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McDermott International Legal Highlights August 2017
August 2017
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August 2017
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‘Spoofing’ Conviction Upheld: Implications for Private Fund Managers and Algorithmic Traders
ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
‘Spoofing’ Conviction Upheld: Implications for Private Fund Managers and Algorithmic Traders
August 11, 2017
Read time: 10 min
On August 7, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit unanimously upheld the first-ever criminal conviction under the anti-spoofing provision of the Commodity Exchange Act.[1] In doing so, the court rejected arguments by the defendant, high-frequency commodities trader Michael Coscia, that the anti‐spoofing provision is unconstitutionally vague and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. As the first appellate court to address these arguments, the decision clears the path for the government to continue its efforts to pursue spoofing claims, particularly in the context of algorithmic and high-frequency trading.
This decision is an important one for private fund managers and other advisers, particularly managers that utilize algorithms or other systematic trading strategies. It makes clear that the push to pursue criminal sanctions for manipulative marketplace conduct is not limited to insider trading or to the securities markets. The Coscia decision also shows that courts are increasingly willing to look at the architecture of the code that generates trading instructions to divine a trader’s intent. Compliance and other supervisory personnel should consider whether and how these aspects of the Coscia decision should be reflected in their regulatory compliance efforts.
“Spoofing” generally entails efforts to affect the price of a stock or commodity through buy or sell orders that the trader has no intention of being executed. Though spoofing takes many forms,[2] it typically involves a trader:
The large order creates the false appearance of market demand, thus causing the market clearing price to move in the direction of the price at which the small order was placed. This results in the small order on the opposite side of the market getting filled at the advantageous price. Having successfully used the larger order to shift the market price, the trader then cancels that large order.
In Coscia’s case, the government alleged that Coscia employed high-frequency trading algorithms to place large sale or buy orders that drove prices in Coscia’s favor, but then canceled the orders before they could be executed. Coscia’s orders created price fluctuations that lasted just long enough for him to fill a smaller order at the new price — the entire process took Coscia only a fraction of a second. The government claimed that, over a 10-week period in 2011, Coscia engaged in tens of thousands of acts of spoofing through his trading programs, earning $1.4 million in trading profits. A jury convicted Coscia of violating the anti‐spoofing provision of the CEA and of committing commodities fraud, and he was subsequently sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
Coscia argued on appeal that the anti‐spoofing provision should be held to be void for vagueness. That provision states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to engage in any trading, practice, or conduct on or subject to the rules of a registered entity that … is, is of the character of, or is commonly known to the trade as, ‘spoofing’ (bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution).”[3] Coscia claimed that this language does not give adequate notice of the proscribed conduct, as the construction of the statute signals a belief that “spoofing” is an established industry term of art when in fact it has no industry definition. The court rejected this argument, finding that the statute’s parenthetical (“bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution”) clearly defines spoofing, rendering any reference to an industry definition irrelevant. When it passed the anti-spoofing provision, therefore, “Congress provided the necessary definition [of spoofing] and, in doing so, put the trading community on notice.”
Coscia also argued that, even if the statute gives adequate notice, it encourages arbitrary enforcement, as many high-frequency traders cancel the vast majority of their orders (98 percent) before execution. The court rejected this argument as well, finding that Coscia’s “behavior clearly falls within the confines of the conduct prohibited by the statute” and that, as such, “he cannot challenge any allegedly arbitrary enforcement that could hypothetically be suffered by a theoretical legitimate trader.” Furthermore, the court found, the statute does not allow for arbitrary enforcement because it only allows for prosecutors to charge a person who has “specific intent to cancel orders at the time they were placed.” The court explicitly differentiated between legal trades, such as stop-loss orders and so-called fill-or-kill orders, that are “designed to be executed upon the arrival of certain subsequent events” (but that may be cancelled if those events fail to occur), from spoofing, where the government must prove “an intent to cancel the order at the time it was placed.”
Typically, the most difficult challenge for the government in spoofing cases is to prove that the trader intended to cancel the orders when they were placed. Coscia argued that the government failed to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt in his case, but the Seventh Circuit disagreed. In finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish Coscia’s intent, the court relied heavily on statistics about Coscia’s order cancellation rates and how they compared to rates for other market participants. Specifically, the court cited evidence showing that: (1) Coscia’s cancellations represented 96 percent of all Brent oil futures cancellations on the Intercontinental Exchange during the relevant period; (2) only 0.08 percent of Coscia’s large orders on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange were filled, versus 35.61 percent of his small orders; (3) only 0.5 percent of Coscia’s large orders on the Intercontinental Exchange were filled; (4) only 0.57 percent of Coscia’s large orders stayed on the market for more than one second, in contrast to 65 percent of large orders by other high-frequency traders; and (5) Coscia’s order-to-trade ratio was 1,592 percent, in contrast to a range of 91 percent to 264 percent for other market participants. However, the court relied on other evidence as well, and as a result its decision may not support the proposition that a criminal conviction for spoofing can be established by statistical evidence alone.
Of particular note to private fund managers and other algorithmic or systematic traders, the court cited testimony of the architect of Coscia’s algorithms that the programs were designed to avoid large orders being filled and that Coscia had asked for the program to act “like a decoy,” which would be “[u]sed to pump [the] market.” The programs were designed to cancel large orders (1) based on the passage of time (usually measured in milliseconds), (2) following the partial filling of the large orders, or (3) following the complete filling of the small orders – parameters that, according to the court, “suggest[], strongly, fraudulent intent.” While “no single piece of evidence necessarily establishes spoofing,” the court concluded, “when evaluated in its totality” the evidence allowed a rational jury to find that Coscia placed orders with the intent to cancel them before their execution.
Turning to Coscia’s separate conviction for commodities fraud, the Seventh Circuit likewise rejected Coscia’s argument that the evidence failed, as a matter of law, to establish that he acted with fraudulent intent. Relying on essentially the same evidence supporting the CEA conviction, the court found that the proof at trial supported the conclusion that Coscia “designed a scheme to pump and deflate the market through the placement of large orders.” Coscia’s scheme was therefore “deceitful,” the court explained, “because, at the time he placed the large orders, he intended to cancel the orders.”
For private fund managers and other advisers, Coscia is a reminder that criminal liability for trading activity: (1) is not limited to insider trading and (2) is not limited to trading in securities;[4] criminal liability can be implicated by manipulative activity in the securities, futures and swaps markets. While civil enforcement actions for spoofing and other manipulative activity can be brought by the SEC, the CFTC and the various securities and futures exchanges, those actions are not exclusive remedies: federal prosecutors can and will utilize their criminal enforcement powers when they deem it appropriate. Compliance and supervisory personnel should review their training materials and policies and consider how to reflect Coscia and the issues it raises.
Managers should also consider reviewing the extent to which their trade surveillance systems capture and retain records of unfilled and cancelled orders and evaluate how effectively their compliance tools and procedures detect evidence of spoofing.
Private fund managers and other algorithmic or systematic traders should also focus on the fact that the appeals court cited the specifications of the algorithms and code designed by and created for Coscia as evidence of manipulative intent. This aspect of the Coscia decision underscores the need for compliance and supervisory personnel to oversee the design and operation of algorithmic and similar automated or systematic trading models. These personnel should consider how best to ascertain the purpose of each trading model and how to confirm that models are operating in accordance with the stated intent and purpose; in some cases, this may require compliance personnel to rely on personnel with more technical skillsets. To the extent that there is a violation, regulators will likely consider the amount of effort invested in supervising systematic trading when determining sanctions.
The Coscia decision likely will embolden the DOJ, SEC, CFTC and other regulators to pursue more spoofing claims, regardless of the forum in which the spoofing occurred.
Authored by Brian T. Daly, Gary Stein, Peter H. White, Jacob Preiserowicz, Jeffrey F. Robertson and Bayard P. Brown.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] United States v. Coscia, No. 16-3017, 2017 WL 3381433 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2017).
[2] See, e.g., In re Behruz Afshar et al., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 76546 (Dec. 3, 2015) (spoofing related to generating liquidity rebates); Complaint, SEC v. LEK Securities Corporation et al., 17 CV 1789 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017) (alleging a type of spoofing referred to as “layering”).
[3] 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c(a)(5).
[4] It is also worth noting that, even though the federal securities laws do not contain a specific anti-spoofing provision akin to the provision in the CEA, the criminal fraud statute under which Coscia was convicted (18 U.S.C. § 1348) applies equally to securities fraud and commodities fraud (although it is possible that the “vagueness” argument could be re-asserted in a securities fraud case).
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances.
The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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Spring/Summer 2017
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Andrea Kramer co-authored this bylined article on how social diversity improves the collaboration process, because in a diverse group “we pay more attention, and we care more about getting it right … Collaboration in the presence of social diversity may be more difficult than collaboration in the presence of similarity, but it produces greater team productivity—and a better bottom line.”
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August 11, 2017
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Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article discussing when a move of cash from a US corporation to a controlled foreign corporation under Rev. Proc. 99-32 creates an investment in US property under section 956.Two recent section 965 cases hold that such a payable is not treated as an obligation, Mr. Yoder wrote, thus supporting a similar conclusion for purposes of section 956, and supporting that such a payable should not be treated as debt in the first instance.
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August 7, 2017
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Martin Lambe and Mai Muto wrote this bylined article on the main legal implications of Brexit according to different models, including European Economic Area model. “In light of recent comments made by [Prime Minister] Theresa May, it is unlikely that the EEA model will apply,” the authors wrote. “Nonetheless, the UK’s position may evolve as negotiations with the EU progress.”
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August 2017
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Dr. Gero Burwitz on the new Investment Tax Reform Act, which will enter into force on August 1, 2017, and will partly fundamentally change the existing system of investment taxation.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
August 2, 2017
Read time: 25 min
On Aug. 2, 2017, President Trump signed into law the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (the “Act”), after it was passed by overwhelming majorities in the House and Senate.[1] While media coverage of the legislation has focused on its provisions tying the hands of the current administration when it comes to lifting Russia-related sanctions, the Act also authorizes, and in many instances directs, the President to impose additional sanctions against Russia, as well as against Iran and North Korea. The sanctions described in the Act contemplate Executive Branch implementation anywhere from 30 to 180 days after the Act’s enactment (implementation requirements vary by provision), so firms should expect to see regulations released and designations by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) made in the coming months.
Separately, on July 26 and 31, 2017, 14 current and former Venezuelan government officials, including Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and the current Vice President of Finance for Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”), were added to OFAC’s Specially Designated Nationals List (“SDN List”). The Venezuelan sanctions take effect immediately.
U.S. firms, including financial institutions and investment fund managers, engaged in any business activity in or with persons or entities in Russia, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela are advised to pay close attention to these new prohibitions.
The Act’s provisions relating to Russia are likely to have the greatest practical impact. These provisions modify and expand the scope of existing Russia-related sanctions and require the President to take steps to sanction additional persons engaged in other types of conduct involving Russia.
In 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, President Obama issued a series of Executive Orders (“E.O.”) to block property of persons contributing to the undermining of the democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine. These included sanctions directed against various Russian government officials, as well as businesses and individual business executives connected to the Russian government and certain sectors of the Russian economy.[3] In December 2016, President Obama also amended a cybersecurity-related E.O. originally issued in April 2015, to block property of persons involved in cyber-enabled attacks directed at influencing the United States presidential election.[4] The Act codifies the sanctions provided for in each of those Executive Orders and requires the President to obtain Congressional approval prior to the termination of any such sanctions or the waiver of the initial application of the sanctions against qualifying persons.[5]
In addition, Section 223 of the Act modifies E.O. 13662, which was issued on March 20, 2014, in order to strengthen and expand its existing sanctions. Specifically, Section 223 of the Act authorizes the imposition of sanctions against state-owned enterprises in the railway or metals and mining sector of the Russian economy. This section of the Act does not mandate any new sanctions; rather, it provides that “the Secretary of the Treasury may determine that a person” is subject to the E.O.[6]
Section 223 also orders the Secretary of the Treasury to modify Directives issued by OFAC pursuant to E.O. 13662. Under these Directives, U.S. persons are prohibited from participating in transactions involving new equity and/or new debt of certain maturities issued by entities designated on OFAC’s Sectoral Sanctions Identification List (“SSI List”). Directive 1 is intended for the financial services sector of the Russian economy, while Directives 2 and 4 apply to the energy sector of the Russian economy. The modifications required by the Act must be made to Directives 1 and 2 within 60 days of the legislation’s enactment, and to Directive 4 within 90 days of enactment.
Directive 1. Directive 1 is amended to prohibit all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 14 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to the Directive, their property or their interests in property. The existing prohibition in Directive 1 applies to new debt of longer than 30 days maturity.
Directive 2. Directive 2 is amended to prohibit all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 60 days maturity of persons identified under Directive 2, their property, or their interests in property. Prior to this amendment, Directive 2 applied to new debt of longer than 90 days maturity.
Directive 4. Directive 4 is amended to prohibit the provision, exportation, or reexportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, services (except for financial services) or technology in support of exploration or production for new deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects that both have the potential to produce oil and involve any person or property of a person subject to Directive 4 who has a controlling interest or substantial non-controlling interest (> 33 percent) in the project. The Act modifies the existing Directive 4 in two principal ways. First, its restrictions apply not only to projects in Russia itself, but also to projects anywhere in the world, regardless of location, if a designated person is involved in the project. Second, whereas the existing Directive 4 applies to projects involving “entities owned 50 percent or more” by a designated person,[7] the Act extends its application to entities in which a designated person has a “substantial non-controlling interest,” which is defined as not less than 33 percent.
Sections 225 and 226 of the Act amend sections 4(b)(1) and 5 of the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (“UFSA”), respectively, by removing permissive language simply allowing the President to impose certain sanctions and adding language requiring the President to impose such sanctions 30 or more days after the Act’s enactment, unless the President determines that it is not in the national interest of the United States to do so. Section 4(b)(1) of UFSA, as amended by Section 225 of the Act, pertains to foreign persons that knowingly make a significant investment in a special Russian crude oil project.[8] Section 5 of UFSA, as amended by Section 226 of the Act, applies to foreign financial institutions that knowingly engage, after the Act’s passage, in significant transactions involving certain defense- and energy-related sanctioned persons, and foreign financial institutions that, 30 or more days after enactment, knowingly facilitate a significant financial transaction on behalf of any sanctioned Russian person.[9]
Sections 227 and 228 of the Act amend Section 9 of, and add new Sections 10 and 11 to, the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014 (the “Ukraine Sovereignty Act”), respectively.[11] Consistent with the amendments to UFSA, the amendments to Section 9 of the Ukraine Sovereignty Act remove the permissive language allowing the President to impose sanctions, replace such language with a requirement that he impose such sanctions and extend the scope of the sanctions to include acts of significant corruption anywhere in the world, and not only in Russia. As revised, the President “shall” impose certain sanctions with respect to “any official of the Government of the Russian Federation, or close associate or family member of such an official, that … is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing acts of significant corruption in the Russian Federation or elsewhere … .”[12]
Section 228 of the Act adds Sections 10 and 11 to the Ukraine Sovereignty Act. The new Section 10 directs the President to impose sanctions against foreign persons that materially violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any covered E.O., the Ukraine Sovereignty Act, or UFSA, or that facilitate a significant transaction or transactions for or on behalf of any person subject to Russia-related sanctions or such person’s child, spouse, parent or sibling. Similarly, the new Section 11 directs the President to impose sanctions on foreign persons responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, the commission of serious human rights abuses in any area forcibly occupied or otherwise controlled by the Russian government, as well as foreign persons that materially assist, sponsor, or provide financial, material or technological support for, or goods or services to, such a person or are owned or controlled by, or act or purport to act for or on behalf of, such a person.
In addition to the codification of existing Russia-related sanctions and modifications to existing Directives and legislation, the Act requires the imposition of new sanctions regimes targeting: (1) persons that, on behalf of the Russian government, undermine cybersecurity; (2) the defense and intelligence sectors of the Russian government; (3) investments that aid in the privatization of state-owned assets so as to unjustly benefit Russian government officials and their associates; and (4) persons who provide support to the Syrian government. In addition, the President is authorized, though not required, to impose, in collaboration with the United States’ allies, sanctions related to Russian pipeline developments.
Cybersecurity. Section 224(a) of the Act requires the President, 60 days after enactment, to impose certain sanctions against persons involved in actions on behalf of the Russian government that undermine cybersecurity. First, the President must impose blocking sanctions against persons that: (1) knowingly engage, on behalf of the Russian government, in significant activities undermining cybersecurity (as defined in the Act) against any person or government or (2) are owned or controlled by, or act or purport to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, such a person. Second, the President must impose five or more of the sanctions described in Section 235 of the Act (described below in “Types of Sanctions”) against any person that knowingly materially assists, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services (except financial services) in support of, such activity. Third, the President must impose three or more of the sanctions described in Section 4(c) of UFSA, 22 U.S.C. § 8923(c), against any person that knowingly provides financial services in support of such activity.[13]
Defense and Intelligence Sectors. Section 231 of the Act requires the President, 180 days after the enactment of the Act, to impose five or more of the sanctions described in Section 235 against persons that knowingly, on or after the Act’s enactment, engage in a significant transaction with a person that is a part of, or operates for or on behalf of, the defense or intelligence sectors of the Russian government. The imposition of such sanctions may, however, be delayed with respect to such a person if the President certifies to the appropriate Congressional committees, at least every 180 days during which the delay is in effect, that the person is substantially reducing the number of qualifying significant transactions in which that person is engaged.
Privatization of State-Owned Assets. Section 233 of the Act requires the President to impose five or more of the sanctions described in Section 235 against any person that, with actual knowledge, on or after the Act’s implementation, makes an investment of $10 million or more (or a combination of investments, each at least $1 million, that aggregate to $10 million or more in a 12-month period) or facilitates such an investment, if the investment directly and significantly contributes to the ability of Russia to privatize state-owned assets in such a way as to unjustly benefit Russian government officials or their close associates or family members.
Support for the Government of Syria. Section 234 of the Act requires the President to impose blocking sanctions against a foreign person that, on or after the date on which the Act is enacted, knowingly exports, transfers, or otherwise provides to Syria significant financial, material, or technological support that contributes materially to the ability of the Syrian government to acquire or develop (a) chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or related technology; (b) ballistic or cruise missile capabilities; or (c) destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons; or to acquire certain defense-related materials defined in or designated under the Arms Export Control Act. These sanctions extend not only to such foreign persons, but also to successor entities of such foreign persons and foreign persons owned or controlled by, or that have acted for or on behalf of, such foreign persons.
Russian Pipeline Developments. Section 232 of the Act permits the President to coordinate with allies of the United States to impose five or more of the sanctions described in Section 235 against persons that knowingly, on or after the date of enactment, make certain investments (defined in the Act) or sell, lease, or provide to Russia, for the construction of Russian energy export pipelines, goods, services, technology, information or support (as described in the Act). Unlike other sections of the Act, Section 232 grants the President the authority to impose sanctions but does not require that such sanctions be implemented.
Types of Sanctions. Section 235 of the Act provides 12 types of sanctions from which the President may choose in implementing the provisions contained in Sections 224 (relating to cybersecurity), 231 (relating to the defense and intelligence sectors of the Russian economy), 232 (relating to Russian pipeline developments) and 233 (relating to the privatization of state-owned assets). The available sanctions most relevant for U.S. firms include: (a) the prohibition of loans or the provision of credits in amounts greater than $10 million over any 12-month period to sanctioned persons by United States financial institutions (subject to a limited exception); (b) the use of the voice and vote by the United States executive director to each international financial institution to oppose any loan from such institution to the benefit of a sanctioned person; (c) specific prohibitions against sanctioned persons that are financial institutions; (d) the prohibition of foreign exchange transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States in which the sanctioned person has any interest; (e) the prohibition of banking transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States involving any interest of the sanctioned person; (f) the prohibition of property transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the United States involving the sanctioned person; and (g) the prohibition of United States persons from investing in or purchasing significant amounts of equity or debt instruments of the sanctioned person.
Congressional Review of Easing of Sanction and Licenses. As noted above, Section 216 of the Act establishes a framework for Congressional review of any proposal by the President to lift or waive any of the Russia-related sanctions, including the grant of a license that “significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation.”[14] The President must not only report to Congress any proposed action easing or waiving the Russia-related sanctions, but the President may not act if Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, and may not act during the 30 days in which such Congressional review is pending (absent a joint resolution of approval).
Senior Foreign Political Figures and Sovereign Debt. The Act also identifies a number of detailed reports that the Secretary of the Treasury, in certain instances in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of State, must submit to the appropriate Congressional committees. Notably, Sections 241 and 242 of the Act require, within 180 days of enactment, the submission of detailed reports (1) concerning senior foreign political figures and oligarchs in Russia and Russian parastatal entities, the exposure of key economic sectors of the United States to both, and the potential impact of certain sanctions against each; and (2) describing the potential effects of expanding the sanctions under Directive 1 of E.O. 13662 to include “sovereign debt and the full range of derivative products.”
The Iran-related provisions of the Act primarily codify into law existing sanctions regimes involving Iran and include a reporting mechanism the President must follow in the event he seeks to waive any required sanction designations. The Iran-related sanctions relate, generally, to Iran’s ballistic missile program, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”), and persons responsible for human rights abuses, as well as to enforcing arms embargoes against the country.
More specifically, Section 104 of the Act, which is designed to respond to Iran’s ballistic missile program, directs the President to block from entering the United States persons, and to block all transactions in the property and interests in property of persons, that he determines satisfy criteria outlined in the Act.[15] Section 105 of the Act requires the President, 90 days after the Act’s passage, to impose sanctions against the IRGC and foreign persons that are officials, agents, or affiliates of the IRGC.[16] Section 107 of the Act requires the President to impose sanctions intended to enforce arms embargoes against Iran and identifies such persons against whom the sanctions should be implemented.[17] Section 106 of the Act, unlike sections 104, 105, and 107, which require the President to implement sanctions, reaffirms the President’s authority, pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., to block transactions in all property and interests in property of a person identified on an annual list the Secretary of State is required to prepare identifying persons responsible for human rights abuses. Section 111 of the Act contains, among other things, national security and humanitarian exceptions to the sanctions established in Sections 104, 105, 106 and 107.
The Act imposes additional sanctions against North Korea, primarily by amending the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (“NKSPEA”), 22 U.S.C. Ch. 99. Section 333 of the Act requires the President to promulgate regulations aimed at implementing this portion of the Act within 180 days of its enactment, and Section 324 requires the Secretary of State, within 90 days of enactment, to submit to the appropriate Congressional committees a determination as to whether North Korea meets the criteria for designation as a state sponsor of terrorism.
Additional Designations. Section 311 of the Act expands the scope of the mandatory and discretionary designations defined in Section 104 of NKSPEA. With respect to the mandatory designations, Section 311(a)(1) modifies the ninth mandatory designation category to include “any defense article or defense service,” and Section 311(a)(3) adds five new mandatory designation categories relating to persons that (1) engage in transactions with North Korea involving significant amounts of certain minerals or rocket, aviation, or jet fuel; (2) engage in certain transactions associated with sanctioned aircrafts and vessels or vessels owned or controlled by the North Korean government; and (3) maintain correspondent accounts, as that term is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5318A, with any North Korean financial institution (unless specifically approved by the United Nations Security Council). Section 311(b)(1)(D) adds 11 new categories of discretionary designations pursuant to which the President may impose sanctions, including, among other things, transactions or transfers with the government of North Korea involving (1) coal, iron or iron ore, textiles, bulk cash, precious metals, gemstones and other stores of value, crude oil and other petroleum products and natural gas resources, online commercial activities including online gambling, fishing rights and food and agricultural products; (2) North Korea’s transportation, mining, energy or financial services industries; and (3) the operations of any branch, subsidiary, or office of a North Korean financial institution. Section 311(d) also requires the President to submit to the appropriate Congressional committees, within 180 days of the Act’s enactment, a report that includes a determination as to whether reasonable grounds exist to designate as subject to sanctions under NKSPEA certain specific persons.[18]
Indirect Correspondent Accounts. In addition to requiring sanctions against persons that maintain correspondent accounts with any North Korean financial institution, the Act amends NKSPEA by inserting a new Section 201A prohibiting U.S. financial institutions from knowingly maintaining indirect correspondent accounts for designated persons. Pursuant to Section 312 of the Act, U.S. financial institutions that have or obtain knowledge “that a correspondent account established, maintained, administered, or managed by that institution for a foreign financial institution is being used by the foreign financial institution to provide significant financial services indirectly” to a party designated under Section 104 of NKSPEA must ensure that “such correspondent account is no longer used to provide such services,” subject to certain exceptions.[19] Pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, U.S. financial institutions are presently prohibited from maintaining correspondent accounts for North Korean financial institutions,[20] and must, generally, apply enhanced due diligence procedures to their foreign financial institution customers.[21] In applying such enhanced due diligence, U.S. financial institutions should remain alert to any activity or information indicating that the foreign financial institution customer’s correspondent account is being used to provide significant financial services to person sanctioned under NKSPEA.
Employment of North Korean Laborers. Section 321 amends NKSPEA to strengthen the United States’ response to human rights abuses by the Government of North Korea. Section 321(a)(1) directs the Secretary of State to identify to Congress a list of “foreign persons that knowingly employ North Korean laborers,” as that term is defined in NKSPEA. Section 321(b) prohibits, under the Tariff Act of 1930, any “significant goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part by the labor of North Korean nationals or citizens,” unless certain findings are made by the Commissioner of the U.S. Customers and Border Protection. It also requires the President to impose blocking sanctions against such foreign persons that knowingly employ North Korean laborers.
On July 26, 2017, pursuant to E.O. 13692,[22] OFAC added to the SDN List 13 senior current or former Venezuelan government officials in an action designed to respond to the plans of the Venezuela President, Nicolas Maduro, to hold an election on July 30, 2017, that appears designed to consolidate his power.[23] Among the individuals added to the SDN List were Simon Alejandro Zerpa Delgado and Carlos Erik Malpica Flores, the current and former Vice Presidents of Finance for PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company. In the press release announcing the new designations of July 26, 2017, the Treasury Department described Venezuelan government corruption as being “associated heavily – but by no means exclusively – with two government entities[,]” one of which is PDVSA.[24] On July 31, 2017, after he chose to hold the disputed election, OFAC added the Venezuelan president himself to the SDN List. As tensions between the Trump Administration and the Venezuelan government continue to escalate, U.S. firms engaged in any business activity in or with persons or entities in Venezuela, particularly PDVSA, should remain alert to further actions by OFAC.[25]
The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act expands the existing sanctions regimes related to Russia, Iran, and North Korea, and requires the President to take steps to implement the various provisions by imposing sanctions on a host of foreign persons whose activities touch upon the three countries. While the specific entities and individuals targeted by these sanctions are yet to be identified, firms should expect to see updates and releases from OFAC in the coming months aimed at fulfilling the requirements established by this legislation. Likewise, firms should keep an eye out for updates and releases from OFAC relating to Venezuelan sanctions.
Authored by Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Seetha Ramachandran, Peter H. White, Jennifer M. Opheim and Nicole Geoglis.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
[1] The full Act, which runs to 184 pages, may be found here: https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr3364/BILLS-115hr3364eh.pdf. President Trump also issued a signing statement questioning the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Act, including the form of Congressional review applicable to the waiving or easing of Russia-related sections and the absence of certain exceptions in provisions requiring him to deny certain persons entry to the United States. The full signing statement may be found here: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/02/statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-hr-3364.
[2] The Act is divided into three main sections relating to Iran (Title I), Russia (Title II) and North Korea (Title III), each of which bears its own short title (e.g., Title II is entitled “Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017”).
[3] See Executive Order 13660, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine (Mar. 6, 2014); Executive Order 13661, Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine (Mar. 16, 2014); Executive Order 13662, Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine (Mar. 20, 2014); Executive Order 13685, Blocking Property of Certain Persons and Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Crimea Region of Ukraine (Dec. 19, 2014).
[4] See Executive Order 13694, Blocking Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (Apr. 1, 2015); Executive Order 13757, Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency with Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities (Dec. 28, 2016).
[5] § 222 of the Act.
[6] § 223(a) of the Act (emphasis added).
[7] OFAC Frequently Asked Questions at No. 373 (Sept. 12, 2014).
[8] See 22 U.S.C. § 8923(b)(1) (2014). Section 2(9) of UFSA, 22 U.S.C. § 8921(9), defines “special Russian crude oil project” as “a project intended to extract crude oil from — (A) the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation in waters more than 500 feet deep; (B) Russian Arctic offshore locations; or (C) shale formations located in the Russian Federation.” “Significant transaction,” on the other hand, is not defined in either the Act or UFSA.
[9] See 22 U.S.C. § 8924 (2014).
[10] See 22 U.S.C. § 8901 et seq. (2014).
[11] Note that, unlike other sections of the Act, Sections 227 and 228 do not specify the date by which the President must act to implement the provisions.
[12] “Acts of significant corruption” are not defined in the Ukraine Sovereignty Act, but examples of such acts are described in Section 9(a)(1) – “the expropriation of private or public assets for personal gain, corruption related to government contracts or the extraction of natural resources, bribery, or the facilitation or transfer of the proceeds of corruption to foreign jurisdictions.” 22 U.S.C. § 8908(a)(1) (2014).
[13] Section 4(c) of the UFSA provides for nine types of sanctions, including: (1) a prohibition on Export-Import Bank assistance; (2) a prohibition on procurement contracts with an executive agency; (3) an arms export prohibition; (4) a dual-use export prohibition; (5) property transaction prohibitions; (6) banking-related prohibitions; (7) prohibitions on investment in equity or debt; (8) exclusion from the United States; and (9) the extension of sanctions to principal executive officers of an otherwise sanctioned entity. See 22 U.S.C. § 8923(c) (2014).
[14] Section 216(a)(6) clarifies that the provision requiring Congressional review in advance of any grant of a license that “significantly alters United States’ foreign policy” with respect to Russia is not to be construed to require the submission of a report for “the routine issuance of a license that does not significantly alter United States foreign policy” with respect to Russia. Nevertheless, as written, the provision is applicable to either a general or a specific license, if such a license significantly alters the United States’ foreign policy with respect to Russia.
[15] Such persons include those that: (1) knowingly engage in any activity that materially contributes to the activities of the Iranian Government with respect to its ballistic missile program or any other Iranian program for developing, deploying or maintaining systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (“WMDs”); (2) are a successor entity to a person referred to in (1); (3) are owned or controlled by a person referred to in (1); (4) form an entity with the purpose of evading sanctions otherwise imposed pursuant to (3); (5) are acting for or on behalf of a person referred to in (1)-(4); or (6) knowingly provide or attempt to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for or goods or services in support of a person referred to in (1)-(5). See §§ 104(b)(1)-(6) of the Act.
[16] The IRGC, and the IRGC-Quds Force, are presently subject to sanctions under existing sanctions regimes related to WMD proliferators and their supporters, terrorist organizations and their supporters, and Iran. See Executive Order 13606, Blocking the Property and Suspending Entry Into the United States of Certain Persons With Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology (Apr. 22, 2012); Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 22 U.S.C. §§ 8501 et seq.; Executive Order 13553, Blocking Property of Certain Persons With Respect to Serious Human Rights Abuses By The Government of Iran and Taking Certain Other Actions (Sept. 28, 2010); Executive Order 13382, Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters (Jun. 28, 2005); Executive Order 13224, Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions With Persons Who Commit, Threaten To Commit, or Support Terrorism (Sept. 23, 2001).
[17] The President must block all transactions in property and interests in property of any person who: (1) knowingly engages in any activity that materially contributes to the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly to or from Iran, or for the use in or benefit of Iran, certain arms; or (2) knowingly provides to Iran any technical training, financial resources or services, advice or other services or assistance related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture, maintenance or use of arms and related material described in the Act. See §§ 107(a)-(b) of the Act.
[18] The persons identified in this section include: (1) The Korea Shipowners’ Protection and Indemnity Association; (2) Chinpo Shipping Company (Private) Limited; (3) The Central Bank of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; (4) Kumgang Economic Develop Corporation (KKG); (5) Sam Pa and any entities owned or controlled by such individual; and (6) The Chamber of Commerce of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
[19] Under these exceptions, a U.S. financial institution is permitted to “process transfers of funds to or from North Korea, for the direct or indirect benefit of” a designated party “only if the transfer—(1) arises from, and is ordinarily incident and necessary to give effect to, an underlying transaction that has been authorized by a specific or general license issued by the Secretary of the Treasury; and (2) does not involve debiting or crediting a North Korean account.” See § 201A(b) of NKSPEA, as amended.
[20] Final Rule, Imposition of a Special Measure Against North Korea as a Jurisdiction of Primary Money Laundering Concern, 81 Fed. Reg. 78715 (Nov. 9, 2016) (implementing the fifth special measure under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318A, against North Korea and prohibiting the maintenance of correspondent accounts for, or on behalf of, North Korean financial institutions).
[21] See Due Diligence Programs for Correspondent Accounts for Foreign Financial Institutions, 31 C.F.R. § 1010.610 (2012), implemented pursuant to Section 312 of the USA PATRIOT Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i) (2001).
[22] Executive Order 13692, Blocking Property and Suspending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela (Mar. 8, 2015).
[23] See Treasury Press Release, Treasury Sanctions 13 Current and Former Senior Officials of the Government of Venezuela (Jul. 26, 2017).
[24] Id.
[25] See e.g., Patricia Zengerle, U.S. Lawmakers Expect More Sanctions on Venezuela Over Vote, Reuters.com (Jul. 28, 2017) (quoting Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL) as stating that more Venezuela-related sanctions can be expected and that there is “high-level engagement throughout this administration on this issue”).
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ARTICLE
August 2, 2017
Read time: 2 min
Jennifer Geetter and Lisa Schmitz Mazur wrote this bylined article on the regulatory implications of technology-supported devices, resources, and solutions that facilitate health patient-provider interaction. “Health industry regulators are struggling with how to apply the existing privacy regulatory regime, and the permitted uses and disclosures for which they provide, in this new world of healthcare innovation,” the authors wrote.
ARTICLE
August 2017
Read time: 1 min

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
August 1, 2017
Read time: 6 min
In recognition that the traditional regulatory approach toward moderate to high risk medical devices is not well-suited for current digital health software products, the US Food and Drug Administration published a Digital Health Innovation Action Plan. The plan requires the issuance of new guidance, the development of a digital health precertification pilot program and the internal expansion of FDA’s digital health capabilities.
Late last week, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published its Digital Health Innovation Action Plan (Plan). The agency recognized that the traditional regulatory approach toward moderate and higher risk medical devices is not well suited for the fast-paced, iterative design, development and type of validation used for digital health software products today. Going forward, the agency will explore an innovative approach to regulate these types of products. The approach contains three primary prongs: (1) the issuance of new guidance, (2) the Digital Health Software Precertification (PreCert) Program and (3) an internal expansion of FDA’s digital health capabilities.
New Guidance
FDA plans to issue a number of guidance documents that may impact digital health product development and compliance activities, analyses regarding the regulatory status of products in the United States, and the overall regulatory strategy for those products. The proposed guidance includes: (1) guidance concerning the interpretation of Section 3060 of the 21st Century Cures Act (i.e., certain types of software will not be regulated as medical devices), which codifies aspects of the Food and Drug Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) Health IT Report and FDA’s Mobile Medical Applications (MMA) guidance; (2) guidance on Clinical Decision Support (CDS) software; (3) guidance on multifunction software and devices; (4) final guidance on submission of a 510(k) for a software change to an existing device; and (5) final guidance on clinical evaluation of Software as a Medical Device (SaMD) in accordance with the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF) quality and efficacy standards. Although tentative dates of publication are referenced, the agency provided very few concrete timelines regarding the expected publication date of these guidance documents. As such, companies may choose to continue product strategies and development under the current regulatory framework and industry standards.
PreCert Pilot Program
The purpose of this program is to develop a new firm-based approach toward regulating digital technology, “by looking first at the software developer or digital health technology developer, not the product.” The PreCert pilot will leverage developer input to create a potentially faster and cheaper pathway by determining and confirming criteria that FDA can use to certify developers that reliably manufacture high-quality, safe and effective digital health devices. In other words, FDA envisions that the Center for Devices and Radiological Health (CDRH) could “pre-certify” eligible digital health developers that demonstrate “a culture of quality and organizational excellence” based on the objective criteria identified in the PreCert pilot. Then, pre-certified developers could, in theory, qualify to market their lower-risk devices without additional FDA review or with a more streamlined premarket review. Neither approach is articulated with detail in the Plan or Federal Register. However, referencing similar pilot programs, such as FDA’s accredited third-party inspection program for medical devices, may provide a foundation and operational principles that will similarly guide the digital health PreCert pilot.
Program Details, In Summary
While participation in the program is a great opportunity to shape policy and form relationships with key stakeholders at FDA, potential participants should consider whether their quality systems and product development processes are sufficiently developed to facilitate meaningful engagement with FDA. Participation may require a commitment of time and resources from the company, but the payoff may be greater insight into FDA’s thinking and approach to the development and regulation of current and future digital health products. Finally, it’s important to remember that although the PreCert pilot offers the potential for an expedited path to market through pre-certification or “streamlined premarket review” (e.g., submission of reduced content and/or expedited review by FDA), clearance or approval of the product are not guaranteed.
In descriptions of the future regulatory pathway, FDA also emphasized the importance of real-world data and mentioned the future possibility of third-party certification of digital health developers. A webinar to discuss and answer questions about the pilot program will be held today (August 1, 2017).
Expansion of Digital Health at FDA
FDA plans to hire new staff for its Digital Health Program. The positions will be supported by user fee funding. The “new staff will work with reviewers, compliance officers, and others within the FDA to improve the quality, predictability, consistency, timeliness, and efficiency of decision making on individual products and firms.” The agency is also launching an “Entrepreneurs in Residence” program in the fall.
Future Public Meeting and Comments
Stakeholders are invited to comment on the policies, pathways and regulatory tools the agency should consider in designing a new paradigm for overseeing digital health medical devices through the public docket. FDA will hold a public workshop in January 2018 to discuss the Plan and report on and review the PreCert pilot program.