Resignation following a transfer and Italy’s unemployment benefit: Distance alone does not constitute just cause

In Italy, an employer’s power to change an employee’s place of work is one of the clearest expressions of its managerial and organizational prerogatives. When a transfer requires an employee to relocate far from home, an important social security issue arises: Is an employee who resigns, rather than accepts the transfer, entitled to Italy’s unemployment benefit, Nuova Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego (NASpI) ?

The Italian Supreme Court addressed this issue in Order No. 10559 of 21 April 2026, holding that distance alone is insufficient. While the outcome is consistent with the facts of the underlying case, the legal principle articulated by the court is framed broadly. Read together with Order No. 8564 of 6 April 2026, the decision raises several issues worthy of closer examination.

The matter concerns three key aspects: (i) the requirement of involuntary unemployment under Article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 22/2015, (ii) the concept of just cause under Article 2119 of the Italian Civil Code, and (iii) the limitations on transfers established by Article 2103 of the Italian Civil Code.*

The legal framework: Involuntary unemployment and resignation for just cause

Article 3 of Legislative Decree No. 22/2015 grants NASpI to workers who have involuntarily lost their employment. Paragraph 2 expressly extends eligibility to employees who resign for just cause. Through this decree, the legislature adopted the approach developed by the Italian Constitutional Court in Judgment No. 269/2002: Resignation for just cause is not the result of an employee’s free choice, but rather of a defect in the employment relationship so serious that continuation becomes impossible.

Accordingly, an employee who resigns and applies for NASpI must demonstrate the existence of just cause and show that the termination resulted from conduct by the employer that was serious, or at least objectively intolerable.

Article 2103 of the Italian Civil Code permits transfers to another workplace only where there are “proven technical, organizational, and production-related reasons”. According to settled Supreme Court case law, courts must verify that such reasons genuinely exist, but they may not review the business merits or expediency of the management decision (Supreme Court, Judgment No. 25384/2015).

Where these requirements are absent, the transfer constitutes a contractual breach capable of disrupting the balance of the employment relationship.

The case and the principle of law

The case involved an employee who was transferred from Genoa, where the employee lived, to Catania and subsequently resigned.

Reversing the first-instance decision, the Genoa Court of Appeal found that just cause existed, holding that a transfer of more than 50 kilometres and the practical impossibility of working at such a distance constituted a serious objective circumstance, regardless of whether the employer had committed a breach.

The Supreme Court upheld the appeal brought by INPS (the Italian National Social Security Institute), finding that the Genoa Court of Appeal had failed to determine whether the transfer was supported by the required technical, organizational, and production-related reasons.

Only the absence of those reasons could have rendered the transfer unlawful and therefore capable of constituting just cause. The Supreme Court referred to Judgment No. 23039/2024, reaffirming that entitlement to NASpI is excluded whenever an employee voluntarily relinquishes employment despite being able to continue the relationship.

By focusing exclusively on the distance between Genoa and Catania, the Genoa Court of Appeal had overlooked two essential questions: whether the employer had committed a breach and whether any other circumstance objectively undermined the relationship of trust.

The Supreme Court therefore stated the following principle of law: Entitlement to NASpI following resignation requires the existence of circumstances attributable to the employer that amount to a serious breach or conduct making the continuation of the employment relationship, even temporarily, intolerable. Consequently, the significant distance resulting from a workplace transfer is not, in itself, sufficient.

The judgment was quashed and remanded to the Genoa Court of Appeal.

Consistency with case law on health-related resignations

The April 2026 order is consistent with the approach previously adopted in Supreme Court Judgment No. 12565/2017, which denied NASpI to an employee who had resigned for health reasons.

The court clarified that, although the resignation was driven by compelling personal necessity, it remained a voluntary decision because it was not caused by any unlawful conduct on the part of the employer.

The same reasoning applies to workplace transfers. Logistical difficulties do not automatically make continuation of the employment relationship impossible where the transfer complies with Article 2103 of the Italian Civil Code.

The decisive factor is not the severity of the hardship itself but whether that hardship is attributable to the employer.

The burden of proof and the relationship with administrative practice

From an evidentiary perspective, the order significantly increases the burden placed on employees.

It is not sufficient to prove the existence of the transfer and the distance involved. Employees must also demonstrate that the transfer was unlawful under Article 2103 of the Italian Civil Code.

Distance and logistical hardship remain relevant considerations, but they are not independently sufficient. They must be accompanied by a breach of Article 2103, such as the absence of proven business reasons or the existence of a retaliatory or otherwise abnormal transfer. Consistent with established case law, the burden remains on the employee to plead and prove just cause, including demonstrating that the resignation followed promptly upon the employer’s conduct.

The decision departs from INPS administrative practice. Circular No. 94/2015 treated any transfer lacking “proven reasons” as constituting just cause, regardless of distance, and considered unemployment involuntary where an employee and employer agreed to terminate the relationship following the refusal of a transfer exceeding 50 kilometres or requiring more than 80 minutes of travel by public transport.

The ruling follows Supreme Court Judgment No. 8564 of 6 April 2026, which reaffirmed that administrative circulars are internal acts and cannot alter the statutory requirements governing entitlement to benefits.

Divergent views in legal scholarship

Early academic commentary has taken two opposing approaches.

One school of thought views the order as an important safeguard against an overly expansive interpretation of just cause for social security purposes. According to this perspective, the decision prevents NASpI from becoming a benefit linked solely to geographical distance and protects the freedom of enterprise guaranteed by Article 41 of the Italian Constitution.

A second school of thought is more critical. It argues that the decision conflates the civil law concept of just cause with the social security concept of involuntary unemployment, even though the two concepts do not fully overlap. According to this view, greater consideration should be given to personal circumstances such as family responsibilities, genuine inability to relocate, and disproportionate economic costs. Otherwise, the threshold for access to NASpI may become excessively restrictive.

Critics have also proposed various corrective measures, including a broader assessment of all relevant circumstances, consideration of administrative circulars as nonbinding but useful benchmarks, and greater coordination between employment litigation and social security proceedings so that the latter do not become an even more burdensome “second trial.”

A reflection: Lawful does not necessarily mean voluntary

At its core, the order raises a question that extends well beyond the distance between Genoa and Catania: When can a choice truly be considered free?

For the Supreme Court, the answer is straightforward. If the employer exercised a lawful managerial power, the employee could have remained employed, and the decision to resign was voluntary.

From a legal standpoint, this reasoning is coherent. In practical terms, however, the situation is often more complex. An employee with a mortgage, school-age children, or elderly relatives requiring care may not perceive two equally viable alternatives. There may be only one realistic choice, even if that option results in the termination of employment. Describing such a decision as “voluntary” may be technically accurate, but it does not fully capture the employee’s lived reality.

The challenge lies in the fact that social security law must draw a line, and every line inevitably excludes some cases. Drawing the linetoo broadly risks transforming NASpI into a benefit available whenever an employee has personal reasons for leaving employment. Drawing it too narrowly risks transferring onto employees the costs associated with business decisions made by employers.

The Supreme Court chose not to make geographical distance the decisive criterion. That choice is defensible, but it does not by itself resolve the broader question of where the boundary should be drawn.

The decision may also have practical implications. A distant transfer could, in some circumstances, become a way to encourage an employee’s departure without resorting to dismissal. While most transfers are undoubtedly motivated by genuine business needs, a system that encourages employees to negotiate an agreed termination, rather than exercise their rights, in order to preserve social security protection raises concerns about fairness and balance.

The paradox remains: The same factual circumstances may entitle an employee to NASpI if the employment relationship ends by mutual agreement yet provide significantly less protection if it ends through resignation.

Perhaps the most important lesson is not about distance at all. Rather, the order highlights that, in employment relationships, the manner in which the relationship ends can be just as important as the reasons it ends. Understanding that distinction before making any decision is essential.

Conclusions: Practical guidance

The order provides a clear message: Distance alone does not make unemployment involuntary. Entitlement to NASpI requires a judicial assessment of the lawfulness of the transfer.

For employers, this underscores the importance of carefully documenting the technical, organizational, and production-related reasons supporting every transfer. A lawful transfer does not constitute a contractual breach.

For employees and their advisers, relying on distance alone is insufficient. Before resigning, employees should carefully assess and, where appropriate, challenge the substantive reasons underlying the transfer and gather evidence to demonstrate its unlawfulness. Otherwise, the resignation will be regarded as voluntary and will not entitle the employee to NASpI.

In such cases, the parties may wish to consider a mutual termination agreement, that however will not grant the employee the right to receive the indemnity in lieu of notice. Unlike a voluntary resignation, and unlike the general cases of mutual termination where unemployment benefits are ordinarily unavailable except in specific circumstances, a mutual termination agreement appears, in the case at issue, to be the consensual solution that preserves entitlement to NASpI where the transfer is to a location more than 50 kilometres away and the new workplace can only be reached by public transport in more than 80 minutes.

*Trainees Francesco Cannavina, Rachele Miotello and Francesco Uslenghi contributed to this article