Content Type: Article

  • Buying a Company out of Insolvency – the Investor’s Point of View

    ARTICLE

    Buying a Company out of Insolvency – the Investor’s Point of View

    September 6, 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The number of German corporate insolvencies is currently at an all-time low. However, the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic is not without consequences. Many companies were only able to cope with the pandemic by relying on government liquidity assistance and additional loans. This additional debt burden must be paid in the future. In cases where a company’s business model already appeared questionable before Covid, or in sectors which are affected by major change processes, the challenges are likely to have been exacerbated by an (in some cases significant) increase in the debt burden. Covid-related long-term changes in the markets also should be considered.

    It seems realistic that the Covid-19 crisis will be reflected in increasing insolvency cases in the medium term. What does that entail for investors?

    In depth
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  • The Reform of Germany’s Foreign Investment Control Regime: To Be Continued?

    ARTICLE

    The Reform of Germany’s Foreign Investment Control Regime: To Be Continued?

    September 6, 2021

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    It is a trend that in recent years has developed into something like a never-ending story: the continued expansion in scope and further tightening of Germany’s foreign investment control regime. The 17th Amendment Ordinance to the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance dated 27 April 2021, which entered into force on 1 May 2021, adds another chapter to this story. It was meant to be the final one – at least for the time being. However, further amendments are already in preparation for autumn 2021. What’s to come?

    In depth
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  • Dubai Announces Creation of Specialist Court to Hear Financial Crime Cases

    Dubai Announces Creation of Specialist Court to Hear Financial Crime Cases

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Dubai Announces Creation of Specialist Court to Hear Financial Crime Cases

    September 6, 2021

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Speed Read

    • The Dubai Courts recently announced the establishment a specialised court to hear cases relating to alleged money laundering and other financial crime.
    • This is the latest in a series of steps taken by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to implement its commitment to upholding the integrity of the international financial system. It is also part of the UAE’s broader strategy to develop and improve its standing and competitiveness as an international financial centre.
    • The new court will help Dubai keep pace with international anti-money-laundering (AML) standards and developments.

    Introduction

    The Government of Dubai Media Office announced the establishment of a specialist court to hear cases relating to money laundering and financial crime. This is one of several steps taken over the last few years to tackle financial crime and enhance the integrity and robustness of the UAE’s financial system.

    Anti-Money-Laundering Developments in the UAE

    Between 2013 and 2018, 282 money laundering cases were identified in the UAE. This led to 50 prosecutions and 33 convictions.

    Such a modest level of enforcement and convictions had been a source of concern, given the UAE’s status as a leading financial and business centre in the Middle East, along with the nature and extent of the financial institutions established in the UAE and the value of funds moved through the UAE.

    Since 2018, the UAE has taken steps to enhance the strength of its AML regime. This began with the issuing of Federal Decree No. 20 of 2018 on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism.

    The decree defined a perpetrator of a money-laundering offence as any person who is aware that money is derived from a felony or misdemeanour, and who intentionally commits one of the following acts (the drafting of which is broadly similar to the equivalent primary money laundering offences in the UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002):

    • transferring or transporting proceeds of crime with intent to conceal or disguise its illicit origin
    • concealing or disguising the true nature, origin, location, way of disposition, movement or rights related to any proceeds or the ownership thereof
    • acquiring, possessing or using such proceeds
    • assisting the perpetrator of the predicate offence to escape punishment.

    The decree (along with a supplemental by-law passed in 2019) established a robust legal framework to support UAE authorities that are concerned with tackling financial crime. The decree also consolidated and expanded the scope of the preventative measures to the full range of standards covered by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and provided further powers to competent authorities across the whole of the UAE.

    In April 2020, FATF published its Mutual Evaluation Report on AML and counter-terrorist financing measures in the UAE. The report praised the UAE for having made “significant improvements” in recent years, but also noted several areas for potential enhancement.

    The UAE has been swift and proactive in seeking to remedy some of the concerns raised by the report and has already taken several key steps in this regard:

    These developments have been coupled with a stronger emphasis on enforcement. For example, the Abu Dhabi Criminal Court recently convicted eight companies and 40 individuals of various nationalities of fraud and money laundering offences. The defendants (23 of whom are expatriates now facing deportation) have been sentenced to prison terms ranging between five and ten years, and have been collectively fined almost AED 860 million (approximately £170 million). The Dubai Misdemeanour Court also recently convicted three companies and eight individuals of cyber fraud and money laundering, resulting in imprisonment, deportation and fines for the offenders.

    This latest step of creating a court in Dubai focused on money laundering and financial crime shows that the UAE remains focused on this space. Indeed, one of the “priority actions” recommended in the FATF report was that “all Public Prosecutions, but especially Dubai Public Prosecutions given its risk exposure, [should] prioritise the pursuit of money laundering charges, including complex or standalone prosecutions in cases of foreign predicate offending.” This new specialised court will help Dubai do exactly this.

    Brief Comment
    This new court supports the trend in the UAE towards judicial specialisation, which is important in prosecuting cases of financial crime since they often require specialised knowledge and expertise.

    Given the status of the UAE (and particularly that of Dubai) as a leading international financial centre, it is important that its business environment be underpinned by strong money laundering laws and supported by a regulatory and judicial framework which is able to deter and ultimately prosecute breaches. The new court is a useful part of a package of measures introduced by the UAE over the last few years to enhance the confidence of the international business, financial and political community in the UAE as a safe place from and through which to conduct business. The recent conviction of 8 companies and 40 individuals in Abu Dhabi, along with significant prison sentences and fines, indicates how effective these specialist courts can be and demonstrates the determination of UAE authorities to prosecute money laundering and related crimes. The Emirati authorities are to be congratulated for their initiative and leadership in this regard.

    It is important to note that the UAE’s specialist AML courts will not be able to operate properly in a vacuum. The success and integrity of the system will also depend upon extraneous factors such as the quality of transaction monitoring by financial institutions, prompt and accurate reporting of suspicious activity, and the accuracy and completeness of data provided to regulators. Robust judicial oversight and meaningful penalties for enablers as well as perpetrators will also be key.

    In the meantime, the inauguration of the new court is a significant positive step forward and sends an important signal to those seeking to abuse the financial services sector in the region: the UAE authorities mean business.

    In depth
    Authors

    Simon Airey

    Partner

    London – 22 Bishopsgate

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  • Illinois Enacts Pass-Through Entity Tax to Help Partners and S Corporation Shareholders Avoid the $10,000 SALT Cap

    Illinois Enacts Pass-Through Entity Tax to Help Partners and S Corporation Shareholders Avoid the $10,000 SALT Cap

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Illinois Enacts Pass-Through Entity Tax to Help Partners and S Corporation Shareholders Avoid the $10,000 SALT Cap

    September 3, 2021

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Illinois enacted a pass-through entity tax (PTE Tax) that may be elected by partnerships and S corporations to permit a federal deduction of state income taxes that otherwise are limited to $10,000 per year from 2018 to 2025 by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA). State income taxes paid by individuals, whether attributable to pass-through entity income or other income, are subject to the TCJA’s $10,000 “SALT Cap.”

    In Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Notice 2020-75, the IRS announced its approval of the federal deduction of state PTE Taxes paid by the entity in circumstances where the partner or shareholder receives a state tax credit, and the PTE Tax essentially is paid in lieu of the state income tax otherwise imposed upon the partner or S corporation shareholder.

    The new Illinois PTE Tax was signed into law by Governor JB Pritzker on August 27, 2021 (Public Act 102-658) and applies to taxable years ending on or after December 31, 2021, and prior to January 1, 2026. Eighteen other states have also enacted PTE Taxes and 14 of those (including Illinois) are effective for 2021.

    In depth

    TAX AT ENTITY LEVEL

    The Illinois PTE Tax is imposed on electing partnerships and S corporations at a rate of 4.95%, the flat income tax rate applicable to individuals. The tax is imposed upon the Illinois net income of the partnership or S corporation, which is equal to Illinois base income after apportionment or allocation. As discussed below, partners and S corporation shareholders may claim a refundable Illinois credit equal to their distributive share of the Illinois PTE Tax paid by the partnership or S corporation. Illinois base income of a partnership or S corporation for purposes of the PTE Tax is computed without deduction of Illinois net loss carryovers or the standard exemption. It’s also computed after addback of the partnership subtraction modification for reasonable compensation of partners (including guaranteed payments to partners) and the subtraction modification for income allocable to partners or shareholders subject to the Illinois “replacement tax.” The PTE Tax does not affect the replacement tax computation.

    The Illinois PTE Tax is paid by the partnership or S corporation on all of its Illinois net income after apportionment or allocation. As a result, any tax exempt owner of a partnership or S corporation may be required to file Illinois refund claims in order to recoup PTE Taxes paid at the entity level (including as estimated payments). In some cases, this may be avoided by forming an upper-tier partnership for partners that are not tax exempt. Other states have avoided this problem by permitting the PTE Tax to be elected on a partner-by-partner basis rather than for the entity as a whole (e.g., California) or by imposing the PTE Tax only upon income that is allocable to partners subject to the state’s personal income tax (e.g., New York State).

    TIERED PARTNERSHIPS

    In the case of tiered partnerships, if a lower-tier partnership makes the PTE Tax election, the upper-tier partnership that also makes a PTE Tax election will exclude income allocated by the lower-tier partnership to the upper-tier partnership. The partners in the upper-tier partnership will be allowed a credit for their distributive share of the PTE Tax paid by both partnerships. Corporate partners with a higher Illinois tax rate (7%) will also be allowed a credit for their distributive share of the PTE Tax (at 4.95%) and will pay the difference to the State of Illinois.

    ANNUAL ELECTION OF PTE TAX AND ESTIMATED PAYMENTS

    The election to pay the PTE Tax is required to be made on an annual basis “at such time, and in such form and manner as prescribed” by the Illinois Department of Revenue. A separate election is made for each year and is irrevocable once made. The PTE Tax requires the partnership to make estimated payments in the same manner as individuals (in April, June, September and January). S corporations are to make estimated payments in the same manner as corporations (in April, June, September and December). If the PTE Tax is elected, the partnership or S corporation is not required to withhold income tax on nonresident partners (and Illinois does not allow composite returns).

    For the 2021 taxable year, the Department of Revenue is expected to announce a decision as to when the election must be made, and whether estimated payments will be due for the entirety of 2021. Taxpayers should be aware that Illinois may follow the lead of New York State, which also recently enacted a PTE Tax. New York requires the election for 2021 to be made by October 15 and requires estimated payments to be made by both the pass-through entity and the partners or shareholders in 2021. Alternatively, the Department of Revenue could require the election to be made with the 2021 tax return. In order to claim the federal deduction for 2021, the PTE Tax must be paid to the State of Illinois (and other states with PTE Taxes) during 2021.

    STATE INCOME CREDITS FOR PARTNERS AND SHAREHOLDERS

    Partners and S corporation shareholders are allowed a refundable credit for the PTE Tax paid by the pass-through entity. Partners and S corporation shareholders must addback their distributive share of the PTE Tax to their Illinois income so that the tax liability at the partner level equals the PTE Tax paid at the entity level.

    Illinois explicitly allows a credit to resident partners and S corporation shareholders for “substantially similar” PTE Taxes imposed by other states. The Illinois credit for PTE Tax paid to other states is based upon the partner’s share of the partnership income allocated or apportioned to the other state (without specifying whether Illinois or the other state’s apportionment rules are applied for this purpose—another detail to be addressed by the Department of Revenue).

    As noted above, 18 other states have adopted pass-through entity taxes. Some of these taxes differ from the Illinois PTE Tax in important respects. For example, nine states allow a credit for PTE Tax paid in a manner similar to Illinois while the other nine states allow a deduction or exclusion of the income taxed at the entity level rather than a credit.

    Although it is expected that Illinois will allow its residents a credit for PTE Taxes paid in all of these states, multistate partnerships and S corporations should consult their tax advisors to avoid unexpected adverse results that could occur if Illinois (or possibly other states) do not allow a credit for PTE Taxes paid in some other states. In particular, states that have not enacted a similar PTE Tax may or may not allow their residents to claim a credit for PTE taxes paid to states that have enacted PTE Taxes (since the tax is imposed on the entity rather than the individual partner or shareholder that seeks the credit).

    CONSULT WITH A TAX ADVISOR

    Taxpayers deciding whether to make a PTE Tax election in one or more states or establish a partnership or S corporation to qualify for the federal tax deduction should consult their tax advisors generally and with respect to several issues. For example, multistate partnerships and S corporations and entities with owners in multiple states should consider whether all partners or shareholders will receive a tax credit in their state of residence, which may be a significant issue in states that have not enacted a PTE Tax. Multistate partnerships should also be aware that many of the state PTE Tax rules differ from one another.

    Investment partnerships that are not engaged in a trade or business should consult their tax advisors regarding the availability of the federal deduction and the federal income tax reporting rules for state PTE Taxes paid by investment partnerships. Partnerships with nonbusiness income and nonresident partners may be subject to Illinois PTE Tax at the entity level on such nonbusiness income (if the commercial domicile of the partnership is in Illinois) but should be allowed an Illinois credit at the partner level. Highly-compensated employees that may consider establishing a personal service S corporation to take advantage of the federal deduction should consult their tax advisors as well.

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  • No Service, No Notice

    No Service, No Notice

    ARTICLE

    No Service, No Notice

    September 2, 2021

    Read time: 8 min

    Addressing the notice requirements of Fed. R. of Civ. Pro. 65(a)(1), the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction, finding that the aggrieved party did not have sufficient notice of the possibility of a preliminary injunction. Document Operations, L.L.C., v. AOS Legal Tech., Inc., Case No. 20-20388 (5th Cir. Aug. 23, 2021) (Per Curiam) (unpublished).

    In 2017, Doc. Ops. entered into a licensing agreement by which AOS Japan would serve as the company’s exclusive representative and marketing provider in Japan for its virtual data room technology. Later, Doc. Ops. learned that a competing product known as AOS VDR had been developed by AOS Korea and would soon be marketed in the two Asian countries. Despite protests from AOS Japan that AOS Korea developed AOS VDR independently, Doc. Ops. filed suit alleging violation of the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act and for common law breach of contract, fraudulent inducement, conversion, civil conspiracy and breach of fiduciary duty.

    The licensing agreement mandated that AOS Japan protect Doc. Ops.’ confidential information and also prohibited AOS Japan from acting to “represent, promote, develop, or otherwise try to sell within [Japan] any lines of product that. . . compete with [the technology].” Doc. Ops. sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) as well as preliminary injunction and filed and emailed copies of the complaint and TRO motion to AOS representatives. Once a Zoom hearing was scheduled, Doc. Ops. again contacted AOS to inform it of the hearing date. When AOS failed to appear at the hearing, the district court chose to reschedule the hearing three weeks later in order to ensure that AOS was aware of the hearing.

    During this three-week interval, Doc. Ops. continued to communicate relevant dates and filings with AOS, which had appointed Texas-based counsel. One of these communications included a letter from Doc. Ops. to the district court stating that if the district court granted its TRO motion, Doc. Ops. would seek to conduct limited expedited discovery to prepare for a subsequent preliminary injunction. AOS failed to appear at the second hearing, stating that it would not appear until served with process. Subsequently, the district court not only granted the TRO motion and the related request for expedited discovery but also issued a preliminary injunction against AOS. AOS appealed both the preliminary injunction and the order granting expedited discovery.

    The Fifth Circuit first explained that Rule 65 requires sufficient notice for a preliminary injunction, which the Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted as implying a hearing where the defendant is given a fair opportunity to oppose the preliminary injunction. The Court contrasted the notice requirement for preliminary injunctions from the more informal notice requirement for TROs. While TRO hearings are sometimes converted into preliminary injunction hearings, this conversion has two requirements: Sufficient notice and an opportunity to meaningfully prepare and respond.

    The Fifth Circuit found that while AOS certainly had notice that a preliminary injunction was looming, it lacked sufficient notice that this relief would be issued at the second TRO hearing because the only two matters set to be resolved were the TRO motion and the request for expedited discovery. The Court also noted that Doc. Ops.’ letter to the district court showed that even Doc. Ops. did not anticipate the issuance of a preliminary injunction at the hearing. While the Court acknowledged that AOS’s refusal to participate in the litigation may have factored into its lack of notice, the “uncertainty surrounding whether service of process had been effectuated warrant[ed] the reasonable apprehension AOS Japan exhibited.”

    The Fifth Circuit distinguished AOS’s position from other situations where TRO proceedings were converted into preliminary injunction hearings. In those other situations, either the relevant facts were undisputed and the defendants had already provided comprehensive memoranda detailing the injunction issue, or the defendants had filed opposition briefs, presented witnesses and engaged in cross-examination. In contrast, the Court found that AOS never participated in the TRO hearing and the district court knew why. At most, AOS expected a TRO to be issued and instead received notice of an indefinite injunction.

    Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the preliminary injunction, finding the district court’s interpretation of AOS’s silence as a factual concession on the injunction issue as unreasonable.

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  • COVID-Update: New COVID-19 Occupational Health and Safety Ordinance

    COVID-Update: New COVID-19 Occupational Health and Safety Ordinance

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    COVID-Update: New COVID-19 Occupational Health and Safety Ordinance

    September 2, 2021

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    What must be observed in Germany as of September 10, 2021?

    In depth
    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • Cybersecurity Update for Private Fund Managers: Lessons from Recent SEC Enforcement Actions

    Cybersecurity Update for Private Fund Managers: Lessons from Recent SEC Enforcement Actions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Cybersecurity Update for Private Fund Managers: Lessons from Recent SEC Enforcement Actions

    September 2, 2021

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This Alert was republished in Thomson Reuters Westlaw on Oct. 14, 2021.

    The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has highlighted cybersecurity risks to investment advisers for many years and routinely reminds firms of their obligations as fiduciaries and under other applicable laws. Cybersecurity is also a common part of exam staff sweeps and enforcement inquiries. In June, the SEC Enforcement staff reached out to numerous companies, including private funds, in what it described on its website as a “confidential fact-finding investigation” of the December 2020 SolarWinds attack. While providing a response was voluntary, the SEC staff offered that it would not recommend charges against victims who agreed to provide information about the widely publicized attacks.[1] This week’s trio of enforcement actions against investment advisory firms and broker-dealers shows how seriously the SEC takes cybersecurity risks and provides lessons for private fund managers on how to satisfy these obligations.

    On Aug. 30, 2021, the SEC announced the settlement of charges in three separate enforcement actions against investment advisers and broker-dealers for deficient cybersecurity procedures, where each firm had experienced breaches of cloud-based email accounts that exposed the personal information of thousands of investors of each firm. The actions demonstrate the SEC’s more aggressive enforcement of the Safeguards Rule of Regulation S-P at a time when financial institutions are increasingly targets of cyberattacks. The Safeguards Rule requires advisers to adopt written policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect customer records and information. In its enforcement of the Safeguards Rule, the SEC staff has focused its attention on cybersecurity policies and procedures, including in the context of cloud-based solutions.[2] The SEC also charged one of the advisory firms for violating the anti-fraud provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”), and the Compliance Rule (206(4)-7) thereunder, for failing to adopt sufficient written policies and procedures. The fines ranged from $200,000 to $300,000. The enforcement actions each began with deficiencies identified by the exam staff and demonstrate the coordination between the exam staff and the Cyber Unit of the Enforcement Division on these issues.

    This Alert discusses each of the actions and the lessons they provide for fund managers, including specific recommendations for cybersecurity compliance.

    Overview of the Actions

    Cetera. The SEC found that between November 2017 and June 2020, cloud-based email accounts of 60 representatives of Cetera Advisor Networks LLC and four of its affiliates (“Cetera”) were taken over through phishing,[3] credential stuffing[4] or other modes of attack, resulting in the exposure of personal information of at least 4,388 clients. Cetera responded by amending its policies to require multifactor authentication (“MFA”) to be turned on for “privileged or high-risk access.” While Cetera activated MFA for its employees and certain other cloud-based email accounts, it did not activate MFA for independent contractors, including contractor accounts that had been breached as recently as the first half of 2020. In finding Cetera violated the Safeguards Rule, the SEC observed that Cetera’s policy of requiring MFA for “privileged or high risk access” was not reasonably designed; it did not apply to accounts of independent contractors, who had access to data that was no less high risk than the data to which employees had access.

    The SEC also charged Cetera with violations of Section 206(4) of the Advisers Act and Rule 206(4)-7 thereunder, which require advisers to adopt and implement written compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act. Cetera engaged outside counsel to prepare breach notices that were sent to clients impacted by the breach. Certain of these notices relied on template language that was misleading about the timing around the incident. In particular, certain breach notices stated that Cetera had learned of the breach two months before the notification when, in fact, Cetera had learned of the breach at least six months earlier. In finding a violation of the Advisers Act, the SEC noted that, while Cetera had a policy requiring that its personnel review all client communications before they were sent, Cetera failed to implement a reasonably designed policy because Cetera personnel failed to correct the template language that Cetera knew to be misleading at the time personnel conducted their review of the breach notices.

    Cambridge. Between January 2018 and July 2021, cloud-based email accounts of 121 representatives of Cambridge Investment Research Inc. and Cambridge Investment Research Advisors Inc. (“Cambridge”) were taken over through phishing, credential stuffing or other modes of attack, resulting in the exposure of personal information of at least 2,177 clients. During that period, Cambridge’s policies recommended, but did not require, individuals registered with FINRA as independent contractors, and associated with independent branch offices providing brokerage and investment advisory services, to implement enhanced security measures, such as MFA, on cloud-based email accounts.

    After discovering the email account breaches, Cambridge suspended and reset the passwords for the accounts of the affected independent representatives. Cambridge also recommended, but did not require, these representatives to implement MFA or other enhanced security measures to prevent future breaches of cloud-based accounts. Some, but not all, representatives followed Cambridge’s recommendations, and takeovers of independent contractor email accounts persisted. Not until April 2021 did Cambridge revise its policy to require MFA for all cloud-based accounts. The SEC found that Cambridge’s failure to timely adopt and implement a firmwide policy requiring enhanced security measures for cloud-based email accounts violated the Safeguards Rule.

    KMS. Between September 2018 and December 2019, cloud-based email accounts of 15 independent financial advisers of KMS Financial Services Inc. (“KMS”) were taken over through phishing and other modes of attack, resulting in the exposure of personal information of approximately 4,900 clients. During this period, KMS maintained a policy manual that required its financial advisers to (1) “[c]onduct [their] business practices in a way that safeguards the confidentiality of [their] client’s identity, including protecting all sensitive client information” and (2) “[p]eriodically review [their] internal business policies to make sure they are adequately designed to protect sensitive client information.” The policy manual also required advisers to comply with KMS’s Computer Network and Security Policies, which contained detailed technical security requirements,[5] but did not require the use of MFA for accessing sensitive data.

    After discovering the email account breaches, KMS reset passwords, removed email forwarding rules and enabled MFA for the accounts of the affected financial advisers. However, KMS did not implement these security measures for all independent advisers until approximately 21 months after the discovery of the first breach, a period during which approximately 2,700 emails of one KMS financial advisor were exposed and forwarded outside the firm. The SEC’s order also notes that KMS failed to adopt enhanced security measures firmwide, despite several of the incident reports prepared by the forensic firms KMS hired to investigate the breach recommending that KMS expedite the enabling of MFA for all independent contractor email addresses. As in the Cambridge action, the SEC found that KMS’s delay in adopting and implementing a firmwide policy requiring enhanced security measures for cloud-based email accounts violated the Safeguards Rule.

    Compliance Lessons and Recommendations for Private Fund Managers

    These enforcement actions serve as an important reminder that, to comply with the Safeguards Rule and the Advisers Act, investment managers must (1) adopt and implement a robust written cybersecurity policy, (2) regularly update the policy to account for risks introduced by the use of new technologies and in response to known cybersecurity incidents and (3) regularly test the policy to ensure the security measures it mandates have been properly implemented. In the SEC’s announcement, the Chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s Cyber Unit remarked: “It is not enough to write a policy requiring enhanced security measures if those requirements are not implemented or are only partially implemented, especially in the face of known attacks.” The involvement of the SEC’s examination staff in pursuing these actions also serves as a reminder to managers to keep good records of their compliance, as questions about cybersecurity compliance are likely to come up on exams.

    The three actions brought by the SEC share common themes that underscore the importance of the following cybersecurity considerations for fund managers:

    • Use of Cloud Solutions. The SEC staff continues to be focused on risks presented by the use of new technologies, in particular the use of cloud-based email and other cloud-based solutions. In making IT infrastructure changes that impact how client records are handled, including what third parties have access to client records and how client records are stored, managers should review and update their cybersecurity policies to account for the risks that have been introduced. Managers are also reminded to conduct, and document the findings of, cybersecurity due diligence on vendors, both at the time of engagement and periodically thereafter.
    • Application of Policies to Contractors Where Appropriate. Cybersecurity policies should be written, implemented and updated on a firmwide basis, including to properly account for the role of any independent contractors who have access to personal or other sensitive information. In some cases that will require application of the firm’s policies to those contractors, while in other cases the firm may be able to rely on contractors following their own policies, provided these policies pass muster in the vendor due diligence process.
    • Implementation and Testing. Managers should periodically test the effectiveness of their cybersecurity policies and procedures to determine if they are reasonably designed in light of current developments, including any recent cyberattacks, and whether they are being effectively implemented. As part of this review, Managers should also consider whether measures that are recommended in their policies should be changed to requirements.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication. The SEC’s recent enforcement actions and risk alerts signal that the SEC staff views MFA as a valuable tool for safeguarding email accounts and other electronic systems containing sensitive client information. Managers should, in consultation with their outside IT advisers, review their cybersecurity policies to ensure that MFA is required where appropriate and, where it is required, has in fact been implemented.
    • Training on Phishing and Credential-Stuffing. Phishing and credential stuffing continue to be the most common modes through which threat actors are able to breach systems. In addition to implementing MFA, managers should conduct training on these tactics for all personnel (including independent contractors) that is targeted to the types of threats the firm is facing. Training should be conducted no less than annually, as well as promptly after the firm experiences a cyberattack that differs from the types of attacks (if any) the firm experiences in the ordinary course of its business.[6]
    • Remedial Measures Following a Breach. Managers should carefully consider the advice of forensic and other advisers they hire to investigate incidents; failure to follow that advice could be viewed by the SEC as a contributing factor in determining that the manager’s cybersecurity policies are deficient.
    • Scrutiny of Notices to Investors. Managers should consider including details on the handling of breach notices in their policies and procedures to ensure drafts of such notices (including notices prepared by outside counsel) are carefully reviewed by personnel with knowledge of the incident to identify any inaccuracies or misleading information. Personnel reviewing notices should be particularly careful to confirm any template language used to facilitate the preparation of large numbers of notices has been adjusted to accurately describe the incident as it relates to the specific client (or group of clients) to which the notice is addressed.
    • Absence of Harm. The SEC does not require there to have been actual harm to investors for there to be a violation of Regulation S-P and the Advisers Act. In all three cases, the SEC’s order notes that the breaches do not appear to have resulted in any unauthorized trades or fund transfers. Therefore, managers should carefully document their response to all cyber incidents.

    Authored by Marc E. Elovitz, Kelly Koscuiszka and Edward H. Sadtler.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Cybersecurity-Related FAQs.

    [2] The SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (“OCIE”) has previously issued guidance on cybersecurity-related compliance issues under the Safeguards Rule, in particular, in a Risk Alert dated April 16, 2019, in which OCIE identified numerous compliance issues under the Safeguards Rule arising from insufficient cybersecurity policies (or failures to properly implement such policies), and a Risk Alert dated May 23, 2019, in which OCIE discussed compliance issues, including under the Safeguards Rule, associated with the use of cloud-based solutions. See SRZ’s August 2019 update discussing these risk alerts.

    [3] Phishing is a type of attack perpetrated by using a fraudulent or “spoofed” email address to trick a victim into downloading malicious software, or entering login credentials, and employing such software or credentials to gain unauthorized access to accounts and systems.

    [4] Credential stuffing is a type of attack perpetrated by collecting compromised client login credentials from the dark web and, through the use of automated scripts, employing such credentials to gain unauthorized access to accounts and systems. See SRZ’s October 2020 update on credential stuffing.

    [5] These requirements included maintaining strong passwords, securing wireless networks, using anti-virus and malware protection, securing backup and stored data, and encrypting hard drives.

    [6] OCIE issued a cybersecurity Risk Alert on Sept. 15, 2020 discussing the risks associated with credential stuffing. SRZ’s October 2020 update provides further recommendations on steps managers should take to safeguard against credential stuffing.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    In depth
    Authors

    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Kelly Koscuiszka

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Second Circuit Applies Federal Bankruptcy Law, Not Securities Law, in Madoff SIPA Liquidation

    Second Circuit Applies Federal Bankruptcy Law, Not Securities Law, in Madoff SIPA Liquidation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Applies Federal Bankruptcy Law, Not Securities Law, in Madoff SIPA Liquidation

    September 2, 2021

    Read time: 14 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “[L]ack of good faith in a SIPA [Securities Investor Protection Act] liquidation applies an inquiry notice, not willful blindness, standard, and that a SIPA trustee does not bear the burden of pleading the transferee’s lack of good faith,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on Aug. 30, 2021. In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, 2021 WL 3854761, 91 (2d Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) (“Madoff”). Reversing the district court’s imposition of federal securities law in this fraudulent transfer action, the Second Circuit applied federal bankruptcy law when holding that good faith is an affirmative defense under sections 548(c) and 550(b)(1). It rejected the district court’s requiring the trustee to “bear the burden of pleading the transferee’s lack of good faith,” id., at *17, refusing to depart “from the well-established rule that the defendant bears the burden of pleading an affirmative defense.” Id. at 57.

    The Madoff decision makes the following essential points:

    • A SIPA liquidation is to be conducted like a Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation;
    • The federal securities laws do not apply in a SIPA liquidation;
    • Federal bankruptcy law, not securities law, governs fraudulent transfer litigation in a SIPA liquidation (“ … no reason to depart from the meaning of the good faith defense under [Code] Section 548 and 550 as it is applied in an ordinary bankruptcy [case].”). 2021 WL 3854761 at *15.
    • “ … SIPA does not compel departing from the well-established burden-of-pleading rules … [meaning that] the initial or subsequent transferee bears the burden of pleading good faith.” Id.
    • “[P]lacing the burden to plead good faith on the initial and subsequent transferees does not contradict the goals of SIPA.” Id., at *18.

    Relevance

    The appellate courts have been wrestling with the good faith issue in fraudulent transfer litigation over the past 20 years. See Janvey v. GMAG LLC. 977 F.2d 422, 428 (5th Cir., 2020) (reversed district court’s judgment in favor of defendants who received fraudulent transfer “while on inquiry notice of a Ponzi scheme.”; “good faith defense must fail” because defendants never “diligently investigated their initial suspicions of [debtor’s] fraud while on inquiry notice.”; receiver’s suit brought under Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”), not under Bankruptcy Code § 548, which “is not necessarily substantively congruent with state law counterparts, despite a common ancestry.”; Texas Supreme Court had answered certified question from Fifth Circuit that “transferee on inquiry notice [had] to conduct an investigation into the fraud, … irrespective of whether a hypothetical investigation would reveal fraudulent conduct.”; but Fifth Circuit left ‘for another day … what actions a party must take to show that [it] diligently investigated fraud for the purposes of a TUFTA good faith defense.”); Templeton v. O’Cheskey, 785 F.3d 143,164(5th Cir. 2015) (in Code § 548 suit, transferee may “rebut” proof of inquiry notice by showing that it “conducted a ‘diligent investigation’ into [its] suspicions”), citing In re Bayou Group LLC, 439 B.R. 284, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (reversing bankruptcy court, held that information suggesting mere “infirmity in [debtor) or in integrity of its management” is insufficient to trigger inquiry notice; “the great weight of authority holds that it is information suggesting insolvency or a fraudulent purpose in making a transfer that triggers inquiry notice,” but an investigation may not be required if the transferee can establish that a diligent investigation would not have uncovered debtor’s insolvency or a fraudulent purpose; “a transferee is entitled to offer evidence and to argue to the finder of fact that no diligent investigation would have disclosed the transferor’s insolvency or fraudulent purpose. If the transferee can meet its burden of demonstrating that a diligent investigation would not have led to the discovery of the fraud, it may prevail on this prong of the good faith affirmative defense.”); Gold v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n (In re Taneja), 743 F.3d 423 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying good faith test under section 548(c); bank officers had expert knowledge of industry and investigated collateral for debtor’s mortgages; market-wide economic conditions hindered officers’ ability to detect underlying fraudulent conduct by debtor; lender established good faith under both (a) subjective and (b) objective standard by having neither (1) actual knowledge of fraud nor (2) “ information that would [reasonably] have led it to investigate further”; its actions “were in accord with [its] and the industry’s usual practices”); In re Hannover Corp., 310 F.3d 796, 800 (5th Cir. 2002) (independent third party unaffiliated with debtors acted in good faith when it accepted payments from debtors on contract that had been negotiated at arms-length; transferee’s “state of mind” important; no way of learning of debtor’s insolvency; knew of SEC suit from newspapers, but “undertook its own investigation, contacting the SEC and the … court … receiving assurances … from the … court … .”).

    Facts

    The trustee sued the initial transferee (“A”) who received $212 million from Madoff and three subsequent transferees (collectively, “B”) for roughly $350 million. The initial transferee, A, was a so-called “feeder fund,” a firm that “pooled money from investors and invested directly (or indirectly) with [Madoff].” 2021 WL 3854761, at *1. The subsequent transferees here were investors with the feeder fund who withdrew money from the fund, after the fund “received” it from Madoff. Id.

    Madoff “was a sham.” Id., at 2. “It sent its customers account statements with fabricated returns; in actuality, it was making few, if any, trades … . The customers’ funds were co-mingled in [Madoff’s] bank account. When customers withdrew their profits or principal, [Madoff] paid them from this co-mingled account. As a result, each time [Madoff] transferred payments to a customer, it was money stolen from other customers.” Id.

    The Madoff SIPA liquidation was “conducted … as though it were being conducted under … chapter 7 of [the Code].” Id. at 3, quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78 (fff)(b). Because customer claims could not be paid in full, the SIPA trustee was empowered to “recover any property transferred by the debtor which, except for such transfer, would have been customer property if and to the extent that such transfer is voidable or void under the provisions of [the Code].” Id., quoting 15 U.S.C. §78(fff)-2(c)(3).

    The trustee sued the defendants here “because, as alleged, [Madoff] made fraudulent transfers to them, which are voidable under [Code] §548.” Id., at *4. According to the trustee, he could also “recover those transfers under [Code] §550 from subsequent transferees and [the] initial transferee… unless they took the transfers for value and in good faith,” under Code §§548(c) or 550(b)(1) Id. The Second Circuit explained that §550(b)(1) provides “‘a complete defense to recovery of the property transferred,’ whereas under §548(c), ‘the transaction is still avoided, but the transferee is given a lien to the extent that value is given in good faith.’” Id., citing 5 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 548.09 (16th ed. 2021).

    The Subsequent Transferees. According to the trustee’s proposed amended complaint, the subsequent transferees, B, who received repayment of loans, had “uncovered facts suggesting that [Madoff] was engaged in fraudulent activity.” Id. Specifically,

    • B was “unable to independently verify that [Madoff] maintained segregated customer accounts, or even that the assets existed in any account”;
    • B was “unable to find any evidence that [Madoff] was in fact making the options trades it was reporting to its customers”;
    • B’s “quantitative analysis” showed that Madoff’s “returns outperformed the market in a manner that appeared statistically impossible”;
    • B “knew [Madoff] lacked an independent custodian for its customers’ assets, giving [Madoff] sole control over customers’ funds and making it more likely [Madoff] could steal or misuse those funds”; and
    • B “was unable to confirm Madoff’s purported options trades.”

    Id., at *4-*5. As a result of these facts, among others, the trustee argued that B received payments “when [it was] willfully blind to circumstances suggesting the high probability of fraud at [Madoff].” Id. at *5.

    The Initial Transferee. The initial transferee, A, was “suspicious” of Madoff’s returns and analyzed Madoff’s “purported investment strategy” and “produced a report” that showed the following:

    • “The market could not support the options volumes [Madoff] purported to trade”;
    • “Many of Madoff’s trades were at improbable prices, and … there was no footprint of its trades”; and
    • A later investigation “confirmed that the trades were ‘statistically impossible’ and revealed that [Madoff] lacked a capable auditor and the staff necessary to conduct research on [Madoff’s] investment opportunities.”

    Id., at *5. Again, the trustee sought to recover the initial transfers because A received payments with “willful blindness to circumstances suggesting a high probability of fraud at [Madoff].” Id.

    The Lower Courts

    The defendants successfully moved to withdraw the litigation from the bankruptcy court to the district court under 28 U.S.C. §157(d) (withdrawal proper if “resolution of the proceeding requires consideration of both [the Code] and other [federal] laws … regulating organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce.”). Id., at *6. A and B had asked the district court to determine whether “SIPA and other securities laws alter[ed] the standard the [trustee] must meet in order to show that a defendant did not receive transfers in ‘good faith’ under either [Code sections] 548(c) or … 550(b).” Id.

    The district court “made two rulings on the ‘good faith’ defense. Id. It first required “a showing that the defendant acted with willful blindness to the truth, that is, he intentionally chose to blind himself to the red flags that suggest a high probability of fraud.” Id. When doing so, it “rejected applying an inquiry notice standard, ‘under which a transferee may be found to lack good faith when the information the transferee learned would have caused a reasonable person in the transferee’s position to investigate the matter further.’” Id.

    The district court also held that, in a SIPA liquidation, “the trustee bears the burden of pleading the defendant’s lack of good faith.” Id. It acknowledged, though, that in an ordinary bankruptcy case, “the defendant bears the burden of pleading this affirmative defense under both Section 548(c) and Section 550(b)(1).” Id.

    On remand from the district court, the bankruptcy court dismissed the claims against both transferees and held the trustee’s proposed amended complaint did “not plausibly allege willful blindness.” Id. Still, the bankruptcy court also allowed the trustee to seek “to avoid and recover fictitious profits transferred to [A], payments it received in excess of its principal.” Id., at n.13.

    Relevant Standard for Defendants’ Good Faith Defense. The Second Circuit explained the substantive differences when defining “good faith” in a SIPA liquidation or bankruptcy case. “[A] willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing and who can almost be said to have actually known the critical facts.” Id. at 21, quoting Global-Tech. Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769 (2011) (emphasis added). In contrast, inquiry notice only “requires knowledge of suspicious facts that need not suggest a ‘high probability’ of wrongdoing but nonetheless sufficient to induce a reasonable person to investigate.” Id., at 7, citing Merck & Co. Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 650-51 (210).

    The district court held that “the inquiry notice standard for good faith applicable under the… Code ‘must yield’ to the willful blindness standard for good faith required under the securities laws.” Id. It reasoned that the inquiry notice standard, applied in bankruptcy cases, “would impose a burden of investigation on investors totally at odds with the investor confidence and securities markets stability that SIPA is designed to enhance.” Id., at 22.

    The Second Circuit’s Analysis

    Code §§ 548(c) and 550(b) Apply an Inquiry Notice Standard. The court joined “all of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue in holding that a lack of good faith under Section 548 and 550 of the… Code encompasses an inquiry notice standard.” Id. at *12. It relied on the “historical usage of the phrase ‘good faith’ (… in the context of fraudulent [transfer] law),” Second Circuit precedent, and the “the legislative history of the… Code” to “reject the heightened willful blindness standard” applied by the district court and relied upon by the defendants. Id. According to the Second Circuit, “a court must examine what facts the defendant knew; … determine whether these facts put the transferee on inquiry notice of the fraudulent purpose behind a transaction [and] would have led a reasonable person in the transferee’s position to conduct further inquiry into a debtor-transferor’s possible fraud.” After finding the transferee’s having been “put on inquiry notice, the court must inquire whether ‘diligent inquiry [by the transferee] would have discovered the fraudulent purpose’ of the transfer.” Id.

    No Willful Blindness Standard for Lack of Good Faith in a SIPA Liquidation. The Second Circuit rejected the “district court’s theory… that SIPA prohibits the trustee from utilizing the inquiry notice standard under the… Code because it is inconsistent with the willful blindness standard under federal securities laws.” Id. First, a SIPA liquidation case must be “conducted in accordance with, and as though it were being conducted under [the Code].” Id., quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78fff. Therefore, the “general fraudulent intent requirement in the [securities law] is irrelevant to the specific context of a SIPA liquidation.” Id. at *13. “A § 10(b) action for securities fraud is meaningfully different from a SIPA liquidation.” Id. And the securities laws do not “prescribe a uniform willful blindness requirement.” Id. at *14.

    Nor is the “inquiry notice standard… ‘unworkable’ and contrary to SIPA goals,” as the district court reasoned. Id. A transferee’s “duty to conduct a diligent investigation arises only when a transferee is actually aware of suspicious facts that would lead a reasonable investor to inquire further into a debtor-transferor’s potential fraud.” Id. This requirement is “not overly burdensome on the customers and indirect investors of broker-dealers.” Id. Whether an investigation is adequate requires “a fact-intensive inquiry to be determined on a case-by-case basis, which naturally takes into account the disparate circumstances of differently situated transferees,” something the courts “routinely conduct… without a hitch.” Id., citing Janvey v. GMAG LLC, 977 F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 2020) (no diligent inquiry after being put on inquiry notice).

    The Trustee Was Not Required to Plead a Transferee’s Lack of Good Faith. The Second Circuit rejected (a) the district court’s requiring the trustee to plead lack of good faith and (b) B’s denial that “good faith is an affirmative defense under Code § 550.” Id. at *15. Although Code §§ 548 and 550 “are silent on the pleading burden,” courts have “uniformly… held good faith is an affirmative defense under these sections.” Id., citing Picard v. Gettinger, 976 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2020). Once a trustee establishes a prima facie case under the fraudulent transfer provisions, the trustee may recover unless the transferee establishes an affirmative defense. Id. The defendant transferee “bears the burden of establishing its good faith [affirmative defense] under [Code] § 548(c).” Id.

    Because “good faith” addresses “the transferee’s knowledge of suspicious facts and other information ‘peculiarly within the knowledge and control of the defendant, [that fact] supports the allocation of the pleading burden on the defendant-transferee.” Id. at *17. In view of the “structural similarity of § 552 to § 548, the case law, and the legislative history, … the transferee has the burden to show that it took (1) for value, (2) in good faith [, and (3) without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer.” Id. at *18, quoting 5 Collier, Bankruptcy ¶ 550.03 (16th ed. 2021).

    Finally, “placing the burden to plead good faith on the initial and subsequent transferees does not contradict the goals of SIPA.” Id. The district court’s “requiring the trustee to plead the transferee’s lack of good faith would do more to hinder SIPA’s goal of distributing customer property ‘as promptly as possible after the appointment of a trustee’ by delaying the trustee’s actions to recover the property.” Id.

    Remand for Trial. The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal of the trustee’s suit and remanded the litigation for trial. Given the detailed facts in the trustee’s proposed amended complaint, the defendants will have an uphill battle. They will have to argue that had they conducted an investigation, they would have been unable to complete it because of Madoff’s active concealment of his fraud. See, e.g., Bayou Group, 439 B.R. 284, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (no diligent investigation would have disclosed transferor’s insolvency or fraudulent purpose); Hanover Group, 310 F.3d 796, 800 (5th Cir 2002) (no way of learning of debtor’s insolvency).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This communication is issued by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice or establish an attorney-client relationship. In some jurisdictions, this publication may be considered attorney advertising. ©2021 Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

    All rights reserved. SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL is the registered trademark of Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP.

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