Content Type: Article

  • Trebled Damages Mean No Injunction for Knock-Off Software

    ARTICLE

    Trebled Damages Mean No Injunction for Knock-Off Software

    December 6, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jodi Benassi wrote this bylined article on the Fourth Circuit’s SAS Institute, Inc. v. World Programming Ltd. ruling, which affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded a district court finding that a defendant was liable for breach of a software license agreement and therefore infringed the plaintiff’s copyright in the subject software.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • District Court Affirms Disallowance of Lender’s Legal Fee Claim

    District Court Affirms Disallowance of Lender’s Legal Fee Claim

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    District Court Affirms Disallowance of Lender’s Legal Fee Claim

    December 5, 2017

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “[T]he Bankruptcy Code does not permit [an undersecured] creditor . . . to advance an unsecured claim for post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees,” held the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina on Nov. 27, 2017. Summitbridge Nat’l Invs. Iii v. Faison, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195267, *8 (E.D. N. C. Nov. 27, 2017). Affirming the bankruptcy court, the district court agreed that “the Code is most properly interpreted to allow only oversecured creditors to add post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees.” Id., at *10.

    Relevance

    Both the district and bankruptcy courts recognized that “a number of courts … hold generally that post-[bankruptcy] attorney’s fees are allowable as an unsecured claim, irrespective of whether the creditor is oversecured.” Id., at *7 (emphasis added), citing In re 804 Congress, L.L.C., 756 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2014) on remand, 529 B.R. 213, 227-28 (Bankr. W. D. Tex. 2015) (“unreasonable” commission under § 506(b) still “enforceable” unsecured claim under state law); In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, 844 (9th Cir. 2009) (held, “attorneys’ fees arising out of a pre-[bankruptcy] contract but incurred post-petition fall within the . . . Code’s broad definition of claim” and are enforceable under relevant contract and state law); In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc); and Ogle v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 586 F.3d 143, 148 (2d Cir. 2009). Still, because of a purported “absence of binding [Fourth] Circuit precedent,” the district court accepted the reasoning of other lower courts that “unsecured creditors are not entitled to post-[bankruptcy] attorneys’ fees. Id., at *9. As shown below, the blinkered analysis of the lower courts in Summitbridge should be reversed on appeal. The Fourth Circuit had, in fact, decided a similar case in 1999, reversing lower court decisions for “inappropriately” focusing on bankruptcy issues instead of the terms of a contract and “applicable state law.” In re Shangra-La, 167 F.2d 843, 848 (4th Cir. 1999).

    Facts

    The individual Chapter 11 debtor owed Summitbridge’s predecessor $1.627 million, secured by real estate. Each of the debtor’s notes to the lender “provided for reasonable attorneys’ fees should the note be placed with an attorney for collection.” Id., at *2. The debtor “was not in default” when “the Chapter 11 petition was filed,” but Summitbridge’s counsel performed post-bankruptcy services. Id.

    The bankruptcy court later confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan which provided for the allowance of the lender’s claim in the amount of $1.715 million, including “principal, pre-[bankruptcy] interest, and post-[bankruptcy] interest, appraisal fees, late fees, and attorneys’ fees.” Id. To satisfy the lender’s secured claim in full, the debtor transferred the real estate collateral to it, without prejudice to the lender’s right to assert an unsecured claim for legal fees and the debtor’s right to object. The lender then filed an unsecured claim for post-bankruptcy legal fees in the amount of $302,596, “equal to 15% of the outstanding indebtedness.” Id., at *3.

    The bankruptcy court disallowed the lender’s claim as a matter of law. It reasoned that Bankruptcy Code “§§ 506(b) and 502(a)-(b) do not permit the recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees sought as unsecured claims.” Id. Because “post-petition attorneys’ fees [are] governed by [Code §] 506,” reasoned the bankruptcy court, that section “by its express terms applies only to oversecured creditors.” Id., at *4. Summitbridge was undersecured (i.e., its underlying claim exceeded the value of its collateral) and thus had no allowable claim for legal fees, reasoned the bankruptcy court.

    The District Court

    The district court affirmed, reasoning that the “Code expressly awards post-[bankruptcy] fees under several circumstances, none of which include an award of [these] fees to an unsecured creditor.” Id., at *9. Finally, the court found the “equities [to] weigh in favor of the protection of assets for distribution to all creditors.” Id., at *10. To allow the lender’s claim here, it reasoned, would “reduce the pool of assets available” to other unsecured creditors. Id.

    Critique

    At least five Courts of Appeals have taken a sensible contrary approach to allowing an undersecured creditor’s claim for legal fees: if the claim is valid under applicable state law, it is allowable. A comprehensive decision of the Second Circuit, holding that a creditor was entitled to its post-bankruptcy legal fees incurred under a pre-bankruptcy indemnity agreement, illuminates the entire issue and guts the district court’s flawed analysis in Summitbridge. Ogle v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 586 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2009). Affirming the lower courts, the Second Circuit explained that the Code “interposes no bar … to recovery.” Id., at 148 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 452 (2007) (“[C]laims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”).

    1. The Ogle Analysis Should Govern. Lenders, financial advisors, accountants, indenture trustees and other professionals who bargain for reimbursement of their legal fees should be reassured by Ogle. Lower courts in the Second Circuit and elsewhere had previously disallowed creditors’ professional fees, wrongly holding that (a) nothing in the Code authorizes the payment of these fees, and that (b) contractual rights to these fees are unenforceable. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan Trust Co., N.A. v. A.P. Green Indus., Inc., No. 06-0885, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2007) (affirmed bankruptcy court’s denial of indenture trustee’s reimbursement claim for legal fees; “Under the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of the alternatives), silence as to undersecured claims for attorneys’ fees and costs in [Code] § 506(b) indicates that they are excluded from payment.”); In re Crafts Retail Holding Corp., 378 B.R. 44, 50 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“[A]bsent statutory authority, [financial advisor’s] claimed contractual rights or asserted principles of equity alone do not constitute cognizable bases for an award of compensation or reimbursement of expenses in bankruptcy cases.”). According to the Second Circuit in Ogle, the courts had been “closely divided on the” issue of post-bankruptcy fees. 586 F.3d at 145. Compare In re SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d 826, 839-45 (9th Cir. 2009) (allowing unsecured guarantor’s reimbursement claim for post-petition attorneys’ fees based on pre-petition contract); Martin v. Bank of Germantown, 761 F.2d 1163, 1168 (6th Cir. 1985) (“… creditors are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy claims if they have a contractual right to them valid under state law . . .”; collection costs and legal fees in lender’s note); In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 848-49 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Entitlement to attorneys’ fees … depended on … terms of [contract] and on state law.”), with Adams v. Zimmerman, 73 F.3d 1164, 1177 (1st Cir. 1996) (disallowing claim for post-insolvency fees against FDIC receiver; non-bankruptcy case), and In re Waterman, 248 B.R. 567, 573 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2000) (allowing claim for post-petition fees under Code § 506(b) only because creditor was oversecured).

    The claim for attorneys’ fees in Ogle arose from a series of pre‑bankruptcy agreements between Fidelity and Agway. In exchange for Fidelity’s providing surety bonds to Agway’s insurers, Agway agreed to indemnify Fidelity for any payments made under the bonds plus any legal fees incurred enforcing the agreements. 586 F.3d at 145. After filing its Chapter 11 petition, Agway defaulted on its obligations to the insurers. Fidelity complied with its obligation under the bonds and tendered payment to Agway’s insurers. Fidelity’s efforts to enforce its indemnity rights against Agway, however, resulted in protracted litigation during which Fidelity incurred costs, including attorneys’ fees. Id. The Second Circuit considered this narrow issue: “Under the Bankruptcy Code, is an unsecured creditor entitled to recover post-petition attorneys’ fees that were authorized by a pre-petition contract but were contingent on post-petition events?” Id. The court answered affirmatively because the Code does not bar these claims.

    1. Code § 502(b) Not a Bar to Recovery. The court first rejected the trustee’s argument in Ogle that Code § 502(b) precluded the legal fees sought by Fidelity. Quoting the Supreme Court in Travelers, the Code defines “claim” to be a “right to payment,” which “usually refer[s] to a right to payment recognized under state law.” Id., at 146. (Travelers, 549 U.S. at 451) (internal quotation marks omitted).

    The contingent nature of the creditor’s claim in Ogle was also unimportant. As the court explained, Code § 101(5)(A) includes “contingent” claims in its definition of “‘claim.” Id. Because applicable state contract law gave the creditor a right to payment when the indemnification agreement was signed, the creditor “possessed a contingent right to post-petition attorneys’ fees,” although “its right arose pre-petition.” Id. Moreover, nothing in Code § 502(b) precludes an unsecured creditor’s recovery of post-petition attorneys’ fees merely because the claim was contingent. Id., at 146-147. Accord, In re SNTL Corp., 571 F3d 826, 838 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Under section 502(b)(1), those contingent claims cannot be disallowed simply because the contingency occurred postpetition … . Contingent claims are allowed under Section 502(b).”). According to the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court’s Travelers opinion required it to “presume that claims enforceable under applicable state law will be allowed in bankruptcy unless they are expressly disallowed.”

    Moreover, none of the exceptions to the allowability of a claim listed in § 502(b) applied to the claim in Ogle. Although § 502(b)(1) makes any defense to a claim available to a bankruptcy trustee, unless applicable state law or one of the exceptions in § 502(b) applies, “the claim must be allowed.’” Id., at 147 (quoting Travelers. 549 U.S. at 452).

    The Second Circuit’s reasoning is straightforward:

    The underlying contract is valid as a matter of state substantive law; none of the § 502(b)(2)-(9) exceptions apply; and the Code is silent as to the particular question presented—… whether the Code allows unsecured claims for fees incurred while litigating issues of contract law more generally.

    Id., at 476 (internal quotation marks omitted).

    1. Code § 506(b) Not a Bar To Recovery. The Second Circuit in Ogle also rejected the trustee’s reliance on Code § 506(b), which only bars interest on an undersecured creditor’s claim. Because Code § 506(b) “does not implicate unsecured claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees,” reasoned the court, it thus “interposes no bar to recovery.” Id. Accord. In re SNTL Corp., 57 F3d at 841 (“… we reject the argument that section 506(b) preempts postpetition attorneys’ fees for all except oversecured creditors.”), citing In re 268 Ltd., 789 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1986) (§ 506(b) does not “limit the fees available” as an unsecured claim but merely “define[s] the portion of the fees [to] be afforded secured status,”); In re Welzel, 275 F.3d 1308, 1316-20 (11th Cir. 2001) (§ 502(b) “does not … disallow attorneys’ fees of creditors … .”).
    2. Timbers Not a Bar to Recovery. Nor does the Supreme Court’s holding in United Savings Ass’n v. Texas Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988), mandate disallowance of unsecured claims for post-bankruptcy legal fees. Although § 502(b)(2) “specifically disallows claims for unmatured interest,” § 502(b) “does not contain a similar prohibition against attorneys’ fees.” SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 844. As the Second Circuit stressed in Ogle, “while section 502(b)(2) bars claims for unmatured interest, it does not similarly bar (or even reference) claims for post-petition attorneys’ fees.” Id., at 148.
    3. No Unfairness. Finally, the Second Circuit rejected the trustee’s policy argument in Ogle that allowance of the fees would “unfairly disadvantage other creditors … whose distributions would be reduced.” Id., at 149. Sophisticated parties in Ogle negotiated an agreement with a provision for the recovery of legal fees. The creditor will not be receiving an undeserved bonus at the expense of others. Allowance of the claim “‘merely effectuates the bargained-for terms of the [pre-bankruptcy] loan contract.’” Id. (quoting In re United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 674 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1982) (pre-Code case)). See SNTL Corp., 571 F.3d at 845 (“… the Bankruptcy Code itself [does] not specifically disallow … postpetition fees … . In the end, it is the province of Congress to correct statutory dysfunctions and to resolve difficult policy questions embedded in the statute.”).
    4. Stubborn Lower Courts. Some lower courts simply ignored or misread the Supreme Court’s Travelers decision, as did the court in Summitbridge. See, e.g., A.P. Green Industries, supra (Section 506(b), dealing with a secured creditor’s claim for legal fees, “controls over the general statute, section 502(a)”; secured creditors “are able to collect [legal fees] only to the extent that there is a security cushion from which they can be paid”; “to allow contractual claims for attorneys’ fees … would impair the debtor’s fresh start … while treating similarly situated creditors differently.”). Another bankruptcy court asserted, despite the Travelers holding, that it had never approved a pre-bankruptcy contractual legal fee reimbursement clause and that, in any event, the clause “was not in compliance with federal bankruptcy law, i.e., [Code] §§ 327 and 330.” Crafts Retail 378 B.R. at 51 (relying on In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 597 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1979) (denying legal fees to indenture trustee), but ignoring In re United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc., 674 F.2d 138-39 (2d Cir. 1982) (“ … we find no law or policy that supports the … disallowance of … claims… for collection costs under … the loan agreements”; distinguished compensation for expenses in administering the estate from “claims [that] are part of the contractual indebtedness [to creditors], and [thus] not subject to the statutory limitations on reimbursement for expenses of administering the estate.”).

    The bankruptcy court in Crafts Retail also stressed the lack of an express Code provision authorizing the reimbursement of a financial advisor’s pre-bankruptcy contractual claim for post-bankruptcy legal fees. 378 B.R. at 44. In its view, the ‘‘morphing of attorney compensation into a garden variety expense item is unacceptable … .” Id. Other bankruptcy courts reached similar conclusions. In re Elec. Mach. Enter., Inc., 371 B.R. 549, 551-52 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (stating that the Supreme Court in Travelers “declined to express an opinion on whether unsecured creditors are entitled to post-petition attorneys’ fees. …d”; “plain language’’ of § 506(b) precludes claims); In re Pride Cos., LP., 285 B.R. 366, 372-75 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (rejected Second Circuit’s 1982 United Merchants decision for its purportedly questionable “logic and importance.”).

    1. Consistent Appellate Decisions. At least five, if not six, Circuits have now put to rest the contractual post-bankruptcy legal fee issue. But there is still no uniformity in the lower courts, as Summitbridge shows. Outside the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the contractual legal fee issue is still open.

    But even the Fourth Circuit should be convinced to reverse the district court in Summitbridge. Reversing the lower courts in a similar case, the Fourth Circuit held that they had “inappropriately focuse[d] on the presence of issues peculiar to bankruptcy law, rather than on whether … attorneys’ fees are properly recoverable under the terms of the lease and applicable state law.” In re Shangra-La, Inc., 167 F.3d 843, 848 (4th Cir. 1999). The district court in Summitbridge inexplicably ignored the Shangra-La decision.

    In that case, a commercial landlord claimed post-bankruptcy legal fees after the Chapter 7 trustee assumed the debtor’s lease. Reversing the lower courts’ denial of the claim, the Fourth Circuit went “back to state contract law [to determine] the terms of default and the landlord’s rights upon default under the lease.” Id. As the court stressed, “[a]ttorneys’ fees qualify as … losses when state law would recognize them as such.” Id., at 850. Merely because “federal bankruptcy law” issues “were involved will not preclude an award of fees” on remand. Id.


    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your lawyer or the author.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Precaution Is Better Than Cure

    ARTICLE

    Precaution Is Better Than Cure

    December 5, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Uwe Goetker wrote this bylined article advising companies which may face financial crisis that “prevention is better than cure, and the earlier the problem is recognized, the better the treatment options.” Mr. Goetker wrote that this includes early recognition of crisis conditions, allowing for “timely fulfillment of legal and legal requirements to comply with the insolvency filing obligation.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Uwe Goetker

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    More insights

  • State Income Tax Implications of Base Broadening Components of House and Senate Tax Reform Bills

    State Income Tax Implications of Base Broadening Components of House and Senate Tax Reform Bills

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    State Income Tax Implications of Base Broadening Components of House and Senate Tax Reform Bills

    December 4, 2017

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    While there are differences between the House and Senate tax reform bills that remain to be worked out between the two chambers, both bills are positioned to broaden the tax base and reduce the tax rate. This article highlights the possible impact on state income tax liabilities stemming from the base broadening provisions.

    In depth

    On November 16, 2017, the US House of Representatives passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. On December 2, 2017, the US Senate passed an amended version of the House bill. While there are differences between the two bills that remain to be worked out between the two chambers, the approach to tax reform taken by both bills is to broaden the tax base and reduce the tax rate, with increases in taxable income caused by the base broadening provisions tempered by a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 20 percent. Because most state income tax regimes key off of taxable income for federal income tax purposes, the base broadening provisions of the federal tax reform bills will have implications for state income taxes, but without the tempering of the federal rate reduction. This article highlights the possible impact on state income tax liabilities stemming from the base broadening provisions in the two tax reform bills.

    Deemed Repatriation of Foreign Earnings

    Both the House and the Senate bills would treat as Subpart F income the amount of the undistributed, not previously taxed post-1986 foreign earnings and profits of certain US-owned businesses (the “deemed repatriation”). Both bills would allow deductions for a percentage of the deemed repatriation such that the effective tax rates would be reduced to approximately 14 percent for foreign earnings held in cash or cash equivalents and approximately 7 percent for earning held in illiquid assets. The amount of the deemed repatriation, net of the deduction, presumably would result in an increase in taxable income. While the provisions allow for payment of tax in installments over a number of years, the inclusion in Subpart F income and income of the deemed repatriation comes in the last tax year of the taxpayer that begins before January 1, 2018.

    Anti-Base Erosion Provisions

    Both bills have anti-base erosion provisions that would require the inclusion in gross income of excess returns associated with the foreign exploitation of intangible property. The Senate version would require the inclusion income of “global intangible low-taxed income” (GILTI) with a 50 percent deduction (reduced to 37.5 percent for tax years beginning after 2025). This is similar to the House provision which requires the inclusion in income of 50 percent of the foreign high return amount. These provisions would require the inclusion in gross income of amounts in excess of a given rate of return on tangible assets.

    Full Expensing of Certain Property

    Currently, under Section 168(k), taxpayers are allowed to deduct 50 percent of the adjusted basis of qualified property placed in service during the taxable year. Qualified property generally includes property having a useful life of 20 years or less and computer software. Both bills would increase the deduction to 100 percent for five years. Naturally, this would have a dramatic reduction in taxable income for many capital intensive companies.

    Section 174 Deduction for Research and Experimentation Expenditures

    Under current law, taxpayers are allowed a deduction for research and experimentation (R&E) expenditures. Under both the House and the Senate bills, for R&E expenditures made during tax years beginning after 2022, such expenditures would be required to be capitalized and amortized over a period of five years. This will result in significant reductions in the R&E expenditure deduction in the early years of this requirement with a concomitant increase in taxable income.

    Repeal of the Section 199 Deduction for Domestic Production Activities

    Current law allows a deduction equal to 9 percent of the taxpayer’s qualified domestic production activities. Both the House and Senate bills would repeal this deduction. Repeal of the deduction will result in an increase in taxable income on the federal return.

    Limitation on the Deductibility of Business Interest

    Under current law, subject to a number of limitations, interest paid or accrued by a business generally is deductible in the computation of taxable income. With certain differences, both the House and Senate bills would limit the deduction for business interest to the sum of business interest income plus 30 percent of the adjusted taxable income of the taxpayer for the taxable year. These provisions could result in the reduction of the interest expense deduction resulting in an increase in taxable income on the federal return.

    Deduction for Dividends from Foreign Subsidiaries

    In moving to something in the nature of a territorial tax system, both bills would allow a 100 percent deduction for dividends received from foreign subsidiaries. At first blush, one would think there would be no increase in federal taxable income because the deduction rate is 100 percent. Because of the GILTI in the Senate version and inclusion of the foreign high return amount in the House version, the dividends received deduction, effectively, only provides a tax benefit for the amount attributable to the routine return on tangible assets excluded from those anti-base erosion provisions.

    Effects on State Income Taxes

    These provisions likely to result in increases in taxable income discussed above are just a sampling of the numerous provisions in both the House and Senate bills that could cause increases in the amount of taxable income on the federal return, which, as noted, is, for many states, the starting point in determining taxable income for state income tax purposes.

    Some, but not all states, tax Subpart F income. Presumably, the deductions will also flow through to the states taxing such income, providing a reduced tax rate at the state level as well. However, absent a change in law, the full tax will be due in the year the income is reported. For states that do not tax Subpart F income, but have decoupled from the federal dividend received deduction, this income may be taxed when actually distributed or may receive a full or partial deduction at that time. To the extent the federal rules accelerate distributions to a US parent, even states that do not tax Subpart F income thus may receive a benefit. Questions regarding E&P calculations on such income may be more than difficult.

    GILTI could be taxed by a state regardless of its conformity to Subpart F, unless water’s edge definitions or some other deduction related to foreign income allows an exclusion from taxable income. If the income is included, fair apportionment issues may arise. The concept of apportionment is further complicated because only a percentage of this income is included in the base. The inclusion could be further complicated by the interplay with state addback statutes. Some increase in at least the sales denominator should be allowed, but it is unclear under what mechanism this could occur or how it would be calculated.

    On the 100 percent expensing issue, many states already either decouple from or significantly modify the existing 50 percent deduction under Section 168(k). Given the potential magnitude of the impact of this benefit on state tax revenues, it is likely state legislatures will respond with additional decoupling or modifications. If and when they do so, it will result in additional complexity by giving rise to differences in adjustments to basis for state and federal purposes and book-to-tax differences for financial reporting purposes.

    Some states have already decoupled from the Section 199 deduction, so the federal repeal will not affect such states.

    The limitation on the interest deduction should affect every state unless it proactively decouples—which seems unlikely as the change increases the base. The limitation will be complicated by the interplay with intercompany addback statutes.

    States and corporate taxpayers have barely begun to grapple with these concepts and the situation remains fluid. We continue to analyze the issues and will provide thoughts and updates in the days, weeks, and months (perhaps years) ahead.

    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Mark Nebergall

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

    More insights

  • Regulating Short Term Rental Companies [STRs]

    ARTICLE

    Regulating Short Term Rental Companies [STRs]

    December 3, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Banks Brown wrote this bylined article urging more stringent regulation of short term rental companies such as Airbnb. That company’s “aggressive resistance to transparency has put our regulators and law enforcement officials in the dark about” about its rental locations and customers, Mr. Banks wrote, and he urged that “the jurisdictions trying to regulate STRs should not hesitate to do so as needed and should not back down if they get sued.”

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • New York Paid Family Leave Benefits Law to Take Effect

    New York Paid Family Leave Benefits Law to Take Effect

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New York Paid Family Leave Benefits Law to Take Effect

    December 1, 2017

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Effective Jan. 1, 2018, New York State’s Paid Family Leave Benefits Law (the “PFLBL”) will go into effect. The PFLBL will require nearly all employers with at least one employee in New York to provide job-protected paid family leave to their employees for up to eight weeks in 2018, increasing to 10 weeks in 2020 and to 12 weeks in 2021.

    Overview of Benefits

    To provide paid family leave benefits, most employers will add a paid family leave insurance policy to their existing short-term disability policy. The cost of the paid family leave premiums may be funded through deductions from employees’ after-tax pay, with such deductions not to exceed the lesser of 0.126 percent of (i) the employee’s weekly wage or (ii) the current New York State Average Weekly Wage, which is currently $1,305.92. For 2018, the maximum deduction is $1.65 per week.

    In 2018, the maximum weekly benefit an employee is eligible to receive will be the lesser of 50 percent of (i) the employee’s weekly wage or (ii) the New York State Average Weekly Wage, increasing to 55 percent in 2019, 60 percent in 2020 and 67 percent in 2021. For 2018, the maximum weekly benefit is $652.96.

    Employee Eligibility

    Under the PFLBL, employees who have been employed full-time for 26 consecutive weeks or part-time (less than 20 hours per week) for 175 days are eligible for paid family leave for the following reasons:

    • To bond with the employee’s child during the first 12 months following the birth, adoption or fostering of the child.
    • To care for a family member[1] with a serious health condition.[2]
    • For family matters arising from an employee’s spouse, child, domestic partner or parent being on active military duty.

    The PFLBL does not provide paid leave benefits for an employee’s own serious health condition. The amount of leave available to an employee is computed by reviewing the amount of leave taken by the employee over the 12 preceding months, as of the first date that paid family leave benefits begins. If an employee or an employee’s spouse gave birth to or adopted/fostered a child in 2017, the employee will be eligible for eight weeks of paid family leave in 2018, even if the employee took paid or unpaid child care leave in 2017. Leave may be taken intermittently in full day increments.

    Under the new law, employees will be subject to the same notice requirements for leave under the PFLBL as for leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) (i.e., at least 30 days of prior notice in instances where the need for leave is foreseeable, or otherwise as soon as practicable).

    Interaction With FMLA

    Employers subject to the FMLA are permitted to require that paid family leave and FMLA leave run concurrently. To accomplish this, employers must notify an employee that leave will be counted against the employee’s entitlements under both statutes concurrently.

    Use of Unused Paid Time Off

    Employers may not require employees to use accrued, unused paid time off benefits (including any paid parental or childcare leave) while receiving paid family leave benefits. If an employer has designated that paid family leave and FMLA leave will run concurrently, pursuant to the FMLA the employer may require the employee to use accrued, unused paid time off benefits while receiving paid family leave benefits.

    If an employee is receiving full pay while on paid family leave, an employer may request reimbursement for any paid family leave benefits the employee receives during that time period.

    Interaction With Short-Term Disability

    An employee may not receive paid family leave benefits and short-term disability benefits for the same time period. As a result, an employee who gives birth to a child in 2018 would initially be entitled to six or eight weeks of short-term disability benefits for childbirth, followed by an additional eight weeks of paid family leave (which the employee can take at any time during the 12 months following the child’s birth). Under the PFLBL, an employee is entitled to a maximum combined total of 26 weeks of short-term disability and paid family leave benefits during a consecutive 52-week period.

    Health Benefits and Return From Leave

    The new law requires employers to maintain an employee’s health benefits during the employee’s paid family leave and requires employees to continue contributing to the cost of health insurance premiums during that time. In addition, employers must reinstate employees to the same or comparable position upon returning from paid family leave.

    Special Considerations for Unionized Employers

    Employers with employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement are not required to provide paid family leave benefits to employees if the collective bargaining agreement provides paid family leave benefits at least as favorable as those required under the PFLBL.

    It is possible that a unilateral decision to deduct paid family leave insurance premiums from an employee’s wages without bargaining with the labor organization may violate the National Labor Relations Act. As a result, it is unclear whether an employer may make payroll deductions to cover the cost of paid family benefits absent negotiations with the union concerning such deductions.

    Special Considerations for Schools and Other Nonprofits

    Schools and certain other nonprofit institutions are not required to provide short-term disability insurance coverage and paid family leave insurance coverage to certain categories of employees, but may elect to do so. An employer may voluntarily provide coverage to exempt employees (such as teachers), subject to approval of the Chair of New York State Workers’ Compensation Board. If the employer intends to require employees to contribute to the cost of such coverage, the election will require the approval of a majority vote of employees who will be covered under the law. Employers who currently deduct from employees’ pay for short-term disability benefits may deduct from employees’ pay for paid family leave benefits without obtaining any additional approval.

    Recommendations

    The Workers’ Compensation Board has released a form of notice that employers must provide to employees giving them notice of their rights under the PFLBL.[3] Employers must also update their handbooks to include information regarding paid family leave. In addition, employers should review their current policies and procedures, such as paid sick leave or other paid time off, disability leave and FMLA leave policies, to ensure those policies work in conjunction with the PFLBL.

    Employers should consult with their short-term disability insurance provider to determine the additional premiums required to be paid for coverage. In addition, employers should consult with their payroll service provider.


    Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold, Adam B. Gartner, and Donna Lazarus.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your lawyer or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Adam B. Gartner

    Special Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Donna K. Lazarus

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • The EEOC Releases Wellness Program Guidelines

    ARTICLE

    The EEOC Releases Wellness Program Guidelines

    December 1, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jacob Mattinson and Finn Pressly wrote this bylined article on a lawsuit filed against the EEOC’s final regulations for wellness program ADA compliance. A federal district court ordered the EEOC to develop new guidelines because of the lawsuit, and the authors wrote that “employers should continually review their wellness programs to ensure they are structured correctly and that the appropriate notices are provided to employees in light of the guidance issued by the EEOC.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Jacob M. Mattinson

    Partner

    Chicago

    More insights

  • The Protection of Foreign Investor Expectations Under the Paris Climate Accord

    ARTICLE

    The Protection of Foreign Investor Expectations Under the Paris Climate Accord

    November/December 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jacob Grierson and Thomas Granier wrote this bylined article which described how the various policies that national governments may use to implement the Paris Climate Accord of 12 December 2015 “could prove to be fraught with consequences as to the value of investments” of companies that are affected.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Texas Court of Appeals Reverses T.G.I. Friday’s Label Decision

    ARTICLE

    Texas Court of Appeals Reverses T.G.I. Friday’s Label Decision

    November/December 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Marc Sorini wrote this bylined article on the Texas Court of Appeals decision in Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Mark Anthony Brewing, Inc. The decision upheld the state’s ban on private-label malt beverage/beer labels, saying that such labels did not enjoy First Amendment protection because they violate the state’s comprehensive tied-house laws.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights

  • Direct Investments Safeguard – Ways Forward for SMEs

    ARTICLE

    Direct Investments Safeguard – Ways Forward for SMEs

    December 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Direct investments abroad make it possible for German companies to open up new markets abroad. Yet such investments also entail risks through high capital commitments. If, for example, the investment is lost through expropriation or the framework conditions of existing investments are altered by state intervention, this can quickly threaten the existence of SMEs. In this article Dr. Sabine Konrad and Arne Fuchs explain the various safeguard mechanisms available to German businesses, and examine their costs and benefits.

    In depth
    Authors
    More insights