Content Type: Article

  • Can Courts Bless a Trustee’s Decision?

    ARTICLE

    Can Courts Bless a Trustee’s Decision?

    August 30, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Nicholas Holland authored this bylined article the English courts’ power to bless a trustee’s momentous decisions before the trustee acts on them. “Importantly, the court’s blessing includes the process by which decisions are made, which essentially immunizes trustees from subsequent allegations that a decision amounts to a breach of trust,” he wrote.

    In depth
    Authors

    Jane Zhao

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Top 5 Takeaways: CMS’s Proposed Overhaul of the MSSP ACOs

    ARTICLE

    Top 5 Takeaways: CMS’s Proposed Overhaul of the MSSP ACOs

    August 30, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) published a proposed rule on August 17, 2018, that would make sweeping changes to the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP), a federal program that incentivizes integrated health provider networks to form Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). According to CMS, the proposed rule aims to create new “pathways for success” for participating organizations to move more swiftly into performance-based risk arrangements.

    This McDermott+Consulting article by Mara McDermott, Consultant at McDermott+Consulting and Peter Rich, Counsel at McDermott Will & Emery, explores how the changes in the new proposed rule it will impact ACOs.

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  • Update to Illinois Captive Legislation (SB 1737)

    Update to Illinois Captive Legislation (SB 1737)

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Update to Illinois Captive Legislation (SB 1737)

    August 28, 2018

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    On August 26, 2018, Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner issued an amendatory veto of Senate Bill 1737 (Amendatory Veto). The governor vetoed aspects of the bill, which he characterized as imposing additional regulatory barriers to short-term limited duration health plans (STLDs) and worker’s compensation insurance. The governor said he supported the bill’s captive insurance provisions, as well as its reinsurance provisions. The governor issued an Amendatory Veto Message in connection with his action.

    Article IV, Section 9 of the Illinois Constitution dictates the procedure and time frame for the Illinois General Assembly’s consideration of the Amendatory Veto. The Illinois Senate may call the Amendatory Veto for consideration within 15 calendar days after the bill is placed on the Senate’s journal. If the bill is called for consideration, the Senate may either pass the bill as amended by the governor (requiring a majority vote) or vote to override the governor’s veto (requiring a 3/5s majority vote). If the Senate does not act, the bill dies. If the Senate acts to approve or override the bill, the Illinois House then has an additional 15 calendar days to either call the bill, accept the veto (by majority vote) or override (by 3/5s majority). Action by both the Illinois Senate and the House is required for the bill to become law.

    Our understanding is that the Amendatory Veto will not be placed on the Illinois Senate’s journal, triggering the 15-day review period, until the Senate is next in session on November 13, 2018. As a result, we won’t know the ultimate fate of the bill until late November or December.

    Authors

    Lisa M. Kaderabek

    Counsel

    Chicago

    Mary Kay Martire

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 8

    August 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dive into the August 2018 issue of IP Update: Vol. 21, No. 8

    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Second Circuit Rejects Use of Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition as Collection Tool

    Second Circuit Rejects Use of Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition as Collection Tool

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Rejects Use of Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition as Collection Tool

    August 22, 2018

    Read time: 10 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy court properly dismissed a creditor’s involuntary bankruptcy petition “for cause” when it “would serve none of the Bankruptcy Code’s goals or purposes . . . and [when] the sole [petitioning] creditor is not substantially prejudiced by remedies available under state law,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 14, 2018. In re Murray, 2018 WL 3848316, *7 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2018). In its view, the bankruptcy court “declined to serve as a ‘rented battle field’ or ‘collection agency’” for a single creditor. Id., at *7. The bankruptcy court had stressed that “bankruptcy is not a judgment enforcement device.” In re Murray, 543 B.R. 484, 494 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016).

    Relevance

    “Most bankruptcy filings are initiated as voluntary petitions,” and “[f]ar fewer are initiated as involuntary petitions by creditors, much less a single creditor,” explained the Second Circuit. Id., at *4,[1] citing Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judicial Facts and Figures, tbl 7.2 (last visited Aug. 13, 2018). According to the bankruptcy court, “less than 1/10 of 1% of all bankruptcy cases” are involuntary. 543 B.R. at 497. In the view of the Third and Seventh Circuits, involuntary bankruptcy petitions have “serious consequences [for] the alleged debtor, such as loss of credit standing, inability to transfer assets and carry on business affairs, and public embarrassment.” In re Forever Green Athletic Fields Inc., 804 F.3d 328, 335 (3d Cir. 2015), quoting In re Reid, 773 F.2d 945, 946 (7th Cir. 1985).

    Even when creditors file an otherwise valid involuntary petition, “that doesn’t mean the bankruptcy court can’t dismiss the case.” In re Forever Green, 804 F.3d at 334. Because an involuntary bankruptcy petition is an extreme remedy, the Second Circuit stressed in Murray that “Congress provided bankruptcy courts with a variety of tools with which to police their use.” Murray, 2018 WL 3848316, at *4.

    Facts

    A creditor obtained a $19-million judgment against the debtor and assigned the judgment to its counsel (“W”) as part of a fee settlement, agreeing to split any recovery on a 70/30 basis. Id., at *1. The debtor was jobless, had no income and made no payments to satisfy the judgment. According to W, the debtor sold assets and transferred the sale proceeds “to an offshore asset-protection trust.” Id.

    The debtor’s sole remaining asset was a $4.6-million residential cooperative apartment in Manhattan, the shares of which the debtor held with his wife as tenants by the entirety. The debtor lived in the apartment with his spouse and their two children. With its judgment, W obtained a lien on the shares of the cooperative apartment.

    W then filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the debtor in February 2014, admittedly, “to take advantage of bankruptcy remedies that would allow it to force a sale of the apartment — notwithstanding [the debtor’s] wife’s interest which would be recognized after the sale — rather than state law remedies that would permit it to execute on [the debtor’s] interest only.” Id., at *2. The debtor moved to dismiss the petition and alternatively asked the bankruptcy court to abstain from hearing the case.

    The bankruptcy court dismissed the petition on its own motion under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 707(a) after discovery and oral argument. W had improperly exploited the bankruptcy system, it held, relying on Code § 707(a) to dismiss the case for “cause.” Id. After detailing its reasoning, the bankruptcy court stressed “the behavior of [W, as] a creditor . . . .” Id., at *2. Significantly, the bankruptcy court declined to rule on the debtor’s “bad faith” argument, its sanctions request or abstention.

    W argued on appeal that the bankruptcy court had erred because the involuntary petition met the statutory requirements, there was no finding of bad faith, and because bankruptcy “would provide . . . relief not available outside of the bankruptcy forum.” Id., at *3. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, reasoning that New York law provided “a sufficient means for [W] to enforce its judgment and [W’s] inability to execute on [the debtor’s] wife’s interest under that law does not, under these circumstances, justify a need for [bankruptcy] relief . . . .” Id.

    The Second Circuit

    A bankruptcy court must engage in a fact-intensive analysis to determine what constituted “cause” to warrant dismissal, said the court, because the Code does not define “cause.” Id., at *3. Accordingly, it had to consider “whether dismissal would be in the best interest not only of the parties but of the bankruptcy system.” Id. Although a debtor is ordinarily interested in obtaining a fresh start upon the discharge of its debts, a creditor focuses on whether “it is prejudiced by dismissal such as when it is ‘prevented from taking other measures’ to collect.” Id.

    Acknowledging “equitable considerations” and “the sound discretion” of the bankruptcy court, the Second Circuit “found the following factors [to] favor dismissal” here: W “is a sole creditor; judgment enforcement remedies exist under state law; and no assets would be lost or dissipated in the event the bankruptcy case does not continue.” Id., at *4. The court rejected W’s argument that “New York’s remedies for enforcing a judgment on property owned in a tenancy by the entirety do not adequately protect its interests.” Id.

    No Abuse of Discretion by Bankruptcy Court. In sum, reasoned the Second Circuit, “dismissal better advances [the] debtor’s interests . . ., furthers the interests of the bankruptcy courts and the public, and does not substantially prejudice [W’s] interests as a creditor . . . . [T]he judgment enforcement remedies under New York law sufficiently protect [W’s] interests as a sole creditor.” Id.

    Unusual Nature of Involuntary Bankruptcy Petitions. Code § 303 contains the requirements for an involuntary petition and “courts tend to scrutinize such petitions closely.” Id. But “neither party dispute[d] that the [statutory] requirements were met” here. Id. Still, explained the court, “a bankruptcy court may dismiss [the petition] for cause under Section 707(a) after notice and a hearing.” Id., at *5. The “New York remedies are sufficient in this case [and] do not substantially prejudice [W’s] interests . . . . ” Id. Citing the Third Circuit’s Forever Green decision, the court stressed that “inappropriate use of the . . . Code may constitute cause to dismiss,” and that mere debt collection is not a proper purpose for a bankruptcy filing. Id. The court did not have to find bad faith on W’s part because “misuse” of the Code “is one of a number of factors supporting cause to dismiss.” Id.

    The Second Circuit distilled the bankruptcy court’s detailed findings of “cause” as follows: “[W’s] petition was part of a long-running two-party dispute, there were no other creditors to protect, and it had been brought solely as a judgment enforcement device for which adequate remedies existed in state law.” Id. The debtor neither wanted nor needed a bankruptcy discharge, and there were no “competing creditors.” Id.

    No Prejudice to W. The court rejected W’s argument that New York’s judgment enforcement remedies are inadequate when compared to available bankruptcy remedies. Under New York law, W could “execute on [the debtor’s] shares in his apartment and . . . cause those shares to be sold in a judgment execution sale.” Id., at *6. According to W, the Code would, in contrast, permit the sale of both the debtor’s interest and the interest of his non-debtor spouse in the apartment, subject to the requirements of Code § 363(h). The Second Circuit stressed, though, that it was “by no means certain that [W] would be authorized to sell the apartment” in a bankruptcy case and that any sale proceeds would be “speculative.” Id., at *6.

    This case, said the court, “involves only one creditor and no risk of asset depletion in favor of other creditors. Id., at *7. A “two-party dispute” like this one “should not be in bankruptcy court to begin with.” Id.

    Interests of Debtor and the Bankruptcy System. Because “the interests of a debtor must be considered when determining whether cause exists to dismiss” an involuntary petition, the debtor’s “vigorous opposition to the petition” is relevant. Id. More important to the court, though, was “the interest of the bankruptcy system . . . and . . . the public interest . . . in preventing parties from exploiting the bankruptcy system for non-bankruptcy-related reasons, especially when adequate remedies exist in state courts.” Id.

    Comment

    1. The Second Circuit’s sensible analysis relied heavily on the bankruptcy court’s magisterial opinion. As that court noted, had the debtor fraudulently transferred assets, W could sue in the state court “without resort to the bankruptcy court.” 543 B.R. at 492, citing N.Y. Debtor & Creditor Law § 271 et seq. Moreover, no “creditor community” needed the protection of bankruptcy law. Id., at 486. “[B]ankruptcy was created as a collective remedy, to achieve pari passu distribution amongst creditors . . . .” Id. (emphasis in text). Here, “there are no other creditors’ needs and concerns to protect . . . .” Id.
    2. The Third Circuit’s Forever Green decision provides perspective on a bad faith involuntary petition. In that case, a judgment creditor had been sued by the debtor in an arbitration proceeding. The Third Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s finding that the creditor had acted in bad faith in blocking the debtor’s efforts to litigate against it and to collect on its claim. 804 F.3d at 332.

    The creditor’s “litigation strategy was to use any means necessary to force the payment of [his] Consent Judgment and the abandonment of [the debtor’s] claims against [him].” 804 F.2d at 336. Moreover, the creditor’s “plan was to use the consent judgment to garnish the arbitrator’s fees, thereby forcing the arbitrator to halt the arbitration.” In fact, the creditor and “his counsel said they would keep the arbitration suspended until [the debtor] paid on the consent judgment,” and “[t]hey also threatened to file an involuntary petition unless [the debtor] agreed to stop the [arbitration] proceedings.” Id.

    The creditor’s actions thus “ran counter to the spirit of collective creditor action that should animate an involuntary filing.” The creditor “put his own interest above all others . . . [b]y trying to end the arbitration” and “was obstructing [the debtor] from pursuing its largest asset, the potential proceeds of which [the debtor] could have used to pay its creditors.” The creditor “was also using the bankruptcy process to exert pressure on [the debtor] to pay the consent judgment without regard to . . . other creditors, many of which had higher priority claims.” Agreeing with other courts, the Third Circuit found it “improper for creditors to use the bankruptcy courts to gain a personal advantage in other pending actions or as a debt-collection device.” Id., citing In re Nordbrock, 772 F.2d 397, 400 (8th Cir. 1985) (“A creditor does not have a special need for bankruptcy relief if it can go to state court to collect a debt.”).

    1. Murray also shows, as a matter of state debtor-creditor law, the utility of the tenancy by the entirety as an asset-protection device. W could only reach the debtor’s interest in the apartment shares, not those of his wife. Nor could W “force a partition or sale of the apartment, or . . . inhabit the apartment . . . . [The debtor’s] wife [had] her right of survivorship in the apartment [and] would own the apartment free and clear . . . if [the debtor] predeceases her.” 2018 WL 3848316, *6.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] Available here.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2018 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Company Culture, Post #MeToo

    ARTICLE

    Company Culture, Post #MeToo

    August 21, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Sarah Walters authored this bylined article on effective investigations into alleged misconduct. “The crux of so many of the lawsuits that have been filed—whether by the complainants, the accused, or the shareholders—is that management did not adequately investigate complaints of harassment before taking action, or not taking action,” she wrote.

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  • IRS Slams Door on Refunds/Credits for Taxpayers with Section 965 Transition Tax Liability

    IRS Slams Door on Refunds/Credits for Taxpayers with Section 965 Transition Tax Liability

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Slams Door on Refunds/Credits for Taxpayers with Section 965 Transition Tax Liability

    August 21, 2018

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has issued PMTA 2018-016, reaffirming its position that for taxpayers making an election under Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 965(h) to pay the transition tax over eight years through installment payments, any overpayments of 2017 tax liabilities cannot be used as credits for 2018 estimated tax payments or refunded, unless and until the overpayment amount exceeds the full eight years of installment payments.

    The IRS’s position has affected many taxpayers, and practitioners expressed their concerns to the IRS to no avail — we examine this surprising development in greater detail below.

    In depth

    On August 8, 2018, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issued PMTA 2018-016 reaffirming its position that for taxpayers making an election under Internal Revenue Code (Code) Section 965(h) to pay the transition tax over eight years through installment payments, any overpayments of 2017 tax liabilities cannot be used as credits for 2018 estimated tax payments or refunded, unless and until the overpayment amount exceeds the full eight years of installment payments. PMTA 2018-016 relies on Code sections 6402 and 6403, and case law, for its position. This nonbinding legal advice from IRS Chief Counsel attorneys to IRS personnel marks the first time the IRS has provided to the public its reasoning on this subject. We have previously discussed this issue in the following two Tax Controversy 360 blog articles: “Tax reform insight: IRS doubles down on retention of 2017 overpayments to satisfy future Section 965 installment payments” and “IRS holding 2017 overpayments to satisfy future Section 965 liabilities,” as discussed below, continue to believe that the IRS’s position is incorrect.

    Code section 6402(a) provides that, in the case of any overpayment, the IRS may (within the applicable limitations period) credit the amount of such overpayment against any liability in respect of an internal revenue tax of the taxpayer who made the overpayment. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3(a)(6) provides that the IRS may credit any overpayment of income tax against any outstanding liability for any tax owed by the taxpayer making the overpayment.

    The IRS’s position is that payments in excess of the first installment amount due under Code section 965(h)(1) for 2017 are not “overpayments” because the entire transition tax is a 2017 tax liability. Thus, according to the IRS, absent an overpayment of the entire 2017 tax liability (which includes all eight installments of the transition tax) the IRS has no statutory authority under Code section 6402 to issue a credit or refund.

    Code section 6403 provides:

    In the case of a tax payable in installments, if the taxpayer has paid as an installment of the tax more than the amount determined to be the correct amount of such installment, the overpayment shall be credited against the unpaid installments, if any. If the amount already paid, whether or not on the basis of installments, exceeds the amount determined to be the correct amount of the tax, the overpayment shall be credited or refund as provided in section 6402.

    Similarly, the regulations under Code section 6403 provide that if any installment of tax is overpaid, the overpayment shall first be applied against any outstanding installments of such tax and if the overpayment exceeds the correct amount of tax due, the overpayment shall be credited or refunded as provided in Code section 6402 and the regulations thereunder.

    The IRS’s position is that an election under Code section 965(h) to pay in eight installments makes the 2017 tax liability a tax payable in installments under the longstanding general principles of Code section 6403. According to the IRS, Code section 6403 does not set out the order in which excess payments are to be applied to remaining installments due and, therefore, the IRS will apply any excess amounts subsequent transition tax installment payments until such excess exceeds the amount of that installment due. The IRS relies on estate tax cases under Code section 6166 holding that overpayments of installments of estate tax must be applied to future installment payment obligations. The IRS has concluded that section Code 6403 does not permit the IRS to refund any excess installment payment prior to there being an overpayment of the entire liability as provided in section 6402.

    On August 16, 2018, the National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA) posted IRS Administration of the Section 965 Transition Tax Contravenes Congressional Intent and Imposes Unintended Burden on Taxpayers. The NTA expressed the position that Congress’ intent “seems pretty clear” in that taxpayer would have eight years to pay the transition tax liability with smaller payments amounts in early years and no interest due on any payments. The NTA indicated that the IRS’s interpretation in PMTA 2018-016 “sharply limits the value of Section 965(h), and in some cases, may even render it meaningless.” The NTA noted that it is common for large corporations to overpay their estimated taxes, including to minimize the risk they may become liable for underpayment interest. The NTA stated that while the IRS’s interpretation may be legally correct, members of the private sector have suggested that the IRS may be able to refund estimated taxes in certain situations (see below). Finally, the NTA noted that a request has been made to the IRS Office of Chief Counsel to re-examine this issue and consider alternative approaches.

    In addition to the points made by the NTA, we note that Supreme Court precedent provides that an “overpayment” is defined as any payment in excess of that which is properly due. Future installment payments of the transition tax are not due in 2017; they are due in later years. This is consistent with Congress’ intent of allowing taxpayers to elect to pay the transition tax in eight backloaded, interest-free installments instead of all at once. It appears that the purpose of allowing taxpayers to make payments in eight installments was to lessen the liquidity burden of this one-time tax on a massive amount of foreign earnings. Further, Congress did not require that taxpayers pay interest on subsequent installment payment amounts (note that Code section 6601 generally requires interest on underpayments of tax). Code section 965(h) is sui generis, and treating it like any other installment payment scenario clearly frustrates congressional intent.

    With regard to PMTA 2018-016’s reliance on Code section 6403 and underlying case law under Code section 6166, Code section 965 is different from Code section 6166 in many respects. First, interest does not accrue on subsequent installment payments of the transition tax. Second, taxpayers were required to make two separate payments to the IRS on April 17, 2018: one payment for the first installment of the transition tax and a separate payment reflecting tax owed without regard to the transition tax. Thus, for taxpayers that correctly calculated their Code section 965 transition tax liability, the first installment payment for the transition tax did not exceed the installment due. Finally, as noted above, Congress expressed its intent in allowing taxpayers to make eight installment payments (without interest) and presumably would not have intended that the rules in section 6403 should apply here.

    PMTA 2018-016 does not address situations where taxpayers timely filed Form 4466, Corporation Application for Quick Refund of Estimated Tax, pursuant to Code section 6425. Our understanding is that the IRS is not processing some of those requests despite the statutory requirement (subject to certain exceptions) that they be acted upon within 45 days. It remains to be seen whether the IRS will issue additional guidance relating to this issue, as suggested by the NTA.

    The IRS, by issuing PMTA 2018-016, has staked out its position (at least for situations not involving timely filed Forms 4466) and affected taxpayers will need to explore all options once their 2017 tax returns are filed. Please contact one of the authors or your regular McDermott lawyer if you are affected by the IRS’s position and would like to further discuss these issues.

    Authors

    Sandra P. McGill

    Counsel

    Chicago

    David G. Noren

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • European Court of Justice: Registrability of Coloured Position Marks (Louboutin)

    ARTICLE

    European Court of Justice: Registrability of Coloured Position Marks (Louboutin)

    August 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In its judgement Louboutin dated 12 June 2018, the European Court of Justice ruled that so-called position marks which claim a color at a certain position of a product (in this case: red colored soles of high heel shoes) may be registered as European trademarks. In this bylined article, Boris Uphoff explains the background of the European Court of Justice’s Louboutin judgement and its practical impact on European trademark law.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Boris Uphoff

    Partner

    Munich, Düsseldorf

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  • IRS Private Letter Ruling Will Help Clear the Way for 401(k) Plan Student Loan Benefits

    IRS Private Letter Ruling Will Help Clear the Way for 401(k) Plan Student Loan Benefits

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRS Private Letter Ruling Will Help Clear the Way for 401(k) Plan Student Loan Benefits

    August 17, 2018

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Earlier today, the IRS released a private letter ruling which will help clear the way for employers to provide a new type of student loan repayment benefit as part of their 401(k) plans. This ruling is important because many employers have been looking for ways to help their employees manage student loan repayment obligations, but to date the options available for doing so have been rather limited.

    In depth

    Background

    Over the last decade, the amount of outstanding student loan debt in the US has nearly tripled. Studies suggest there are currently around 44 million Americans with student loan debt, bringing the total student loan debt obligation in the US to more than $1.3 trillion dollars. As a result, not surprisingly, managing student loan debt has become an increasingly significant concern for many employees. This includes not only employees who are entering the workforce for the first time, but also older workers who may still have student loan repayment obligations of their own, or who may have taken on some of those obligations for their children.

    With student loan debt obligations on the rise, employees are placing increasing value on the availability of employer-provided student loan repayment assistance. In a 2015 survey, more than three-quarters of young professionals said that the availability of employer-provided student loan repayment assistance would be a considerable factor in deciding to accept a job offer. As a result, forward-thinking companies are looking for new ways to help their employees tackle student loan debt. A private letter ruling (PLR) released by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) earlier today will help clear the way for these companies to offer a new type of student loan benefit as part of their 401(k) plans.

    Key Features of New Student Loan Repayment Benefit

    By issuing the PLR, the IRS gave its blessing to an employer-provided student loan repayment benefit offered through an employer’s 401(k) plan. More specifically, the PLR confirmed that, under certain circumstances, employers may be able to link the amount of employer contributions made on an employee’s behalf under a 401(k) plan to the amount of student loan repayments made by the employee outside the plan.

    Historically, many plan sponsors have questioned whether such an approach would be permissible under IRS rules. As a result, to date, employers have been reluctant to create student loan benefit programs that specifically link 401(k) plan contributions to student loan repayments. However, the PLR provides welcome confirmation that such an arrangement is permissible under certain circumstances. In particular, the IRS concluded that the employer could make a non-elective contribution to its 401(k) plan, where the amount of the non-elective contribution would be based on an employee’s total student loan repayments and would be contributed to the plan in lieu of the matching contributions that would otherwise be made to the plan had the employee made pre-tax, Roth 401(k) and/or after-tax contributions.

    The student loan benefit program detailed in the PLR includes a number of key features:

    • Participation in the student loan repayment benefit program is voluntary. If an employee signs up to participate, then for each payroll period during which the employee makes sufficient student loan repayments, the employee is eligible to receive a non-elective employer contribution. The non-elective employer contribution is equal to the matching contribution the employee would otherwise receive if the employee made pre-tax, Roth 401(k) and/or after-tax contributions to the plan during the same payroll period.
    • The student loan repayment benefit effectively replaces the employer matching contribution for an employee who chooses to participate in the program. An employee who signs up for the program is not eligible to receive regular matching contributions under the plan while the employee is participating in the student loan repayment program. However, the employer provides a year-end true-up match to ensure that if an employee fails to make sufficient student loan repayments to receive the full student-loan-based non-elective employer contribution for any payroll period, but does make pre-tax, Roth 401(k) and/or after-tax contributions during the same period, the employee will be eligible to receive a true-up matching contribution. The true-up matching contribution is equal to the regular matching contribution the employee would otherwise be entitled to receive for such payroll period.
    • The student loan repayment benefit is subject to coverage and nondiscrimination testing, as well as other applicable requirements for a qualified retirement plan, including contribution limits, eligibility and vesting and distribution rules.

    Impact of IRS Ruling on Employers

    Employer-provided student loan benefit programs are still relatively new. In fact, recent surveys have suggested only about 4 percent of employers currently offer their employees some form of assistance or incentive to repay student loans. Most other companies are still trying to figure out what (if any) student loan benefit programs are well-suited for their workforce. As a result, the PLR provides helpful guidance for employers looking for new ways to provide such benefits and, in particular, for employers looking for ways to accomplish the dual purpose of helping employees manage student loan repayment obligations while saving for retirement.

    From a cost perspective, the student-loan-repayment-based non-elective employer contribution approved in the PLR is also arguably closer to cost-neutral than most other student loan benefit programs. Typically, student loan benefits (like traditional student loan reimbursement payments) result in an additional cost for the employer because the employer is adding a new benefit that requires paying an additional amount to employees in the form of the student loan benefit. However, under the program described in the PLR, employees aren’t eligible to receive any more in total contributions under the 401(k) plan than they could otherwise be entitled to receive in regular matching contributions. The student-loan-based non-elective employer contribution essentially offsets any matching contribution an employee would otherwise be eligible to receive under the plan. This means that, unlike other types of student loan benefits, employers may be able to add a student-loan-repayment-based non-elective employer contribution to their existing retirement plan without considerable additional costs.

    Conclusion

    Because student loan benefit programs are becoming an increasingly powerful way for employers to attract and retain key talent, the PLR will very likely cause many employers, particularly employers with a young and educated workforce, to consider offering a student loan benefit as part of their retirement program.

    Importantly, employers who wish to do so should take care to review their 401(k) plans for special rules, features or design elements (outside those discussed in the PLR) that might create additional hurdles to linking the amount of employer contributions made on an employee’s behalf under a 401(k) plan to the amount of student loan repayments made by the employee outside the plan. For example, some of the special rules that apply to safe harbor plans could limit an employer’s ability to create a similar student loan benefit structure.

    Authors

    Jeffrey M. Holdvogt

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • No Fraudulent Initial Coin Offering Is Too Small for the SEC

    No Fraudulent Initial Coin Offering Is Too Small for the SEC

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    No Fraudulent Initial Coin Offering Is Too Small for the SEC

    August 17, 2018

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On August 14, 2018, the SEC announced a $30,000 fine and trading ban against a company and its founder, finding that the defendants carried out a fraudulent ICO to fund a speculative oil-drilling venture, and that such conduct violated federal securities registration and antifraud laws. This SEC enforcement action indicates the SEC is closely scrutinizing ICOs, even those that involve marginal amounts of virtual currency.

    In depth

    The US Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) Administrative Order titled In the Matter of Tomahawk Exploration LLC and David Thompson Laurance, indicates that the SEC has set its sights on fraudulent initial coin offerings (ICOs).

    Between July and September 2017, oil and gas exploration company Tomahawk Exploration LLC, and its founder, David Laurance, held an ICO in which they offered and sold “Tomahawkcoins” or “TOM” in an effort to raise $5 million to fund an oil drilling venture in California. The SEC found that the defendants published fraudulent promotional materials overstating the economic potential of TOM coins and failed to disclose Laurance’s prior criminal convictions. In the corresponding press release, the Chief of the SEC’s Cyber Unit stated, “Investors should be alert to the risk of old-school fraud, like oil and gas schemes, masquerading as innovative blockchain-based ICOs.”

    Tomahawk’s promotional materials stated that the drilling project was “capable of producing significant risk adjusted rates of return,” and that the TOM coin was “backed by profits generated by Tomahawk.” The defendants also offered token holders the opportunity to convert TOM into equity and potentially profit from the anticipated oil production. The SEC found that the defendants used inflated projections of oil production and falsely suggested that Tomahawk already possessed drilling leases. Tomahawk also described its managers as “refined successful citizens with flawless backgrounds,” but failed to disclose Laurance’s prior brushes with law enforcement, including a 1993 conviction for fraud, past involvement with companies subject to SEC actions, and personal bankruptcies.

    To promote the ICO, the defendants launched a free promotional token giveaway called the “Bounty Program,” in which 80,000 TOM coins were distributed to internet users who promoted the currency on trading platforms, blogs and social media.

    The SEC found that the defendants had violated federal law by: (1) selling securities without complying with registration requirements, in violation of Sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933; and (2) making materially false and misleading statements in connection with that sale, in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.

    In making this determination, the SEC opined that the TOM tokens were “securities” because they represented an investment of money in Tomahawk’s drilling enterprise and could be converted into equity. The SEC also determined that the promotional token giveaway constituted a securities “sale” because it involved “an attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value.”

    Significantly, the SEC noted that the “free” nature of a token giveaway “does not mean that there was not a sale or offer for sale” because a “gift of a security is a sale . . . when the donor receives some benefit.” The SEC specifically pointed to the online marketing benefits associated with Tomahawk’s “Bounty Program” giveaway and the creation of a public trading market for TOM, as the value that Tomahawk received in exchange for its Bounty Program distribution. When combined with the misleading statements made in connection with the ICO, such a “sale” of virtual currency violated registration and antifraud rules.

    This enforcement action suggests that the SEC is taking a close look at token sales and Bounty Programs and may proceed with investigations and penalties against individuals and entities even in comparatively small-scale operations. Those in the industry should tread carefully, even when dealing with relatively small sums of virtual currency.

    We would also like to thank McDermott Partners David L. Taub, Alexandra C. Scheibe and Summer Associate Charlie Wohlberg for their contributions to this article.

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