Content Type: Article

  • The Disturbing EU State Aid Proceedings

    ARTICLE

    The Disturbing EU State Aid Proceedings

    May-June 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article on a European Commission investigation of whether EU member state transfer pricing rulings constitute illegal state aid. “The Commission is using novel theories to support its unprecedented actions” aimed disproportionately at US companies, Mr. Yoder wrote, calling the Commission’s approach “totally at odds with the arm’s-length standard in the OECD transfer pricing guidelines and completely incompatible with internationally accepted transfer pricing principles.”

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    Authors

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Using Legal Project Management in Merger and Acquisition Transactions

    ARTICLE

    Using Legal Project Management in Merger and Acquisition Transactions

    May 25, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    To meet the increasing demands for transparency and efficiency in the deal process and predictability of legal costs in M&A, this new Guidebook contains tools to help M&A lawyers streamline and manage transactions, without overlooking important matters or compromising the quality of their legal services. Complete with practical guidance from veteran M&A practitioners, this valuable resource outlines each step of the M&A process, from “Pre-Deal,” “Deal,” to “Post-Closing,” offering insight to help deal lawyers effectively scope, plan, manage, and execute M&A deals. The Guidebook contains downloadable checklists, forms, and tools that you can customize to implement legal project management in your M&A practice.

    In depth
    Authors

    Byron S. Kalogerou

    Partner

    Boston

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  • Flambeau Inc. Wellness Program Testing Falls within ADA Safe Harbor

    ARTICLE

    Flambeau Inc. Wellness Program Testing Falls within ADA Safe Harbor

    May 2016

    Read time: 2 min

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    Overview

    Amy Gordon, Michael Graham, Kristen Michaels and Susan Nash wrote this bylined article on a Wisconsin federal court decision, in which the judge ruled in favor of Flambeau Inc. and against the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by holding that Flambeau’s medical exams as part of its wellness program and self-insured medical plan did not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act because they were not discriminatory.

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  • Activist Investing Update: DOJ’s HSR Action Against ValueAct Highlights Uncertainties Regarding the ‘Investment-Only’ Exemption

    Activist Investing Update: DOJ’s HSR Action Against ValueAct Highlights Uncertainties Regarding the ‘Investment-Only’ Exemption

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Activist Investing Update: DOJ’s HSR Action Against ValueAct Highlights Uncertainties Regarding the ‘Investment-Only’ Exemption

    May 20, 2016

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Last month, the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) filed a complaint in federal court against two ValueAct investment funds and their shared general partner (together, “ValueAct”) for failing to comply with the notification and waiting requirements of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the “HSR Act”). According to the complaint, ValueAct acquired over $2.5 billion of voting securities of two oil industry service companies, Halliburton Company (“Halliburton”) and Baker Hughes Incorporated (“Baker Hughes”), after the two companies announced a possible merger on Nov. 17, 2014, which has since been abandoned.[1] The complaint alleges that ValueAct became “one of the largest shareholders of both Halliburton and Baker Hughes, without providing the government its statutory right to notice and prior review of the stock purchases.”[2]

    The HSR Act requires purchasers of voting stock to file notifications with the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) and to wait to acquire the stock when the purchaser’s holdings would exceed a minimum threshold of aggregate voting stock that is adjusted and published annually.[3] The “investment-only” or so-called “passive investor” exemption allows a purchaser to acquire stock without observing the notification and waiting requirements. The exemption requires that the purchaser’s holdings cannot exceed 10 percent of the company’s voting securities and that the purchase must be “solely for the purpose of investment.”[4] The DOJ (and the FTC) narrowly interpret this HSR Act provision to allow an investor to rely on the exemption only when acquiring voting stock with the intention of being a truly passive investor.[5] In their view, if there is an intention to influence business decisions or participate in management, the exemption becomes unavailable.

    The DOJ alleges that, from the time ValueAct began acquiring shares in Halliburton and Baker Hughes, its executives were planning to use ValueAct’s position as a significant shareholder in both companies to increase the chances that the merger would be implemented. The complaint cites memoranda to investors stating that the purchase of Halliburton and Baker Hughes securities would allow ValueAct to “be a strong advocate for the deal to close” and “[i]ncrease [the] probability of [the] deal happening,” as well as statements regarding ValueAct’s intent to help restructure the merger transaction if it encountered regulatory or other hurdles, including a “back-up plan” to sell components of Baker Hughes’ business if the merger failed. In addition, the DOJ alleges that ValueAct intended to influence management at both Halliburton and Baker Hughes through frequent direct communications regarding their operations, including multiple meetings with the companies’ respective CEOs. Specifically, the complaint mentions statements made by ValueAct to Halliburton regarding contacting other shareholders about ValueAct’s view on the merger prior to a shareholder vote, recommending a firm that could assist the companies with post-merger real estate integration services, and proposing changes to Halliburton’s executive compensation plan. The complaint seeks, at a minimum, a civil penalty of $19 million as well as an injunction against future violations of the HSR Act.[6]

    Implications for Investors of theValueAct Complaint

    The DOJ’s complaint represents an extension of its position that proxy-related activity (such as nominating board candidates or making shareholder proposals), board representation or being a competitor of the issuer renders the “investment-only” exemption inapplicable. Significantly, the DOJ seemed to place heavy emphasis on the fact that ValueAct is an activist investor. The following are key takeaways from the complaint:

    • Communications with an issuer outside the types of conduct enumerated in the exemption’s Statement of Basis and Purpose may amount to intent to “influence management.” While some amount of communication between shareholders and issuers is expected, the government has taken the position that there is a point at which having discussions with and making recommendations to the management of an issuer renders the exemption inapplicable. Unlike prior enforcement actions, the complaint here does not allege that ValueAct took any steps during the relevant time periods toward engaging in any of the enumerated[7] actions that typically render the exemption unavailable or took action to change the composition of the board of directors.[8] In contrast, the facts emphasized in the complaint indicate that communications with the management of the issuer about the running of the business could be evidence that the investor improperly availed itself of the exemption.
    • Internal or promotional statements may be viewed by regulators as evidence of intent, even in the absence of traditionally “activist” steps. The government seems to presume that ValueAct’s investments were not passive because ValueAct is “well known as an activist investor” that promotes itself as such.[9] The complaint alleges that internal communications and marketing statements referring to ValueAct’s general activist strategy are proof that ValueAct did not purchase the voting securities “solely for the purpose of investment.” Thus, the way investors market themselves and/or typically conduct business may play a role in how future investments are perceived by government agencies — causing those agencies to look at such investors’ acquisitions with a more critical eye — as the DOJ did here.
      • Internal communications and drafts, which can be obtained by the government during the course of an HSR-related investigation;
      • The investor’s own marketing materials or communications —all things being equal, an investor that generally holds itself out to be an activist or as pursuing activist strategies may have more difficulty availaing itself of the exemption;
      • Statements that an investor may seek to take on an active role in the issuer, depending on future events (e.g., regulatory roadblocks or the failure of an underlying merger to be consummated); and
      • A Schedule 13D filing with the SEC, even if the stated purpose is “investment purposes,” particularly if the investor discloses plans to discuss business matters with management.[10]
    • In addition, the complaint indicates that any of the following could be viewed after the fact by the government as evidence that the investor’s intent was not “solely for the purpose of investment” at the time an otherwise reportable transaction was made:
    • Be cautious when investing in competitors. It is generally understood that multiple investments in competing issuers may be subject to heightened scrutiny. The FTC has stated informally[11] that investments of 10 percent or more in a competitor to an issuer may create the presumption that an investment in the issuer is not passive. Here, the government does not dispute that ValueAct held less than 10 percent of both companies at all relevant times. Notwithstanding that, the DOJ asserts that the “investment-only” exemption does not apply, highlighting the fact that the 10 percent test should not be viewed as a safe harbor. Accordingly, investments of less than 10 percent in competitors that are also parties to a potential merger can expect to receive an even greater level of scrutiny, particularly where the investor engages with management personnel at either of the merging parties.
    • Hindsight can cause a regulator to assume that an investor intended to influence management beginning with its initial acquisition. It has long been understood that a purported change of intent that is close in time to an otherwise reportable transaction may be viewed skeptically by the agencies. The ValueAct complaint alleges that ValueAct was ineligible for the exemption because it “planned from the outset to take steps to influence the business decisions of both companies, and met frequently with executives of both companies to execute those plans,” precluding the possibility that the stock purchases were made “solely for the purpose of investment.”[12] Although many of the specific events cited in the complaint took place after ValueAct had ceased to acquire additional shares,[13] the government has attempted to use prior statements made by ValueAct personnel about their plans for the merging parties as evidence of ValueAct’s purported intent at the time of the acquisition.

    The court in this matter could shed light on how narrowly the exemption should be interpreted. Whether government agencies are correctly interpreting the scope of the “investment-only” exemption is far from settled law. Indeed, there are conflicting opinions on this issue that have not been addressed because prior enforcement actions involving the exemption have been settled out of court. For instance, the FTC Commissioners involved in the recent Third Point action did not unanimously agree on the interpretation of the “investment-only” exemption. The dissenters stated: “[T]he Commission’s narrow interpretation of the exemption . . . is likely to chill valuable shareholder advocacy while subjecting transactions that are highly unlikely to raise substantive antitrust concerns to the notice and waiting requirements of the HSR Act.”[14] Some members of the premerger bar also have advocated for a simpler, bright-line test for the use of the investment-only exemption, or at least for a clearer set of examples of permissible conduct while still claiming the exemption.

    A decision by the court in ValueAct, either in connection with motions or following a trial, hopefully will clarify the scope of the “investment-only” exemption. In the meantime, investors should be aware that internal communications, communications with management of an issuer, and marketing or promotional statements can be used against them should the government choose to bring an enforcement action. Investors should continue to seek the advice of counsel regarding the HSR implications of their potential investments.

    Authored by Peter Jonathan Halasz, Eleazer Klein, Michael E. Swartz, Beverly J. Ang and Brittany L. Lane.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The Halliburton-Baker Hughes merger was challenged by the DOJ. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Sues to Block Halliburton’s Acquisition of Baker Hughes (Apr. 6, 2016). On May 1, 2016, the parties announced that they would be terminating their merger agreement.

    [2] Complaint at ¶ 5, United States v. VA Partners I, LLC, No. 16-cv-01672 (N.D. Ca. Apr. 4, 2016).

    [3] The minimum threshold for reportability under the HSR Act is currently $78.2 million.

    [4] 15 U.S.C. § 18a(c)(9).

    [5] For the more about the “investment-only” exemption and the implications of another recent enforcement action, see our previous Alert, “Hart-Scott-Rodino Filing Update: Recent Settlement Interprets ‘Investment-Only’ Exemption Narrowly” (Sept. 3, 2015).

    [6] ValueAct entities previously violated the HSR Act by failing to make required filings. The first time, no enforcement action was brought against the company. The second time, ValueAct settled the enforcement action and paid a civil penalty of $1.1 million in connection with the settlement.

    [7] According to the Statement of Basis and Purpose underlying the exemption, conduct that is viewed as inconsistent with an acquisition that was purportedly solely for the purpose of investment includes: (1) nominating a candidate to the board of the directors of the issuer; (2) proposing corporate action requiring shareholder approval (although the mere voting of stock is not inconsistent with an investment intent); (3) soliciting proxies; (4) having a controlling shareholder, director, officer or employee simultaneously serving as an officer or director of the issuer; (5) being a competitor of the issuer; or (6) doing any of the foregoing with respect to any entity directly or indirectly controlling the issuer. 43 Fed. Reg. 33,450, 33,465 (July 31, 1978).

    [8] In the 2012 enforcement action against Biglari Holdings Inc., the investor allegedly reached out to the issuer requesting board seats, in addition to other actions. More recently, the government alleged that Third Point LLC and three of its affiliated funds took various steps in preparation of a proposal for an alternate slate of directors for the issuer in question, Yahoo! Inc.

    [9] Complaint at ¶¶ 12-13; see also Complaint at ¶ 2.

    [10] According to the complaint, ValueAct filed a Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) that said ValueAct “might ‘propos[e] changes in [Baker Hughes’s] operations.’”

    [11] HSR Informal Interpretation Letters, #1403011 (March 20, 2014).

    [12] Complaint ¶ 4.

    [13] According to the complaint, ValueAct’s purchases, through one of its funds, of Baker Hughes voting securities continued through Jan. 15, 2015, one day prior to the filing of the Schedule 13D. ValueAct’s purchases, through two of its funds, of Halliburton voting securities continued through June 30, 2015 and March, 12, 2015, respectively — prior to July 2015 and September 2015 meetings with Halliburton’s CEO in which ValueAct presented: (1) proposed changes to Halliburton’s executive compensation plan; and (2) a potential restructuring plan to selectively acquire parts of Baker Hughes’ business.

    [14] Dissenting Statement of Commissioners Maureen K. Ohlhausen and Joshua D. Wright, In the Matter of Third Point, File No. 121-0019 (Aug. 24, 2015).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions. 

    In depth
    Authors

    Peter Jonathan Halasz

    Of Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ele Klein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Breaking the Health Company Compliance Program Monopoly

    ARTICLE

    Breaking the Health Company Compliance Program Monopoly

    May 20, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Michael Peregrine and Stephen Wu wrote this bylined article cautioning that, while healthcare organization compliance programs must focus on fraud and abuse, self-referral and reimbursement rules, “that sensitivity should not lead to, nor justify, marginal program emphasis on compliance with other laws enforced by health industry regulators.” The authors called for a “balanced” compliance program that covers “renewed federal enforcement of individual and corporate violations of the antitrust laws.”

    Read the full article.

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    Authors

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Selecting and Protecting International Trade Marks

    ARTICLE

    Selecting and Protecting International Trade Marks

    May 19, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jennifer Mikulina and Sarah Bro wrote this bylined article which explained the benefits of using an internationally focused trademark lawyer to secure the benefits of mark registration in multiple countries. “These benefits may differ by jurisdiction,” the authors wrote, so “to determine if [a mark] may be available for use and registration in a jurisdiction, a trade mark lawyer will assess the mark from several different angles.”

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    Authors

    Sarah Bro

    Partner

    Orange County, Los Angeles

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  • Last Renovation of Brussels

    ARTICLE

    Last Renovation of Brussels

    May 18, 2016

    Read time: 1 min

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    Dr. Uwe Goetker and Dr. Benedikt Schulz wrote this article about corporate reorganization proceedings.

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    Authors

    Dr. Uwe Goetker

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • District Court Blocks FTC and PA AG Challenge to Hershey-Pinnacle Merger

    District Court Blocks FTC and PA AG Challenge to Hershey-Pinnacle Merger

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Blocks FTC and PA AG Challenge to Hershey-Pinnacle Merger

    May 17, 2016

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 9, 2016, the US District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the motion by the Federal Trade Commission and Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger of Penn State Hershey Medical Center and PinnacleHealth System. The decision ends a string of victories by the FTC in recent health care merger litigation.

    In depth

    Overview

    On May 9, 2016, the US District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denied the motion by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General (together, the agencies) for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the merger of Penn State Hershey Medical Center (Hershey) and PinnacleHealth System (Pinnacle). The decision ends a string of victories by the FTC in recent health care merger litigation. The key issue in the case, and ultimately dispositive, was geographic market definition. Focusing on the “commercial realities faced by consumers in the region,” US District Judge John E. Jones III found the FTC’s proposed geographic market unrealistically narrow and said other hospitals within the region provided reasonable alternatives for patients. Long-term agreements with two commercial health insurers also were significant to the court’s analysis. Judge Jones found these agreements, which locked in rate structures and differentials for at least five years, “extremely compelling” evidence.

    Although the decision is a setback for the FTC—and the Pennsylvania Attorney General, which has been among the most active state attorneys general offices in health care antitrust enforcement in recent years (see, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No. 1:13-cv-02647-YK (M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013); Pennsylvania v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No. 4:12-cv-01081-CCC (M.D. Pa. June 7, 2012))—the matter is not yet resolved. On May 11, 2016, the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General moved for a temporary stay pending a planned appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and on May 12, 2016, they filed an emergency motion for an injunction with the Third Circuit. On May 12, 2016, the district court did not grant the temporary stay, but instead ordered a two-week extension of the temporary restraining order. Accordingly, the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General have until May 27, 2016, to persuade the Third Circuit to grant the injunction.

    The Hershey-Pinnacle case is one of three hospital mergers the FTC has challenged since last fall. The hospital parties opposed the agency’s definition of the relevant geographic market in each case. Courts have not had occasion to address hospital geographic market definition during the recent wave of hospital mergers and FTC challenges to several of them. Hospitals and health systems pursuing mergers with a competitor should monitor these developing cases closely for new guidance from the courts.

    Background

    On December 9, 2015, the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General brought an action before the Middle District of Pennsylvania to temporarily restrain and preliminarily enjoin the parties’ from consummating the proposed merger pending a full administrative proceeding before the FTC on the merits of the case.

    The agencies alleged that the proposed merger of Hershey and Pinnacle would result in a substantial lessening of competition for general acute care (GAC) inpatient hospital services offered in a four-county area around Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, (the Harrisburg Area). They contended that the proper relevant geographic market is one in which “consumers can practicably find alternative providers of the service,” and emphasized that health care consumers generally prefer to seek care relatively close to their home or workplace. In support of their alleged four-county geographic market, the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General further asserted that: (1) a large percentage of the patients in the four-county area seek GAC services within these four counties; (2) hospitals located outside the four counties do not draw many patients from within the four county area; and (3) health plans could not effectively market a network to employers and patients in the Harrisburg Area that did not include a hospital in these four counties. Within the Harrisburg Area, a combined Hershey and Pinnacle would have created the area’s largest general acute care system with a 64 percent market share.

    After a five-day evidentiary hearing, the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

    The Court’s Analysis

    Geographic Market

    In the two previous hospital merger challenges that were litigated, the relevant geographic market was uncontested. Not so here. The defendants countered that the alleged Harrisburg Area market was far too narrowly drawn. The court found that the resolution of this threshold issue was dispositive to the case.

    The agencies’ proposed geographic market reflected the FTC’s core view, expressed repeatedly in numerous recent merger challenges, that markets for GAC inpatient services are inherently local because patients prefer to seek care close to their home. In support of their proposed market, the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General argued that “very few” patients who live in the Harrisburg Area travel to hospitals outside of the four counties, and commercial health plans would not be able to successfully market a network that excluded Hershey or Pinnacle to employers and consumers in the Harrisburg Area. The availability of competing hospitals reasonably near the merging parties, with which commercial health plans can contract to form a marketable provider network in that area, is central to the FTC’s method for defining the relevant geographic market.

    The court concluded that the agencies’ proposed geographic market was too small and unreasonably excluded important competitors to the merging parties. Instead of focusing, as the agencies do, on patient preferences for local care or on the location of hospitals to which commercial health plans turn for their provider networks, the court emphasized the substantial in-migration of patients from outside the Harrisburg Area. The court noted that 43.5 percent of Hershey’s patients (comprising over half of Hershey’s revenues) traveled to Hershey from outside the FTC’s and Pennsylvania Attorney General’s proposed geographic market. The court also noted that central Pennsylvania is highly rural, which obliges many residents to drive significant distances for goods and services. Applying this observation to hospital services, the court noted that half of Hershey’s patients drive at least 30 minutes for care, and that 20 percent of Hershey’s inpatients traveled more than an hour for their admission to Hershey. The court also highlighted that 19 hospitals are within a 65-minute drive of Hershey. Against this background, the court found the FTC’s and Pennsylvania Attorney General’s proposed market “unrealistically narrow” and divorced from the “commercial realities faced by consumers in the region.” Accordingly, the court held that the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General failed to demonstrate a likelihood of ultimate success on the merits.

    Payor Contracts

    Recently, Hershey and Pinnacle entered into five-year and 10-year agreements with Highmark and Capital Blue Cross—respectively—that require the hospitals to maintain existing rate structures for fee-for-service contracts and preserve the existing rate-differential between Hershey and Pinnacle. The court found these agreements with two of Pennsylvania’s largest commercial health plans to be “extremely compelling” evidence for the competition analysis. The FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General argued that the court needed to consider what would happen to rates once these agreements expired, but the judge said that doing so would be “imprudent” in light of the “rapidly-changing arena of healthcare and health insurance.”

    In light of the hospitals’ agreements with Highmark and Capital Blue Cross, the court found that it could not predict that the merger would allow Hershey and Pinnacle to impose an anticompetitive price increase. In doing so, the court implicitly rejected several FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General arguments relating to these agreements, including that they: (1) were “strong evidence” that the health plans believed the merger would be anticompetitive; (2) would not prevent the merged entity from allocating more risk to the health plans and less risk to the merged entity in future risk-sharing agreements; and (3) would do nothing to address the anticompetitive effects of the merger on non-price competition between the hospitals, including expansion of services, quality of care, and the purchase and implementation of new technologies and equipment.

    Equities

    Having found the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General unlikely to prevail on the merits as a result of their failure to define a relevant geographic market, the court was not required to weigh the equities. Nevertheless, it did so and evaluated evidence presented by Hershey and Pinnacle that the merger would result in procompetitive efficiencies. The court found that the merger would alleviate some of Hershey’s capacity constraints by allowing Hershey—the more expensive, higher-acuity facility—to transfer patients immediately to Pinnacle’s less expensive, lower-acuity facilities, thereby permitting Hershey to forego the expense of constructing a new bed tower and shift patients to Pinnacle’s lower-cost setting of care.

    Other Factors

    The decision identified other factors in support of denying the motion for a preliminary injunction as well. The court found that the merging parties were already facing enhanced competition, by virtue of “extensive repositioning” by other hospital systems looking to “erode” the parties’ patient base, and that these hospital systems will competitively constrain Hershey and Pinnacle post-merger. The court also found that the merger would add scale and thereby create advantages related to risk-based contracting of the type encouraged by the Affordable Care Act (ACA), even though the judge agreed with the agencies’ contention that Hershey and Pinnacle already are “independently capable” of entering into risk-based contracts. This portion of the court’s opinion is dicta, but it is notable that a court has now recognized and credited a defense to an antitrust challenge to a healthcare merger based on provisions in the ACA.

    Key Implications

    Few courts have had occasion to address disputes over hospital geographic market definition during the recent wave of hospital mergers and FTC challenges. In light of this opinion, should it stand on appeal, hospital defendants in future cases will likely use patient flow volumes into and/or out of the government’s proposed market (although the Hershey court did not mention outflows) to argue for a market broader than that alleged by the government. A larger geographic market containing additional hospitals provides defendants greater opportunity to argue that competition will constrain them from raising prices after the merger.

    Although this court seemed to diverge from recent case law by crediting risk-based contracting efficiencies, it is important to note that the court weighed the efficiencies only after finding that the FTC and Pennsylvania Attorney General could not establish a prima facie case. Accordingly, it is not clear that similar efficiency claims based analogous evidence, if presented in a hospital merger case with a different posture in terms of the court’s assessment of the government’s prima facie case, would be sufficient to overcome that merger’s potential adverse competitive effects.

    The court observed that a tension exists between the antitrust laws and the Affordable Care Act, stating: “We find it no small irony that the same federal government under which the FTC operates has created a climate that virtually compels institutions to seek alliances.” FTC officials have repeatedly rejected this point of view, stating that the goals of the antitrust laws and the ACA are aligned. The extent to which this argument finds traction in the Third Circuit and in other courts remains to be seen.

    Authors

    Daniel Powers

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Does Yates Sound The Death Knell For Joint Defense Agreements?

    ARTICLE

    Does Yates Sound The Death Knell For Joint Defense Agreements?

    May 12, 2016

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Highlights of FinCEN’s Long-Awaited Customer Due Diligence Final Rule

    Highlights of FinCEN’s Long-Awaited Customer Due Diligence Final Rule

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Highlights of FinCEN’s Long-Awaited Customer Due Diligence Final Rule

    May 11, 2016

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On May 11, 2016, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) published its long-awaited Final Rule regarding the customer due diligence (“CDD”) requirements under the Bank Secrecy Act for banks, broker-dealers, mutual funds, and futures commission merchants and introducing brokers in commodities (collectively, “covered financial institutions”).[1] The Final Rule requires these covered financial institutions to identify and verify the natural persons behind legal entity customers (beneficial owners), subject to certain exemptions. The new CDD requirements present significant compliance challenges for covered financial institutions. Accordingly, compliance with the Final Rule is not mandatory until May 11, 2018 (the “Applicability Date”), approximately two years after its effective date of July 11, 2016.

    The Final Rule takes into account many, but not all, of the comments received in response to the Proposed Rule.[2] At a high level, the Final Rule requires:

    • Consistent with the Proposed Rule, covered financial institutions must conduct CDD on certain legal entity customers that open new accounts going forward from the Applicability Date.
      • FinCEN considers CDD as consisting of the following four elements: (1) identifying and verifying the identity of customers; (2) identifying and verifying the identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers; (3) understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships; and (4) conducting ongoing monitoring for reporting suspicious transactions, and, on a risk-basis, maintaining and updating customer information. Under FinCEN’s existing rules, the first element of CDD is already satisfied by the existing customer identification program (“CIP”) requirements of covered financial institutions, and the third and fourth elements are described by FinCEN as “already implicitly required for covered financial institutions to comply with their suspicious activity reporting requirements.” According to the Final Rule, the only new requirement is the obligation to take explicit steps to identify and verify the identity of the natural persons who are the beneficial owners of legal entity customers.
      • The definition of beneficial owner remains unchanged and includes both an individual who owns more than 25 percent of the equity interests in a company and a single individual who exercises control.
    • Covered financial institutions must collect information on beneficial owners of legal entity customers when an account is opened, either using the model form included with the Final Rule or taking other steps to collect the same information, provided the individual providing the information makes a representation that, to the best of his or her knowledge, the information provided is complete and correct. Covered financial institutions can rely on the information provided by the customer (provided that it has no knowledge of facts that would reasonably call into question the reliability of the information).
    • Covered financial institutions must use CIP procedures to verify the identity of beneficial owners of legal entity customers, although the procedures for CDD need not be exactly the procedures for CIP. Moreover, unlike the CIP rule, the covered financial institutions can rely on copies of documents. As with the CIP rule, covered financial institutions may rely on the performance by another financial institution (including an affiliate) of the beneficial ownership requirements of the Final Rule, as long as the same criteria are met.
    • Covered financial institutions are not required to update beneficial ownership information on a periodic or ongoing basis, but only on an event-driven basis, when in the course of their normal monitoring they detect information about the customer that may be relevant to assessing the risk of the customer.
    • FinCEN clarified the definition of “legal entity customer” to mean “a corporation, limited liability company, or other entity that is created by the filing of a public document with a Secretary of State or similar office, a general partnership, and any similar entity formed under the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, that opens an account.” This definition would not include sole proprietorships, unincorporated associations or trusts (other than statutory trusts created by a filing with a Secretary of State or similar office).
    • The Final Rule adopts all of the exclusions from the definition of “legal entity customer” that were listed in the Proposed Rule,[3] and adds several others:
      • A bank holding company, as defined in section 2 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. § 1841), or savings and loan holding company, as defined in section 10(n) of the Home Owners Loan Act (12 U.S.C. § 1467a(n)).
      • A pooled investment vehicle that is operated or advised by a financial institution excluded under this paragraph.
      • An insurance company that is regulated by a state.
      • A financial market utility designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
      • A foreign financial institution established in a jurisdiction where the regulator of such institution maintains beneficial ownership information regarding such institutions.
      • A non-U.S. governmental department, agency or political subdivision that engages only in governmental rather than commercial activities.
      • Any legal entity only to the extent that it opens a private banking account for non-U.S. persons that are subject to FinCEN’s private banking account rule (31 C.F.R. § 1010.620).
      • Non-excluded pooled investment vehicles, such as non-U.S. managed mutual funds, hedge funds and private equity funds: Covered financial institutions would be required to collect beneficial ownership information under the control prong only (e.g., an individual with significant responsibility to control, manage or direct the operator, adviser, or general partner of the vehicle).
      • Charities and nonprofit entities: Covered financial institutions would be required to collect beneficial ownership information under the control prong only.
    • Covered financial institutions are exempt from the beneficial ownership requirement with respect to certain new accounts solely used to finance the purchase of postage, insurance premiums or leasing of equipment, and certain private label credit card accounts.
    • Covered financial institutions must maintain records of any identifying information obtained regarding the beneficial ownership, including the certification (if obtained), for five years after the date the account is closed. Covered financial institutions must also maintain records of a description of any document relied on, of any non-documentary methods and the results of any measures undertaken, and of the resolution of each substantive discrepancy, for five years after the record is made.
    • In addition, the Final Rule adopts a new “fifth pillar” of the AML program, which requires appropriate risk-based procedures for conducting ongoing customer due diligence, to include, but not limited to: “(i) Understanding the nature and purpose of customer relationships for the purpose of developing a customer risk profile; and (ii) Conducting ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and, on a risk basis, to maintain and update customer information.”
      • The term “customer risk profile” is used to refer to the information gathered about a customer to develop the baseline against which customer activity is assessed for suspicious transaction reporting, and may include information such as the type of customer or type of account, service or product, and may, but need not, include a system of risk ratings or categories of customers.
      • Financial institutions are required to conduct ongoing monitoring to identify and report suspicious transactions and conduct a monitoring-triggered update of customer information. When a financial institution detects information about the customer in the course of its monitoring that is relevant to assessing risk, including a change in beneficial ownership information, it must update the customer information, including the beneficial ownership information.
      • FinCEN views the fifth pillar as an explicit codification of existing expectations. Apparently, covered financial institutions do not have until the Applicability Date to implement the requirements set forth in the fifth pillar. According to the preamble to the Final Rule, “current industry practice to comply with existing expectations for SAR reporting should already satisfy this proposed requirement.”[4]

    As a companion to the Final Rule, the Treasury Department also sent a letter to Congress encouraging the adoption of legislation that would require U.S. companies to compile beneficial ownership information at the time of their creation, disclose beneficial ownership information to the states at the time the company is created, and file such information with the Treasury Department for use by law enforcement.[5]

    If you have any questions regarding the Final Rule, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Betty Santangelo and Melissa G.R. Goldstein.


    [1] See Final Rule, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 81 Fed. Reg. 29398 (May 11, 2016), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-05-11/pdf/2016-10567.pdf (“Final Rule”).

    [2] See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions, 79 Fed. Reg. 45151 (Aug. 4, 2015), available at https://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/files/CDD-NPRM-Final.pdf (“Proposed Rule”).

    [3] The Proposed Rule and Final Rule exclude the following entities from the definition of “legal entity customer”: “(i) A financial institution regulated by a Federal functional regulator or a bank regulated by a State bank regulator; (ii) A person described in § 1020.315(b)(2) through (5) of this chapter; (iii) An issuer of a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of that Act; (iv) An investment company, as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under that Act; (v) An investment adviser, as defined in section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, that is registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under that Act; (vi) An exchange or clearing agency, as defined in section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, that is registered under section 6 or 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of that Act; (vii) Any other entity registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (viii) A registered entity, commodity pool operator, commodity trading advisor, retail foreign exchange dealer, swap dealer, or major swap participant, each as defined in section 1a of the Commodity Exchange Act, that is registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; (ix) A public accounting firm registered under section 102 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.” Proposed Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 45170-4517. See also Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 29452.

    [4] Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 29420.

    [5] See Letter to The Speaker of U.S. House of Representatives, Honorable Paul D. Ryan, from Secretary of the Treasury, Jacob J. Lew (May 5, 2016), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Lew%20to%20Ryan%20on%20CDD.PDF. See also Press Release, Treasury Announces Key Regulations and Legislation to Counter Money Laundering and Corruption, Combat Tax Evasion (May 5, 2016), available at https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0451.aspx.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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