Content Type: Article

  • Are Vaccination Discount Agreements Still Relevant?

    ARTICLE

    Are Vaccination Discount Agreements Still Relevant?

    January 26, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Katharina Wodarz wrote this bylined article on Germany’s Standing Committee on Vaccination (STIKO) recommendation that a tetravalent vaccine to protect against influenza should replace the predominantly used trivalent influenza vaccines. “The question of which vaccine can be prescribed at the expense of statutory health insurance (SHI) is answered by the vaccination guideline of the STIKO recommendations,” Ms. Wodarz wrote.

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  • Are Vaccination Discount Agreements Still Relevant?

    ARTICLE

    Are Vaccination Discount Agreements Still Relevant?

    January 26, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “The Standing Committee on Vaccination (STIKO) has recommended a tetravalent vaccine to protect against influenza. Tetravalent vaccines will replace the predominantly used trivalent influenza vaccines. For contract doctors, this means that in the coming influenza season, they will be allowed to prescribe and in principle have to pay for tetravalent influenza vaccines at the expense of statutory health insurance (SHI). The question of which vaccine can be prescribed at the expense of the SHI is answered by the vaccination guideline of the STIKO recommendations. The insured’s entitlement to a vaccine recommended by the STIKO is implemented by means of supply contracts (vaccination agreements).”

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  • Split First Circuit Prevents Non-Debtor Licensee From Using Rejected Trademark License

    Split First Circuit Prevents Non-Debtor Licensee From Using Rejected Trademark License

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Split First Circuit Prevents Non-Debtor Licensee From Using Rejected Trademark License

    January 25, 2018

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A Chapter 11 debtor-licensor’s rejection of a trademark license “left [the non-debtor licensee (“M”)] with only a pre-petition damages claim in lieu of any obligation by Debtor to further perform under . . . the trademark license . . .,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit on Jan. 12, 2018. In re Tempnology, LLC, 2018 W.L. 387621, *1 (1st Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) (2-1). Reversing the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) and affirming the bankruptcy court, the First Circuit explained that “we favor the categorical approach of leaving trademark licenses unprotected from [bankruptcy] court approved rejection.” Id. at *11. Thus, M’s “right to use Debtor’s trademarks did not otherwise survive rejection of the” license. Id., at *4. “[P]ractically speaking,” said the court, the issue for the parties was “whether to classify as prepetition or post-petition liability any damages caused by Debtor’s failure to honor its executory obligations” under the rejected trademark license. Id., at *5. But the dissent urged an equitable approach “guided by the terms of the [parties’ agreement] and non-bankruptcy law,” consistent with a major decision by the Seventh Circuit that the BAP had followed.

    Relevance

    The key trademark issue, conceded the First Circuit, “poses for this circuit an issue of first impression concerning which other circuits are split.” Id., at *1. It expressly noted the Seventh Circuit’s contrary view in Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, Ch. J.) (right to use debtor’s trademark continues post-rejection), a view shared by an important judge on the Third Circuit. In re Exide Techs, 607 F.3d 957, 964-68 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring) (“. . . a trademark licensor’s rejection of a trademark agreement . . . does not necessarily deprive the trademark licensee of its rights in the licensed mark.”). The First Circuit, however, followed the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Lubrizol Enters, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985) (effect of rejection was to terminate intellectual property license). The U.S. Supreme Court may soon get a chance to resolve this circuit split.

    Facts

    The Chapter 11 debtor (“Debtor”) and its licensee, M, had signed a marketing and distribution agreement in 2012 giving M, among other things, a “non-exclusive, non-transferrable, limited license . . . to use [Debtor’s] trademark and logo . . . for the limited purpose of performing its obligations,” subject to certain limitations.

    The parties later litigated various issues under the agreement until 2015. After sustaining operating losses, Debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition and moved to reject its agreement with M under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) § 365(a). According to the Debtor, “it sought to reject the Agreement because it hindered Debtor’s ability to derive revenue from other marketing and distribution opportunities.” Id. Although M objected, the bankruptcy court granted the motion, holding, among other things, that the trademark license was not included within the protections of Code § 365(n) for certain intellectual property, and was thus “unprotected from rejection.” Id., at *3.

    M appealed to the BAP for the First Circuit. The BAP affirmed other parts of the bankruptcy court’s decision, but “disagreed as to the effect of” its trademark holding. “Rather than finding that rejection extinguished [M’s] rights, the BAP followed the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in Sunbeam . . . .” Id. According to the BAP, “because [Code] § 365(g) deems the effect of rejection to be a breach of contract, and a licensor’s breach of a trademark agreement outside the bankruptcy context does not necessarily terminate a licensee’s rights, rejection under § 365(g) likewise does not necessarily eliminate those rights. Thus, the BAP reversed the bankruptcy court’s determination that [M] no longer had protectable rights in the Debtor’s trademarks and trade names.” Id.

    The First Circuit

    The First Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court. “Unlike the BAP and the Seventh Circuit [in Sunbeam]” it held “that [M’s] right to use Debtor’s trademarks did not otherwise survive rejection of” the parties’ agreement. Id. at *4.

    1. Statutory Framework for Rejection. The Court of Appeals first explained the statutory framework for contract rejection in reorganization cases. Code § “365(a) permits the debtor-in-possession to assume those contracts that are beneficial and reject those that may hinder its recovery,” thus furthering “Chapter 11’s ‘paramount objective’ of rehabilitating debtors.” Id. at *4, citing In re FBI Distrib. Corp., 330 F.3d 36, 41 (1st Cir. 2003). After rejecting a contract, “a Debtor is left with a liability for what the Code deems to be a pre-petition breach of the contract.” Id., citing Code § 365(g). Distinguishing between “statutory breach” and “common law breach,” the court relied on the Fourth Circuit’s controversial decision in Lubrizol Enters, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he statutory ‘breach’ contemplated by § 365(g) controls, and provides only a money damages remedy for the non-bankrupt party. . . . Allowing specific performance would obviously undercut the core purpose of rejection under § 365(a).”).
    2. Legislative Response to Lubrizol. Congress responded to the Lubrizol decision three years later in 1988 by enacting Code § 365(n), giving “a [nondebtor] licensee of intellectual property rights a choice between treating the license as terminated and asserting a claim for pre-petition damages — a remedy the licensee held already under § 365(g) — or retaining its intellectual property rights under the license.” Id. at *5. In this Code amendment, Congress also defined intellectual property in § 101(35A), but specifically excluded trademarks from the new statutory protection. According to the First Circuit, “[t]rademark licenses (hardly something one would forget about) are not listed [in the new definition of intellectual property], even though relatively obscure property such as ‘mask work . . .’ is included . . . . Nor does the [new definition] contain any catchall or residual clause from which one might infer the inclusion of properties beyond those expressly listed.” Id. at *9. Moreover, reasoned the court, this case did not present “a request by a party following rejection to recover its own property temporarily in the hands of the Debtor. Rather, it presents a demand by a party to continue using the debtor’s property.” Id.
    3. The Fresh Start Rationale. The court then explained its rejection of the Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam decision. Noting that the goal of § 365(a) was to release the Debtor “from burdensome obligations,” it declined to accept Sunbeam’s premise that a debtor should be freed from “any continuing performance obligations under a trademark license even while preserving the licensee’s right to use the trademark.” Id. at *10. In this case, reasoned the court, Debtor should not be forced to choose between performing its obligations under the license agreement or risking the loss of its trademarks under applicable federal law. Any such “restriction on Debtor’s ability to free itself from its executory obligations, even if limited to trademark licenses alone, would depart from the manner in which Section 365 (a) operates.” Id., at *10. “In sum, . . . Sunbeam entirely ignores the residual enforcement burden it would impose on the debtor just as the Code otherwise allows the debtor to free itself from executory burdens. [It] also rests on a logic that invites further degradation of the debtor’s fresh start options.” Id., at *11.
    4. Majority Response to Dissent. The dissent essentially argued for “equitable treatment” of the non-debtor licensee, M, when a debtor-licensor breaches the trademark license. Id., at *12-13. In response, the majority reasoned that “a case-specific, equitable approach” would entail “added cost and delay” in distinguishing “between greater and lesser burdens” among the debtor and the non-debtor licensee. Id., at *11. In short, the majority wanted to preserve the debtor’s “fresh start options.” Id.

    Comment

    The majority in Tempnology relied on the notion that federal bankruptcy law preempts federal trademark law, taking a “categorical approach” that values reorganization over other concerns. Unless the First Circuit rehears, vacates and reverses the panel opinion, the case is ripe for U.S. Supreme Court review.

    The Seventh Circuit’s Sunbeam decision is more persuasive. First, merely because trademarks are not covered by the protection of Code § 365(n), means nothing: “an omission is just an omission.” 686 F.3d at 375. “According to the Senate committee report on the bill that included § 365(n), the omission was designed to allow more time for study, not to approve Lubrizol.” Id. Second, “[o]utside of bankruptcy, a licensor’s breach does not terminate a licensee’s right to use intellectual property . . . . [N]othing about [the rejection] process implies that any rights of the other contracting party have been vaporized . . . . [R]ejection is not the functional equivalent of a rescission, rendering void the contract and requiring that the parties be put back in the positions they occupied before the contract was formed.” Id., at 376-377, quoting Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2007). Finally, “Lubrizol devoted scant attention to the question whether rejection cancels a contract, worrying instead about the right way to identify executory contracts to which the rejection power applies [and] [s]cholars uniformly criticize Lubrizol . . . .” Id., at 377.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information and any presentation accompanying it (the “Content”) has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It is not intended as and should not be regarded or relied upon as legal advice or opinion, or as a substitute for the advice of counsel. You should not rely on, take any action or fail to take any action based upon the Content. This information or your use or reliance upon the Content does not establish a lawyer-client relationship between you and SRZ. If you would like more information or specific advice on matters of interest to you please contact us directly.

    As between SRZ and you, SRZ at all times owns and retains all right, title and interest in and to the Content. You may only use and copy the Content, or portions of the Content, for your personal, non-commercial use, provided that you place all copyright and any other notices applicable to such Content in a form and place that you believe complies with the requirements of the United States’ Copyright and all other applicable law. Except as granted in the foregoing limited license with respect to the Content, you may not otherwise use, make available or disclose the Content, or portions of the Content, or mention SRZ in connection with the Content, or portions of the Content, in any review, report, public announcement, transmission, presentation, distribution, republication or other similar communication, whether in whole or in part, without the express prior written consent of SRZ in each instance. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • Do I Need New Trial Counsel? 9 Questions to Ask

    ARTICLE

    Do I Need New Trial Counsel? 9 Questions to Ask

    January 25, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Russell Hayman and Jon Dean wrote this bylined article posing questions to help in-house lawyers assess several months beforehand if their litigation counsel should remain lead trial counsel in a case going to trial. Positive answers, the authors wrote, mean “you should be well-positioned for your upcoming jury trial,” but negative ones make it “critical to ask whether the company should bring in new trial counsel to present your case to the jury. It’s not too late, unless you do nothing.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Russell Hayman

    Partner

    Los Angeles

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  • IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 1

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 1

    ARTICLE

    IP Update, Vol. 21, No. 1

    January 2018

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors

    Paul Devinsky

    Senior Counsel

    Washington, DC

    Amol Parikh

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • A Short Primer on Autonomous and Connected Vehicle Regulation

    A Short Primer on Autonomous and Connected Vehicle Regulation

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    A Short Primer on Autonomous and Connected Vehicle Regulation

    January 22, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    The regulatory framework for autonomous and connected vehicles is developing rapidly. In addition to laws of general application that extend to autonomous and connected vehicles as a result of the data—especially personally identifiable data—that these vehicles collect and process in large quantities, the framework increasingly includes laws, regulations and guidance focused specifically on vehicle autonomy.

    This Special Report examines the emerging regulatory framework for autonomous and connected vehicles in the US and in certain key jurisdictions around the world, with particular emphasis on regulations pertaining to privacy and cybersecurity.

    In depth
    Tabs

    Michael G. Morgan

    Partner

    Los Angeles, Silicon Valley

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    Endnotes

  • Tax Reform: Taxation of Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations

    ARTICLE

    Tax Reform: Taxation of Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations

    January 22, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder, David Noren and Elizabeth Chao wrote this bylined article on the significant expansion of Subpart F by the recently enacted tax bill. The authors wrote that while many longstanding planning issues remain under the new law, taxpayers must contend with significant complexity and uncertainty under the new global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI) and base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) provisions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Elizabeth Chao

    Partner

    Chicago

    David G. Noren

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • State Income Tax Implications of Base-Broadening Reform

    State Income Tax Implications of Base-Broadening Reform

    ARTICLE

    State Income Tax Implications of Base-Broadening Reform

    January 21, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Stephen Kranz, Diann Smith and Mark Nebergall wrote this bylined article on the state tax implications of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). “Because most state income tax regimes key off of federal taxable income, the base-broadening provisions of the TCJA will have implications for state income taxes, but without the tempering of the federal rate reduction,” the authors wrote, adding that this will directly impact state income tax liabilities.

    In depth
    Authors

    Stephen P. Kranz

    Partner

    Washington, DC

    Mark Nebergall

    Counsel

    Washington, DC

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  • Seventh Circuit Affirms Lessor’s Priming of DIP Lender’s Lien

    Seventh Circuit Affirms Lessor’s Priming of DIP Lender’s Lien

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Affirms Lessor’s Priming of DIP Lender’s Lien

    January 19, 2018

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A super-priority debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) lender with a lien on all of the debtor’s assets has no “better claim” to a Chapter 11’s debtor’s leased property than the lessor, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on Jan. 11, 2018. Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 738, *12 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 2018). According to the court, the “lease between [the debtor] and [the lessor] gave [the debtor] no post-termination property interest” in “installations or structures” on the debtor’s property. Id. Affirming the dismissal of the lender’s complaint, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that “[n]o matter the priority of the bank’s claim to [the debtor’s] assets, . . . the bank has no claim to the [lessor’s] assets.” Id., at *3.

    Facts

    The debtor and a city had signed a lease on the city’s landfill, allowing the debtor to construct and operate a gas conversion project. Under the terms of the lease, when it ended, “the city had an absolute right to retain, at no cost, the ‘structures’ and ‘below-grade installations and/or improvements’ that [the debtor] installed” on the property. The debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition several years later and obtained DIP financing from a bank (“Bank”) secured by liens on all of the debtor’s assets. Id. at *2. When the debtor defaulted on its loan from the Bank, the city terminated its lease, electing to “retain the structures and installations as provided in the lease.” Id. The city also continued to use the underlying property when the Bank sued it for “unjust enrichment.” Id. at *3. According to the Bank, it had a better claim to the property because it had a lien on all of the debtor’s assets with a “super-priority” bankruptcy court order. The district court granted the city’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

    The Seventh Circuit

    The Seventh Circuit stressed that the Bank had “no claim” to the city’s assets. The terms of the lease made the “disputed structures and installations” the city’s property, with “no post-termination property interest” retained by the debtor.

    The court conceded the Bank’s “super-priority” claim under Bankruptcy Code § 364(c)(1), which conferred a “priority in right of payment over any and all other unsecured obligations, liabilities and indebtedness of the Debtor” plus “administrative expenses and certain priority claims.” Id. at *5. Still, the court stressed, the Bank “could not have obtained any rights greater than those held by [the debtor] even with a super-priority interest” in the debtor’s assets. Id. at *7.

    The Bank’s sole claim was one for unjust enrichment under applicable Illinois law. In essence, it argued that it had a “better claim to the gas collection system” on the debtor’s property than the one asserted by the defendant city. Id. at *8-9. But “the lease gave [the debtor] no post-termination interest in the disputed property at all, only obligations,” reasoned the Court of Appeals. Id., at *9. “[T]he property in question — pipes, pumps, electrical lines, etc. — was . . . installed on public property, the city landfill and removal would pose obvious practical problems, at least without the city’s consent.” Id. Most important, “the lease gave the [lessor city] the right to retain the structures and installations at no cost no matter how the lease terminated.” Id, at *11. That “property automatically passed to [the lessor city] 90 days after termination of the lease . . ., which happened years before” the Bank sued. Id, at *12. Upon termination of the lease, it “allowed for no situation in which [the debtor] could have kept the structures and installations,” meaning that the Bank’s “security interest could not reach” them. Id.

    Comment

    This case confirms the need for effective diligence by a lender before making a DIP loan. A priority lien on a debtor’s property turns on the nature of the debtor’s property interest. Is it terminable? If so, by whom? If so, when? The lender here apparently failed to analyze the debtor’s lease. It learned of the nature of its collateral only during later litigation.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information and any presentation accompanying it (the “Content”) has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It is not intended as and should not be regarded or relied upon as legal advice or opinion, or as a substitute for the advice of counsel. You should not rely on, take any action or fail to take any action based upon the Content. This information or your use or reliance upon the Content does not establish a lawyer-client relationship between you and SRZ. If you would like more information or specific advice on matters of interest to you please contact us directly.

    As between SRZ and you, SRZ at all times owns and retains all right, title and interest in and to the Content. You may only use and copy the Content, or portions of the Content, for your personal, non-commercial use, provided that you place all copyright and any other notices applicable to such Content in a form and place that you believe complies with the requirements of the United States’ Copyright and all other applicable law. Except as granted in the foregoing limited license with respect to the Content, you may not otherwise use, make available or disclose the Content, or portions of the Content, or mention SRZ in connection with the Content, or portions of the Content, in any review, report, public announcement, transmission, presentation, distribution, republication or other similar communication, whether in whole or in part, without the express prior written consent of SRZ in each instance. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • US Tax Reform Measures Affecting Foreign Multinationals

    ARTICLE

    US Tax Reform Measures Affecting Foreign Multinationals

    January 19, 2018

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Thomas Giegerich, Kristen Hazel, Sandra McGill and Barry Quirke wrote this bylined article on the new federal tax bill’s application to foreign (non-US) multinational entities (FMNEs). Because the bill can increase FMNE tax liability and compliance burdens, the authors urged FMNEs to “thoroughly review their US operations, paying particular attention to cross-border payments to non-US related parties,” adding “it may be the right time to consider restructuring opportunities.”

    In depth
    Authors

    Kristen E. Hazel

    Partner & Deputy General Counsel

    Chicago

    Sandra P. McGill

    Counsel

    Chicago

    Barry J. Quirke

    Partner

    Chicago

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