ARTICLE
When the Gloves Come Off: Litigation Issues for Lenders
January 19, 2021
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ARTICLE
January 19, 2021
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ARTICLE
January 19, 2021
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
January 19, 2021
Read time: 9 min
During the first half of January, the Trump Administration continued to expand the ban on trading related to the public securities of designated Communist Chinese military companies (“CCMCs”). Meanwhile, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued additional guidance on how the ban applies to U.S. investors and other market participants. This client alert describes these actions, reflected in additional designations of CCMCs, amendments to the original Executive Order issued on Nov. 12, 2020 (“Executive Order”), new Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQs”) published by OFAC, and two OFAC General Licenses.
The sanctions against trading in CCMC securities, as set forth in the original Executive Order, took effect on Jan. 11, 2021. As of that date, U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions in “publicly traded securities, or any securities that are derivative of, or are designed to provide investment exposure to such securities” (“CCMC securities”), of the CCMCs initially designated on Nov. 12, 2020. For additional CCMCs designated after Nov. 12, 2020, the trading ban takes effect 60 days after the date of the designation. As described in SRZ’s prior client alerts, the trading ban encompasses not only the CCMC public securities themselves, but also indices and ETFs that include one or more CCMCs as components, as well as various derivatives and other financial instruments that reference CCMC securities.[1]
The CCMC sanctions present significant compliance challenges for the investment community, compounded by the uncertain contours of the trading ban. While OFAC has clarified some aspects of the sanctions, many unresolved questions remain and some of the recent actions give rise to new interpretive ambiguities. Firms are advised to carefully monitor developments in this area and take steps to avoid unintentional breaches of this new and unusual U.S. sanctions program.
On Jan. 14, 2021, the U.S. Department of Defense (“DOD”) named nine additional CCMCs. Transactions in the public securities of each of these entities are permitted through March 14, 2021, at which point only transactions to effectuate divestment are permitted through Jan. 13, 2022.[2] Among other entities, DOD named Xiaomi, the world’s third-largest smartphone maker. According to press reports, Xiaomi is considering action in response to its identification as a CCMC.[3]
The additional designations underscore the multiagency character of the CCMC sanctions program. Under the Executive Order, DOD, as well as OFAC, has the authority to designate CCMCs subject to the trading ban. While OFAC maintains a list of designated CCMCs on its website, entitled “Non-SDN Communist Chinese Military Companies List” (“NS-CCMC List”),[4] as of this writing, OFAC still had not updated this list to reflect the DOD designations made on Jan. 14, 2021. Thus, firms seeking to keep abreast of additional CCMC designations should monitor the DOD website as well as the OFAC website.
When combined with the 31 CCMCs initially designated in the Executive Order, and another 4 CCMCs designated by DOD on Dec. 3, 2020, the 9 designations on Jan. 14, 2021 bring to 44 the total number of CCMCs designated to date.
On Jan. 13, 2021, President Trump issued an Executive Order amending certain provisions of the original Nov. 12, 2020 Executive Order.[5]
Most notably, the amended Executive Order adds a new provision prohibiting “possession” by U.S. persons of CCMC securities as of 11:59 p.m. ET on the date 365 days after the CCMC was named. By contrast, the original Executive Order, while indicating that U.S. persons could no longer engage in transactions – including divestment transactions – in CCMC securities beginning 365 days after the company was named, did not expressly require divestment.
In the wake of this amendment, OFAC issued FAQ 872 expressly stating that U.S. persons are required to divest their holdings of CCMC securities by the end of the applicable wind-down period and are “prohibited from holding covered securities after the relevant deadline.”[6]
While it is now clear that divestment by U.S. persons is mandatory, the amended Executive Order’s use of the undefined term “possession” will likely engender interpretive difficulties of its own.
FAQ 862, issued on Jan. 4, 2021, makes clear that U.S. persons, including U.S. funds, are not required to divest their holdings in CCMC securities by Jan. 11, 2021, the date the trading ban went into effect.[7] As set forth in the Executive Order, U.S. persons may divest their holdings in the 31 CCMCs initially designated at any time up to Nov. 11, 2021 (and have 365 days from date of designation to divest their holdings in other CCMCs).
FAQ 874 addresses the types of activities by which U.S. persons are permitted to effectuate divestment in accordance with the requirements of the Executive Order.[8] The FAQ reiterates that any transaction (including purchases for value and sales) that is entered into during the wind-down period for the sole purpose of divestment, in whole or in part, is permitted. FAQ 874 refers back to FAQ 865 (discussed below) for the permissibility of market intermediaries and other participants to engage in activities necessary to effect divestment.
There has been considerable confusion concerning the application of the trading ban to subsidiaries and controlled affiliates (“subsidiaries”) of CCMCs. OFAC issued an FAQ on Dec. 28 (FAQ 857) stating that the Executive Order does not cover subsidiaries of CCMCs unless and until the subsidiary is itself listed or designated by OFAC or DOD (while adding that OFAC “intends” to list subsidiaries of designated CCMCs in the future).[9] Another FAQ issued at the same time (FAQ 858), however, stated that the Executive Order does apply to securities of an entity with a name that “exactly or closely matches” the name of a CCMC.[10]
FAQ 864, issued on Jan. 6, 2021, states that the prohibitions in the Executive Order extend to transactions in securities of subsidiaries of CCMCs, even if those subsidiaries are not expressly listed as subject to the trading ban, if the subsidiary’s name “exactly or closely matches” that of a listed CCMC.[11] FAQ 864 thus clarifies that, in the case of subsidiaries, FAQ 858 in effect trumps FAQ 857 — that is to say, if a publicly traded subsidiary has a name that “exactly or closely matches” the name of a CCMC, it is currently covered by the trading ban even though it has not been expressly listed as a CCMC.
In the absence of a standard for determining when one company’s name “closely matches” that of another, market participants could not be sure which CCMC entities would be subject to the trading ban when it took effect on Jan. 11, 2021. As a result, OFAC issued General License No. 1 on Jan. 8, 2021.[12] General License No. 1 authorizes, until 9:30 a.m. ET on Jan. 28, 2021, all transactions and activities involving the securities of entities whose names closely match the names of CCMCs but which have not been listed on OFAC’s NS-CCMC List.
Thus, until Jan. 28, U.S. persons may trade in the securities of CCMC subsidiaries that are not included in the NS-CCMC List without having to make a judgment as to whether the subsidiary’s name is a “close match” to that of a listed CCMC. Whether OFAC issues further guidance before Jan. 28 remains to be seen. If it does not do so, and General License No. 1 lapses on that date, firms will have to decide whether to trade in the securities of CCMC subsidiaries based on the guidance provided in FAQ 864.
It should also be noted that on Jan. 8, 2021, OFAC added to the NS-CCMC List the names of, and stock tickers for, four CCMC subsidiaries. Consequently, trading by U.S. persons in the securities of these entities is unaffected by General License No. 1 and is currently prohibited.[13]
FAQ 865 addresses an issue of particular importance to private investment funds. It states: “Transactions by U.S. persons (including investors and intermediaries) involving investment funds that are seeking to divest during the relevant wind-down periods to ensure compliance with the [Executive Order] are permitted.”[14] In other words, a U.S. person may continue to invest in a hedge fund, even if that hedge fund is still holding CCMC securities, as long as the fund is seeking to divest its holdings in compliance with the Executive Order.
FAQ 863 states that U.S. persons may provide clearing, execution, settlement, custody, transfer agency, back-end services and other such support services related to transactions in CCMC securities, to the extent such services are not provided to U.S. persons in connection with prohibited securities.[15] Thus, such services may be provided in connection with a trade between two non-U.S. persons or a permitted divestment by a U.S. person of CCMC securities.
FAQ 865 confirms that market intermediaries and other participants may facilitate the divestment from CCMC securities (including divestment by investment fund managers).[16] According to this FAQ, participants may engage in ancillary or intermediary activities necessary to effect divestiture during the relevant wind-down periods.
On Jan. 14, 2021, OFAC issued General License No. 2, which authorizes all transactions and activities by securities exchanges operated by U.S. persons involving CCMC securities that are listed after Jan. 14, 2021 for the 365 days following the date the entity is listed as a CCMC.[17]
FAQ 871 was issued in tandem with General License No. 2 and addresses the compliance obligations of securities exchanges operated by U.S. persons. However, other than repeating verbatim the authorizations permitted by General License No. 2, this FAQ does not shed any further light on what those compliance obligations are.[18]
The amended Executive Order revises Section 4(e) to include the “sale” of a publicly traded security within the meaning of the term “transaction” as used in the Executive Order.[19] Previously Section 4(e) referred only to the “purchase for value” of a publicly traded security. OFAC FAQ 873 notes that, in light of the amendment, the term “transaction” for purposes of the Executive Order now includes “the purchase for value, or sale, of any publicly traded security.”[20]
This same definition governs divestments, as Section 1(b) and (c), which address the wind-down periods after a CCMC is identified, have been amended to clarify that any “transaction” solely to divest from CCMC securities is permitted during such period.
FAQ 864 notes that the trading ban was to take effect at 9:30 am ET on Jan. 11, 2021, and clarifies that compliance with it “is measured by trade date, rather than settlement date.”[21]
Authored by Gary Stein, Betty Santangelo, Melissa G.R. Goldstein, and Hannah M. Thibideau.
If you have any questions concerning this client alert, please contact your lawyer or one of the authors.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
January 15, 2021
Read time: 4 min
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, creates 1,000 new Medicare-funded graduate medical education (GME) residency positions, expands opportunities for rural residency training, and allows hospitals that have very low resident full-time equivalent (FTE) caps and/or per resident amounts (PRAs) due to short-term resident rotations to “reset” their calculations, resulting in increased opportunities to receive Medicare payment for resident training. These changes represent the first significant increase in Medicare funding for residency training in almost 25 years.
The Medicare program subsidizes a portion of residency training costs incurred by teaching hospitals through both direct GME (DGME) payments, which are calculated by multiplying the teaching hospital’s PRA by the weighted number of FTE residents and the hospital’s Medicare share of total inpatient days and indirect medical education (IME) payments, which are calculated using a hospital’s ratio of FTE residents to beds and a multiplier that is set by Congress. Medicare has established limits on the number of residents that hospitals may count for purposes of calculating DGME and IME payments (often referred to as resident caps), which have not been meaningfully increased since 1996. As a result, many hospitals train residents far in excess of the number for which Medicare payment is available.
The Act contains three important provisions supporting GME:
Despite years of advocacy efforts from teaching hospitals, lawmakers have generally resisted increasing Medicare funding for residency training in favor of pursuing a different funding model to support medical education. The public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has put unprecedented strain on the healthcare provider community, which has in turn highlighted the need to invest in the healthcare workforce, particularly in rural and other underserved communities. As a result, the Act will implement the first increase to the GME program in almost 25 years.

ARTICLE
January 15, 2021
Read time: 2 min
After a long period of uncertainty as to whether the preferential gift tax regime for business assets is applicable if the donor has withdrawn substantial extraordinary operating assets (wesentliches Sonderbetriebsvermögen) or transferred them to another business (partnership) prior to the gift, the German Federal Tax Court confirmed the applicability in his decision of 17 June 2020, II R 33/17.
Dr Nils Wighardt and Jonathan Storz have published remarks on the decision in the tax journal Zeitschrift für Erbrecht und Vermögensnachfolge (ZEV) and have contextualized the decision with regard to the new Administrative Guidance on the Inheritance and Gift Tax Act and the possible effects on income tax law (ZEV 2021, p. 49).

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
January 15, 2021
Read time: 4 min
Following the landmark case before the UK High Court in October 2020 in which a businessman linked to notorious criminals surrendered £10 million in property, land, cash and other assets at the conclusion of an unexplained wealth order (UWO), the Supreme Court recently rejected an appeal to overturn the United Kingdom’s first UWO.
Background
Zamira Hajiyeva is married to Jahangir Hajiyev, a former chairman of the International Bank of Azerbaijan who, in 2016, was sentenced to 15 years in prison on charges of fraud, embezzlement and misappropriation of £2.2 billion of public funds. Hajiyeva moved to the United Kingdom in 2006 and since then has spent significant sums of money that the British authorities said were out of keeping with her husband’s official salary.
In 2018, Hajiyeva became the first person to receive a UWO under the new anti-money-laundering legislation introduced by the Criminal Finances Act 2017. Hajiyeva was required to provide a “clear account” of the source of her spending, which included:
Supreme Court Rejects Hajiyeva’s Application for Permission to Appeal
In December 2020, the Supreme Court announced that it had refused Hajiyeva’s application for permission to appeal the UWO made against her by the National Crime Agency (NCA), asserting that her challenge to the UWO raised no arguable point of law. Hajiyeva had already failed to convince the Court of Appeal and the High Court to overturn the order, which means that all her rights of appeal are now exhausted. As a result, she will be required to provide the NCA with the information it seeks in connection with her assets.
Hajiyeva denies any wrongdoing, and her lawyers have said that the case against her husband was politically motivated. In her statement to the Supreme Court, Hajiyeva said that she has been unable to defend herself or her husband because he is in prison and is therefore unable to provide a detailed account of how he became a legitimate and successful businessman. If she cannot explain the source of her wealth, she stands to lose her London home and Berkshire golf course. Indeed, the Courts can fast-track the seizure of her properties without investigators having to even prove a crime.
Graeme Biggar, director-general of the national economic crime centre at the NCA, said:
“This is a significant result which is important in establishing unexplained wealth orders as a powerful tool for financial investigations. This was the first UWO secured, and the NCA has been determined throughout the many legal challenges faced over the last two years. This case will set a helpful precedent for future UWO cases.”
This case serves to highlight the United Kingdom’s commitment to effectively seizing the proceeds of crime. Expect to see the further use of UWOs in the future to address money laundering.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
January 15, 2021
Read time: 4 min
A secured lender’s “mere retention of property [after a pre-bankruptcy–repossession] does not violate” the automatic stay provision [§ 362(a)(3)] of the Bankruptcy Code (“Code”), held a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court on Jan. 14, 2021. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 2021 WL 125106, *4 (Jan. 14,2021). Reversing the Seventh Circuit’s affirmance of a bankruptcy court judgment holding a secured lender in contempt for violating the automatic stay, the Court resolved “a split” in the Circuits. Id., at *2. The Second, Eighth and Ninth Circuits had agreed with the Seventh Circuit. But as we noted in our Oct. 31, 2019 Alert, the Third Circuit, like the D.C. and Tenth Circuits, had reached the right result in other cases. SRZ represented five law professors who submitted an amicus brief supporting the prevailing party in the Supreme Court.
The Court rejected the debtors’ argument in Fulton that the repossessing lender had exercised “control over” their property in violation of the Code’s stay. Id. The “language of [Code] § 362(a)(3) implies that something more than merely retaining power is required” for a stay violation. Id., at *3.
“Reading § 362(a)(3) to cover mere retention of property,” as the Seventh Circuit did, would make the Code’s turnover provision (§ 542) meaningless and inconsistent. Because section 542 “carves out exceptions to the turnover command” and does not “mandate turnover” of valueless property, it would be “odd… to require a creditor to do immediately what § 542 specifically excuses,” as the Seventh Circuit held. In sum, the stay provision (§ 362(a)(3)) imposes “no turnover obligation.” Id. at *4. As the Tenth Circuit stressed, “[s]tay means stay, not go.” In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943, 949 (10th Cir. 2017). Secured lenders with statutory defenses to a debtor’s turnover claim can now retain possession pending a bankruptcy court order resolving the issue after a hearing.
The Court’s sensible, practical decision in Fulton keeps the right balance between debtors’ and creditors’ rights. By maintaining the status quo and the debtor’s right to reclaim its property, it also relieves secured lenders from the threat of bankruptcy court sanctions. The Code’s automatic stay does not require lenders, on pain of sanctions, to do what the Code’s turnover provision does not — immediately surrender repossessed collateral in the absence of a court ruling.
Fulton hardly threatens a debtor’s ability to reorganize. The debtor or trustee can quickly start a turnover proceeding to recover essential property with a court order. That is exactly what happened in In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2019). Although debtors might argue that they should not have this obligation as a policy matter, the Code makes no such provision. Mission Products Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1665 (2019) (“Code … aims to make reorganizations possible [but] does not permit anything and everything that might advance that goal.”).
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.
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ARTICLE
January 14, 2021
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ARTICLE
January 13, 2021
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ARTICLE
Jan 14, 2021
Read time: 4 min
The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a dismissal of trade secret claims, finding that although misappropriation of a trade secret prior to the enactment of the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) does not preclude a claim arising from post-enactment or continued use of the same trade secret, the publication of a trade secret in a patent application extinguishes trade secret status. Eli Attia; Eli Attia Architect PC v. Google LLC, et al., Case No. 19-15771 (9th Cir. Dec. 16, 2020) (Wallace, J.)
Eli Attia is an architect who developed a system and method for automated design, fabrication and construction, called Engineered Architecture (EA). In 2010, Attia entered into a partnership with Google. Attia disclosed his trade secrets related to the technology to Google so that they could work together to develop a program that would implement EA. Attia executed patent assignments with Google, and a year later Google filed patent applications related to the EA trade secrets. The patents were published in 2012. Google then allegedly excluded Attia from the project and used EA to create Flux, a platform used by architects, engineers and construction workers, focused on making buildings more efficient and using artificial intelligence to streamline the design process.
In 2014, Attia sued Google under state law for trade secret misappropriation and breach of contract. In 2016, Congress enacted the DTSA. Since its inception, DTSA has been an enumerated predicate for the civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which means that plaintiffs can bring lawsuits claiming a conspiracy when theft of trade secrets is an underlying claim. Attia amended his complaint to add RICO claims based on Google’s alleged trade secret misappropriation. Google removed the action to federal court and moved to dismiss. Attia filed another amended complaint, this time asserting a new DTSA claim and two RICO claims.
The district court dismissed Attia’s federal claims with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The district court found that the alleged trade secrets were already disclosed in Google’s 2012 published patent applications, and those publications extinguished the relevant trade secrets. The court held that Attia lacked standing to assert DTSA or RICO claims, and neither estoppel nor continued use could convert the 2012 publications into a DTSA violation. Attia appealed.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the issue was one of first impression before the Court, and set out to determine whether, as a matter of law, the pre-enactment disclosure of a trade secret forecloses the possibility of a DTSA claim arising from the continued use of the trade secret after enactment. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), the established model statute for trade secret misappropriation that has been adopted by the majority of the states, contains an anti-continued use provision, the Court noted. The UTSA states that “ a continuing misappropriation that began prior to the effective date,”… “does not apply to the continuing misappropriation that occurs after the effective date.” The DTSA does not contain a similar provision, and the Ninth Circuit determined that the DTSA, therefore, is not limited to misappropriation that began after enactment of the DTSA. The Court also considered the intent of Congress and found that the legislature was aware of the role and limitations of the UTSA as model legislation for the states and recognized the DTSA and UTSA as similar. The Ninth Circuit concluded that “the misappropriation of a trade secret prior to the enactment of the DTSA does not preclude a claim arising from post-enactment misappropriation or continued use of the same trade secret.”
Turning to the effect of the alleged trade secrets’ publication in Google’s patent applications, the Ninth Circuit found it to be well-settled in law that the disclosure of a trade secret in a patent application extinguishes the information’s trade secret status. Google filed the patent applications in 2011, with Attia’s permission and knowledge that the patents would be available to the public. The Court explained that a plaintiff has a viable trade secret claim only if what is revealed implements details and techniques beyond what was disclosed in the published patent applications. Since Attia admitted that the alleged trade secrets were parallel to what was disclosed in the patent applications, his trade secrets were extinguished.