Content Type: Article

  • The Death of Dead Man’s Statutes?

    ARTICLE

    The Death of Dead Man’s Statutes?

    September 26, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Monica Asher and Joseph Viviano authored this bylined article evaluating the potential impact of the dead man’s statute that may apply in a particular case.

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    Authors

    Monica S. Asher

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Joseph J. Viviano

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Federal Courts Diverge on Bristol-Myers and Class Actions

    ARTICLE

    Federal Courts Diverge on Bristol-Myers and Class Actions

    September 26, 2018

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Christopher Murphy and Elizabeth Rowe authored this bylined article examining the various factors that must be considered in determining whether Bristol-Myers applies to a class action in federal court.

    In depth

    This article was originally published in Law360, September 26, 2018.

    In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the California forum court lacked specific jurisdiction over nonresident plaintiffs’ mass tort claims, because the defendant’s conduct giving rise to their claims did not occur in California.[1] Although the Bristol-Myers decision concerned a mass tort action in state court, federal courts across the country have been wrestling with the question of whether its holding extends to class actions in federal court.

    To date, no federal appellate court has addressed the issue. This article examines the various factors that must be considered in determining whether Bristol-Myers applies to a class action in federal court.

    Application of Bristol-Myers in Federal Courts

    Several courts have questioned whether Bristol-Myers applies to any cases in federal court, because Bristol-Myers focused on whether the California state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the claims of nonresident plaintiffs comported with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment.

    Specifically, the Supreme Court was concerned that a California court may have overstepped its authority by applying its law to the claims of nonresident plaintiffs. Indeed, Justice Sonia Sotomayor stated that “[t]he majority’s animating concern, in the end, appears to be federalism: ‘[T]erritorial limitations on the power of the respective States. …”[2]

    Given the unique federalism concerns involved in state courts exercising personal jurisdiction over claims of out-of-state residents, plaintiffs attempting to avoid the reach of Bristol-Myers have argued that the decision is irrelevant to lawsuits in federal courts. Federal courts in which subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship have held overwhelmingly that Bristol-Myers applies in federal courts.[3]

    These courts generally conclude that the due process analysis under both the 14th and 5th Amendments is the same.[4] They also find that the concerns raised by Bristol-Myers are equally present when a federal court is applying state substantive law claims and the state long-arm statute is coextensive with federal law.[5]

    Federal courts are split, however, over the issue of whether Bristol-Myers applies to federal cases where subject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question. Federal courts in New Jersey, Illinois and Ohio have applied Bristol-Myers to federal claims.[6] Similar to several of the rulings by courts sitting in diversity, the Ohio federal court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish between the Fifth Amendment and 14th Amendment jurisdiction analyses.[7]

    The Illinois federal court based its decision to apply Bristol-Myers on whether the relevant federal statute authorized nationwide service of process.[8] Thus, following the reasoning of the Illinois federal court, it is an open issue as to whether Bristol-Myers would apply to federal actions where subject matter jurisdiction is based on a federal claim that permits nationwide service of process, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act or the Sherman Act.

    Federal courts in California and Georgia, however, have rejected the application of Bristol-Myers to claims in federal court based on violations of federal law. These courts find that the Supreme Court’s federalism concerns in Bristol-Myers (i.e., concerns about a state court applying its own laws to claims of nonresidents) are nonexistent in cases in federal courts applying federal law.[9]

    Application of Bristol-Myers to Class Actions

    Bristol-Myers was a mass tort action, not a class action. Federal courts analyzing whether Bristol-Myers applies to class actions have split into three distinct factions: (1) those that categorically reject the application of Bristol-Myers to class actions; (2) those that apply Bristol-Myers to the claims of the named plaintiffs, but not to the claims of absent class members; and (3) those that apply Bristol-Myers to the claims of all class members.

    A few federal courts have held that Bristol-Myers is simply inapplicable to class actions.[10] One rationale for these decisions is that the Supreme Court in Bristol-Myers narrowly ruled in the context of the mass tort action before it.[11] In addition, some of these courts have reasoned that class actions, unlike mass tort actions, contain additional due process safeguards in the form of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s certification standards.[12]

    Other federal courts, especially in California, have applied Bristol-Myers to the claims of the named plaintiffs, but not to the claims of absent class members. According to these courts, an important distinction between mass tort actions and class actions is that, in the former, all plaintiffs are named and considered real parties in interest to the complaint; while in the latter, select named plaintiffs represent unnamed, similarly situated persons.[13]

    These courts reason that only the claims of the named plaintiffs are relevant for purposes of establishing specific jurisdiction because “individual members of a plaintiff class, aside from named representatives, need not satisfy the ‘minimal contacts’ test in order for the forum court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them.”[14] As such, these courts have applied Bristol-Myers to named plaintiffs — requiring that their claims arise out of defendant’s activity that occurred within the forum state — but not to absent class members.[15] These cases certainly are more persuasive than the minority of cases that categorically reject the application of Bristol-Myers in federal court or in class actions generally.

    Other courts, especially in Illinois, have held that Bristol-Myers applies both to the named plaintiffs and to all members of the putative class(es).[16] These courts have reasoned that a defendant’s due process protection should not vary depending on the type of plaintiff bringing the claim.[17] According to these courts, the federalism concerns remain the same, regardless of whether the action is a mass tort action or a class action.[18]

    Exercise of “Pendent Personal Jurisdiction” to Circumvent Bristol-Myers

    Some nonresident named plaintiffs have argued that, although Bristol-Myers prevents the court from exercising specific jurisdiction over their claims, personal jurisdiction can be established under the doctrine of “pendent personal jurisdiction” if there is at least one resident named plaintiff.

    Pendent jurisdiction traditionally refers to the joinder of a state law claim by a party already presenting a federal claim against the same defendant. The doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction is a discretionary variant on pendent jurisdiction that is recognized in some jurisdictions.[19]

    According to the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, where a federal statute authorizes nationwide service of process, and the federal and nonfederal claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, the court may assert personal jurisdiction over the parties to the nonfederal claims even if personal jurisdiction would not otherwise lie if the nonfederal claims were filed separately.[20]

    Some class action plaintiffs have argued for a variation of the doctrine of pendent personal jurisdiction, in which a court that possesses personal jurisdiction over a resident plaintiff’s state law claims may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over claims of nonresident plaintiffs against the same defendant arising under their own states’ laws.[21]

    The majority of courts encountering this argument have flatly rejected it.[22] However, at least one court has accepted this argument, holding that Bristol-Myers does not bar the exercise of pendent personal jurisdiction over these types of claims.[23] The Sloan court reasoned that application of the doctrine would avoid piecemeal litigation, and there was a minimal burden to the defendant from joining five nonresident plaintiffs asserting claims under two states’ laws because the court likely had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident absent class members anyway.[24] It remains to be seen whether any other courts follow Sloan to circumvent Bristol-Myers.

    Timing of Challenges to Personal Jurisdiction Under Bristol-Myers

    Because objections to personal jurisdiction may be waived, defendants are encouraged to move to dismiss the nonresident named plaintiffs and nonresident absent class members under Bristol-Myers in response to the filing of the complaint.[25]

    Some courts, however, have concluded that a personal jurisdiction challenge to the claims of absent class members is not ripe at the pleading stage. For example, in Chernus v. Logitech Inc., the court held that while personal jurisdiction over named plaintiffs’ claims can be resolved at the pleading stage, personal jurisdiction as to the absent class members is better decided at the class certification stage.[26]

    The court explained that it need not yet analyze whether specific jurisdiction is properly exercised over the claims of the absent class members because they are not yet parties to the case.[27] Regardless, it is highly unlikely that a defendant would await the class certification stage to challenge whether the court has personal jurisdiction over the claims of absent class members because of the risk that the court will find a waiver.

    Conclusion

    A clear majority of courts holds that Bristol-Myers applies to the claims of nonresident named plaintiffs. It is less clear whether Bristol-Myers applies to the claims of nonresident absent class members. Regardless, defendants certainly will be encouraged to move to dismiss all nonresident named plaintiffs, with the hope that the court will later not allow the remaining resident named plaintiffs to represent a national class or statewide classes of nonresidents.

    The consequences of such successful motions remain to be seen. If defendants are successful in knocking out the nonresident named plaintiffs (or both the nonresident named plaintiffs and nonresident absent class members), then the plaintiffs might respond by filing multiple separate statewide class actions in various states with a class representative from each state, or by filing a single national or multistate class action in a state with general jurisdiction over the defendant.

    Multiple statewide class actions in separate states would create costly piecemeal litigation for the defendant. But a single class action in the defendant’s principal place of business or state of incorporation (i.e., where there is general jurisdiction) may be preferred to an unfavorable jurisdiction selected by the plaintiff. A class action defendant moving to dismiss claims of named plaintiffs or absent class members based on Bristol-Myers will need to analyze how the forum court currently interprets Bristol-Myers in the context of class actions, and consider the potential ramifications of a successful motion.

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  • IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 9

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 9

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 9

    September 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dive into the September 2018 issue of IP Update: Vol. 21, No. 9

    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Cross-Border Foreign Investment Control in the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and China

    Cross-Border Foreign Investment Control in the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and China

    ARTICLE

    Cross-Border Foreign Investment Control in the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and China

    September 24, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jacob Kuipers, Uwe Goetker, Alexa Ningelgen, Christian von Sydow, Nadine Hartung, Nils Vitalis, Nicolas Lafont, Nicholas Azis and David Dai authored this bylined article on cross-border foreign investment.

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Uwe Goetker

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

    Jacob A. Kuipers

    Partner

    Boston

    Dr. Alexa Ningelgen

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • Update on M&A in Germany: Market Overview and 2018 Trends

    ARTICLE

    Update on M&A in Germany: Market Overview and 2018 Trends

    September 24, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Christian von Sydow and Dr. Germar Enders authored this bylined article on M&A Market Overview and 2018 Trends in Germany.

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  • Chinese Outbound Investments into Germany: A Regulatory Overview

    ARTICLE

    Chinese Outbound Investments into Germany: A Regulatory Overview

    September 24, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Dr. Nikolaus von Jacobs, Dr. Germar Enders and Ding Han authored this bylined article on Chinese Outbound Investments into Germany.

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  • Opinion | GDPR, Subcontracting and Co-Responsibility: Constraint or Opportunity?

    ARTICLE

    Opinion | GDPR, Subcontracting and Co-Responsibility: Constraint or Opportunity?

    September 20, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Romain Perray authored this bylined article on co-responsibility for processing personal data under the General Data Protection Regulation.

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  • States Continue to Bury Testimony From the Grave, but Many Dead Man’s Statutes Remain Alive and Well

    States Continue to Bury Testimony From the Grave, but Many Dead Man’s Statutes Remain Alive and Well

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    States Continue to Bury Testimony From the Grave, but Many Dead Man’s Statutes Remain Alive and Well

    September 20, 2018

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The Supreme Court of Wisconsin recently voted unanimously to repeal the state’s set of so-called dead man’s statutes. As of July 1, 2017, the effective date of the court’s order, Wisconsin joined 29 other states that have repealed similar statutes and rules. In states that have not repealed their statutes, the exclusionary effect of a dead man’s statute can create an insurmountable evidentiary hurdle that results in involuntary dismissal of claims that depend on testimony that would be otherwise admissible and credible. Because the dead man’s statutes that remain vary widely in scope, it is important to evaluate the potential impact of the specific dead man’s statute, if any, that is applicable in your case.

    In depth

    The term “dead man’s statute” is defined generally as “[a] law prohibiting the admission of a decedent’s statement in certain circumstances, as when an opposing party or witness seeks to use the statement to support a claim against the decedent’s estate.” Many states’ statutes are broader than this definition suggests, however, and may bar evidence of “any matter occurring before the death” of a party. Thus, dead man’s statutes may apply in cases involving claims made by or against a decedent’s estate. These laws have been justified on the grounds of fairness to the deceased, protection of decedents’ estates from false claims, and safeguarding against perjury. Dead man’s statutes also have “been roundly criticized as ignoring the interests of the living” because they defeat “more honest claims than there would be fictitious claims established if all such enactments were swept away.”

    A recent case in Illinois illustrates the competing public policies behind the enactment and repeal of dead man’s statutes. In Spencer v. Wayne, 80 N.E.3d 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017), the plaintiff alleged that injuries she sustained from slipping on a mat and falling in the defendant’s garage were caused by the defendant’s negligence. The plaintiff slipped on the mat while the defendant was in the driver’s seat of a car parked in the garage. The defendant died while the case was pending, and the special representative of her estate subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment based on the Illinois dead man’s statute

    In support of her motion, the special representative argued that the Illinois dead man’s statute barred the plaintiff’s testimony regarding the fall because it occurred in the defendant’s presence. The trial court determined that the statute applied and entered an order granting summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed.

    The appellate court found that it “was indisputabl[e]” that the defendant was in the plaintiff’s presence when she fell. Still, the plaintiff argued that the Illinois dead man’s statute should not bar her testimony because the defendant was in the driver’s seat of the car and could not have seen plaintiff’s feet when she fell. The appellate court rejected this argument as “circular” because the plaintiff’s testimony was the only evidence of the defendant being in the driver’s seat when the fall happened, and this testimony was also barred by the Illinois dead man’s statute. The appellate court held that “because plaintiff’s testimony that [defendant] was in the driver’s seat at the time of her fall is barred under the Act, so is her testimony about the fall itself.” Had the plaintiff presented admissible evidence that the defendant was in the driver’s seat, the appellate court would have permitted the plaintiff to testify about her fall.

    Spencer illustrates both the purpose of dead man’s statutes and the reason for their repeal in many states. On one hand, it would arguably be unfair to have allowed the plaintiff to testify as to the cause of her injuries when the defendant, if living, might have refuted the plaintiff’s testimony. On the other hand, the application of a dead man’s statute made it impossible for a plaintiff to prove her case against a defendant who may have actually been negligent in causing the plaintiff’s injury.

    Thirty states, including California, Florida, Alaska, Delaware, Nevada and South Dakota, do not currently have dead man’s statutes. In these states, every witness is competent to testify on any matter, subject to attacks on his or her credibility and ordinary evidentiary rules. Some of these states, such as California, Utah and South Dakota, have enacted special hearsay rules that enable the court to exclude out-of-court statements made by a decedent when circumstances indicate that the statements are untrustworthy.

    The other 20 states (and the District of Columbia) retain some form of dead man’s statute. The scope of these statutes varies widely. Some states limit the application of their statutes to testimony from the parties, certain types of proceedings (e.g., proceedings against a decedent’s estate or proceedings to enforce a debt against a decedent) or certain types of statements (e.g., oral but not written statements). Other states, such as New York and Illinois, have broad dead man’s statutes that bar not only communications made by a decedent, but also evidence of transactions with the decedent or events that took place in the presence of the decedent. All dead man’s statutes are subject to one or more legislatively created or judicially recognized exceptions. For example, in Texas and other states, a party’s testimony concerning a statement made by a decedent is admissible only if corroborated by other evidence.

    In light of the significant variance among states in the admissibility of evidence concerning transactions with the deceased, it is important to examine the scope of the specific dead man’s statute, if any, that may apply in a particular case. Moreover, when a court in more than one state can establish jurisdiction, the dead man’s statute applicable in each jurisdiction should be considered as an important factor when selecting a forum.

    Authors

    Monica S. Asher

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    Joseph J. Viviano

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Criminal Cases in the October 2018 Term: A Law Professor’s Dream

    ARTICLE

    Criminal Cases in the October 2018 Term: A Law Professor’s Dream

    September 18, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Rory Little authored this bylined article noting that 13 of the 28 cases up for the Supreme Court of the United States raise criminal law and related issues.

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  • Enforcing the Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies: Recent Developments

    Enforcing the Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies: Recent Developments

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Enforcing the Regulatory Landscape for Virtual Currencies: Recent Developments

    September 18, 2018

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    US regulators have stepped up their activity in terms of enforcing the regulation of virtual currencies and on September 11, 2018, issued four relevant decisions: FINRA’s first disciplinary action involving cryptocurrencies; the SEC’s first enforcement action regarding an investment company registration violation involving investments in digital assets; the SEC issued its first case charging unregistered broker-dealers for selling digital tokens, and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled, in what is believed to be the first criminal case of its kind, that an initial coin offering may be deemed a “security” for purposes of federal criminal law.

    In depth

    On September 11, 2018, US financial regulatory authorities and a New York Federal District Court were busy enforcing the federal securities laws against virtual currency companies. On that day, four important virtual currency-related enforcement decisions were delivered:

    • The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) issued its first disciplinary action involving cryptocurrencies. In its complaint, FINRA alleged that Timothy Tilton Ayre (Ayre), the president and the largest shareholder of Rocky Mountain Ayre, Inc. (RMTN), a public company, attempted to lure public investment in RMTN by making fraudulent, positive statements about RMTN’s business and finances, and by issuing and selling HempCoin, a coin which Ayre publicized as “the first minable coin backed by marketable securities” and “the world’s first currency to represent equity ownership” in a publicly traded company. FINRA alleges that Ayre defrauded investors by making materially false statements and omissions regarding the nature of RMTN’s business, failing to disclose his unlawful distribution of HempCoin, and making multiple false and misleading statements in RMTN’s financial statements. Ayre is being charged under the federal securities laws with the unlawful distribution of an unregistered security since he never registered HempCoin, and no exemption to registration applied.
    • The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued its first enforcement action regarding an investment company registration violation by a hedge fund manager based on its investments in digital assets. According to the SEC’s order, hedge fund manager Crypto Asset Management LP (CAM) and its sole principal, Timothy Enneking (Enneking), offered a fund that operated as an unregistered investment company. CAM, marketed falsely as the “first regulated crypto asset fund in the US”, had filed a registration statement with the SEC and raised more than $3.6 million. CAM was found to be engaging in an unregistered non-exempt public offering, investing more than 40 percent of its assets in digital asset securities, causing the fund to operate as an unregistered investment company. Eventually, CAM and Enneking paid a $200,000 penalty after agreeing to the SEC’s cease-and-desist order and censure without admitting or denying the findings against them.
    • The SEC also issued its first enforcement action charging unregistered broker-dealers for selling digital tokens since the issuance of The DAO Report in 2017, which cautioned that those who offer and sell digital securities must comply with the federal securities laws. The SEC entered an order finding that TokenLot LLC, a self-described “ICO Superstore”, and its owners received orders from retail investors and handled hundreds of different digital tokens, which the SEC found included securities, without registering as broker-dealers. TokenLot and its owners promoted the company’s website as a way to purchase digital tokens during Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) and engage in secondary trading, with most of its business occurring after the issuance of The DAO Report on the applicability of securities laws to digital assets. After being contacted by the SEC staff, TokenLot voluntarily winded down and refunded investors’ payments for unfilled orders. TokenLot and its owners were charged with violating the registration provisions in connection with their conduct.
    • The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York ruled that a jury may find that the investment opportunities provided by a defendant who offered virtual currency investment schemes and related ICOs may meet the definition of “security”. United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 1:17-cr-00647 (E.D.N.Y. September 11, 2018). The SEC sued defendant Maksim Zaslavskiy (Zaslavskiy) for making materially false and fraudulent representations and omissions in connection with two purported virtual currency investment schemes and their related ICOs: REcoin Group Foundation, LLC (REcoin) and DRC World, Inc. (DRC). Zaslavskiy, who allegedly promised token purchasers profits from his companies’ investments in diamonds and real estate, moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the virtual currencies promoted in the REcoin and DRC ICOs are “currencies”, and therefore, by definition, not securities. As such, Zaslavskiy argued that the ICOs did not involve securities, and are beyond the reach of the federal securities laws. As a separate basis for dismissal, Zaslavskiy argued that the US securities laws are unconstitutionally vague as applied to cryptocurrencies, and are “void for vagueness”. The government asserted that the investments made in REcoin and DRC were “investment contracts”, and thus “securities”, as defined by both Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and Section 2(a)(l) of the Securities Act. The court rejected Zaslavskiy’s arguments, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that the facts alleged in the indictment satisfy the Howey test, which determines whether certain transactions qualify as “investment contracts”, and that the laws under which Zaslavskiy was charged were not unconstitutionally vague “as applied to his conduct”. Ultimately, the court determined that “at this juncture, Zaslavskiy’s contrary characterizations are plainly insufficient to bypass regulatory and criminal enforcement of the securities laws,” and as a result, the case will proceed to trial.

    Conclusion

    Market participants should note the increased activity by the SEC and FINRA in their enforcement of regulation of virtual currency transactions. Similarly, recent court rulings such as in the Zaslavskiy case show that US courts are finding that an initial coin offering may be deemed a “security” for purposes of federal securities law. We will know the full implications of these interpretations and rulings over time, but they will certainly have wide-ranging market implications.

    Authors

    Thomas P. Conaghan

    Partner

    Washington, DC, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

    David L. Taub

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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