Content Type: Article

  • IRA Mandate for Private Sector Employers in New York State and New York City

    IRA Mandate for Private Sector Employers in New York State and New York City

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    IRA Mandate for Private Sector Employers in New York State and New York City

    March 23, 2022

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    New York State enacted requirements under which certain private sector employers, including not-for-profit organizations, are required to establish automatic enrollment payroll deduction IRAs if a qualified retirement plan is not offered to employees (“Secure Choice IRA”). More than half of private sector employees, including part-time workers, in New York do not have access to an employer-sponsored retirement savings option. The Secure Choice IRA was developed to address the retirement savings crisis. The purpose is to promote greater retirement savings for private-sector employees in a convenient, automatic, low-cost and portable manner. Only certain employers (defined below) are impacted by the new rules and have up to two years to implement the programs.

    New York City has enacted similar legislation, Retirement Security for All. However, the New York City law states that the City program’s retirement savings board will not implement the City program if “the state establishes a retirement savings program that requires a substantial portion of employers who would otherwise be covered employers to offer to their employees the opportunity to contribute to accounts through payroll deduction or another method of contribution.” As the New York State program will likely cover many of the same employers as the New York City program, it is unclear if the City’s program will be implemented. Employers should note that the Secure Choice IRA does not distinguish between New York State and New York City, and City and State distinctions discussed below will only apply if both programs are implemented.  

    Which Employers are Subject to the Secure Choice Savings Program Payroll Deduction IRA?

    • Any private sector employer engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade or other enterprise in New York, including private and not-for-profit companies, that has at all times during the prior calendar year without interruption employed at least
      • Ten (10) employees in New York State, or
      • Five (5) employees in New York City,
    • Has been in business at least two (2) years, and
    • Has not offered, in the preceding two (2) years, a qualified retirement plan such as a 401(k) or 403(b) plan.

    An employer that facilitates access for its employees to the Secure Choice IRA program is a participating employer. An employee who is enrolled in the Secure Choice IRA program is an Enrollee.

    What Rights do Employees Have?

    1. Employees have the right to (a) participate in the Secure Choice IRA and select the contribution level, which may be expressed as a percentage of wages or as a dollar amount up to the IRA annual limit (the limit for 2022 is $6,000, and $7,000 for employees age 50 and older).

    2. Employees can affirmatively elect to opt out of the Secure Choice IRA program using the applicable Opt-Out Form.

    3. If an employee fails to opt out of participation or make an election to participate with a different level of contributions, the employer will automatically enroll them at the default contribution rate, which is

    • Three percent (3%) of wages in New York State, or
    • Five percent (5%) in New York City (the “Default Rate”).

    4. Enrollees may change their contribution level at any time, subject to rules promulgated by the New York State Secure Choice Savings Board.

    5. The Secure Choice IRA is individually owned, which makes it portable—employees can take it with them if and when they change jobs.

    What Must an Employer Do?

    1. Under the Secure Choice IRA, a participating employer must provide informational materials to its employees. The notice must be provided to new employees at the time of hiring and for existing employees at least one month prior to the participating employer’s facilitation of access to the Secure IRA Savings Program. The notice must inform the employees of their election choices; the benefits and risks associated with making contributions to the program; the processes for making contributions, opting out of the program, changing the level of contributions, withdrawing savings, selecting beneficiaries, accessing information on financial literacy programs and obtaining more information; information on how to obtain financial advice from financial advisors (that participating employers are not in a position to provide financial advice and that participating employers are not liable for the investment decisions that employees make); and that the program fund is not guaranteed by New York State.
    2. Participating employers must automatically enroll in the Secure Choice IRA each employee who does not opt out of participation using the applicable Opt-Out Form or who has made an election to participate with a level of employee contributions other than three percent (3%) of wages in New York State or five percent (5%) in New York City.
    3. Participating employers must withhold and remit payroll deductions to the program by the 30th day after the employee is enrolled in the Secure Choice IRA.
    4. Participating employers must maintain records for at least three (3) years.

    Note: Employers do not make employer contributions to the Secure Choice IRA on behalf of their employees. Further, employers cannot terminate an existing qualified plan to participate in the Secure Choice IRA.

    Does the Employer Bear any Risk?

    The program is designed to limit liability for employers. The Secure Choice IRA is not covered by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”), and the participating employer will not be considered to be a fiduciary of the program. Participating employer involvement is limited. Unlike a qualified plan, with the Secure Choice IRA, there are no employer contributions, no annual testing requirements and no annual returns to file. Participating employers will not have liability for an employee’s decision regarding whether to participate in, or opt out of, the program or for the investment decisions of the New York State Secure Choice Savings Board or of any enrollee. The Board must select investment options that include a target date life-cycle fund and may also include a conservative principal protection fund, a growth fund, an annuity fund or a secure return fund. In New York City, there are penalties for employers that do not enroll their employees, make deposits or maintain records. The penalties escalate for continued violations ($250 per employee for the first violation, $500 per employee for the second violation within two years and $1,000 per employee for the third and subsequent violations, plus an additional $100 fine per violation for employers that fail to maintain records of compliance for three years).

    ERISA Preemption

    Similar automatic IRA programs have been adopted in a more than a dozen states, including California, whose program was at issue in the first case challenging whether ERISA preempts a state law that creates a state-run IRA program. The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision that ERISA preemption does not apply. The panel concluded that ERISA applies to plans that are established or maintained by an employer, but that here “it is the State that has established CalSavers and the State that maintains it—and not eligible employers.” On Feb. 28, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case, leaving in place the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that state-sanctioned auto-IRAs can coexist with employer-sponsored employee benefit plans subject to ERISA.

    When are the Rules Effective?

    Although the New York State and New York City laws are currently in effect, each of the governing boards, which are responsible for the administration and operation of the automatic IRAs, have up to two years to implement the programs. Thus, there is no need for employers to take immediate action. Employers will have nine months after the governing boards open the program for enrollment to begin to make payroll deposits. On Jan. 26, the New York State Secure Choice Program Board held its first meeting and directed the Department of Taxation and Finance to undertake the implementation of the program.

    Authored by Mark Brossman, David Cohen, Ronald Richman, and Susan Bernstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David M. Cohen

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Fifth Circuit Resolves ‘Clash’ Between FERC and Bankruptcy Courts

    Fifth Circuit Resolves ‘Clash’ Between FERC and Bankruptcy Courts

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Resolves ‘Clash’ Between FERC and Bankruptcy Courts

    March 23, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A Chapter 11 debtor’s “rejection [(under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) §365(a)] of a filed-rate [natural gas] contract… relieve[d] it of the obligation to continue performance absent the approval of FERC [the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission],” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 14, 2022. In re Ultra Petroleum Corp., 2022 WL 763836, *1 (5th Cir. Mar 14, 2022). Moreover, held the court in affirming the bankruptcy court on a direct appeal, Code § 1129(a)(6) did not “require the bankruptcy court to seek FERC’s approval before it confirmed [the debtor’s] reorganization plan.” Ultra followed, as expected, the reasoning of its precedent, In re Mirant Corp., 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004), and, more important, carefully balanced the power of FERC and the nation’s bankruptcy courts. 

    Relevant Statutes. The Fifth Circuit first acknowledged the text of Code § 1129(a)(6): “a reorganization plan can be confirmed only if ‘[a]ny governmental regulatory commission with jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor has approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate change is expressly conditioned on such approval.’” FERC conceded “that Mirant allows a bankruptcy court to approve rejection of a filed-rate contract.” Ultra, 2022 WL 763836, at *2, *4.

    Mirant. For the relevant background, the court explained the reasoning of its governing precedent, Mirant. That case dealt with the rejection of an electricity-purchase contract governed by the Federal Power Act. Although Ultra dealt with a natural gas contract governed by the Natural Gas Act, both statutes are “substantially identical” and give FERC exclusive jurisdiction over rates. Courts cite decisions regarding the two statutes “interchangeably.” Ultra at *2. n.1. The Fifth Circuit held in Mirant that “a district court [could] authorize the rejection of an executory contract for the purchase of electricity as part of a bankruptcy reorganization [and that] Congress [had not] granted [FERC] exclusive jurisdiction over those contracts.” 378 F.3d at 514-15. The electric power contract there “included filed rates that could only be modified by FERC.”

    Although FERC had “exclusive authority to determine wholesale rates” and any modification of rates or the contract had to “go through FERC,” Mirant’s “rejection of the [contract] is a breach” and “FERC [lacks] exclusive authority over a breach of contract claim.” Id., at 519 (emphasis in original). “[D]istrict courts are permitted to grant relief [when] the breach of contract claim is based upon another rationale,” held the Fifth Circuit, “so long as that rejection does not… challenge [the] agreement’s filed-rate.” “[R]ejection had only an ‘indirect effect upon the filed rate’ and ‘is not a collateral attack upon [the filed rate]’….” Ultra, 2022 WL 763836, at *6, quoting Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519-20.

    No Special Statutory Exception for Power Contracts. “[R]ejection of a power contract was allowed,” too, because the “Code does not… include an exception prohibiting rejection of, or providing other special treatment for, wholesale electric contracts subject to FERC jurisdiction.” 378 F.3d, at 521. Although Congress had enacted other “specific limitations on and exceptions to the § 365(a) general authority,” it said nothing about the rejection of power contracts. Id. To enable “the reorganization process to proceed,” and because FERC lacked “authority to compel continued performance and continued payment of the filed rate after a valid rejection,” FERC also had to be enjoined from compelling the debtor “to perform under the” rejected contract, held the Fifth Circuit in Mirant. Ultra, 2022 WL 763836, at *6, citing 378 F.3d at 519-20, 522.

    Higher Standard for Rejection Power. The Mirant decision further applied “a more rigorous standard” than “normal business judgment” for courts to use when resolving a debtor’s rejection motion. Id. A court must “carefully scrutinize the impact of rejection upon the public interest and should… ensure that rejection does not cause any disruption in the supply of electricity to other public utilities or to consumers.” Id., at 525. When applying this “careful scrutiny” test, courts should “welcome FERC’s participation [in the case]… as a party in interest…” Id., at 525-26.

    Mirant Holding Not Dicta. The Fifth Circuit in Ultra rejected FERC’s argument that Mirant’s holding about the consequences of rejection were dicta. “The consequences of rejection of a filed-rate contract are central to the decision to allow rejection of said contracts, and the governing rules of law related to those consequences required explication… that… was not dicta.” Ultra, 2022 WL 763836, at *5. 

    Other Circuit Precedent. The Sixth Circuit also followed Mirant in In re First Energy Solutions Corp. 945 F.3d 431, 455-56 (6th Cir. 2019) (2-1) (“[W]hen a Chapter 11 debtor moves… to reject a filed energy contract that is… governed by FERC, via the FPA, the bankruptcy court must consider the public interest and ensure that the equities balance in favor of rejecting the contract, and it must invite the FERC to participate and provide an opinion within a reasonable time.”). For the sake of uniformity in applying federal bankruptcy law and to avoid a “circuit split,” the Ultra “result [was] straightforward,” if not pre-ordained by Mirant and First Energy. Id., at *6.

    The Key Facts in Ultra. “The bankruptcy court considered and granted rejection,” which “did not collaterally attack the rate filed with FERC because the rate was still used to set the damage award… after rejection. [The debtor in] Ultra… did not seek to reject… because the rates were excessive (… a prohibited collateral attack on the rate itself)…. [The debtor]… wants out of the contract altogether [instead], given the suspension of its drilling program…. [The debtor’s] “rejection” was “valid” because “under Mirant, [it did] not undermine FERC’s exclusive authority to set rates.” Id. 

    The bankruptcy court in Ultra also “explicitly considered the public interest in reaching its decision,” when it determined “whether ‘the equities balance in favor of rejecting’ the filed-rate contract.” Id., at *7, quoting NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984) and Mirant, 378 F.3d at 525. “Mirant makes clear that courts should carefully scrutinize the impact of rejection upon the public interest, not FERC.” Id. (emphasis in original). Specifically, there would be no “disruption in the supply of… whatever regulated commodity is the subject of the contract under consideration.” Id.

    Need for Expediency. Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Ultra refused to require the “bankruptcy court to halt its progress” for “FERC to hold a hearing on the public-interest ramifications of the rejection of a filed-rate contract.” Id. In a Chapter 11 case, “time is of the essence and delay drains the coffers of all involved (except of course, for those lawyers who would be paid to hurry up and wait).” Id. The court’s “approach balances the benefits of [gaining] FERC’s insight with the necessity for [a] swift and efficient bankruptcy….” Id.

    Comments

    • The Fifth Circuit in Ultra delicately balanced the “clash of two congressionally constructed titans, FERC and the bankruptcy courts.” , at *2.
    • The nuanced analysis in Ultra undermines, if not rejects, the reasoning of In re Calpine, 337 B.R. 27, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“[T]his court does not construe the filed rate doctrine [of Mirant] so narrowly as to only reach modifications of the rate…. FERC has exclusive jurisdiction to modify or terminate the Power Agreements, …. an issue of great public interest [to] be heard in a branch accountable to the electorate in a forum that specializes in considering the public interest.”).

    Authored by Douglas S. Mintz and Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • SEC Proposes Landmark Standardized Disclosure Rules on Climate-Related Risks

    SEC Proposes Landmark Standardized Disclosure Rules on Climate-Related Risks

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    SEC Proposes Landmark Standardized Disclosure Rules on Climate-Related Risks

    March 22, 2022

    Read time: 18 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed new climate change disclosure rules on March 21, 2022. The proposed rules (Release Nos. 33-11042; 34-99478) draw heavily on the “four pillar” disclosure framework developed by the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) and are significantly more prescriptive and granular than the SEC’s 2010 guidance on climate change-related disclosures. The rules would apply to disclosures by domestic and foreign companies that file periodic reports or registration statements with the SEC (collectively, registrants). Among other key features, the proposed rules include the following provisions:

    • Registrants would be required to provide detailed information about their handling of climate change issues, including climate-related governance, strategy, risk management and metrics and goals (the four TCFD pillars).
    • Registrants would be required to measure and disclose greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in accordance with the GHG Protocol methodology, the most widely known and used international standard for calculating GHG emissions.
    • Larger registrants would be required to have the data they disclose regarding their direct GHG emissions (Scope 1) and indirect GHG emissions from purchased electricity and other forms of energy (Scope 2) attested to by independent “GHG emissions attestation providers.”
    • Larger registrants would be required to disclose data regarding their Scope 3 emissions (those that are the result of activities from assets not owned or controlled by the registrant, but that the registrant indirectly impacts in its upstream or downstream value chains through its activities) if material to them, or if they have set a GHG emissions reduction target or goal that includes its Scope 3 emissions.
    • Registrants would be required to add a note to their financial statements that provides disaggregated metrics and related disclosure concerning climate-related impacts included in line items of the financial statements required under existing financial statement requirements.

    The rule proposal, which was approved for issuance by a 3-1 vote by the SEC, is subject to a comment period that ends 30 days after the date of publication of the proposed rules in the Federal Register or May 20, 2022 (60 days after issuance of the proposed rules), whichever period is longer. The SEC’s proposing release includes 201 specific requests for comment covering virtually all aspects of the rule proposal.

    In depth

    BACKGROUND

    The issuance of the SEC’s proposal is a notable landmark in the accelerating trend in capital markets worldwide for more and better corporate sustainability disclosures concerning “environmental, social and governance” (ESG) matters. Investors have sought information about the present and possible future impacts of climate change on companies, which has led many registrants to significantly increase their disclosure of information—often outside of SEC filings—regarding climate risks, uncertainties, impacts and opportunities. Investors have questioned, however, whether current voluntary climate disclosures are adequate. The new rules proposed by the SEC are intended to increase the sufficiency, reliability, consistency and comparability of material climate-related disclosures by registrants.

    Significantly, issuance of the SEC’s proposed rules follows an extensive period of prior public comment solicited by the SEC, including a formal request for input issued March 15, 2021, that generated approximately 600 unique comment letters and more than 5800 form letters. Consequently, the new comment period will be a second bite of the apple for many commenters who are expected to renew strongly held views on an array of issues, such as:

    • The SEC’s authority to mandate climate-related disclosures
    • Whether the SEC has (or can) develop the expertise to monitor climate-related disclosures
    • The cost/benefits of mandated disclosures
    • The standards for disclosures to be adopted
    • The qualitative and quantitative information required to be disclosed
    • Reliance on third-party standards
    • The assurance of disclosed information
    • Liability standards for climate-related disclosures
    • The types of companies to which the new disclosure requirements should apply to and to what extent.

    The SEC previously provided guidance on climate-related disclosures in an interpretative letter issued in 2010 (2010 Guidance), advising registrants on how the SEC’s existing disclosure requirements apply to climate change matters in periodic reports and registration statements. The 2010 Guidance focused on two issues: the impact of climate change regulations and the impact of changing climate conditions. The 2010 Guidance also noted that the SEC’s regulations provided a framework for disclosures concerning those two topics, and that, depending on the circumstances, information about climate change-related risks and opportunities might be required in a registrant’s disclosures related to its description of Business (Regulation S-K, Item 101); Legal Proceedings (Regulation S-K, Item 103); Risk Factors (Regulation S-K, Item 105[1]) and Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (Regulation S-K, Item 303). The SEC has cited a review of S&P 500 registrant’s filings, which found that in the several years after the 2010 Guidance was issued registrants did not quantify risks or past impacts relating to climate change and stated that registrants tended to use “boilerplate language of minimal utility to investors.”

    Since the issuance of the 2010 Guidance, both the science and law regarding climate change have evolved significantly. Scientifically, there is even greater, more widely accepted information each day about the potential harmful impacts of changing climate conditions. In the Paris Climate Agreement reached in December 2015, more than 190 countries agreed on climate change targets including, among other goals, limiting increases in the global average temperature to less than 2 degrees Celsius from pre-industrial levels and achieving by the end of this century a balance between human caused GHG emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHG. By some accounts, however, the reported threat of dire climate change in this century remains stark. Even when accounting for existing national pledges to mitigate carbon emissions, Earth is on track to warm about 2.5 degrees Celsius (4.5 degrees Fahrenheit), according to a recent report of United Nations scientists.

    Legally, there are now many more programs regulating climate change in the United States and globally. In December 2009, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an “endangerment and cause or contribute finding” for GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act, which enabled the EPA to craft rules to directly regulate GHG emissions. On January 1, 2010, for the first time, the EPA began requiring large emitters of GHG to collect and report data with respect to their GHG emissions. In parallel to these regulatory changes, a robust market for carbon offsets has developed as most larger companies (e.g., 92% of the S&P 100) have or plan to set GHG emission reduction goals, often including “net zero” commitments and other climate pledges.

    Additionally, since the issuance of the 2010 Guidance, the Financial Stability Board—at the request of the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors—convened the TCFD to address physical, liability and transition risk of climate change. In 2017, the TCFD released recommendations for climate change disclosures, organized under four broad thematic categories: governance, strategy, risk management and metrics and targets. The TCFD framework reflects a belief that disclosing climate-related risks, opportunities and financial impacts is critical for a company’s reputation, ensures compliance with regulations and promotes the management and assessment of potential business strategy effects. The SEC’s proposed rules do not adopt or incorporate the TCFD’s disclosure recommendations but portions of the proposed rules are closely modeled on them.

    The SEC noted in its proposing release that the TCFD and the GHG Protocol (which has become the most widely used GHG accounting standard) have developed concepts and a vocabulary that are commonly used by companies when providing climate-related disclosures in their sustainability or related reports. The SEC’s proposed rules incorporate some of these concepts and vocabulary, which it believes are familiar to many registrants and investors.

    A DETAILED SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSED RULES

    As proposed, the new rules would amend the SEC’s Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X to add the following requirements:

    • The oversight and governance of climate-related risks by the registrant’s board and management
    • How any climate-related risks identified by the registrant have had, or are likely to have, a material impact on its business and consolidated financial statements, which may manifest over the short-, medium- or long-term
    • How any identified climate-related risks have affected, or are likely to affect, the registrant’s strategy, business model and outlook
    • If the registrant adopted a transition plan as part of its climate-related risk management strategy and a description of the plan, including the relevant metrics and targets used to identify and manage any physical and transition risks
    • If the registrant used scenario analysis to assess the resilience of its business strategy to climate-related risks and a description of the scenarios used, including the parameters, assumptions, analytical choices and projected principal financial impacts
    • If a registrant used an internal carbon price, information about the price and how it is set
    • The registrant’s processes for identifying, assessing and managing climate-related risks and whether any such processes are integrated into their overall risk management system or processes
    • The impact of climate-related events (such as severe weather events and other natural conditions, as well as physical risks identified by the registrant) and transition activities (including transition risks identified by the registrant) on the line items of a registrant’s consolidated financial statements, as further discussed below
    • Scopes 1 and 2 GHG emissions metrics, separately disclosed, expressed both by disaggregated constituent GHG and in the aggregate, in absolute and intensity terms
    • Scope 3 GHG emissions and intensity, if material, or if the registrant has set a GHG emissions reduction target or goal that includes its Scope 3 emissions, in absolute terms, not including offsets and in terms of intensity
    • The registrant’s climate-related targets or goals and transition plan (if any)
    • If the registrant has publicly set climate-related targets or goals, including information about:
      • The scope of the activities and emissions included in the target, the defined time horizon by which the target is intended to be achieved and any interim targets
      • How the registrant intends to meet its climate-related targets or goals
      • Relevant data to indicate whether the registrant is making progress toward meeting the target or goal and how such progress has been achieved, with updates each fiscal year
      • If carbon offsets or renewable energy certificates (RECs) have been used as part of the registrant’s plan to achieve climate-related targets or goals and certain information about the carbon offsets or RECs, including the amount of carbon reduction represented by the offsets or the amount of generated renewable energy represented by the RECs.

    The proposed rules provide for detailed presentation requirements under which registrants would have to adhere to the following mandates:

    • Provide climate-related disclosures in registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 and annual reports under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
    • Provide the Regulation S-K mandated climate-related disclosure in a separate, appropriately captioned section of its registration statement or annual report or incorporate that information in the separate, appropriately captioned section by reference from another section, such as Risk Factors, Description of Business or Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations
    • Provide the Regulation S-X mandated climate-related financial statement metrics and related disclosure in a note to the audited financial statements
    • Electronically tag both narrative and quantitative climate-related disclosures in Inline XBRL
    • “File” rather than “furnish” climate-related disclosures, except disclosures made by “foreign private registrants” on Form 6-K.

    The proposed rules would also require an “accelerated filer” or a “large accelerated filer” to include in the relevant filing an attestation report covering, at a minimum, the disclosure of its Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions and provide certain related disclosures about the service provider. The proposed rules would provide minimum attestation report requirements, minimum standards for acceptable attestation frameworks and require an attestation service provider to meet certain minimum qualifications. The proposed rules would not require an attestation service provider to be a registered public accounting firm. “Non-accelerated filers” and “smaller reporting companies” would not be required to provide an attestation report.

    The new rules would be phased in with compliance dates dependent on the registrant’s filer status. For example, if the rules are adopted in 2022, a year-end reporting large accelerated filer would be required to make its first disclosure under the new rules in 2024 for Fiscal Year 2023, while accelerated filers and non-accelerated filers would have an additional year to make the new disclosures and “smaller reporting companies” two additional years. Each category of registrant would have an additional one-year period after its initial compliance date to comply with disclosure of Scope 3 emissions (“smaller reporting companies” would be exempt from this requirement).

    As proposed, the attestation engagement would phase in the level of assurance required to be provided by the independent GHG emissions attestation provider from limited to reasonable over a five-year period after each registrant’s compliance date. Reasonable assurance would be equivalent to the level of assurance provided in an audit of a registrant’s consolidated financial statements included in a Form 10-K. Limited assurance would be equivalent to the level of assurance (commonly referred to as a “review”) provided over a registrant’s interim financial statements included in a Form 10-Q.

    Emissions Calculations

    Many large industrial companies in the United States are already required to report their GHG emissions to the EPA. There is no perfect overlap between the EPA’s reporting requirements and the SEC’s proposed disclosure requirements. Most importantly, the EPA’s GHG reporting rule (40 C.F.R. Part 98) is generally facility-specific with some limited exceptions. The SEC’s proposed rule is focused on “organizational” emissions, with the organization defined by reference to all entities that are included in the registrant’s consolidated financial statements. Thus, a registrant who collected all the information necessary to comply with the EPA’s requirements may have to collect additional emissions-related information to comply with the SEC’s proposed GHG emission disclosure requirements.

    Line Item Disaggregation of Risks

    The proposed rule requiring a note to financial statements that discloses disaggregated climate-related financial statement metrics would mandate disclosure under three categories of information: financial impact metrics, expenditure metrics and financial estimates and assumptions. Similar to the TCFD’s recommendation regarding financial impacts, the proposed financial statement metrics have the objective of increasing the transparency of how climate-related risks impact a registrant’s financial statements. The TCFD framework identifies two broad categories of actual and potential financial impacts driven by climate-related risks and opportunities—financial performance (income statement focused) and financial position (balance sheet focused) —and includes suggested metrics, such as the amount of capital expenditure deployed toward climate-related risks and opportunities, which are similar to the SEC’s proposed financial statement metrics.

    Materiality

    In its rules proposal, where certain disclosures are required only when “material,” the SEC reaffirmed adherence to the definition of materiality set forth in both its rules and past Supreme Court of the United States opinions: Information is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider it important in deciding how to vote or make an investment decision, or, put another way, if the information would significantly alter the total mix of available information to investors.[2] Accordingly, as materiality for purposes of the proposed rules (as with SEC disclosures generally) is to be viewed from the perspective of reasonable investors in the registrant, the proposed rules reject the request of some commenters to expand the definition of materiality to encompass company-induced impacts occurring external to the company, including those in the economy, the environment, people, the so-called “double materiality” standard adopted in Europe and other jurisdictions for corporate sustainability disclosures. The SEC did emphasize the dynamic nature of materiality determinations that registrants must make under US securities laws, particularly with regard to potential future events.

    Liability Issues

    The proposed rules do not provide a broad liability safe harbor for the new climate-related disclosures, but they do include a targeted safe harbor for Scope 3 emissions data in light of concerns that registrants might have about liability for information that would be derived largely from third parties in a registrant’s value chain. The proposed safe harbor would provide that disclosure of Scope 3 emissions by or on behalf of the registrant would not be deemed a fraudulent statement unless it is shown that said statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith. The safe harbor would also extend to any statement regarding Scope 3 emissions that is disclosed pursuant to the proposed rules and made in a document filed with the SEC.

    The SEC noted that to the extent the proposed climate-related disclosures constitute forward-looking statements, including, for example, information regarding a registrant’s internal carbon pricing or scenario analysis disclosure, the forward-looking statement safe harbors pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act for such statements would apply, subject to the limitations and conditions specified in those safe harbor provisions of that act.

    CONTINUING SEC CLIMATE-RELATED DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE

    Many commenters in the 2021 input process suggested that the SEC expand upon its 2010 Guidance. In September 2021, the SEC referenced the 2010 Guidance in providing a sample comment letter to illustrate comments it might make regarding climate change disclosures, or lack thereof, in SEC filings. While the proposed new rules are pending and prior to their phase-in compliance date if adopted, registrants should continue to carefully consider the 2010 Guidance, as augmented by the discussion in the release of the proposed rules, and the 2021 sample comment letter in preparing climate change-related disclosure.

    As a general matter, the sample comment letter indicates that the SEC might request an explanation as to why a registrant provides more extensive climate-related disclosures in a corporate social responsibility, sustainability or ESG report than it does in its SEC filings. More specifically, although actual comments from the SEC are typically tailored to each registrant, the sample comment letter indicates that SEC staff expects the following disclosures (to the extent they are applicable and material to the registrant):

    • The effects of transition risks related to climate change, such as policy and regulatory changes, or market trends that may alter business opportunities, credit risks or technological changes
    • Litigation risks related to climate change
    • Developments in federal and state legislation and regulation and international accords regarding climate change
    • Pending or existing climate change-related legislation, regulations and international accords
    • Past or future capital expenditures for climate-related projects
    • Indirect consequences of climate-related regulation or business trends, such as
      • Decreased demand for goods or services that produce significant GHG emissions or are related to carbon-based energy sources
      • Increased demand for goods that result in lower emissions than competing products
      • Increased competition to develop innovative new products that result in lower emissions
      • Increased demand for generation and transmission of energy from alternative energy sources
      • Any anticipated reputational risks resulting from operations or products that produce material GHG emissions.
    • Physical effects of climate change on operations and results, including:
      • Severity of weather, such as floods, hurricanes, sea levels, arability of farmland, extreme fires and water availability and quality
      • Quantification of weather-related damages to your property or operations
      • Potential for indirect weather-related impacts that have affected, or may affect, major customers or suppliers
      • Decreased agricultural production capacity in areas affected by drought or other weather-related changes
      • Any weather-related impacts on the cost or availability of insurance.
    • Increased compliance costs related to climate change
    • Purchases or sales of carbon credits or offsets.

    EVOLVING GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND OTHER SUSTAINABILITY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS

    Globally, the United States has not been a leader in adopting mandatory climate change disclosure rules. Many countries already require disclosure in accordance with the TCFD’s recommendations, and the United Kingdom was the first G20 country to enshrine mandatory climate change risk and opportunity disclosures into law. Starting April 6, 2022, more than 1,300 of the largest UK-registered companies and financial institutions will have to disclose climate-related financial information on a mandatory basis—in line with recommendations from the TCFD. This will include many of the United Kingdom’s largest traded companies, banks and insurers, as well as private companies with more than 500 employees and £500 million in annual revenues.

    In 2019, the European Commission (EC) published new climate reporting guidelines for companies. (A summary of the EC guidelines is available here.) The guidelines on reporting climate-related information are a supplement to the non-binding guidelines on non-financial reporting published by the EC in 2017. They are consistent with the requirements of the EC’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive and integrate the TCFD’s recommendations. They also provide guidance for companies on how to report the impacts of their business on the climate and the impacts of climate change on their business.

    More broadly, there is a rapidly accelerating consolidation of the most internationally significant existing global sustainability disclosure frameworks and standards currently underway. Last fall, the International Financial Reporting Standards (IRFS) Foundation (which administers the IFRS Accounting Standards that is used in most jurisdictions other than the United States) formed a new International Sustainability Standards Board (ISSB) that will develop a comprehensive global baseline of sustainability disclosure standards. The ISSB is expected to complete the consolidation of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB) and the Value Reporting Foundation (VRF) in 2022, which itself resulted from the 2021 merger of the Integrated Reporting Framework and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board.

    The ISSB developed prototype climate and general disclosure requirements resulting from joint efforts of the CDSB, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the TCFD, the VRF and the World Economic Forum, supported by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) regulators. The ISSB intends to sit alongside and work closely with the IASB, ensuring connectivity and compatibility between IFRS Accounting Standards and the ISSB’s standards, to be known as the IFRS Sustainability Disclosure Standards. The extent to which the SEC participates in the development or application of ISSB standards or develops its own standards for registrants remains to be seen. The SEC’s proposed rules suggest that it is unlikely to adopt international sustainability standards in lieu of developing its own disclosure requirements in the foreseeable future. However, as in the case of the TCFD’s influence on its current climate change rule proposal, the SEC is expected to take further international developments into consideration.

    ANTICIPATED SEC RULEMAKING REGARDING OTHER ESG ISSUES

    Although the SEC solicited input in 2021 on the disclosure of other ESG issues and whether a comprehensive ESG disclosure framework might be appropriate, the proposed rules only concern climate-related risks. Additional SEC rulemaking is anticipated in the near future for other ESG issues, including with respect to workforce issues such as wage quality and equity, diversity and family and other benefits.

    * * * * *

    For more information, please contact your regular McDermott lawyer or the authors of this article.

    Authors

    David A. Cifrino

    Counsel

    Boston

    Jacob Hollinger

    Partner

    New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • New Federal Directive Places Contractor Pay Equity Audits Under Heightened Scrutiny

    New Federal Directive Places Contractor Pay Equity Audits Under Heightened Scrutiny

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    New Federal Directive Places Contractor Pay Equity Audits Under Heightened Scrutiny

    March 21, 2022

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Government contractors are required to perform pay equity audits as part of their affirmation action obligations. Now, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) has released a new Directive clarifying its authority to access those pay equity audits and confirming that those audits cannot be sheltered as privileged.

    In depth

    A series of Executive Orders requires federal contractors to meet multiple affirmative action obligations. One of the attendant obligations in that process is a requirement for contractors to perform “an in-depth analysis” of their employment practices to determine whether barriers to equal employment opportunity exist. This analysis includes an examination of compensation systems to determine whether barriers to equal employment opportunities exist on the basis of race, gender or ethnicity, as stipulated by federal law, otherwise known as a pay equity audit.[1] If the pay equity audit determines that barriers to equal employment opportunities exist, federal law requires that contractors develop “action-oriented programs” to address the issues.[2]

    Now, with this brand-new Directive, OFCCP is (1) establishing how OFCCP reviews contractors’ compliance with their obligation to conduct the pay equity audit; (2) verifying OFCCP’s authority to access and review contractors’ pay equity audits; and (3) confirming that contractors may not claim privilege with respect to those audits:

    OFCCP recognizes that federal contractors often retain counsel to assist with the preparation of the pay equity audit and compliance records required by OFCCP’s regulations. OFCCP notes, however, that federal contractors must maintain and make available to OFCCP documentation of their compliance with OFCCP regulations. Contractors cannot withhold these documents by invoking attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine.

    OFCCP PAY EQUITY AUDIT DOCUMENTATION

    OFCCP has the authority to review contractors’ pay equity audits in order to understand the methodology used to perform the audit and to determine compliance with their obligation to conduct the audit. To do this, OFCCP will now request a complete copy of the pay equity audit(s) conducted. This complete copy must include:

    • All pay groupings that were evaluated;
    • Any variables used by the contractor to conduct the audit; and
    • The results of the analyses including any disparities found.

    OFCCP may also request any information related to the frequency of pay equity audits, communication to management, and how contractors rectified disparities based on gender, race, and/or ethnicity.

    OFCCP PAY EQUITY AUDITS CANNOT BE PRIVILEGED

    This Directive (issued and effective March 15, 2022) clarifies that contractors cannot withhold documents from OFCCP by invoking the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine. In the context of an audit, failure to provide the required pay equity audit will be considered by OFCCP as an admission of noncompliance with regulatory requirements.

    For other purposes, a contractor may conduct a separate pay equity audit in order to obtain legal advice under the umbrella of those privileges. But, if a contractor conducts an audit for the dual-purpose of performing a pay equity audit for compliance with its OFCCP obligations and obtaining legal advice, OFCCP may obtain those records (i.e., any privilege will be waived).

    WHEN OFCCP WILL REQUEST PAY EQUITY AUDITS

    During a compliance evaluation, OFCCP will perform a “desk audit” in which it examines a contractor’s affirmative action plans and supporting data. If the desk audit reveals pay disparities (or other concerns about compensation practices), OFCCP may request additional data from the contractor. Examples of this information include, but are not limited to, the pay equity audit, additional compensation data, follow-up interviews, and information on factors that impact compensation such as prior experience or education, promotions, assignments or steering patterns. Contractors will need to be ready for this added burden.

    Authors

    Melis Solaksubasi

    Associate

    Chicago

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  • Self-Dealing Lawyer Held Jointly and Severally Liable in Trade Secret Misappropriation

    Self-Dealing Lawyer Held Jointly and Severally Liable in Trade Secret Misappropriation

    ARTICLE

    Self-Dealing Lawyer Held Jointly and Severally Liable in Trade Secret Misappropriation

    May 17, 2022

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment holding a lawyer jointly and severally liable for trade secret misappropriation and fraudulent transfer and enjoining any further use of the trade secrets until a money judgment against the lawyer-purchased client business was satisfied. Thomas v. Hughes, Case No. 20-50671 (5th Cir. Mar. 3, 2022) (Wilson, J.)

    James Pearcy founded Performance Products, Inc., (PPI) to develop and sell probiotics for livestock. In 2006, Pearcy sold PPI to his lawyer, Lou Ann Hughes. Hughes paid cash for PPI’s stock and agreed that PPI would pay Pearcy a 14% licensing royalty for use of his proprietary formulations, up to $1.35 million over five years, at the end of which PPI would have the option to purchase Pearcy’s formulations for $100,000. When PPI did not fully pay the royalties, Pearcy brought a Texas state court action against Hughes and PPI for breach of contract, misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury found for Pearcy, and the Texas court entered judgment against PPI in the amount of $1 million. Hughes and PPI appealed the Texas judgment and posted a supersedeas bond, but the appeal was unsuccessful. Pearcy received the supersedeas bond, but PPI never paid the balance of the judgment. Pearcy sought post-judgment discovery and set a hearing on a motion to compel. The day before the hearing, PPI filed for bankruptcy.

    Earlier, in 2006, Hughes had formed a second entity called Performance Products International, LLC. At the time of the Texas judgment, the LLC had no assets. During pendency of the Texas appeal, Hughes changed the second entity’s name to Performance Probiotics, LLC, and obtained a license to sell and distribute commercial livestock feed. In January 2012, Hughes ceased selling products through PPI and began selling them through the LLC. Hughes also formed a third entity called Advance Probiotics International, LLC (API).

    Shortly after PPI declared bankruptcy, Pearcy’s widow (also Pearcy) and PPI’s bankruptcy trustee (Thomas) sued Hughes, Performance Probiotics and API in federal court for misappropriation of trade secrets and fraudulent transfer of PPI’s assets in violation of the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). The plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil of both Performance Probiotics and API, alleging that Hughes had used them to commit fraud. Thomas further alleged that Hughes had breached her fiduciary duty to PPI. At trial, the jury found for Pearcy and Thomas, awarding about $1.4 million plus interest in actual damages, which was derived from the amount then due under the Texas judgment. The jury further awarded $1.2 million in exemplary damages., The district court entered final judgment, further ordering Hughes to disgorge $860,000 in compensation from Performance Probiotics. The district court enjoined Hughes and Performance Probiotics from using Pearcy’s trade secrets until the judgment was fully satisfied and held Hughes and Performance Probiotics jointly and severally liable for “all relief granted” and “all amounts due” under the Texas judgment. The district court retained jurisdiction over API in case Hughes transferred any assets to that entity. Hughes filed a motion under Rule 50(b), which the district court denied. The district court further awarded Pearcy and Thomas $380,000 in attorneys’ fees and almost $30,000 in expenses. Hughes appealed.

    Hughes challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of trade secrets misappropriation (specifically that Pearcy had any trade secrets and that Hughes or Performance Probiotics improperly used any such trade secrets) and challenged the damages award. The Fifth Circuit held that Hughes had waived the first two issues by not raising them in her Rule 50(a) motion. As to the damages award, Hughes argued that the Texas award was an inappropriate measure of compensatory damages because it included attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest. The Court rejected Hughes’s argument because those amounts represented additional losses incurred because of PPI’s breach and misappropriation. Hughes further argued that the award of exemplary damages was inappropriate because the evidence was insufficient to prove that she acted with malice or gross negligence. Hughes did not, however, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of fraud, and the Court found that notwithstanding waiver, there was sufficient evidence that Hughes committed fraud. Because fraud is an independent basis for awarding exemplary damages, the Court affirmed the award.

    Hughes also challenged the propriety of the injunctive relief. She argued that an injunction was inappropriate because an amount of money had already been found that would compensate Pearcy for any misappropriation of trade secrets. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument because Hughes had no right to use the trade secrets until the money judgment was paid, and Hughes’s failure to pay the Texas judgment showed that the entry of judgment alone would not provide an adequate remedy, making an injunction pending payment of the judgment appropriate.

    Hughes also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict of breach of fiduciary duty. The Fifth Circuit found that there was evidence that Hughes had an attorney-client relationship with PPI in 2012, and therefore, she owed PPI a fiduciary duty. The Court found that Hughes had engaged in a self-dealing transaction that created a presumption of unfairness that had not been rebutted and thus supported a finding of breach of fiduciary duty. The Court held that disgorgement of attorneys’ fees paid to Hughes by Performance Probiotics was appropriate because the money that Performance Probiotics used to pay Hughes was derived from the self-dealing transaction—the money belonged to PPI all along.

    Hughes challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support piercing of the corporate veil. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting the finding of actual fraud under TUFTA and that the fraud redounded to Hughes’s personal benefit in her continued ability to operate PPI’s business using Performance Probiotics without satisfying the judgment against PPI.

    Hughes also challenged the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to Pearcy and Thomas, arguing that the award was based on a provision of TUFTA but that only some of the fees were related to the TUFTA claim. The Fifth Circuit noted that the facts supporting the TUFTA claim were sufficiently in common with the facts supporting Pearcy and Thomas’s other claims and found that the fees associated with the various claims could not be separated.

    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

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    Endnotes

  • DOL Compliance Guidance on Plan Investments in Digital Assets

    DOL Compliance Guidance on Plan Investments in Digital Assets

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    DOL Compliance Guidance on Plan Investments in Digital Assets

    March 16, 2022

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On March 10, 2022, the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”) released guidance titled 401(k) Plan Investments in “Cryptocurrencies” (Compliance Assistance Release No. 2022-01 [the “Release”]). In the Release, the DOL expressed “serious concerns” about exposing 401(k) plans and their participants to both direct investments in cryptocurrencies (which the DOL defined as including a wide range of digital assets) and to indirect exposure through products whose value is tied to cryptocurrencies. The DOL further cautioned plan fiduciaries to use “extreme care” before offering such direct and indirect investments as part of a 401(k) plan’s investment menu. Participants self-directing their investments in 401(k) plans and the plan fiduciaries directing investments in defined benefit plans need to be mindful that if an investment in cryptocurrencies and related products do not work out well, it is likely to draw the attention of the DOL and class action plaintiffs lawyers.

    The great majority of 401(k) plans are self-directed and typically offer plan participants an extensive range of investment choices from which to choose, often including a “brokerage window,” which allows participants to invest in an even broader range of choices in addition to the set “menu” offered under the plan. This design is intended to allow plan fiduciaries to avoid responsibility for how an individual plan participant invests the assets in his or her account under the plan. In this Release, the DOL reminds plan fiduciaries that the law requires that the investment options offered under a 401(k) plan must be prudently selected and monitored, which includes that any imprudent options be removed, citing a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling that held that plan fiduciaries must independently evaluate and monitor each investment option, and that the failure to remove imprudent options is a fiduciary breach.

    The DOL noted six specific reasons that caused it to have “serious concerns” with exposing plan participants to an option to invest in cryptocurrencies and related products. In the DOL’s view, such investments present significant risks and challenges to participants’ retirement accounts, including, fraud, theft and loss. The reasons specifically cited include: the speculative and volatility nature of the asset; the challenge faced by inexpert plan participants to understand the investment and its risks; the lack of traditional asset custody and the ease in which assets can be lost due to loss of a password, hacking and theft; the difficulty in obtaining an accurate and reliable valuation of the assets; and the evolving nature of the regulatory environment surrounding cryptocurrencies. In this regard, the DOL expressed its belief that participants may be operating outside of existing regulatory frameworks or simply not complying and that, as a result, law enforcement agencies could shut down or restrict the use of platforms and exchanges. The DOL stated that plan fiduciaries must consider all of these issues before offering direct and indirect cryptocurrencies as a plan investment option. Fiduciaries cannot simply shift to plan participants the responsibility to identify and avoid imprudent investment options.

    The DOL went on to indicate that it has the same concerns if a 401(k) plan’s investment platform includes a brokerage window that allows plan participants who established a brokerage account to invest in cryptocurrencies and related products. We note that DOL rules already permit plan fiduciaries to bar certain investments without losing the protections they enjoy when participants are allowed to self-direct the investment of their account. The DOL concluded the Release with an announcement that the Employee Benefits Security Administration will conduct investigations of fiduciaries who oversee plans offering cryptocurrency and related products as investment options, warning that such plan fiduciaries should be prepared to be questioned as to how they can square offering such options with their duty of prudence and loyalty taking into account the risks described above. Plan fiduciaries should consider limiting the availability of investments including crypto funds, either directly on a 401(k) plan menu, or through a 401(k) plan’s brokerage window, where plan participants do not have a practical understanding of how the investments work, the risks inherent in such investments, and how such investments may work in conjunction with their plan’s other investments.

    The Release does not mention the fiduciary responsibility of trustees of defined benefit plans if they choose to invest in cryptocurrencies and investment products tied to cryptocurrencies. The DOL issued written compliance guidance several years ago, however, concerning the fiduciary responsibility of pension plan fiduciaries that choose to invest in highly and complexly structured financial products. That guidance provides that the plan fiduciaries must understand the investment product and be capable of monitoring the investments in such a product. Although the Release focuses on the risks presented to non-expert plan participants when they are offered cryptocurrencies and related products as investment options, the DOL’s prior written guidance with respect to investing in complicated financial products, as well as the issues raised in the Release, are equally applicable to non-expert plan trustees should they choose to invest the assets of a defined benefit plan in cryptocurrencies and related products.

    Call to Action:

    1. Review the 401(k) plan’s investment menu and determine whether each investment option continues to be prudent.
    2. If the 401(k) plan offers direct or indirect investments in digital assets, review whether the plan should continue offering such options in light of the DOL’s guidance.
    3. If the 401(k) plan has a self-directed brokerage window, consider whether the plan fiduciaries will impose any limitations on permissible investments.
    4. Please contact any one of the individuals listed below if you would like to discuss the structure or operation of your 401(k) or other qualified employee benefit plan.

    Authored by Stephanie Breslow, Mark Brossman, David Cohen, Marc Elovitz, Ian Levin, Ronald Richman, and Susan Bernstein.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Stephanie R. Breslow

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Mark E. Brossman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    David M. Cohen

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Recent Treasury Department Report Emphasizes Fostering Competition in Labor Markets

    Recent Treasury Department Report Emphasizes Fostering Competition in Labor Markets

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Recent Treasury Department Report Emphasizes Fostering Competition in Labor Markets

    March 15, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Continuing the recent string of actions across the Biden administration in response to the July 2021 Executive Order on “Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” on March 7, 2022, the US Treasury Department (Treasury) released a report titled “The State of Labor Market Competition,” and on March 10, 2022, the US Departments of Justice (DOJ) and Labor (DOL) announced a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen and coordinate enforcement efforts in labor markets. These developments highlight the administration’s continuing focus on anticompetitive conduct in the labor markets at both the local and national levels and warrant careful attention by employers of all sizes and in all industries.

    In depth

    Treasury Report in Depth

    • Treasury’s report sets out to “summarize the prevalence and impact of uncompetitive firm behavior in labor markets.”
    • It focuses on both inter-employer conduct—such as the sharing of wage information, entering into no-poach agreements and outright conspiracies to fix wages—and employer-employee conduct—like forcing workers to sign non-compete agreements, mandatory arbitration agreements and class action waivers, misclassification of employees as independent contractors and opacity surrounding employees’ compensation rates—as being potentially anticompetitive and contributing to the imbalance of power between employers and employees in labor markets.
    • The structures of various labor markets, including overall low rates of unionization, “fissuring” of workplaces as a wide variety of job functions (e.g., janitorial or food services) are outsourced from in-house employees to external contractors, and occupational licensing requirements imposed by federal, state, and/or local governments, are highlighted as having overall negative effects on the competitiveness of various labor markets.
    • The report estimates that employers’ market power is responsible for approximately 20% lower wages compared to a fully competitive labor market, and it notes that the harms that flow from a lack of labor market competition disproportionately impact lower-income occupations, women and people of color.
    • The report concludes by emphasizing that adverse effects on workers as a result of limited competition in labor markets have broader effects on the labor markets, the firms that participate in them and the economy as a whole.
    • Finally, the report specifically examines the labor markets in the healthcare, agricultural and minor-league baseball industries, and it outlines the Biden administration’s efforts to increase competition and deter and punish anticompetitive conduct in labor markets across the country.

    The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)

    • The DOJ and DOL’s MOU likewise emphasizes the shared “interest in protecting workers who have been harmed or may be at risk of being harmed as a result of anticompetitive conduct,” as Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter noted in the joint press release announcing the MOU, “[p]rotecting the right of workers to earn a fair wage is core to the work of both our agencies, and it will continue to receive extraordinary vigilance from the Antitrust Division.”
    • The MOU states the DOJ’s and DOL’s intent to “share enforcement information, collaborate on new policies, and ensure that workers are protected from collusion and unlawful employer behavior.”

    Key Takeaways

    • The Treasury report focuses on several ways in which employers’ market power in the employment market is hypothesized to produce negative impacts on labor market participants, including:
      • Information sharing and agreements between employers;
      • Restrictive employment policies such as non-competes and arbitration agreements; and
      • Misclassification of employees as independent contractors.
    • With these as the motivating forces, employers should expect there will likely be greater numbers of enforcement actions brought to challenge these practices in the future.

    Information Sharing and Agreements Between Employers

    • While information sharing or inter-employer agreements can have legitimate, pro-competitive purposes, employers—especially large employers and employers of highly-skilled or specialized workforces—should expect that these types of arrangements will receive increased scrutiny going forward.
    • These practices can take various forms, ranging from participation in trade association or industry surveys on employee wages, benefits or conditions of employment to no-poach agreements or, in the extreme, agreements between different employers to set the wages to be paid for different categories of employees.

    Restrictive Conditions of Employment

    • There can likewise be valid reasons for an employer to want to protect trade secrets, intellectual property, customer lists and the like through the use of non-disclosure, non-compete or other restrictive covenants ancillary to an employment agreement. However, the potential for these types of agreements to have chilling effects on employee mobility is also likely to result in increased scrutiny from federal regulators.
      • The likelihood of government investigations and enforcement actions is higher in connection with less-specialized employment, where a connection to a legitimate interest in protecting the employer’s intellectual property grows more attenuated, and where the restrictive conditions are less narrowly-tailored to protecting the procompetitive interests of the employer, such as with non-compete clauses that are potentially unlimited in time or geography.
      • It is also likely that mandatory arbitration and class action waiver clauses will face heightened scrutiny in the future, reflecting a growing hostility to those types of clauses in the employment context.

    Misclassification of Employees

    • The practice of erroneously classifying employees as independent contractors, called out in the Treasury report as a practice by which employers offload liability for tax and benefit costs onto the misclassified employees, is another area that is likely to receive increased scrutiny by regulators, especially in light of the MOU coordinating the enforcement efforts of DOJ and DOL.

    What This Means

    • The marked shift in the Biden administration’s attitude towards the labor market as rife with anticompetitive conduct is evidenced by its willingness to endorse economic literature that supports regulation of employers’ practices in the labor markets. As a result, employers should anticipate increased scrutiny on their employment practices in the years to come.
      • Employers can anticipate greater regulatory scrutiny even where employment practices had not raised red flags for regulators in the past, where employers are not “large” relative to other employers in the labor market, and where labor markets are perceived to be highly competitive for the employers actually participating in the day-to-day hiring process.
    • Employers should be especially wary of sharing information or entering into agreements with other competing employers, as these types of practices can lead to costly and time-consuming government investigations, not to mention the potential for follow-on private litigation.
    • Employers can manage the business risks posed by this increased emphasis on competition in the labor markets, in consultation with skilled antitrust and labor counsel, by:
      • Implementing robust compliance programs that include training for HR staff, company executives and other employees with roles that could involve interaction with competitors, to ensure that they are educated on the proper scope and limitations of conduct when it comes to employee recruitment and competitor interactions;
      • Engaging in periodic reevaluations of their labor and employment agreements, practices and policies to ensure that any particularly risky policies, such as restrictive covenants in employment agreements, are narrowly-tailored to protect the employer’s legitimate interests while not being overbroad so as to invite regulatory scrutiny or litigation; and
      • Ensuring that the company’s approach to classifying workers as either employees or independent contractors is in line with the applicable legal standards.
    Authors

    Stephen Wu

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • MHRA Launches UK Clinical Trial Regulation Consultation

    MHRA Launches UK Clinical Trial Regulation Consultation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    MHRA Launches UK Clinical Trial Regulation Consultation

    March 15, 2022

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The UK Government, through the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) (the medicines and medical device regulator in the United Kingdom), recently announced a consultation to change the UK clinical trial regulations.

    Following the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, the UK Government is seeking to create an attractive regulatory environment for clinical trials alongside a programme that is intended to enhance the United Kingdom’s status as a go-to destination for the development of new healthcare products and innovation. The Government set out its wider life sciences ambitions in July 2021 in its Life Sciences Vision.

    In depth

    The current UK clinical trial regulations are derived from the 2001 EU Directive. As a consequence of Brexit, the United Kingdom has not adopted the new EU Clinical Trial Regulation 2014, which came into effect on 31 January 2022.

    The consultation’s objectives are wide and include gathering information on how to increase patient and public involvement in clinical trials, improve engagement and diversity of trial participants, streamline clinical trial approvals and reporting processes, share research findings with the health community more transparently and improve labelling of medicinal products.

    The consultation seeks views on the proposed changes to the trial regulatory framework applicable in the United Kingdom and will run until 14 March 2022, following which the Government will publish a report and any future proposals. Such proposals would remain subject to Parliamentary scrutiny before becoming law. The recent Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 provides the powers to update the United Kingdom’s legislation for clinical trials.

    The consultation includes the following key proposed changes:

    • Statutory requirement for patient and public involvement in research. Patient involvement is currently expected as part of research ethics approval. The MHRA proposes to issue guidance on how to meet the legislative requirements.
    • Research transparency. The proposals include registration of clinical trials; publication of results; and the sharing of clinical trial findings with participants in a suitable format within 12 months of the end of the trial, or provision of an explanation of why doing so is not appropriate.
    • “Single front door” for approval processes. In line with the current approach being piloted between the MHRA and the Health Research Authority, the proposals include a single research ethics and clinical trial approval process with timelines for statutory review and response depending on the type of application.
    • “Sunset” provisions for applications. The MHRA proposes that clinical trial approval will lapse after a specified time limit if no participants have been recruited.
    • Research ethics information requirements. The MHRA proposes to remove the current legislative requirements for information to be submitted as part of a research ethics opinion application, and to replace them with guidance that allows for flexibility in the future.
    • Greater flexibility with respect to substantial amendments and timing of Requests for Further Information. This flexibility would allow more iterative communications between sponsors and regulators during a trial.
    • Notification scheme for low-intervention trials. For trials where the risk is similar to that of standard medical care, the consultation proposes that the clinical trial could be approved without the need for a regulatory review but would require ethics approval. This proposal is in line with guidance, but in practice there has not been high uptake of this scheme.
    • Greater inclusion of underserved populations. The consultation proposes the inclusion of legislative requirements to support diversity in clinical trials, for example pregnant and/or breast-feeding individuals.
    • Simplification of informed consent in cluster trials.
    • Changes in safety reporting where these obligations do not contribute to participant safety, and removal of duplicative reporting requirements.
    • Good clinical practice. MHRA proposes changes to current legislation to incorporate more elements on risk proportionality.
    • Electronic master trial files. MHRA proposes changes so that service providers are legally responsible for good clinical practice compliance.
    • New sanctions and corrective measures. These include permitting regulators to take into account serious and on-going non-compliance when considering new studies, and enabling regulatory action to be taken against specific parts of a trial rather than the whole trial.
    • Changes with respect to labelling that will diverge from the EU Clinical Trial Regulation.
    • A risk-based approach with respect to the use of non-investigational medicinal products (which would be re-defined) for labelling of certain products, including those with a marketing authorisation and medicines at the point of care. This approach would allow such products to have reduced or no clinical trial labelling.
    • Requirement for a UK-specific reference and removal of the requirement for EudraCT number.
    • Real-world evidence. MHRA proposes to permit data collection after MHRA early access approval without the need for clinical trial approval. Ethics approvals may still be required as necessary, as such trials would still be regarded as clinical research.
    Authors

    Sharon Lamb

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • Fifth and Sixth Circuits Reject Inexcusable Late Filings

    Fifth and Sixth Circuits Reject Inexcusable Late Filings

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth and Sixth Circuits Reject Inexcusable Late Filings

    March 15, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Sixty-seven creditors [who] failed to file timely [claims] [a]fter an approximately two-year-and-nine-month delay…[thus] failed to meet their burden of providing excusable neglect” on their motion to file late claims, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on March 10, 2022. In re CJ Holding Co., 2022 WL 714890, *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 10, 2022). After reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit “reinstated the judgment of the bankruptcy court,” stressing that it had not “abused its discretion by denying the Claimants’ motion for relief from the bar date.” Id., at *11. The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the lower courts’ denial of the debtor’s motion in another case for an extension of time to appeal, agreeing that counsel’s “miscalculation of the deadline was insufficient to establish excusable neglect.” In re Smith, 2022 WL 591702 (6th Cir. Feb. 28, 2022).

    “The sole issue in CJ Holding, “said the Fifth Circuit, was “whether the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by denying the Claimants’ motion for leave to file late” claims. Id., at 4. Resolution turned on “whether the Claimants’ failure to file timely proofs of claim was the result of excusable neglect.” Id.

    The Applicable Legal Standard

    Both Circuits in CJ Holding and Smith closely followed the Supreme Court’s four criteria for “excusable neglect” in Pioneer Inv. Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 501 U.S. 380 (1993): (1) “the danger of prejudice to the debtor,” (2) “the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings,” (3) “ the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant,” and (4) “whether the movant acted in good faith.” Pioneer, 401 U.S. at 395. Courts make an “equitable” inquiry, with the burden of showing “excusable neglect” on the movant. 2022 WL 714890, at 4.

    Prejudice to the Debtor. The Fifth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court’s finding of “prejudice” in CJ Holding.” Id., at *4-*6. In its view, “the prejudice factor favors the Claimants because the debtors had notice of the Claimants’ claims” when they “negotiated and formulated” their reorganization plan and “had at least some expectation of those claims.” Id., at *5. They also “participated in a global mediation with” those “claims in mind.” Id. Nor would “additional litigation costs and other legal fees” incurred by the debtors “constitute prejudice.” Id. And “a disputed claims reserve [here] mitigate[d] against the risk of “unexpected losses.” Id. Still, said the court, the prejudice criterion “is not entitled to any kind of disproportionate weight.” Id. (emphasis in text).

    Length of Delay. The Fifth Circuit accepted the bankruptcy court’s holding in CJ Holding that “the length of delay” – “two years and nine months after the bar date passed” – would delay “resolution of the case.” Id., at * 6 (emphasis in text). The reorganization plan had “explicitly” provided for the disallowance of late claims. Id. And many courts in other cases have denied motions to file late claims “after far shorter delays than the one here.” Id. Further, the Claimants had failed to present to the bankruptcy court any “evidence regarding the delay’s impact on” the case. Id., at *7.

    Reason for the Delay. The Fifth Circuit also agreed with the bankruptcy court in CJ Holding that the reason for delay “was within the movant’s reasonable control.” Id., at *8. It rejected the “Claimants’ counsel’s argument that he did not have contact information” for each Claimant. Id. Counsel gave no explanation for this assertion or why the Claimants “could not themselves file individual” claims “once they received the bar-date notice.” “Twenty-seven” other similarly situated claimants, in fact, “took it upon themselves to file individual proofs of claim.” Id., at *9. The delay here, said the court, “was not beyond the reasonable control of the Claimants, whose duty it was to file timely” claims. Id.

    Good Faith. Finally, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court in CJ Holding that the Claimants’ counsel’s actions “verged on malpractice” or “both a lack of diligence or misunderstanding of bankruptcy procedure.” Id., at *9-10. If not “bad faith,” said the court, the Claimants’ failure here did them no “favors for purposes of meeting their burden to show good faith.” Id., at *10. And “mere inadvertence or mistake… does not constitute excusable neglect under Pioneer.” Id.

    The Sixth Circuit’s Smith Decision

    The bankruptcy court in Smith had entered a nondischargeability judgment in favor of a creditor. The debtor “missed the fourteen-day deadline to appeal the judgment” and waited three weeks before seeking permission to file a late notice of appeal.” 2022 WL 591702, at *1. He argued that his counsel had “miscalculated the deadline to appeal by one day and had communicated that erroneous deadline to [the debtor] and the new attorney he had obtained for appeal.” Id.

    Although the bankruptcy court had “discretion to extend that deadline by 21 days ‘if the party shows excusable neglect’“ under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(d)(1), the bankruptcy court reasoned that counsel’s “miscalculation of the deadline was insufficient to establish excusable neglect.’’ Id. at *2. It also found “no allegations or evidence of bad faith,” but that the 3-week delay was “within the movant’s reasonable control.” Id. The bankruptcy court had not abused its discretion, said the Sixth Circuit, because “excusable neglect is a ‘flexible’ and ‘elastic’ concept.”· Id., citing Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392, 395 n. 14. In particular, the debtor “waited until the very last day to file his motion despite learning immediately that he had missed the deadline to file his appeal.” Id.

    Comments

    (1) The Fifth Circuit applied an “exceptionally deferential standard of review” in CJ Holding when considering the bankruptcy court’s exercise of discretion. Id., at *11, citing In re Enron Corp., 419 F.3d 115, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are particularly reluctant—absent evident arbitrariness—to substitute our judgment for that of the bankruptcy judge who has presided over the proceedings… [and] who is most familiar with the parties and the potential impact of any late-filed claim[.]”)

    (2) The Fifth Circuit also noted in CJ Holding that the Claimants’ counsel, “[o]n multiple occasions before the district court… attributed the untimeliness of the Claimants’ proofs of claim to inadvertence and mistake.” 2022 WL 714890, at *10 n.4.

    (3) Obvious lesson for creditors and their counsel: Pay attention to claim-filing and appeal-filing bar dates. CJ Holding and Smith are hardly outliers. Courts now have ample precedent to bar late claims and appeals.

    (4) Deadlines to watch:

    • Unsecured Claims: court-ordered under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3002-3005;
    • Administrative Priority Claims: by court order; often within thirty (30) days after any Chapter 11 reorganization plan becomes effective.
    • Notice Of Appeal From Bankruptcy Court: generally “within 14 days after entry of the judgment, order or decree being appealed.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1); In re Tennial, (6th 2020) (rule-based “appeal deadline is mandatory”).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2022 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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  • Changes to the Legislative Landscape of Belgian Competition Law

    Changes to the Legislative Landscape of Belgian Competition Law

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Changes to the Legislative Landscape of Belgian Competition Law

    March 12, 2022

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Introduction of filing fees in concentration notifications and transposition of the ECN+ Directive into Belgian law

    On March 7, 2022, changes to both the Belgian Code of Economic Law (CEL) as well as the Belgian Criminal Code (BCC) were published in the Belgian Official Gazette (Belgisch Staatsblad, Moniteur belge).

    The main changes include:

    • Introducing a filing fee in notifications of concentrations
    • Folding the rules and formalities relating to leniency programmes in the CEL and fine-tuning them
    • Fine-tuning the provisions on the cooperation with other NCAs and the European Commission
    • Expanding the circumstances in which periodic penalty payments and/or fines can be imposed
    • Clarifying which turnover needs to be taken into account for purposes of calculating fines imposed on associations of undertakings and how such fines are to be collected
    • Modifying the bid-rigging provision in the BCC to clarify that (criminal) immunity is available for bid-rigging infringements.

    Save for the introduction of filing fees in concentration notifications, these changes were introduced to bring the Belgian competition law rules in line with “EU Directive 2019/1 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market” or “ECN+ Directive” for short.

    In depth

    The ECN+ Directive aims to ensure that NCAs “have the necessary guarantees of independence, resources, and enforcement and fining powers to be able to effectively [and consistently] apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU”. To that end, the ECN+ Directive introduces minimum standards around the powers of an NCA to:

    • Conduct dawn raids, which may, under certain circumstances, also extend beyond the investigated company’s premises
    • Send requests for information both to the investigated company as well as its employees
    • Interview employees as part of a competition law investigation
    • Impose behavioural or structural remedies to bring an end to competition law infringement
    • Impose interim measures during an ongoing investigation
    • Make use of “commitments”
    • Impose fines or request in non-criminal judicial proceedings to have fines imposed (note that the ECN+ Directive also foresees minimum standards for the calculation of the fines)
    • Impose periodic penalty payments.

    The ECN+ Directive also provides for minimum standards around leniency and immunity programmes, including the possibility of submitting markers and summary applications, and the possibility for natural persons to receive immunity from fines and sanctions. Finally, the ECN+ Directive also outlines rules on the cooperation between NCAs for competition law investigations.

    Main Changes to the Belgian Legislation

    The main changes to the CEL brought about by the publication of March 7, 2022 include:

    • Introducing a filing fee in notifications of concentrations. From now on, notifications of concentrations before the BCA require the notifying party or notifying parties to pay a fee of EUR 52,350 or EUR 17,450 for full-form notifications or simplified notifications, respectively.
    • Folding the rules and formalities relating to leniency programmes in the CEL and fine-tuning them. Previously, the formalities around leniency applications were outlined in the BCA’s 2020 leniency guidelines (Leniency Guidelines). These served as an add-on to Art. IV.54 of the CEL which only outlined the basic conditions and formalities of the Belgian leniency programme. Now the CEL outlines the full conditions and formalities of the leniency programme, such as the rules around immunity and leniency applications submitted by undertakings or association of undertakings, marker requests, summary applications and immunity applications submitted by natural persons.Whilst most of these provisions now covered in the CEL are taken from the existing Leniency Guidelines, it is worth noting that the rules on summary leniency applications differ somewhat to those previously applicable. Previously a summary leniency application could be submitted to the BCA if the applicant “has submitted or intends to submit an application to the European Commission”. Although this has now been expanded to not only cover leniency applications to the European Commission but also markers, an applicant can now only submit a summary leniency application to the BCA if it has already submitted a leniency application or marker to the European Commission – and no longer if it merely intends to do so. In addition, the new rules now also specify that the application must relate to “territory of more than three Member States”.A welcome change brought about by the publication of March 7, 2022 is that an applicant of a summary leniency application, immunity application, leniency application or marker does not have to submit these documents in Dutch or French – as was previously the case – but can opt to submit these in German or “any other EU language as agreed between the applicant and the Auditor”. Evidence is to be submitted in the original language. Insofar that this is not French, Dutch or German, the applicant may be requested to provide a translation in one of these languages.
    • Fine-tuning the provisions on the cooperation with other NCAs and the European Commission, more specifically with regard to the assistance of the BCA in dawn raids requested by the European Commission or another NCA (or vice versa), the exchange between the BCA and other NCAs and/or the European Commission of leniency applications or other information, the use of such information received by NCAs and/or the European Commission in the BCA’s own investigation, etc.
    • Expanding the circumstances in which periodic penalty payments and/or fines can be imposed. In addition to the existing powers of the BCA to impose a fine of maximum 1% of the undertaking’s (or association of undertaking’s) turnover for providing incorrect, misleading or incomplete information, for not providing information within a set deadline and/or for hindering an investigation, such a fine can now also be imposed for gun-jumping (i.e. implementing a notifiable transaction without submitting a notification to the BCA). The latter possibility was deleted following the new changes brought about by the Act of May 2, 2019 but is now reintroduced following case law of the European Court of Justice. In addition, a fine to the maximum of 1% of the average daily turnover realised in the previous financial year can now be imposed, per day of delay, to:
      • Provide complete and correct information in the context of a request for information or notification of a concentration
      • Provide an explanation in case the deadline of a request for information was not respected
      • Consent to investigatory measures
      • Appear before the BCA for a hearing
    • Clarifying which turnover needs to be taken into account for purposes of calculating fines imposed on associations of undertakings and how such fines are to be collected.

    Finally, the publication of March 7, 2022 modifies the rules in the BCC which outline the criminal penalties for bid-rigging. Previously, Art. 314 of the BCC stipulated that bid-rigging was to be sentenced with jail time of between 15 days to 6 months and with a monetary fine of EUR 100 to EUR 3,000. That provision is now extended to clarify that immunity is available – and thus that these penalties are not to be imposed – when the infringer has submitted an immunity application with the BCA in relation to the same facts and has handed over any relevant information in relation to the circumstances of the bid-rigging infringement and the parties involved to the public prosecutor.

    The changes will enter into force on March 17, 2022.

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