Content Type: Article

  • Tax Court: Prior Closing Agreement May Have Relevance in Coca-Cola’s Transfer Pricing Case

    ARTICLE

    Tax Court: Prior Closing Agreement May Have Relevance in Coca-Cola’s Transfer Pricing Case

    November 3, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Kristina Novak, Andrew Roberson and Kevin Spencer wrote this bylined article on a Tax Court dispute between Coca-Cola and the IRS over a closing agreement for transfer pricing adjustments. “The IRS is fighting what seems to be a losing battle” over “clearly questionable motions,” the authors wrote, adding that “our advice to clients is to look at the big picture strategy and do not get mired into petty squabbles with opposing counsel.”

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  • Avoid “Gun Jumping” between Signing and Closing through Correct Conduct under Antitrust Law

    ARTICLE

    Avoid “Gun Jumping” between Signing and Closing through Correct Conduct under Antitrust Law

    November 1, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In this article Dr. von Brevern explains which ways of behaving in the period between signing and closing are permissible in practice under antitrust law, and which are not.

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  • Third Circuit Sidesteps Ruling on Validity of Avoidance Claim Sale

    Third Circuit Sidesteps Ruling on Validity of Avoidance Claim Sale

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Third Circuit Sidesteps Ruling on Validity of Avoidance Claim Sale

    October 31, 2017

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently dismissed an appeal from “the sale of legal claims” as “statutorily moot” under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 363(m) because the appellants “had not obtained a stay” of the effectiveness of the sale order pending appeal. In re Pursuit Capital Mgmt., LLC, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 20889 (3d Cir. Oct. 24, 2017). According to the court, “we cannot give [the appellants] the remedy they seek without affecting the validity of the sale.” Id., at *37.

    Relevance

    The issue dodged by the Third Circuit in Pursuit was whether the trustee could sell the estate’s avoidance power claims to a third party. Other circuits have addressed the issue directly or indirectly. Mellon Bank v. Dick Corp., 351 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 2003) (avoidance actions constituted additional collateral for debtor-in-possession loan; secured lenders entitled to preference actions; lenders had benefited estate and had standing to sue; in dicta, court said that preference claims could be sold by court order); In re P.R.T.C., Inc., 177 F.3d 774, 782 (9th Cir. 1999) (trustee assigned to largest creditor avoidance power claims because estate lacked funds to pursue, but creditor required to remit to estate 50 percent of net proceeds); In re Housecraft Indus. USA, Inc., 310 F.3d 64 (2d Cir.2002) (secured creditor had standing to join with trustee in bringing fraudulent transfer suit on behalf of estate); In re Lahijani, 325 B.R. 282 (9th Cir. BAP 2005) (avoidance actions may be sold for sum certain; do not have to be pursued on behalf of all creditors). The Third Circuit had previously evaded the issue when it found that an asset sale agreement never purported to sell fraudulent transfer claims. In re Cybergenics Corp., 226 F.3d 239 (3d Cir.2000). As noted below, the issue may eventually return to the Third Circuit in the Pursuit case.

    Code § 363(m) essentially provides that the reversal on appeal of an asset sale order will not affect the validity of the sale to a good faith purchaser “unless [the] sale [was] stayed pending appeal.” This provision is meant to “overcome people’s natural reluctance to deal with a bankrupt firm . . . as purchaser . . . by assuring them that so long as they are relying in good faith on [the court’s] approval of the transaction they need not worry about their [position] merely because some creditor is objecting to the transaction and [an appellate court may] reverse the bankruptcy judge. The proper recourse for the object[or] . . . is to get the transaction stayed pending appeal.” In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 1982).

    Courts also recognize the need for finality in consummated transactions. In re UNR Inds., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994); Pittsburgh Food & Bev. Inc. v. Ranallo, 112 F.3d 645, 647-48 (3d Cir. 1999). The requirement of a stay pending appeal is no mere “formality;” it “serves to maintain the status quo . . ., thereby preserving the ability of the reviewing court to offer a remedy and holding at bay the reliance interests in the judgment that otherwise militate against reversal of the sale.” In re CGI Inds., Inc., 27 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1994).

    Facts

    The trustee for the Chapter 7 debtor in Pursuit held “avoidance” claims (i.e., fraudulent transfer, preference) against the debtor’s insiders totaling about $645,000. He decided to sell these claims “because the bankruptcy estate had no funds available” to litigate. 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 20889, at *4. After the defendant insiders objected to the sale of the claims to certain creditors (“Creditor Group”) and even offered more money for the claims, the trustee “decided that an auction was the best means to maximize value for the estate” and obtained court “permission to conduct one.” Id., at *5.

    The auction was adjourned after procedural skirmishing, causing the trustee to solicit sealed bids from the parties. He received a bid for $180,001 from the Creditor Group but “nothing” from the defendant insiders. In their sale agreement, the Creditor Group agreed to pursue the claims “at their cost and expense [and] . . . [a]ny net recovery [would] be paid into the estate for distribution to all creditors.” Id., at *8. The trustee sold the claims “as is, where is “— i.e., no representations or warranties.” Id.

    The insiders offered the trustee $205,150 to settle the claims, which he declined. Rejecting the insiders’ request to reopen the auction with a further increased settlement offer at $250,000, the bankruptcy court approved the trustee’s sale agreement with the Creditor Group, finding “the sale price [to be] fair” and noting the “potential additional recovery” for creditors from this offer. Because “there was no evidence of collusion,” the court found that the parties “had acted in good faith.” Id., at *12. Still, the bankruptcy court preserved the insiders’ ability to raise defenses to any claims by the Creditor Group but took no position as to whether a third party could prosecute avoidance claims. Id., at *13. The Creditor Group, in the meantime, prosecuted the purchased claims, but the bankruptcy court “deferred ruling” on the insiders’ dismissal motion “pending” the Third Circuit’s decision on the sale order appeal. Id., at *16. Thus, the substantive issue (sale of avoidance claims) may ultimately reach the Court of Appeals.

    On appeal, the insiders argued in the district court that (a) only the trustee could prosecute avoidance claims; (b) the trustee lacked authority to sell the claims; and (c) the bankruptcy court’s good faith finding was erroneous. But, of “utmost importance,” the insiders never sought a stay of the sale order pending appeal. The district court found the appeal “statutorily moot” because “no stay had been obtained and any reversal . . . of the sale would naturally affect the validity of the sale.” It also rejected the insiders’ attack on “the good faith and the integrity of the auction process . . .” Id., at ** 14-15.

    The Third Circuit

    The Third Circuit stressed the “purpose of [Code] § 363(m) [:] . . . to promote the finality of sales.” Id., at *18. But the court declined to rule on whether the avoidance claims were transferable, for that was “the very merits issue that the [insiders] should have preserved by seeking a stay but did not.” Id., at *18-*19. Also, the insiders failed to “argue that the avoidance claim[s] are exempt from § 363(m) because [they] did not fall within the meaning of ‘estate property’ under that mootness statute.” Id., at *19 n.16.

    1. Good Faith. The court first rejected the insiders’ challenge to the good faith of the trustee and the Creditor Group. It found “no clear error in the Bankruptcy Court’s good faith finding nor any error in the legal standard applied.” Id., at *23. First, “the Trustee acted in accordance with his fiduciary obligations, rather than in collusion with the Creditor Group or through attempts to take advantage of the [insiders].” Id. The trustee not only entertained a bid from the insiders and requested an auction, which was competitive, but he continued to negotiate “privately and publicly with” the parties. Id., at *24. The trustee also consulted with the bankruptcy court about the best way to proceed. According to the Third Circuit, the insiders “failed to win at the auction not because of the Trustee’s conduct, but because of their own decisions during the bidding process.” Id., at *25. Finally, “the Creditor Group acted in good faith” by following the rules of the auction, submitting timely bids and increasing its bids when required by the competition. Id.
    2. Value. The Third Circuit found that the trustee received “appropriate value . . . for the claims.” Id., at *25. In contrast to the insiders’ bid, the Creditor Group’s bid “offers the opportunity for a recovery to the estate . . . if litigation of the claims against the [insiders] is successful.” Id., at *26. The insiders’ bid for the claims, though, was predicated on their acquiring the claims “precisely so that the claims will not be litigated.” Id.
    3. Discrimination. The court rejected the insiders’ complaint that the trustee had discriminated against them by refusing to negotiate after the final sealed bidding deadline. First, the trustee had to change the auction procedures because of the insiders’ “contentious and at times obstreperous behavior . . . . The [insiders] had ample opportunity to participate, and elected not to. The trustee also entertained multiple bids from the [insiders] and engaged in negotiations with them.” Id., at *28.

    4. Stay Pending Appeal Requirement. The Third Circuit further rejected the insiders’ argument that they “did not need to incur the expense associated with seeking a stay” pending appeal because the assets were being sold “as-is, where-is.” Id., at *29. Applying the terms of Code § 363(m), the insiders had “failed in obtaining a stay of the Sale Order,” stressed the court. Id., at *30. Looking at the remedies sought by the insiders, the insiders wanted a finding that the trustee lacked authority to sell his avoidance powers because, among other things, they may not be transferred. Id., at *35. If the court had accepted that argument, however, its “ruling would surely affect the validity of the sale in the sense that the ability to pursue a claim [was] essential to any meaningful transfer of such an asset.” — a central element of the sale. Id., at *36. As the district court noted, “a finding that the Trustee lacked authority to transfer the causes of action . . . ‘would affect its validity’ and demonstrate that the sale was flawed.” Id., at *37. Because the Third Circuit refused to give the insiders “the remedy they [sought] without affecting the validity of the sale,” it held the appeal to be statutorily moot.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Cross-Border Implementation of MiFID II Research Provisions — SEC No-Action Relief to Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and European Commission Guidance

    Cross-Border Implementation of MiFID II Research Provisions — SEC No-Action Relief to Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and European Commission Guidance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Cross-Border Implementation of MiFID II Research Provisions — SEC No-Action Relief to Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers and European Commission Guidance

    October 31, 2017

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Oct. 26, 2017, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) published three temporary no-action letters providing U.S. broker-dealers and investment advisers relief in the conduct of their business activities with entities subject to the European Union’s Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID II”), which will go into effect on Jan. 3, 2018. The no-action relief, described in further detail below, permits:

    (1) U.S. broker-dealers to receive “hard dollar” payments from research payment accounts (“RPAs”) from EU asset managers subject to MiFID II without having to register as an investment adviser under the Advisers Act;

    (2) Investment advisers to continue to aggregate client orders while accommodating differing research payment arrangements that will be required under MiFID II, notwithstanding certain provisions and obligations of Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rule 17d-1 thereunder and Section 206 of the Advisers Act; and

    (3) Investment advisers to rely on the “soft dollar” safe harbor provided by Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act when the adviser makes payments for research to an executing broker out of client assets — alongside payments to the executing broker for execution — with the research payments credited to an RPA administered either by the executing broker or a third-party administrator.

    On the same day, the European Commission released its own FAQ to clarify how asset managers subject to MiFID II research provisions can purchase research services from U.S. and other non-EU broker-dealers.

    Background

    MiFID II will eliminate the ability of certain EU asset managers to pay for research services together with executions through a bundled commission payment and, instead, requires them to pay for research separately from execution services, either through direct payments from asset managers’ own funds or from client accounts (through an RPA).

    MiFID II also affects U.S. managers to the extent that they are:

    • U.S. investment advisers with affiliated EU asset managers;
    • U.S. investment advisers providing managed account or sub-advisory services to EU asset managers (e.g., through EU fund or managed account platforms) where the U.S. investment adviser is subject to contractual obligations to comply with MiFID II unbundling rules; or
    • U.S. investment advisers without any EU presence or any EU managed account or sub-advisory arrangements that have entered into an agreement with an EU broker to purchase research in a manner that complies with the MiFID II unbundling obligations.

    U.S. broker-dealers have been concerned that this provision of MiFID II would require them to register as investment advisers if they provided research to these asset managers on hard dollar payment terms, and U.S. investment advisers were unclear as to how their Exchange Act Section 28(e)-compliant research purchase practices would be affected to the extent that they obtained research in compliance with MiFID II unbundling requirements.

    The SEC’s no-action relief, which was designed in conjunction with European regulators and the European Commission, confirms that money managers and broker-dealers will continue to benefit from the protection provided by Exchange Act Section 28(e) and will not be in breach of U.S. federal securities laws when complying with MiFID II unbundling requirements. The no-action relief also ensures that EU asset managers will not have their access to research from U.S. broker-dealers severely limited.

    Division of Investment Management No-Action Relief

    The first MiFID II no-action letter[1] allows U.S. broker-dealers, without having to register as an investment adviser, to provide research services to EU asset managers that are subject to MiFID II.[2] These EU asset managers will be required, under MiFID II, to pay for research services from:

    • Their own funds;
    • Separate RPAs funded by client assets; or
    • A combination of the two

    (collectively, “Research Payments”).

    U.S. broker-dealers that provide research services to EU asset managers expect to receive Research Payments for their research services and, absent the no-action relief, receipt of Research Payments might have subjected the U.S. broker-dealers to the substantive provisions of the Advisers Act as well as potentially the registration provisions of the Advisers Act. The no-action relief states that a U.S. broker-dealer providing such research services for cash consideration will not be deemed to be an investment adviser providing investment advice under Advisers Act Section 202(a)(11).

    This no-action relief, which will expire thirty (30) months from Jan. 3, 2018, is intended to provide the SEC with sufficient time to better understand the evolution of business practices after the implementation of MiFID II. The SEC also notes that this no-action relief will allow the industry time to review, comprehend and implement the guidance and evaluate impacts on their business models. It will also allow the SEC time to monitor and assess the impact of MiFID II requirements on the research marketplace and affected participants in order to ascertain whether more tailored or different action is necessary, such as formal rulemaking.

    The second MiFID II no-action letter[3] provides relief for SEC-regulated investment advisers that aggregate client orders while accommodating differing arrangements regarding the payment for research that will be required under MiFID II. After MiFID II goes into effect, some clients within a given aggregated order may pay total transaction costs that include the cost of execution as well as research services, while other clients may pay different amounts in connection with the same order (i.e., for execution only) because of varying research arrangements or because the investment adviser elected to pay part or all of the research expenses for such clients with its own funds.

    This no-action letter allows investment advisers to continue to aggregate client orders while accommodating differing research payment arrangements, provided that:

    • The investment adviser implements procedures designed to prevent any account from being systematically disadvantaged by the aggregation of orders; and
    • Each client in an aggregated order will continue to pay/receive the same average price for the purchase or sale of the underlying security and will pay the same amount for execution.

    Division of Trading and Markets No-Action Relief

    The third no-action letter[4] allows an investment adviser that pays for research through an RPA to continue to rely on the safe harbor provided by Exchange Act Section 28(e) when the investment adviser makes payments for research to an executing broker out of client assets — alongside payments to the executing broker for execution — with the research payments credited to an RPA administered either by the executing broker or a third-party administrator. This no-action relief, however, will only apply if the following four conditions are satisfied:

    • The asset manager makes payments to the executing broker-dealer out of client assets for research alongside payments through an RPA to that executing broker-dealer for execution;
    • The research payments are for research services that are eligible for the safe harbor under Exchange Act Section 28(e);
    • The executing broker-dealer effects the securities transaction for purposes of Exchange Act Section 28(e); and
    • The executing broker-dealer is legally obligated by a contract with the asset manager to pay for research through use of an RPA.

    European Commission Views

    In a coordinated action, the European Commission published FAQ guidance addressing two concerns surrounding the application of MiFID II to EU asset managers and non-EU managers contractually required to comply with MiFID II unbundling rules (“Third-Country Delegates”) when they obtain research from third-country (i.e., U.S. and other non-EU) broker-dealers.

    The European Commission issued the following welcome clarifications:

    • EU managers and Third-Country Delegates may continue making combined payments for research and execution as a single commission to third-country broker-dealers, as long as the payment attributable to research can be identified separately. To this end, EU managers and Third-Country Delegates that operate an RPA for research payments must maintain a clear audit trail of payments to research providers and must be able to identify the amount spent on research with a particular third-country broker-dealer; and
    • In the absence of a separate research invoice from a third-country broker-dealer, the EU manager or Third-Country Delegate should consult with the broker-dealer or other third parties with a view to determining the charge attributable to the research. In this case, the manager must also ensure that the supply of and charges for those benefits or services should not be influenced or conditioned by the levels of payment for execution services.

    Implications

    While the steps taken by the SEC no doubt temporarily reduce the burden on U.S. broker-dealers and asset managers of complying with MiFID II, preserve investor access to research, and accommodate the EU’s changes without materially altering the U.S. regulatory approach, it remains to be seen whether this interim approach to addressing conflicting U.S. and EU requirements will be viable in the long run.

    In addition, investment advisers subject to SEC regulations that will be directly or indirectly covered by MiFID II will have to finalize any needed amendments to their expense review and allocation policies to confirm that they satisfy MiFID II as well as the new conditions and expectations set forth by the SEC and European Commission guidance.

    Authored by Julian Rainero, Brian T. Daly, Marc E. Elovitz and Anna Maleva-Otto.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Oct. 26, 2017) [SEC No-Action Letter].

    [2] Section 202(a)(11)(C) of the Advisers Act generally excludes from the investment adviser definition any broker or dealer who performs investment advisory services (i.e., who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities) and whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor.

    [3] Investment Company Institute (Oct. 26, 2017) [SEC No-Action Letter].

    [4] Asset Management Group of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (Oct. 26, 2017) [SEC No-Action Letter].


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Implications of Recent Supreme Court Free Speech Decision

    ARTICLE

    Implications of Recent Supreme Court Free Speech Decision

    Fall 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Marc Sorini and Ellie Atkins wrote this bylined article on the Supreme Court’s Matal v. Tam decision, which declared the Trademark Act’s disparagement clause an unconstitutional violation of First Amendment free speech. The authors wrote that the decision “adds an additional precedent to these First Amendment principles, highlighting that distillers have substantial protections for messages deemed inappropriate by certain governmental bodies.”

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    Eleanor B. Atkins

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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  • Urban Data and Smart Cities

    ARTICLE

    Urban Data and Smart Cities

    October 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Romain Perray authored the chapter “Smart Cities Challenged by Personal Data Protection” in this collective work, compiled through research carried out by academics, researchers, lawyers and experts. The analysis presents case studies pertaining to urban open data projects in France as well as in Europe (Italy, Belgium and Greece), and also provides answers to legal questions relating to the ownership of urban data and their interaction with smart cities around normative, regulatory and new forms of soft law issues.

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  • Category Management Practices

    ARTICLE

    Category Management Practices

    September/October 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Marc Sorini wrote this bylined article on category management practices to maximize profitability of alcohol beverage marketing. Because some category management activities require close interaction between retailers and suppliers of beverages, Mr. Sorini wrote, the federal Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade Bureau last year issued a ruling indicating that industry members’ participation in category management activities could violate federal tied-house regulations.

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  • Self-Reporting FCPA Violations

    ARTICLE

    Self-Reporting FCPA Violations

    Fall 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sarah Walters and Katrina Rogachevsky wrote this bylined article on the Justice Department’s Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) pilot program to incentivize self-disclosure of potential FCPA violations. “Self-disclosure must be seriously considered” the authors wrote, because “the benefits are real, but making such a disclosure is a frightening proposition,” and they cautioned that even with disclosure, “every defense should be explored and raised.”

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  • SEC Unfairly Seen as Scapegoat for IPO Slump

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    SEC Unfairly Seen as Scapegoat for IPO Slump

    October 30, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Thomas Conaghan wrote this bylined article to suggest that the financial markets are using SEC disclosure requirements as a “scapegoat” for the drop in IPOs. “From securities offering reform, to the JOBS Act, to the more recent FAST Act, the rules relating to conducting initial public offerings have been dramatically liberalized since the ‘old days,’” Mr. Conaghan wrote, which he said indicates that “existing IPO disclosure regulations do not need to be relaxed.”

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    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • The Opioid Crisis and Telemedicine

    ARTICLE

    The Opioid Crisis and Telemedicine

    October 30, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lisa Schmitz Mazur, Ryan Marcus and Marshall Jackson Jr. wrote this bylined article on how a declaration of a public health emergency in the opioid epidemic could eliminate one of the key barriers to the use of telemedicine as a tool in the fight against opioid addiction by allowing providers to remotely prescribe controlled substances for treating addicted patients without first conducting an in-person visit.

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    Lisa Mazur

    Partner

    Chicago

    Marshall E. Jackson , Jr.

    Partner

    Washington, DC

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