefing and hearing schedule on the debtor’s attempt to reinstate the arbitration, D, his spouse and a third party filed an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition against the debtor.
The debtor conceded the existence of three petitioning creditors holding uncontested unsecured claims aggregating the requisite amount, consistent with the requirements of Code Section 303(b). But the debtor also moved to dismiss the involuntary petition “as a bad-faith filing” despite the petitioning creditors’ “facial compliance with” the Code. Id. at *2.
The Bankruptcy Court
The bankruptcy court held a trial, finding that the debtor had “essentially shut down its business” in 2012, that “its operating account had no activity and [that] its balance never exceeded $30.” The debtor was “winding down its affairs and recovering assets for its approximately 50 creditors.” Its largest asset was its $5-million claim against P, but it had $2.3 million in liabilities. Although the debtor had not been paying its debts, its principal had “personally paid off hundreds of thousands of dollars of” corporate debt and was “personally funding all of” the debtor’s litigation, including the suit against P. Id.
The bankruptcy court dismissed the involuntary petition, reasoning that in a court of equity, “a petitioning creditor … must come to the court for a proper purpose.” In its view, involuntary bankruptcy cases “are intended to protect creditors from debtors who are making preferential payments to other creditors or from the dissipation of the Debtor’s assets.” Nevertheless, it found D to be “a bad-faith creditor … motivated by two improper purposes: to frustrate [the debtor’s] efforts to litigate its claim against P and to collect on a debt.” Id. The district court affirmed.
Analysis
Bad Faith Filing
Code Section 303(i)(2) provides that a court may award damages against any creditor when it dismisses an involuntary petition if the filing was “in bad faith.” The section “deals with post-dismissal damages” available when creditors fail to satisfy the statutory requirements for an involuntary bankruptcy case contained in Code Section 303(b) (three or more petitioning creditors with non-contingent, undisputed claims aggregating at least $15,325). See, e.g., In re TPG Troy, 793 F.3d at 235 (“[A]n award of attorneys’ fees and costs serves to discourage the filing of involuntary petitions to force debtors to pay on a disputed debt.”).
The court rejected D’s argument that it could not “engage in a bad-faith inquiry” when “the criteria for commencing a [bankruptcy case] are satisfied and where the debtor is admittedly not paying its debts as they become due.” Id. at *3. Although some courts accept the argument that a creditor’s “subjective motivations are irrelevant,” and although Code Section 303(i) “discusses bath faith only in the context of assessing damages after a petition has been dismissed,” the court disagreed with D. In its view, even “if the three [statutory] requirements are satisfied, the bankruptcy court still can dismiss the case,” adding that “by including an express reference to bad faith in § 303(i)(2), Congress intended for bad faith to serve as a basis for both dismissal and damages.” Id. at *4.
More significant, said the court, D overlooked “the equitable nature of bankruptcy.” The Third Circuit has stressed that the “‘good faith’ filing requirements have ‘strong roots in equity.’” Id., citing In re SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (held, “Chapter 11 petition is subject to dismissal for ‘cause’ … unless it is filed in good faith.”) “As courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are equipped with the doctrine of good faith so that they can patrol the border between good- and bad-faith filings.” Id., citing SGL Carbon, 200 F.3d at 161; In re Little Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1072 (5th Cir. 1986). Explaining that the “majority of courts agree,” the Third Circuit refused to “depart from this general ‘good faith’ filing requirement in the context of involuntary petitions for bankruptcy.” Id. at *4, citing In re U.S. Optical, Inc., 1993 WL 93931, at *3 (4th Cir. April 1, 1993) (“Courts are duty bound to conduct an inquiry, if requested, to determine whether an involuntary petition has been filed in good faith. Bad faith filings are to be dismissed.”); In re Bock Transp., Inc., 327 B.R. 378, 381 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2005) (“A bad faith filing can also be cause for the dismissal of a[n] [involuntary] petition.”).
“Policy considerations,” explained the Third Circuit, made it “wary of creditors who may find alluring the ‘retributive quality’ of thrusting a debtor into bankruptcy.” Id. at *5. Creditors should be allowed to file involuntary bankruptcy petitions only “ for proper reasons such as to protect against the preferential treatment of other creditors or the dissipation of the debtor’s assets.” Id.
Test for Bad Faith
The debtor had to “show by a preponderance of the evidence that the creditors acted in bad faith.” Id. Adopting a “totality of the circumstances” standard for determining bad faith in this context, after a “fact-intensive review,” the Third Circuit looked at whether “the creditors satisfied the statutory criteria for filing the petition; the involuntary petition was meritorious; the creditors made a reasonable inquiry into the relevant facts and pertinent law before filing; there was evidence of preferential payments to certain creditors or of dissipation of the debtor’s assets; the filing was motivated by ill will or a desire to harass; the petitioning creditors used the filling to obtain a disproportionate advantage for themselves rather than to protect against other creditors doing the same; the filing was used as a tactical advantage in pending actions; the filing was used as a substitute for customary debt-collection procedures; and the filing had suspicious timing.” Id. at *6.
The Third Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court, applying this standard, that D’s “litigation strategy was to use any means necessary to force the payment of [his] Consent Judgment and the abandonment of [the debtor’s] claims against [P].” Id. Moreover, D’s “plan was to use the consent judgment to garnish the arbitrator’s fees, thereby forcing the arbitrator to halt the arbitration.” In fact, D and “his counsel said they would keep the arbitration suspended until [the debtor] paid on the consent judgment,” and“[t]hey also threatened to file an involuntary petition unless [the debtor] agreed to stop the [arbitration] proceedings.” Id.
D’s actions thus “ran counter to the spirit of collective creditor action that should animate an involuntary filing.” D “put his own interest above all others … [b]y trying to end the arbitration” and “was obstructing [the debtor] from pursuing its largest asset, the potential proceeds of which [the debtor] could have used to pay its creditors.” D “was also using the bankruptcy process to exert pressure on [the debtor] to pay the consent judgment without regard to … other creditors, many of which had higher priority claims.” Agreeing with other courts, the Third Circuit found it “improper for creditors [such as D] to use the bankruptcy courts to gain a personal advantage in other pending actions or as a debt-collection device.” Id., citing In re Nordbrock, 772 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1985) (“A creditor does not have a special need for bankruptcy relief if it can go to state court to collect a debt.”).
The Third Circuit found no evidence that D had conducted “due diligence” or “sober decision-making” before filing the involuntary petition. Instead, the court identified the following facts showing bad faith:
- “Suspicious timing” — filing the petition immediately before its “brief was due” in the Pennsylvania action regarding the arbitration;
- Threatening involuntary bankruptcy “as an alternative weapon for stopping the arbitration and cashing in on the consent judgment”;
- No preferential transfers by the debtor;
- Payments to creditors only made by the debtor’s principal, but not by the debtor;
- No evidence of the debtor’s depleting its assets;
- The debtor’s principal was “footing the bill for any of its litigation” to recover assets for the debtor.
In sum, the record amply supported the bankruptcy court’s finding of D’s bad faith. Id. at *7.
Other Good Faith Creditors Could Not Have Cured D’s Bad Faith
The court rejected D’s argument that “other good-faith creditors should have been given the chance to cure the petition,” based on Code Section 303(c), which allows other creditors to join the petition before dismissal. Although some courts have applied the so-called “bar to joinder” rule that good faith creditors cannot join in a bad faith petition prior to dismissal, the Third Circuit never had to apply such a rule. In its view, it was “too late for any creditor to save the petition” here. According to the text of Code Section 303(c), other creditors must join “before the case is dismissed.” Here, no creditor even tried “to join the petition before the case was dismissed.”Also, D had “plenty of time … to recruit other potentially curing creditors — approximately nine months lapsed between the hearing on the motion to dismiss and the issuance of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision.” Id.
Comment
Filing an involuntary petition is obviously risky. But the lesson here for creditors is to justify the filing for all creditors. Is the debtor dissipating its assets? Has the debtor used its assets to prefer some creditors with cash payments or liens?
A more practical consideration before filing an involuntary petition is whether it will get the client paid. If not, prosecuting a claim in a non-bankruptcy court may be more effective. A non-bankruptcy court can also resolve any fraudulent transfer claims the creditor may have, although not preferential transfer claims. Most important, any recovery by the creditor will not be shared with other creditors, unlike in bankruptcy, which is a collective creditor remedy.
Authored by Michael L. Cook .
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
[1] Id., at *5, *3.See our July 23, 2015 Alert, “Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Involuntary Bankruptcy Case Because of Creditors’ Legitimately Disputed Claims,” discussing In re TPG Troy, LLC, 793 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2015) (held, court properly awarded attorneys’ fees after dismissing involuntary petition).
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.
Application of European Court of Justice on Rules of Co-Determination
ARTICLE
Application of European Court of Justice on Rules of Co-Determination
October 27, 2015
Read time: 2 min
Dr. Thomas Gennert wrote this bylined article on a decision of the Superior Court of Berlin regarding whether Germany’s Co-Determination Act (which governs worker appointments to the board) infringes EU law. The Berlin Court of Appeal stayed the proceedings and referred the question to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in a decision that Dr. Gennert called “highly controversial for a variety of cross-border business.” Read the full article.
Stock Sales Treated as Asset Sales: SALT Aspects
ARTICLE
Stock Sales Treated as Asset Sales: SALT Aspects
October 26, 2015
Read time: 2 min
Peter Faber, in this bylined article, advised practitioners on how states apply an Internal Revenue Code Section 338 election in asset sales. “Even if a state purports to recognize” such an election, Mr. Faber wrote, “there is a potential trap for unwary buyers in situations in which the selling parent and the target file separate state income tax returns … in one or more states. Some states do not allow combined returns under any circumstances, and the ones that do typically do so only if the corporations are engaged in a unitary business.”
Recent IRS Guidance Prohibits Lump-Sum Windows for Pension Retirees, Updates Pension Mortality Tables for 2016
ARTICLE
Recent IRS Guidance Prohibits Lump-Sum Windows for Pension Retirees, Updates Pension Mortality Tables for 2016
October 26, 2015
Read time: 2 min
Anne Becker, Jeffrey Holdvogt and Maggie McTigue wrote this bylined article on two recent IRS notices involving elimination of lump sum pension payments in lieu of annuities, and delay in implementing new pension mortality tables related to lump sum payments. The authors called the notices “significant … for employers that sponsor defined benefit pension plans, particularly those considering lump-sum windows as a ‘de-risking’ option for their plans.” Read the full article.
Escape From The Collective Agreement
ARTICLE
Escape From The Collective Agreement
October 2015
Read time: 1 min

Tenth Circuit Saves Insider’s Severance Payments
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
Tenth Circuit Saves Insider’s Severance Payments
October 26, 2015
Read time: 2 min
A terminated officer of a corporate debtor, who bargained for “18 months of severance ( … $375,000 …) to ensure that his firing not disrupt [the debtor’s] negotiations for $80 million” of financing gave the debtor “reasonably equivalent value,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on Oct. 15, 2015. In re Adam Aircraft Industries, Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17930, at *27 (10th Cir. Oct. 15, 2015). Affirming the lower courts’ dismissal of a Chapter 7 trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims against the officer as a purported insider, the Tenth Circuit stressed that the officer (“W”) was not an insider and “did not end up getting what he bargained for,” but the debtor did get the entire benefit of “a pretty good trade.” Indeed, although W “presented the initial terms of his departure, the [debtor’s] Board[,] after a negotiation,” only agreed on “less favorable terms” for W.

The Pitfalls of Arbitrator Qualification Clauses
ARTICLE
The Pitfalls of Arbitrator Qualification Clauses
October 23, 2015
Read time: 2 min
Andrew Kratenstein and Audrey Lu wrote this bylined article on problems with arbitration clauses used in commercial agreements. Recounting their own experience in which arbitration over termination of a hotel management agreement turned to litigation when the parties could not agree on an arbitrator, the authors cautioned that “parties often underestimate the difficulties that arise in finding and agreeing upon an arbitrator who has the requisite qualifications.”
More Courage to Early Solution
ARTICLE
More Courage to Early Solution
October 23, 2015
Read time: 1 min
