Content Type: Article

  • Add Batteries to Your Wind Farm and Get More (ITC) Juice

    ARTICLE

    Add Batteries to Your Wind Farm and Get More (ITC) Juice

    November 29, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Heather Cooper, Kevin Spencer and Philip Tingle wrote this bylined article on the technical feasibility and tax credit eligibility of adding batteries to existing renewable energy facilities, especially wind farms. The authors affirmed both the credibility of the battery capabilities, and the battery eligibility for the Investment Tax Credit (ITC).

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    Authors

    Heather Cooper

    Partner

    Miami

    Philip Tingle

    Partner

    Miami

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  • Lessons Learned from Autopsies of Earn-Out Disputes Earn-Out Provisions – The Next IP Battleground?

    Lessons Learned from Autopsies of Earn-Out Disputes Earn-Out Provisions – The Next IP Battleground?

    ARTICLE

    Lessons Learned from Autopsies of Earn-Out Disputes Earn-Out Provisions – The Next IP Battleground?

    Fall 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Diego Gómez-Cornejo co-authored this bylined article on an aspect of earn-out arrangements in M&A deals that is easily overlooked – the exchange of trade secrets or other confidential business information between the target company and its new parent company. “When encountered in practice, the financial impact on the earn-out metric of recognizing the shared confidential information can be large and unexpected,” the article stated.

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  • Connecticut Supreme Court Defines Bankruptcy Effect on Contracts

    Connecticut Supreme Court Defines Bankruptcy Effect on Contracts

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Connecticut Supreme Court Defines Bankruptcy Effect on Contracts

    November 28, 2017

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “[B]ankruptcy does not constitute a per se breach of contract and does not excuse performance by the other party in the absence of some further indication that the [debtor] either cannot, or does not, intend to perform,” held the Supreme Court of Connecticut in a lengthy opinion on Nov. 21, 2017. CCT Communications, Inc. v. Zone Telecom, Inc., 2017 WL 5477540, *13 (Ct. Nov. 21, 2017) (en banc), superseding 324 Conn. 654, 153 A.3d 1249 (2017). Reversing the trial court, granting the plaintiff’s motion for en banc reconsideration of its earlier Feb. 21, 2017 opinion and superseding that earlier opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s erroneous finding that the plaintiff debtor’s “bankruptcy petition constituted a breach of [contract, permitting] the defendant to terminate that agreement.” Id., at *2. Because the trial court never found that the debtor (“CCT”) “either could not or did not intend to perform its obligations as a result of its bankruptcy filing,” the debtor had not “breached the . . . agreement by filing for bankruptcy protection.” Id., at *13. Nothing in the contract itself supported the trial court’s “conclusion that filing the [bankruptcy] petition constituted a breach by [CCT].” Id.

    Equally important, the Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s enforcement of an “ipso facto” bankruptcy termination clause, reasoning that the contractual language in this case “only” gave the non-debtor defendant (“Zone”) “the option to terminate.” Id., at *12. Nor, on the facts of this case, could Zone rely on the so-called judicially created “ride-through” exception to evade the Bankruptcy Code’s invalidation of “ipso facto” termination clauses (§ 365(e)(1)).

    A New York bankruptcy court had dismissed CCT’s Chapter 11 case one month before the commencement of the suit in the Connecticut state court. Although CCT had originally sued Zone in the bankruptcy court, that court “declined to retain jurisdiction” after dismissal of the Chapter 11 case because, among other things, the CCT suit “primarily involved questions of state contract law.” Id., at *6. Still, the Supreme Court questioned “why the parties did not seek to resolve the questions of federal law” before it in the underlying bankruptcy case. Id., at n.7.

    Relevance

    The federal bankruptcy issues in CCT, a routine contract dispute, were significant:

    • Does the filing of a bankruptcy petition constitute a breach of contract?
    • Is an “ipso facto” bankruptcy termination clause effective? Useful?
    • What happens when a trustee or Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession neither assumes nor rejects an executory contract during the pendency of a Chapter 11 case?
    • Does the unassumed or unrejected contract “ride through” the dismissal of the Chapter 11 case?
    • What should a non-debtor contracting party do when its counterparty seeks Chapter 11 relief?

    Facts

    CCT, a Delaware corporation based in Connecticut, bought telecommunication services and resold those services to third parties such as Zone. After contractual disputes with Zone (its customer) and a supplier, CCT filed a Chapter 11 petition in the Southern District of New York on Jan. 29, 2007. It later sued Zone for breach of contract in the bankruptcy court on Jan. 27, 2009.

    Zone had sent a letter to CCT on Feb. 5, 2007, during the pending of the Chapter 11 case, “purport[ing] to terminate [its agreement with CCT, relying on a clause], which provides . . . that either party may terminate upon 30 days written notice” in the event of a party’s bankruptcy. Id., at *5. Zone did nothing further to implement its termination letter. The bankruptcy court later dismissed CCT’s Chapter 11 case on Nov. 25, 2009 when CCT was unable to have the court confirm a reorganization plan.

    CCT then promptly sued Zone in the Connecticut state court on December 2009, claiming Zone’s nonpayment. Zone counterclaimed, alleging (a) CCT’s failure to provide services and (b) termination of the parties’ contract because of its Feb. 5, 2007 purported termination letter. After trial, the lower court ruled for Zone, awarding damages, costs and attorney fees, plus a declaratory judgment that the parties’ contract had been terminated under the bankruptcy termination clause.

    The Connecticut Supreme Court

    The Supreme Court, after agreeing to rehear the case en banc, found that the trial court held for Zone solely on the basis of CCT’s bankruptcy filing. Id., at *8, *9 and *10. In fact, the trial court cited Zone’s Feb. 5, 2007 termination letter and its reliance on the contractual bankruptcy termination clause. The lower court, said the Supreme Court, never held that CCT “breached the purchase agreement by failing to provide adequate service.” Id., at *10.

    1. Bankruptcy Filing NOT a Breach. Zone significantly conceded on appeal that it “never alleged. . . [‘CCT’s] bankruptcy filing constituted a breach . . . .” Id., at *12 n.16. Because of the trial court’s reliance on the bankruptcy filing though, the Supreme Court parsed the following language in the bankruptcy termination clause: “ . . .this [a]greement may be terminated by either party upon thirty . . . days . . . notice of such termination to the other party in the event that [nonterminating] party has . . . filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy . . . .” Id., at *12.

    First, stressed the court, the quoted language does not even “suggest that a bankruptcy filing will constitute a material breach of the . . . agreement.” Id. Instead, it means “only that a bankruptcy affords the other party the option to terminate if it desires.” Id. Thus, “the plain language of the [contract] itself does not support” the lower court’s finding that CCT had breached.

    Despite early cases holding bankruptcy to constitute a breach, a bankruptcy filing, “without more, [is no longer] a material breach.” Id., at *13, citing Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Basic American Industries, Inc., 252 F.3d 911, 917 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) (“Merely filing for the protection of the bankruptcy court is not a repudiation of obligations or a cessation of operations . . . . An insolvent firm is not necessarily out of business, and the parties with which it has contracts cannot automatically assume that the firm will default . . . .); 2 E. Farnsworth, Contracts (3d Ed. 2004) § 8.21. Because the lower court in CCT never found that CCT “either could not or did not intend to perform . . . as a result of its bankruptcy filing,” it “incorrectly determined that [CCT] breached the . . . agreement by filing for bankruptcy protection.” 2017 WL 5477540, at *13.

    1. Ipso Facto Bankruptcy Termination Clause Not Enforceable. Code § 365(e) provides that a debtor’s executory contracts may not be terminated solely as a result “of a bankruptcy filing.” Id., at *13. Thus, the Code invalidates “ipso facto” provisions such as the bankruptcy termination clause in the Zone/CCT agreement.
    2. Assumption or Rejection Flexible in Chapter 11 Cases. The Supreme Court first explained the difference between assumption (i.e., adoption) and rejection (i.e., statutory breach) of an executory contract in bankruptcy cases, noting that either choice is within the trustee’s discretion. Although contracts are ordinarily rejected in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case if they are not “expressly assumed or rejected” within 60 days, “that default rule does not apply to Chapter 11 [cases].” Id. at *14. A Chapter 11 trustee or debtor-in-possession may assume or reject an executory contract “at any time prior to the confirmation of a reorganization plan,” unless the bankruptcy court orders an earlier decision. Id. Thus, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession “should be granted more latitude in deciding whether to reject a contract than should a trustee in liquidation.” National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529 (1984). But the Code “does not specify the legal status of an executory contract that is never expressly assumed or rejected during a Chapter 11 [case],” as happened in CCT. 2017 WL 5477540, at *15.
    3. No Ride-Through Exception to Invalidation of Ipso Facto Clause. Courts had “applied a rule predating adoption of the [Code], namely, the ride-through doctrine.” Id. Under that pre-Code doctrine, when a contract is neither assumed nor rejected during a Chapter 11 case, said the court in CCT, it will “pass through the reorganization unaffected and become an obligation of the reorganized debtor.” Id., citing In re Nevada Emergency Services, Inc. 39 B.R. 859, 861 n.1 (Bnkr. D. Nev. 1984). In CCT though, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the trial court had improperly applied the “ride-through doctrine” in order to “circumvent the protections embodied in [Code] § 365(e).” Id. CCT had failed to assume or reject its contract with Zone during the almost three years of the pending CCT Chapter 11 case, but, more significant, Zone “also never requested that the bankruptcy court order [CCT] to make” a decision on whether to assume or reject the contract. The court thus found that the “ride-through doctrine did not create an exception to [Code] § 365(e) under the circumstances of” this case. Id. at n.20.

    The Supreme Court stressed that the ride-through doctrine “generally ha[d] been applied when a plan of reorganization is confirmed without specifying whether a particular executory contract is assumed or rejected.” Id. at *16. Although it found no court applying the doctrine when a Chapter 11 case had been dismissed prior to confirmation of a reorganization plan, as happened in CCT, one court suggested that because “there is no reorganized debtor, there is no [new] entity for the contract to ride-through to.” Id., citing In re Dehon, Inc., 352 B.R. 546, 565 n. 20 (Bankr. D. Mass 2006). Also, explained the Supreme Court, Code § 349(b)(3) “automatically revests the property of the estate, including contract rights, in the debtor upon dismissal.” Id. It thus held that “the ride-through doctrine does not apply in the context of” this case. Id.

    Moreover, reasoned the Supreme Court, “[e]ven if the ride-through doctrine did apply, . . . the doctrine [did not] create . . . an exception to the prohibition against ipso facto clauses contained in” Code § 365(e). Id., at 16. “Nothing in the plain language of the [Code says] that the protections of . . . § 365(e)(1) are available to the debtor only upon the assumption of an executory contract . . . [Code] § 365(e)(2) lists various conditions under which . . . § 365(e)(1) does not apply, but makes no mention of the need to assume the contract.” Id., at *19, rejecting In re Hernandez, 287 B.R. 795, 800-801 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (Chapter 11 debtor may not rely on protection of Code § 365(e) “[u]nless and until an executory contract is assumed . . . “). Indeed, a Chapter 11 debtor has a “paramount” right to a reasonable period of time “to appraise its financial situation and the potential value of its assets in . . . the formulation of a plan” before having to assume or reject an executory contract. Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102, 106 (2d Cir. 1982); 3 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶365.05[5], at 365-52 (16th ed. 2017) (“decision[s] to assume a long-term contract usually should be delayed until confirmation.”). Therefore, “[o]nce the bankruptcy case is filed, the [non-debtor] is required to perform its obligations . . . even though the debtor’s performance obligation is suspended and the [non-debtor] is stayed from exercising its remedies and rights [while] the debtor decides whether to assume or reject the contract.” 2017 WL5477540, at *18, quoting J. Daniel, “Lawyering on Behalf of the Non-Debtor Party in Anticipation, and During the Course, of an Executory Contract Counterparty’s Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Case,” 14. Hous. Bus & Tax L.J. 230, 238 (2014).

    The Code’s “protections from ‘ipso facto’ clauses” prevented “a non-debtor party [Zone]” from “circumventing those protections by . . . terminating [its] contract” with CCT, the Chapter 11 debtor.” Id., at *18. Still, reasoned the Supreme Court, “a contract that rides through bankruptcy remains binding on all parties, and . . . [after bankruptcy], redress for any alleged defaults may be pursued in state court if such remedy is not otherwise precluded by law . . . . [T]he rationales that led Congress to bar the enforcement of [‘ipso facto’] clauses cease to apply after the reorganization process has been completed. The same is presumably true of a contract that does not ride through but that, instead, revests in the debtor upon dismissal” of the case under Code § 349(b)(3). Id., at *19, citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 p. 349 (1977), reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305.

    1. No Resurrection of Zone’s Barred Contract Termination. The Supreme Court rejected the trial court’s “resurrection” of Zone’s asserted termination of its contract with CCT. Id. No court had ever “revived a termination in this manner,” somehow “validat[ing] and reinstat[ing] . . . a termination that was barred by Code § 365(e) during a bankruptcy [case].” Id. It also cited the unpredictability, the inconsistency (“How [could Zone] terminate the . . . agreement on the basis of [CCT’s] bankruptcy . . . and simultaneously contend the agreement should be applied as if the petition had never been filed?”) and the unfairness of applying the “judicially made” ride-through doctrine in the context of statutory remedies available to Zone, the non-debtor party (e.g., stay modification; availability of judicial deadline for assumption or rejection; and possible judicial annulment of contract).

    Zone’s critical error, said the Supreme Court, was its “opt[ing] not to pursue any of [its] statutory remedies in the bankruptcy court. Instead, it chose to unilaterally terminate the [CCT] agreement. That decision . . . was ‘fraught with peril,’ because ‘[a]n injured party that chooses to exercise a right of self-help . . . by electing to terminate takes the risk that a court may later regard the exercise as precipitous’.” Id., at *20, quoting 2 E. Farnsworth, Contracts (3d ed. 2004), § 8.15, p. 511. See In re Computer Communications, Inc., 824 F.2d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Judicial toleration of. . .self-help and post-hoc justification would defeat the purpose of the automatic stay.”). Thus, concluded the Supreme Court, Code § 365(e) “rendered [Zone’s] purported termination of the . . . agreement ineffective, and . . . the trial court incorrectly [applied] the ride-through doctrine so as to retroactively validate the termination.” Id.

    1. No Forward Contract. Finally, the Supreme Court devoted many unnecessary pages in affirming the trial court’s finding that the CCT/Zone agreement was not a “commodity forward contract” under Code § 556, “which carves out an exception to [Code] § 365(e).” First, Zone was admittedly “not a commodity broker or financial participant.” Id., at *21. Also, the agreement here, said the court, was “a multifaceted agreement [involving]. . .[CCT’s] sale of a noncommodity, namely, . . . digital signal circuits to [Zone].” Id., at *25. Because Code § 365(e) applied, therefore, Zone’s “purported termination” under the contract’s “ipso facto” termination clause “was invalid.” Id.

    Comment

    The lesson from CCT for a non-debtor contracting party: move in the bankruptcy court for appropriate relief.

    • A modification of the automatic stay to permit litigation of any contract dispute outside the bankruptcy court; or
    • An order directing the debtor-in-possession to assume or reject the contract by a fixed deadline; or
    • A declaratory judgment that the debtor-in-possession has effectively terminated the agreement.

    The threshold issue for any non-debtor is whether it wants to retain the contract with the debtor. If so, it should seek payment for any post-bankruptcy services. If not, seek rejection or termination of the contract.

    Zone simply did not want to pay CCT for services it received, merely sent an ineffectual termination letter, did nothing until sued, and ultimately lost. Zone apparently wanted to end its contract with CCT but was either reluctant or afraid to seek relief in the bankruptcy court.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Tax Court Rejects IRS’s Code Sec. 367(d) Argument

    ARTICLE

    Tax Court Rejects IRS’s Code Sec. 367(d) Argument

    November 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder wrote this bylined article on two recent cases relating to Section 367(d) taxation of a domestic corporation’s transfer to a foreign subsidiary of intangible property in an otherwise tax-free transfer. The Tax Court in the cases rejected the IRS’s argument that taxable asset transfers occurred in light of the putative transferee’s subsequent earning of entrepreneurial profits.

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    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Fifth Circuit Rejects Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Fraudulent Transfer Claims

    Fifth Circuit Rejects Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Fraudulent Transfer Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Rejects Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Fraudulent Transfer Claims

    November 27, 2017

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Officers and directors of [an operating corporate debtor] have fiduciary duties to the corporation — not the corporation’s creditors” under Texas law, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on Oct. 27, 2017. In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21337, *7 (5th Cir. Oct. 27, 2017). In affirming the district court’s dismissal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee’s complaint, the Fifth Circuit rejected the trustee’s breach of fiduciary claims against officers and directors for permitting “the payment of . . . stock dividends at the time of [the debtor’s] impending bankruptcy” in 2012 and for authorizing “the payment of cash bonuses to certain . . . officers” in the two years prior to bankruptcy. The decision can be read to rely on the trustee’s failure to plead enough facts to make his case, but relevant case law shows why breach of fiduciary duty claims are generally hard to win.

    Relevant Case Law Backdrop

    Delaware corporate charters typically shield directors from personal liability for claims based on breaches of fiduciary duty except for any breach of their duty of loyalty, similar misconduct, or any claims based on their violation of Delaware’s statute governing the payment of dividends. The Delaware General Corporation Law, 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7), permits the inclusion of an exculpatory provision in a certificate of incorporation.

    Moreover, Delaware courts have applied § 102(b)(7) to claims asserted by creditors such as those asserted by the trustee in ATP. Continuing Creditors’ Committee of Star Telecommunications Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 463 (D. Del. 2004) (“exculpation clauses . . . apply to prevent creditors as well as shareholders from bringing duty of care claims.”), citing Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 793-94 (Del. Ch. 2004). See also Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (trustee in bankruptcy “may only assert claims of [corporate debtor], not its creditors . . .”).

    Courts have also barred negligence-based fiduciary duty claims. See, e.g., IT Litigation Trust v. D’Aniello (In re IT Group Inc.), 2005 WL 3050611, at *11 (D. Del. Nov. 15, 2005)(“Once the § 102(b)(7) provision is raised against duty of care claims, that is ‘the end of the case.’”). In other words, a trustee must show that the board breached its “duty of loyalty by engaging in intentional, bad faith, or self-interested conduct that is not immunized by the exculpatory charter provision.” McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 495 (Del. Ch. 2000). Gross negligence or recklessness by directors will not overcome the exculpation provision. Norfolk County Ret. System v. Joseph A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., 2009 WL 353746, * 12 n.104 (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 2009) (“Delaware courts have held that recklessness by itself only amounts to gross negligence, which is not sufficient to demonstrate the state of mind necessary for finding a breach of the duty of loyalty.”).

    “[F]acts suggesting a fair inference that the directors breached their duty of loyalty” are essential to support a trustee’s claim. In re Lear Shareholder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 641 (Del. Ch. 2008); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92 (Del. 2001) (when directors of a Delaware corporation are sued “with a Section 102(b)(7) charter provision, . . . facts” are necessary to show “breaches of loyalty or good faith.”).

    Directors have a “duty to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it,” not just creditors. North American Catholic Educ. Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 103 (Del. 2007) (affirmed dismissal of complaint; held creditors may not assert breach of fiduciary duty claims when corporation either in zone of insolvency or insolvent). As another Delaware court stated, a Board does “not have a duty to protect creditors of an insolvent corporation at the expense of the corporation and its shareholders . . . . [D]irectors are not liable for decisions they make and actions they take in an effort to prolong the corporation’s viability, even in the face of insolvency.” In re Midway Games Inc., 428 B.R. 303, 315-316 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010), citing Gheewalla. See Continuing Creditors’ Committee of Star Telecomm. Inc. v. Edgecomb, 385 F. Supp. 2d 449, 458 (D. Del. 2004) (national public policy driving economic growth is to “encourage others to assume entrepreneurial and risk-taking activities by protecting them against personal liability when they have performed in good faith and with due care, however unfortunate the consequence.”) (quoting Duesenberg, “The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits; A View From Inside,” 60 Wash. U.L. Qu. 311, 314 (1982)).

    The Delaware Supreme Court explained why “directors of an insolvent corporation owe [no] direct fiduciary duties to creditors” [: It] “would create uncertainty for directors who have a fiduciary duty to exercise their business judgment in the best interest of the insolvent corporation.” Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 103. Instead, creditors may only pursue fiduciary duty claims against directors derivatively, on the corporation’s behalf. Id., at 101. As the court explained, allowing creditors to bring direct fiduciary claims against directors “would create a conflict between those directors’ duty to maximize the value of the insolvent corporation for the benefit of all those having an interest in it, and [a] direct fiduciary duty to individual creditors.” Id., at 103. In short, “creditors of a Delaware corporation that is either insolvent or in the zone of insolvency have no right, as a matter of law, to assert direct claims for breach of fiduciary duty against its directors.” Id., at 103. In the words of another Delaware court, the creditors’ claims should be “limited to harm which Debtor, not the creditors directly, suffered from the Challenged Transactions. The issue, therefore, is how the Challenged Transactions . . . harmed Debtor, not how they directly harmed creditors.” Midway, 428 B.R. at 314.

    The liquidating trustee, in a case similar to ATP, alleged that the defendant directors had breached their fiduciary duties to the “creditors and shareholders” when the corporate debtor had entered the “zone of insolvency.” Torch Liquidating Trust v. Stockstill, 561 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2009). The trustee had cast its complaint as a derivative action. Id., at 382. Dismissing the case, the District Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim by creditors for a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties, explaining that the trustee could not assert those claims on the creditors’ behalf. Torch Liquidating Trust v. Stockstill, 2008 WL 696233, *7 (E.D. La. 2008).

    The Fifth Circuit, in affirming, cut through the trustee’s attempt to disguise his claim, noting the trustee’s “ill-conceived pleading posture.” 561 F.3d at 385. Because the bankruptcy court’s confirmation order and reorganization plan had already given the trustee standing to sue on claims belonging to the debtor, it was thus unnecessary for the trustee to assert the claims as a derivative action.

    More significant, the Court of Appeals, after reviewing the complaint, found that there was no damage to the debtor. Rather, the trustee only alleged harm to creditors resulting from misinformation about the debtor’s financial status. The trustee also asserted that the corporate debtor should have sought bankruptcy relief earlier than it did, and that the defendant directors’ actions had kept the debtor out of bankruptcy for too long a period of time — in other words, a “deepening insolvency” claim. 561 F.3d at 391 n.16.

    First, explained the Fifth Circuit, the trustee’s allegations turned on misrepresentations to creditors in order to induce them to provide additional credit or to refrain from suing on their claims. Id., at 383. Because the trustee was unable to plead fraud with any particularity, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), this claim was insufficient. The trustee also lacked standing to bring fraud claims belonging only to certain creditors. See, e.g. Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co. of New York, 406 U.S. 416 (1972).

    The trustee in Torch thus had to claim a breach of fiduciary duty while alleging wrongdoing that directly harmed creditors and seeking recovery on behalf of specific creditors, a problem recognized by the district court. 2008 WL 696233, at *4-*5. Delaware law precludes individual creditors from asserting this kind of substantive direct claim against directors. Gheewalla. The trustee’s casting his claims in Torch as derivative, moreover, did nothing to change the nature of the claims asserted. Delaware courts have stressed that the fiduciary duties of officers and directors are owed to the corporation, but not to individual creditors. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101-102. As the Fifth Circuit noted, the trustee was “not attempting to recover for injury to [the corporate debtor] but instead attempting . . . to repackage creditor claims against the Directors that are defunct under Delaware law after Gheewalla.” 561 F.3d at 392.

    The real plaintiff in Torch should have been the corporation. Because the complaint, however, “allege[d] no actual quantifiable damages suffered by” the corporate debtor, 561 F.3d at 390, the trustee’s action had to be dismissed. The defendants had not violated the corporate debtor’s rights, and the trustee’s pleadings could not cure the defect. Nor could the trustee in Torch assert a “deepening insolvency” claim under Delaware law, based on a purportedly delayed bankruptcy filing, because “Delaware does not recognize” such a claim. Id., at 391 n.16.

    ATP: Fifth Circuit

    The trustee in ATP framed his claims in conclusory terms, asserting the defendants’ gross negligence. The district court dismissed the trustee’s claims “with prejudice,” however, after the trustee had repeatedly amended his complaint.

    The Fifth Circuit affirmed, stressing the “three broad fiduciary duties” required by corporate officers and directors under Texas law: “the duty of care . . . of loyalty, and . . . of obedience. Id. at *7. As in Delaware, they “owe fiduciary duties to the corporation — not the corporation’s creditors.” Id. Finally, the “business judgment rule in Texas generally protects corporate officers and directors, who owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, from liability for acts that are within the honest exercise of their business judgment and discretion.” Id., at *7-8. Courts therefore, “will not interfere with decisions made by . . . officers or directors based on allegations of mismanagement, neglect, or abuse of discretion.” Id. at *8. Nor do they typically “intervene in corporate affairs unless officers or directors commit acts that are ultra vires, fraudulent, or oppressive to minority shareholder rights.” Id. The Court of Appeals rejected the trustee’s claims that the authorization of stock dividends and bonuses was “grossly negligent,” an argument that would take them out of the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. at *9.

    1. Stock Dividends. Failing to “distinguish between the different roles and responsibilities of the Officers and Directors,” the trustee had failed “to allege with specificity which [officers or directors] authorized the . . .” dividend payment.” Id. Nor did the trustee “explain why the stock dividend payment would ‘necessarily harm’ [the debtor’s] ‘long-term viability and any chance of emerging from bankruptcy.’” Id. In other words, the trustee “failed to plead any facts explaining why [the] stock dividend payment necessarily harmed the corporation itself — the entity to which [they] owed a fiduciary duty.” Id. at *10.

    2. Bonus Payments. Applying the same reasoning as for the dividend payments, the court stressed that the trustee lacked any “evidentiary support that the bonuses . . . were excessive.” Id. at *10. Nor had the Trustee explained why the compensation “was excessive in comparison to other similarly sized public companies in the oil and gas industry at the time.” Id. at *11. Also missing was any “metric or explanation for finding the bonuses ‘exorbitant.’” Id. Because “a corporate fiduciary’s decision to receive or award compensation in exchange for performing corporate services does not constitute a per se duty of loyalty breach,” the trustee could offer “no persuasive explanation for why paying large cash bonuses constitutes a fiduciary duty breach,” a claim that would probably be barred by the business judgment rule in any event. Id. As the court reasoned, “continuing to compensate corporate management during times of financial hardship may be necessary to retain those employees. And during a time of potential insolvency, retaining corporate leadership may be the best way to revitalize the corporation.” Id. at *11-*12.

    3. Fraudulent Transfer Claims. The Fifth Circuit rejected the fraudulent transfer claims relating to the cash bonuses because of the trustee’s failure to allege “plausibly” that the officers had “not honestly and diligently perform[ed] their jobs.” at *13. Moreover, the trustee had “failed to present any financial data showing that [the debtor] was actually insolvent or had little capital when making the complained-of bonus payments.” Id. at *13.

    4. Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting Claims. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court’s dismissal of “a plausible claim for civil conspiracy,” for the trustee failed to allege “any meeting of the minds” to breach their fiduciary duty. Id., at *14-*15. Nor had the trustee’s “aiding and abetting” claim any merit: he had “failed to plausibly allege a fiduciary duty breach.” Id., at *15.

    5. Denial of Leave to Amend Complaint. Because the trustee’s claims “failed as a matter of law,” his “pursuing these claims . . . would [have been] futile.” Id., at *17. The trustee “had a number of previous opportunities to plead his claims” and had “ample access to ATP’s books and records.” Id. Still, the trustee relied “almost exclusively on vague, conclusory allegations of wrongdoing,” leveled “at all eighteen defendants without distinction.” Id. The lower court, therefore, had not abused its discretion in denying the trustee leave to amend his complaint again.

    Comment

    ATP confirms that a trustee will need hard, persuasive facts to prevail in a suit to recover for breach of fiduciary duty. The Third Circuit had those facts in a recent case, affirming a jury verdict imposing compensatory and punitive damages under Pennsylvania law against two officers plus compensatory damages against directors based on their breaching duties of care and loyalty. In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 626-30 (3d Cir. 2015) (one unqualified officer mismanaged by violating federal and state regulations; drew full salary while working part-time; chief financial officer failed to keep basic records, failed to collect receivables, failed to report regularly; failed to respond to creditors and tried to effect a merger with another entity and obtain a better position for himself; and directors failed to remove officers after learning of their mismanagement from independent sources: “stuck their heads in the sand.”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. 

    The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Tax Impacts of Natural Disasters

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    Tax Impacts of Natural Disasters

    November 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
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    Andrew Roberson wrote this bylined article on how the IRS, various organizations, and tax volunteers are available to assist individuals affected by natural disasters. “Natural disasters are inevitable,” Mr. Roberson wrote, which means “there are numerous opportunities for tax practitioners and volunteers to assist others, whether in the form of general legal services or tax services.”

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  • Maryland Tax Court’s Very Troubling Decision: Dog Food

    Maryland Tax Court’s Very Troubling Decision: Dog Food

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    Maryland Tax Court’s Very Troubling Decision: Dog Food

    November 27, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

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    Arthur Rosen and Kathleen Quinn wrote this bylined article on the Maryland Tax Court’s Blue Buffalo Co. ruling, which held that the company was subject to state tax under Public Law 86-272. Calling the decision “illogical,” the authors wrote that “the court does not understand P.L. 86-272 because P.L. 86-272 would, as a matter of law, shield Blue Buffalo from taxation in Maryland even if the company’s Maryland employees did operate as an in-state sales force.”

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    Arthur R. Rosen

    Senior Counsel

    Miami, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Patient Individual Blister of Medicines in the Care of the Elderly

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    Patient Individual Blister of Medicines in the Care of the Elderly

    November 2017

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  • US Tax Court Frustrates IRS Attempt to Expand Privilege Waiver

    US Tax Court Frustrates IRS Attempt to Expand Privilege Waiver

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    US Tax Court Frustrates IRS Attempt to Expand Privilege Waiver

    November 23, 2017

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
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    Robin Greenhouse, Roger Jones, Andrew Roberson, Kevin Spencer and Jeffrey Glassman wrote this bylined article on Estate of Levine v. Commissioner, in which the US Tax Court rejected an Internal Revenue Service attempt to expand upon existing privilege waiver principles. “Taxpayers should carefully scrutinize IRS attempts to obtain privileged documents, and resist the IRS’s attempts to expand the waiver concept beyond reason and principle,” the authors urged.

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    Roger J. Jones

    Counsel

    Chicago

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  • New Partnership Audit Tax Rules: Possible Changes to Fund Organizational and Disclosure Documents

    New Partnership Audit Tax Rules: Possible Changes to Fund Organizational and Disclosure Documents

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Partnership Audit Tax Rules: Possible Changes to Fund Organizational and Disclosure Documents

    November 22, 2017

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Nov. 2, 2015, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 was enacted, fundamentally changing the manner in which the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) conducts audits of entities that are taxed as partnerships for U.S. tax purposes and collects resulting tax liabilities. Generally, the new partnership tax audit rules provide that, absent an election, a partnership, and not its partners, will be required to pay any federal tax deficiency relating to a partnership audit adjustment.[1] The new partnership tax audit rules will be effective for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017, and it may be advisable to make certain changes to your fund organizational and disclosure documents in anticipation of these new rules.

    Under the existing partnership tax audit rules, in the event that an item of partnership income or loss is adjusted in an IRS audit, a fund that is treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes issues amended Schedules K-1 to the investors that were partners of the fund during the year under audit (“Audit Year”). Such investors are then required to amend their own tax returns for the Audit Year and pay any tax shortfall resulting from the adjustment (plus interest and penalties, as applicable).

    Under the new partnership tax audit rules, in the event that an item of partnership income or loss is adjusted in an IRS audit, a fund that is treated as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes will be liable for a tax (plus interest and penalties, as applicable) equal to the amount of the adjustment multiplied by the highest marginal tax rate (“Audit Tax”). The fund can then either pay the Audit Tax (subject to reduction, as discussed below) or make an election under Section 6226 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (“Section 6226 Election”), to push the audit adjustment out to the investors. If the fund decides to pay the Audit Tax, the fund may be able to reduce the Audit Tax (i) by demonstrating to the IRS that a portion of its current investors either would be exempt from tax or taxed at lower rates, or (ii) by having the applicable investors voluntarily agree to amend their tax returns to include their share of the audit adjustment. If the fund decides to make a Section 6226 Election, the audit adjustment would be “pushed out” to investors that were partners of the fund during the Audit Year. Such investors would be liable for the tax (plus interest at a rate 2 percent higher than the regular underpayment interest rate and penalties) directly at their level, taking into account their other tax attributes. However, there is still uncertainty regarding whether an audit adjustment can be pushed out through partnership tiers (e.g., from a master fund to the feeder fund and then to the feeder fund’s investors). As a result, it may not be tax advantageous for particular funds to make a Section 6226 Election.

    Investment managers should discuss with their attorneys at Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP the changes to the funds’ organizational and disclosure documents that might be made in anticipation of the new partnership tax audit rules phasing in next year. These rules would also apply to most investment managers and fund general partners/managing members that are treated as partnerships for U.S. tax purposes, so changes to those entities’ operating agreements should also be considered.


    [1] It is anticipated that various U.S. states will adopt similar rules regarding state taxes.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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