Content Type: Article

  • ‘The End Result Test’ Revisited, Part 1

    ARTICLE

    ‘The End Result Test’ Revisited, Part 1

    December 8, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

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    Philip Levine and Britt Haxton wrote this bylined article that traces the government’s ever-changing approach to the step transaction doctrine and considers future policy directions. The authors in particular examined how IRS and Treasury authorities have addressed step transaction in light of arguments that the use of the end result test in corporate stock transactions should be sharply curtailed, if not prohibited. Read the full article.

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  • PBGC Changes Reportable Event Rules for DB Plans

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    PBGC Changes Reportable Event Rules for DB Plans

    December 4, 2015

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    Diane Morgenthaler and Patrick Ryan wrote this bylined article describing new Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation rules that substantially reduce the requirements for pension plan reportable events. “Given that a reportable event likely occurs sporadically rather than on a normal cycle,” the authors wrote, “pension plan administrators, sponsors and contributing employers need to diligently monitor any changes in their pension plans and related controlled group entities to avoid reportable event errors and penalties.” Read the full article.

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  • The Draft Bill Re. the Reform of Temporary Workers and the Contract Work

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    The Draft Bill Re. the Reform of Temporary Workers and the Contract Work

    December 4, 2015

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  • NYDFS Proposes New AML/Sanctions Programs and Annual Certification Requirements for Banks, Money Transmitters and Check Cashers

    NYDFS Proposes New AML/Sanctions Programs and Annual Certification Requirements for Banks, Money Transmitters and Check Cashers

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    NYDFS Proposes New AML/Sanctions Programs and Annual Certification Requirements for Banks, Money Transmitters and Check Cashers

    December 4, 2015

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Dec. 1, 2015, the New York Department of Financial Services (“NYDFS”) issued a proposed regulation (the “Proposed Regulation”) that would require all depository institutions, trust companies, foreign bank branches or agencies, money transmitters and check cashers chartered or licensed under New York law (each, a “Regulated Institution”)[1] to maintain a “Transaction Monitoring Program” and a “Watch List Filtering Program” (collectively, a “Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program”) to detect potential violations of applicable anti-money laundering (“AML”) laws and regulations[2] and sanctions programs administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).[3]

    The Proposed Regulation would also require a Regulated Institution’s senior compliance officer (or functional equivalent) to certify annually to the NYDFS each April 15 that the Regulated Institution is in compliance with the Proposed Regulation (“Annual Certification”). Specifically, the Annual Certification would require the senior compliance officer to certify to the best of their knowledge that “they have reviewed, or caused to be reviewed” the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program and that “the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program complies with all the requirements of [the Proposed Regulation].”[4] An officer who is deemed to have filed an “incorrect or false Annual Certification” may personally be subject to criminal penalties.[5]

    Scope of Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program

    Generally, the Proposed Regulation requires that the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program reflect the Regulated Institution’s risk assessment and current legal and regulatory requirements; include end-to-end, pre- and post-implementation testing; be subject to on-going analysis to assess whether the program maps to the identified risks; and include easily understandable documentation articulating the program’s detection scenarios and the underlying intent and design of the program.[6] In addition, the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program must identify relevant data sources; provide for validation of data integrity, accuracy and quality; develop a vendor selection process (if applicable); be subject to governance and management oversight; and provide for funding and staffing by qualified and trained personnel.[7]

    Transaction Monitoring Program for Potential AML Violations. For the purpose of monitoring transactions for potential violations of AML laws and regulations, as well as suspicious activity reporting, the Transaction Monitoring Program must reflect “any relevant information available from the institution’s related programs and initiatives, such as ‘know your customer due diligence,’ ‘enhanced customer due diligence’ or other relevant areas, such as security, investigations and fraud prevention” and “include investigative protocols detailing how alerts generated by the [program] will be investigated, the process for deciding which alerts will result in a filing or other action, who is responsible for making such a decision, and how investigative and decision-making process will be documented.”[8]

    Watch List Filtering Program for Potential OFAC Violations. With respect to the filtering of transactions for potential sanctions programs violations, the Proposed Regulation requires each Regulated Institution to maintain a Watch List Filtering Program “for the purpose of interdicting transactions, before their execution, that are prohibited by applicable sanctions, including OFAC and other sanctions lists, politically exposed persons lists, and internal watch lists.”[9]  Thus, NYDFS is mandating that the program be capable of real-time transaction interdiction.

    The Proposed Regulation also states that “no Regulated Institution may make changes or alterations to the Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program to avoid or minimize filing suspicious activity reports, or because the institution does not have the resources to review the number of alerts generated . . . , or to otherwise avoid complying with regulatory requirements.”[10]

    Notable Observations

    The requirements of the Proposed Rule are more prescriptive than the federal AML laws and regulations, and in some instances appear to conflate OFAC requirements with AML requirements (e.g., with respect to politically exposed persons). OFAC regulations do not specifically require transaction filtering programs. Nor do federal regulations prescribe specific elements for a transaction monitoring program, although guidance on transaction monitoring is set forth in the FFIEC Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual.[11] However, such federal banking law guidance is not applicable to money transmitters and check cashers.

    Further, the Annual Certification requirement for senior compliance officers (or functional equivalent) is unprecedented in the AML and sanctions area, and introduces a mechanism to hold senior compliance officers individually liable for the shortcomings of a Regulated Institution’s Transaction Monitoring and Filtering Program. While the Proposed Regulation does not explicitly set forth the criminal penalties that could apply in the case of a false certification, it references Section 672 of the New York Banking Law, which makes it a felony for any employee of a corporation subject to the New York Banking Laws to make a false entry in any book, report or statement with intent to deceive a corporate officer or state regulator.[12] 

    The regulation will be published in an upcoming edition of the New York State Register, commencing a 45-day notice and comment period. The effective date would be immediate on issuance of the final rule. A copy of the Proposed Regulation can be found here and the press release regarding the Proposed Regulation can be found here.

    Authored by Donald J. Mosher, Betty Santangelo, Joseph P. Vitale, Gary Stein, Seetha Ramachandran and Melissa G.R. Goldstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert or would like assistance in preparing and submitting comments on the Proposed Regulation, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Proposed Regulation § 504.2.

    [2] For federal AML laws and regulations, see 31 U.S.C. § 5311, et seq. and 31 C.F.R. Chapter X. For New York State AML regulations, see Part 115 (3 NYCRR 115), Part 116 (3 NYCRR 116), Part 416 (3 NYCRR 416) and Part 417 (3 NYCRR 417).

    [3] 31 C.F.R. part 501 et seq.

    [4] Proposed Regulation, Attachment A.

    [5] Proposed Regulation § 504.5.

    [6] Proposed Regulation § 504.3 (a) and (b).

    [7] Proposed Regulation § 504.3(c).

    [8] Proposed Regulation § 504.3(a).

    [9] Proposed Regulation § 504.3(b).

    [10] Proposed Regulation § 504.3(d).

    [11] See FFIEC Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual at 64-68 and 152-154 (2014), available at http://www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/BSA_AML_Man_2014_v2.pdf.

    [12] N.Y. Bank. Law § 672.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Recent Developments in Tax Law: Tax Amendment Act 2015

    ARTICLE

    Recent Developments in Tax Law: Tax Amendment Act 2015

    December 2015

    Read time: 2 min

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    Dr. Gero Burwitz authored the article “Recent Development in Tax Law: Tax Amendment Act 2015”, featured in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), p. 1347-1349 in December, 2015.

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    Dr. Gero Burwitz

    Partner

    Munich

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  • McDermott International Legal Highlights

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    McDermott International Legal Highlights

    December 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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    McDermott International Legal Highlights

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  • Globalization of the Liability? The Liability of Managers does Not Stop at National Borders.

    ARTICLE

    Globalization of the Liability? The Liability of Managers does Not Stop at National Borders.

    December 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Applying the Subpart F Services Rules to Regarded Entity Structures

    ARTICLE

    Applying the Subpart F Services Rules to Regarded Entity Structures

    November/December 2015

    Read time: 2 min

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    Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article as a follow-up to an earlier one on conducting services operations in a disregarded entity structure under a foreign holding company to minimize Subpart F income. Here he discussed how a regarded entity structure can reduce Subpart F services income when substantial services are deemed performed for related persons, concluding that income derived by each controlled foreign corporation should not be Subpart F services income to the extent the CFC performs any related-person services in its country of organization. Read the full article.

    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Tenth Circuit BAP Limits Insider Claims

    Tenth Circuit BAP Limits Insider Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Tenth Circuit BAP Limits Insider Claims

    December 1, 2015

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Insider creditors “waived [the] right to charge default interest on” their claims and “failed to prove” their claim for non-default interest, held the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit (“BAP”) on Nov. 6, 2015. In re Autterson, 2015 WL 6789168, at *4 (10th Cir. BAP, Nov. 6, 2015). Because the insiders were “separate legal entities”; their pre-bankruptcy dealings with the debtor had been “carefully and appropriately documented”; and their cash transfers to the debtor had “always been treated as loans,” they still held “legitimate unsecured” claims against the debtor. Id. at *1. Nevertheless, because a creditor had “objected that the [insider] claims … would be allowed for more than [the debtor] actually owed, to the prejudice of the other unsecured creditors,” the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court’s allowance of the claims in an amount reduced “by approximately 26%.” Id.

    Relevance

    Creditors ordinarily seek the equitable subordination of insider claims based on misconduct. See, e.g., In re Herby’s Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 134-35 (5th Cir. 1993) (debtor undercapitalized; insider’s loans “neither accurately nor timely reflected” on debtor’s records or by any loan agreement; during deception, trade debt increased dramatically; insiders not allowed to receive 75 percent of estate assets; inequitable conduct warranted equitable subordination of insider claims); In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339, 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Any misconduct by an insider may be invoked to subordinate” insider’s claim; case remanded for finding as to whether insiders were guilty of misconduct by inflating salaries via “retroactive raises”). In Autterson, equitable subordination was not the issue. Rather, the issue was whether the insiders, controlled by the debtor, had, by their conduct, waived their right to default interest under applicable Colorado law. Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 343 (“The dominant theme of U.S. bankruptcy law for a business debtor is preservation of the state-law rights of claimants and their relative ordering.”). Although not explicitly stated, the outcome in Autterson was also affected by the debtor’s self-dealing. See Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 344 (“A loan from a corporate insider muddles [the] conceptual clarity [distinguishing debt from equity]. The relationships start to add up: the same person can be an owner of a company, its creditor … . So do the opportunities for self-dealing [that] would violate the insider’s fiduciary duty to the corporation.”).

    Facts

    The individual debtor had created “Partnership” and “Trust” legal entities as part “of his tax and estate planning.” 2015 WL 6789168, at *1. He had “always acted as the Partnership’s general and managing partner,” and later amended the partnership agreement “to make the Trust an additional general partner.” Id. Limited partners of the Partnership included two other trusts also controlled by the debtor.

    The debtor had borrowed $2 million from the Partnership, providing for interest at 6 percent annually and a default rate of 12 percent in the event of a default. This Partnership claim was held in part by a debtor-controlled Trust, which held “one of the three claims at issue on [the] appeal.” Id. at *2. As a result of later amendments, the contract non-default interest rate became 4.48 percent, and the default interest rate remained at 12 percent. In his bankruptcy schedules, the debtor listed the amount due the Trust “as an uncontested debt in the amount of $933,393.00.” The Trust, nevertheless, claimed $857,648.60 as of the date of bankruptcy. After a two-day trial, the bankruptcy court found that the Trust “had failed to prove entitlement to any interest on the … principal,” allowing the claim for principal only, in the amount of $597,074. Id. at *2.

    The Partnership also held two notes, a 2008 note and a 2010 note. The debtor listed the 2008 note as “uncontested,” and the Partnership claimed $3.449 million. The bankruptcy court, though, held that the Partnership “failed to prove entitlement to default interest,” allowing the claim for “principal and non-default interest” in the reduced amount of $2.517 million. Id. at *3.

    The debtor similarly scheduled a 2010 Partnership note for $1.9 million as “uncontested,” but the bankruptcy court allowed it in the amount of $1.488 million. In its view, the Partnership “failed to prove that it [was] owed interest.” Id. at *4.

    The BAP’s Analysis: Waiver

    The bankruptcy court stated no legal rationale for its conclusions, but the BAP relied on the bankruptcy court’s “oral findings.” According to the BAP, the parties’ “course of conduct” showed that “the parties repeatedly ignored the express terms of the Notes over the course of several years.” “Specifically, the Partnership waived its right to charge default interest on the 2008 and 2010 Notes, and failed to prove its claim for non-default interest under the 2010 Note. The Trust … similarly failed to prove its claim for non-default interest.” Id. Also, because the debtor was “both the borrower and his lenders’ representative, no communication whatsoever between the ‘parties’ was the norm.” Id. at *5. The debtor never issued “default notifications to himself, nor did he directly express an intent to waive the Notes’ provisions … . [H]e simply paid or did not pay his obligations as he saw fit.” Accordingly, the debtor’s “conduct on both sides of the transactions” constituted “a waiver of the express terms of the written agreements.” Id.

    The objecting creditor argued that the advances to the debtor by the Partnership and Trust “were equity payments due to lack of any creditor/debtor relationship.” Id. at *6. Because “the formalities of a debtor/creditor relationship have been honored,” however, the bankruptcy court properly declined to invalidate “any of the principal of the Notes.” Id. According to the BAP, the “record on appeal” also supported the bankruptcy court’s fact findings regarding waiver.

    First, the debtor included only regular accrued interest, not a default rate, despite prior defaults on the Trust note. In financial statements prepared for the objecting creditor and others, the debtor failed to include interest in amounts due to the Partnership and Trust. Nor did the debtor’s accountant “calculate the amounts due under the Notes until [the debtor] was preparing to file bankruptcy.” Indeed, the accountant “inflated the amounts [the debtor] owed by prematurely triggering interest accrual whenever a payment was made so that the payment would be applied to interest rather than principal,” contrary to the terms of the Notes allowing principal to “be prepaid without penalty.” Also, neither the Partnership nor the Trust had charged default interest when the Notes were in default for several years. Id.

    The record confirmed the Partnership and Trust’s waiver of their “rights to hold [the debtor] in default and to charge him interest on his loans.” Id. at *8. Under Colorado law, a creditor’s waiver of a default “may be shown by accepting payment after default, by accepting payment after giving notice of an election to accelerate, or by mere inaction.” Id., quoting Goodwin v. District Court, 779 P.2d 837, 843-44 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (emphasis added). The debtor here “chose not to make required payments and to forego the enforcement of penalties. Indeed, he chose to keep advancing Partnership funds to himself with full knowledge that the Note under which the advances accrued was already in default. He cannot now avoid the consequences of his conduct by simply asserting that he didn’t know. His conduct, on his own behalf and on behalf of his entities, plainly and definitively indicates that there was no intention to enforce the default provisions of the Notes.” Id.

    Comment

    The debtor’s affiliates avoided equitable subordination of their claims. From the stated facts, the objecting creditor apparently could not support an equitable subordination claim against the insiders with tangible evidence of misconduct. The debtor may have been undercapitalized, requiring advances by its insiders, but “undercapitalization alone, without evidence of deception about the debtor’s financial condition or other misconduct, cannot justify equitable subordination of an insider’s debt claim.” Lifschultz, 132 F.3d at 349. Moreover, if there is no misconduct, “then a bankruptcy court cannot subordinate a claim … . The creditor must have done something inequitable — a wrong or an unfairness, or at the very least, a masquerade of something for what it is not.” Id. at 344.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Health System Practice ‘Losses’ Make Headlines, Plaintiffs Make New Stark ‘Law’

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    Health System Practice ‘Losses’ Make Headlines, Plaintiffs Make New Stark ‘Law’

    November 25, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

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    Eric Gordon and Daniel Melvin wrote this bylined article about how “net practice losses” from physician employment arrangements impact healthcare providers. The authors held that such losses are “alone insufficient to establish a volume/value defect” in compensation related to regulatory compliance, but warned that “the Draconian financial consequences of Stark/FCA liability” makes it risky for providers to rely on this viewpoint. Read the full article.

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