Content Type: Article

  • Escalating U.S.–Russia Tensions Lead to New Sanctions, Heightened AML Risks

    Escalating U.S.–Russia Tensions Lead to New Sanctions, Heightened AML Risks

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Escalating U.S.–Russia Tensions Lead to New Sanctions, Heightened AML Risks

    April 4, 2014

    Read time: 13 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States and others have imposed economic sanctions and issued anti-money laundering advisories in the wake of the growing political tensions between the United States and Russia over the fate of Ukraine. This Alert summarizes the actions taken by authorities to date and discusses compliance implications for U.S. businesses engaged in transactions with Russian or Ukrainian counterparties. Firms are advised to continue monitoring developments in this rapidly fluctuating area of heightened sanctions and AML risk.

    Sanctions by the United States

    Russia’s actions in Crimea have been met with a series of Ukraine-related sanctions by the United States, including three Executive Orders and the addition of dozens of names to the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).[1]

    These new sanctions, issued principally under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), apply to all United States persons, including all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all persons and entities within the United States, and all U.S. incorporated entities and their foreign branches (“U.S. persons”). In all three Executive Orders, President Obama authorizes the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to determine whether persons (defined as individuals or entities) fall under specified categories (set forth below) leading to their designation as SDNs. U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing with SDNs wherever they are located and all SDN assets are blocked. Further, any transaction that evades or avoids the prohibitions of the three Executive Orders constitutes a violation thereof. The three Executive Orders also deny immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons on the SDN List.

    • Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014.President Obama declared a national emergency and prohibited dealings with individuals or entities determined by the Secretary of Treasury: (i) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies undermining the democracy or territorial integrity of Ukraine, or the misappropriation of Ukrainian state assets; (ii) to have asserted governmental authority over any part or region of Ukraine without authorization of the Government of Ukraine; (iii) to be a leader of an entity involved in the foregoing activities or an entity with blocked property; (iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the foregoing activities or any person with blocked property; or (v) to be owned or controlled by, or have acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person with blocked property. 

    ◦ Pursuant to Executive Order 13660, four individuals, including two former Ukrainian government officials and two Crimean separatist leaders, have been designated as SDNs.

    • Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014.President Obama identified as additional prohibited individuals or entities those determined by the Secretary of Treasury: (i) to be an official of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Russia”);[2] (ii) to operate in the arms or related materiel sector in Russia; (iii) to be owned or controlled by, or act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a senior Russian government official or a person with blocked property; or (iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, a senior Russian government official or a person with blocked property.

    ◦ Pursuant to Executive Order 13661, 27 individuals and one entity have been designated as SDNs. Among them are 23 Russian government officials, including high-ranking executive branch officials, legislators, presidential aides and the Chairman of Russian Railways, a state-owned company.[3] Also named are four leading Russian businessmen with close ties to President Vladimir V. Putin: Gennady Timchenko, a founder of Gunvor, an oil and energy commodity trading company in which Putin is alleged to have investments; Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, brothers who are said to have made billions of dollars in contracts awarded to them by Putin for the Sochi Winter Olympics and Gazprom, the state-owned oil company; and Yuri Kovalchuk, the largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, whom the United States says acts as the personal banker for Putin and other senior Russian officials. Bank Rossiya was also added to the SDN List.[4]

    • Executive Order 13662 of March 20, 2014.President Obama identified as additional prohibited individuals or entities those determined by the Secretary of Treasury: (i) to operate in designated sectors of the Russian economy, such as financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, defense and related materiel; (ii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person with blocked property; or (iii) to be owned or controlled by, or have acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person with blocked property.

    ◦ To date, no individuals or entities have been designated as SDNs pursuant to Executive Order 13662. However, inasmuch as this Executive Order is directed at key Russian industries such as the financial services, energy and defense sectors, it has the potential of leading to prohibitions that will have an even greater impact on business transactions.

    The fact that an individual or entity falls within one of the categories listed in the Executive Orders (e.g., is a Russian government official or operates in the Russian financial services industry) does not itself render the individual or entity an SDN with whom U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing. Such an individual or entity becomes an SDN only if and when designated as such by the Secretary of Treasury.  

    Sanctions by the European Union and Others

    The European Union adopted Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP and Regulation 208/2014 on March 5, 2014, sanctions which freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and persons responsible for human rights violations in Ukraine.[5] The European Union adopted Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation 269/2014 on March 17, 2014, and an implementing decision and regulation on March 21, 2014, sanctions which restrict travel and freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.[6] While there is substantial overlap between the EU and U.S. sanctions, the EU sanctions reach additional individuals not named as SDNs by the United States. Nations around the world are imposing similar Ukrainian-related sanctions, including Australia, Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom.

    Ukraine AML Advisories

    The U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has issued two advisories warning financial institutions of heightened money laundering risks relating to the crisis in the Ukraine. FIN-2014-A001 was issued on Feb. 25, 2014, reminding financial institutions that they are required to apply enhanced scrutiny to private banking accounts held by or on behalf of senior foreign political figures and to monitor transactions that could represent misappropriated or diverted state assets, the proceeds of bribery or corruption, or other illegal payments, especially with respect to potentially suspicious transactions involving senior members of the administration of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.[7] FIN-2014-A002 was issued on March 6, 2014, apprising financial institutions of recent developments and warning that adverse measures taken against former Ukrainian officials and their close associates will increase the risk that they will seek to move their assets in a deceptive fashion.[8]

    Congressional Action

    Congress has also taken action, adopting the “Support for Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014” (“Ukraine Act”), which President Obama signed into law on April 3, 2014. The Ukraine Act, among other things, authorizes the President to impose sanctions (asset freezes and visa bans) against persons that the President determines have perpetrated or are responsible for human rights abuses in the Ukraine, or acts intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine. These sanctions largely overlap with those already created under President Obama’s Executive Orders.

    However, the Ukraine Act also specifically targets corruption by Russian officials, authorizing sanctions against “any official of the Government of the Russian Federation, or a close associate or family member of such an official, that the President determines is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling or otherwise directing acts of significant corruption” in either Ukraine or Russia. This focus on Russian corruption is not found in the Executive Orders. Since the Act does not itself prohibit dealings with any particular persons, but rather requires President Obama to determine who should be designated, the impact of the Act remains to be seen.

    In addition to sanctions, the Ukraine Act directs the U.S. State Department, Department of Justice and Department of Treasury to assist the new Ukrainian Government in recovering assets linked to corruption by former President Yanukovych and other Ukrainian officials.    

    Implications for Compliance

    The sanctions and AML measures described above create compliance risks for companies operating in or otherwise engaged in business dealings involving Russia or Ukraine. According to reports, regulators in Europe and the United States are asking financial institutions for information relating to risks in Russia and Ukraine. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has reportedly contacted investment companies and public funds, including mutual funds, regarding investments in Russia. Likewise, the Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority has reportedly asked banks to provide details on their exposure to Russia.

    U.S. companies should review existing customers, investors, and other counterparties for compliance with Ukraine-related sanctions. If a U.S. company has possession or control of any property interest belonging to an SDN, that property must immediately be blocked, and a Report of Blocked Transactions Form filed with OFAC.

    U.S. companies should also ensure that new transactions with customers, investors and other counterparties do not run afoul of the Ukraine-related sanctions. This includes screening proposed investments or transactions involving individuals or entities from Russia or Ukraine against the most up-to-date SDN List.

    When performing due diligence — and also when considering whether any existing investments or transactions are subject to blocking — it is important to remember that entities in which an SDN has a 50 percent or greater ownership interest are also considered blocked,[9] and even SDN ownership interests below the 50 percent threshold may warrant careful scrutiny.[10]

    As noted above, OFAC’s Ukraine-related sanctions apply only to U.S. persons and not to foreign individuals or entities, including foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies. Nevertheless, it remains impermissible for U.S. persons and U.S. entities, wherever located, to have any dealings with SDNs or to facilitate a non-U.S. person’s dealings with SDNs. Additionally, non-U.S. companies must also stay apprised of and comply with applicable sanctions imposed by foreign countries and international organizations.

    The application of OFAC sanctions to a particular relationship or transaction often raises complex issues and depends upon an assessment of the specific facts and circumstances involved. Firms should consider reputational as well as legal risk as part of their analysis.

    Finally, even when a proposed investment or other transaction involving Russia or Ukraine does not violate OFAC regulations, U.S. companies should be aware of the increased AML risks associated with these regions in light of the Ukraine crisis. As set forth in the FinCEN advisories described above, U.S. financial institutions should be alert to the possibility that former members of the now-deposed Ukrainian regime will seek to transfer potentially illicit funds in a deceptive manner. Likewise, U.S. financial institutions are reminded of the need for enhanced due diligence for transactions involving senior foreign political figures and politically exposed persons (“SFPFs/PEPs”). Transactions even with permitted Russian counterparties, especially those connected to President Putin and the Russian Government, are likely to attract greater scrutiny from U.S. AML prosecutors and regulators.

    Authored by Lisa A. Prager, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Peter H. White and Nora Lovell Marchant.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] The SDN List is subject to constant updates. As of the date of this Alert, 32 names appear on the SDN List under the Ukraine programs, including 31 individuals and one bank. See OFAC SDN Search, available at http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas.gov/.

    [2] “Government of the Russian Federation” means the Government of the Russian Federation, any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including the Central Bank of the Government of the Russian Federation, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of the Russian Federation.

    [3] OFAC has indicated that government entities are not necessarily blocked even when the leaders of such entities are deemed SDNs. See OFAC FAQ 285, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#index (“A government ministry is not blocked solely because the minister heading it is an SDN. U.S. persons should, however, be cautious in dealings with the ministry to ensure that they are not, for example, entering into any contracts that are signed by the SDN.”).

    [4] See OFAC Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Russian Officials, Members Of The Russian Leadership’s Inner Circle, And An Entity For Involvement In The Situation In Ukraine (March 20, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx.

    [5] Sanctioned individuals, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:066:0026:0030:EN:PDF.

    [6] Sanctioned individuals, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2014:078:0016:0021:EN:PDF; http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%207962%202014%20ADD%201%20REV%202%20DCL%201.

    [7] See FinCEN Advisory, Guidance to Financial Institutions on Recent Events related to the Departure of Victor Yanukovych and Other Ukrainian Officials (Feb. 25, 2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2014-A001.html.

    [8] See FinCEN Advisory, Updated Guidance to Financial Institutions on Recent Events related to the Departure of Victor Yanukovych and Other Ukrainian Officials (March 6, 2014), available at http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/html/FIN-2014-A002.html.

    [9] See OFAC FAQ 10, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#index (“Entities that a person on the SDN List owns (defined as a direct or indirect ownership interest of 50 percent or more) are also blocked, regardless of whether that entity is separately named on the SDN List.”).

    [10] See OFAC Guidance on Entities Owned by Persons Whose Property and Interests in Property are Blocked, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/licensing_guidance.pdf (“U.S. persons are advised to act with caution when considering a transaction with a non-blocked entity in which a blocked person has a significant ownership interest that is less than 50 percent or which a blocked person may control by means other than a majority ownership interest. Such entities may be the subject of future designation or enforcement action by OFAC.”).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Funds Face New Sanctions, AML Risks in Wake of Escalating U.S.–Russia Tensions

    Funds Face New Sanctions, AML Risks in Wake of Escalating U.S.–Russia Tensions

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Funds Face New Sanctions, AML Risks in Wake of Escalating U.S.–Russia Tensions

    April 4, 2014

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States and others have imposed economic sanctions and issued anti-money laundering advisories in the wake of the growing political tensions between the United States and Russia over the fate of Ukraine. This Alert summarizes the actions taken by authorities to date and discusses compliance implications for investment funds. Fund managers should continue monitoring developments in this rapidly fluctuating area of heightened sanctions and AML risk.

    Sanctions by the United States

    Russia’s actions in Crimea have been met with a series of Ukraine-related sanctions by the United States, including three Executive Orders and the addition of dozens of names to the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) maintained by the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).[1]

    These new sanctions, issued principally under the authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”), apply to all United States persons, including all U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens regardless of where they are located, all persons and entities within the United States, and all U.S. incorporated entities and their foreign branches (“U.S. persons”). In all three Executive Orders, President Obama authorizes the Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to determine whether persons (defined as individuals or entities) fall under specified categories (set forth below) leading to their designation as SDNs. U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing with SDNs wherever they are located and all SDN assets are blocked. Further, any transaction that evades or avoids the prohibitions of the three Executive Orders constitutes a violation thereof. The three Executive Orders also deny immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons on the SDN List.

    • Executive Order 13660 of March 6, 2014.President Obama declared a national emergency and prohibited dealings with individuals or entities determined by the Secretary of Treasury: (i) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies undermining the democracy or territorial integrity of Ukraine, or the misappropriation of Ukrainian state assets; (ii) to have asserted governmental authority over any part or region of Ukraine without authorization of the Government of Ukraine; (iii) to be a leader of an entity involved in the foregoing activities or an entity with blocked property; (iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the foregoing activities or any person with blocked property; or (v) to be owned or controlled by, or have acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person with blocked property.

    ◦ Pursuant to Executive Order 13660, four individuals, including two former Ukrainian government officials and two Crimean separatist leaders, have been designated as SDNs.

    • Executive Order 13661 of March 16, 2014.President Obama identified as additional prohibited individuals or entities those determined by the Secretary of Treasury: (i) to be an official of the Government of the Russian Federation (“Russia”);[2] (ii) to operate in the arms or related materiel sector in Russia; (iii) to be owned or controlled by, or act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, a senior Russian government official or a person with blocked property; or (iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, a senior Russian government official or a person with blocked property.

    ◦ Pursuant to Executive Order 13661, 27 individuals and one entity have been designated as SDNs. Among them are 23 Russian government officials, including high-ranking executive branch officials, legislators, presidential aides and the Chairman of Russian Railways, a state-owned company.[3] Also named are four leading Russian businessmen with close ties to President Vladimir V. Putin: Gennady Timchenko, a founder of Gunvor, an oil and energy commodity trading company in which Putin is alleged to have investments; Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, brothers who are said to have made billions of dollars in contracts awarded to them by Putin for the Sochi Winter Olympics and Gazprom, the state-owned oil company; and Yuri Kovalchuk, the largest shareholder of Bank Rossiya, whom the United States says acts as the personal banker for Putin and other senior Russian officials. Bank Rossiya was also added to the SDN List.[4]

    • Executive Order 13662 of March 20, 2014.President Obama identified as additional prohibited individuals or entities those determined by the Secretary of Treasury: (i) to operate in designated sectors of the Russian economy, such as financial services, energy, metals and mining, engineering, defense and related materiel; (ii) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person with blocked property; or (iii) to be owned or controlled by, or have acted for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person with blocked property.

    ◦ To date, no individuals or entities have been designated as SDNs pursuant to Executive Order 13662. However, inasmuch as this Executive Order is directed at key Russian industries such as the financial services, energy and defense sectors, it has the potential of leading to prohibitions that will have an even greater impact on business transactions.

    The fact that an individual or entity falls within one of the categories listed in the Executive Orders (e.g., is a Russian government official or operates in the Russian financial services industry) does not itself render the individual or entity an SDN with whom U.S. persons are prohibited from dealing. Such an individual or entity becomes an SDN only if and when designated as such by the Secretary of Treasury.

    Sanctions by the European Union and Others

    The European Union adopted Council Decision 2014/119/CFSP and Regulation 208/2014 on March 5, 2014, sanctions which freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons identified as responsible for the misappropriation of Ukrainian State funds and persons responsible for human rights violations in Ukraine.[5] The European Union adopted Council Decision 2014/145/CFSP and Regulation 269/2014 on March 17, 2014, and an implementing decision and regulation on March 21, 2014, sanctions which restrict travel and freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons responsible for actions which undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine.[6] While there is substantial overlap between the EU and U.S. sanctions, the EU sanctions reach additional individuals not named as SDNs by the United States. Nations around the world are imposing similar Ukrainian-related sanctions, including Australia, Canada, Norway and the United Kingdom.

    Ukraine AML Advisories

    The U.S. Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) has issued two advisories warning financial institutions of heightened money laundering risks relating to the crisis in the Ukraine. FIN-2014-A001 was issued on Feb. 25, 2014, reminding financial institutions that they are required to apply enhanced scrutiny to private banking accounts held by or on behalf of senior foreign political figures and to monitor transactions that could represent misappropriated or diverted state assets, the proceeds of bribery or corruption, or other illegal payments, especially with respect to potentially suspicious transactions involving senior members of the administration of former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.[7] FIN-2014-A002 was issued on March 6, 2014, apprising financial institutions of recent developments and warning that adverse measures taken against former Ukrainian officials and their close associates will increase the risk that they will seek to move their assets in a deceptive fashion.[8]

    Congressional Action

    Congress has also taken action, adopting the “Support for Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act of 2014” (“Ukraine Act”), which President Obama signed into law on April 3, 2014. The Ukraine Act, among other things, authorizes the President to impose sanctions (asset freezes and visa bans) against persons that the President determines have perpetrated or are responsible for human rights abuses in the Ukraine, or acts intended to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty or territorial integrity of Ukraine. These sanctions largely overlap with those already created under President Obama’s Executive Orders.

    However, the Ukraine Act also specifically targets corruption by Russian officials, authorizing sanctions against “any official of the Government of the Russian Federation, or a close associate or family member of such an official, that the President determines is responsible for, complicit in, or responsible for ordering, controlling or otherwise directing acts of significant corruption” in either Ukraine or Russia. This focus on Russian corruption is not found in the Executive Orders. Since the Act does not itself prohibit dealings with any particular persons, but rather requires President Obama to determine who should be designated, the impact of the Act remains to be seen.

    In addition to sanctions, the Ukraine Act directs the U.S. State Department, Department of Justice and Department of Treasury to assist the new Ukrainian Government in recovering assets linked to corruption by former President Yanukovych and other Ukrainian officials.

    Implications for Compliance

    The sanctions and AML measures described above create compliance risks for investment funds that take investments from, make investments in, or otherwise engage in business dealings with Russia or Ukraine. According to reports, regulators in Europe and the United States are asking financial institutions for information relating to risks in Russia and Ukraine. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has reportedly contacted investment companies and public funds, including mutual funds, regarding investments in Russia. Likewise, the Bank of England Prudential Regulation Authority has reportedly asked banks to provide details on their exposure to Russia.

    Fund managers should review existing investors and investments at the funds they advise for compliance with Ukraine-related sanctions. If a U.S. entity has possession or control of any property interest belonging to an SDN, that property must immediately be blocked, and a Report of Blocked Transactions Form filed with OFAC.

    Effectuating a block is relatively straightforward when funds or securities are held in a separate account in the SDN’s name. But blocking raises greater complexities when an SDN’s funds have been pooled together with those of other investors, as in a typical investment fund. After OFAC-imposed sanctions in 2011 on the Government of Libya (including its sovereign wealth fund, the Libyan Investment Authority), OFAC issued a General License that authorized investment funds in which the Government of Libya held a non-controlling, minority interest to continue their normal operations, provided that the fund did not make any payment or transfer to the Government of Libya, except to a blocked account at a U.S. financial institution.[9] OFAC has not yet issued a similar General License under the Ukraine-related sanctions.

    Fund managers should also ensure that new investments do not run afoul of the Ukraine-related sanctions. This includes screening proposed investments or transactions involving individuals or entities from Russia or Ukraine against the most up-to-date SDN List. Investment funds that rely on administrators and intermediaries to perform this function should check that such third-parties are performing appropriate screening as well.

    When performing due diligence — and also when considering whether any existing investments or transactions are subject to blocking — it is important to remember that entities in which an SDN has a 50 percent or greater ownership interest are also considered blocked,[10] and even SDN ownership interests below the 50 percent threshold may warrant careful scrutiny.[11]

    As noted above, OFAC’s Ukraine-related sanctions apply only to U.S. persons, and not to foreign individuals or entities. Nevertheless, it remains impermissible for U.S. persons and U.S. entities, wherever located, to have any dealings with SDNs or to facilitate a non-U.S. person’s dealings with SDNs. Thus, for example, a U.S. investment manager is prohibited from dealing with an SDN even if the SDN is investing solely in a non-U.S. fund. Additionally, non-U.S. firms must also stay apprised of and comply with applicable sanctions imposed by foreign countries and international organizations.

    The application of OFAC sanctions to a particular relationship or transaction often raises complex issues and depends upon an assessment of the specific facts and circumstances involved. Firms should consider reputational as well as legal risk as part of their analysis.

    Finally, even when a proposed investment or other transaction involving Russia or Ukraine does not violate OFAC regulations, investment funds should be aware of the increased AML risks associated with these regions in light of the Ukraine crisis. As set forth in the FinCEN advisories described above, U.S. financial institutions should be alert to the possibility that former members of the now-deposed Ukrainian regime will seek to transfer potentially illicit funds in a deceptive manner. Likewise, firms are reminded of the need for enhanced due diligence for transactions involving senior foreign political figures and politically exposed persons (“SFPFs/PEPs”). Transactions even with permitted Russian counterparties, especially those connected to President Putin and the Russian Government, are likely to attract greater scrutiny from U.S. AML prosecutors and regulators.

    Authored by Lisa A. Prager, Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Peter H. White, and Nora Lovell Marchant.

    If you have any questions concerning this Client Alert, please contact your attorney or one of the authors.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights

  • Exiting a Joint Venture Partnership That Owns a Foreign Subsidiary

    ARTICLE

    Exiting a Joint Venture Partnership That Owns a Foreign Subsidiary

    April 3, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth
    Authors
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  • Seventh Circuit Reads Bankruptcy Safe Harbor Broadly to Insulate Preferential Settlement Payment to Commodity Broker

    Seventh Circuit Reads Bankruptcy Safe Harbor Broadly to Insulate Preferential Settlement Payment to Commodity Broker

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Reads Bankruptcy Safe Harbor Broadly to Insulate Preferential Settlement Payment to Commodity Broker

    April 3, 2014

    Read time: 9 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, on March 19, 2014, held that a corrupt debtor’s pre-bankruptcy cash transfer to a commodity broker was a “settlement payment” made “in connection with a securities contract,” thus falling “within [Bankruptcy Code] §546(e)’s safe harbor” and insulating the transfer from the trustee’s preference claim. Grede v. FCStone, LLC (In re Sentinel Management Group, Inc.), 2014 WL 1041736, *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 19, 2014). Reversing the district court’s “policy” decision that “Congress could not have intended the safe harbor provisions to apply” to this case, the Court of Appeals stressed that §546(e) makes no “exception for preferential transfers, although it does make an exception for actual fraud,” a claim the bankruptcy trustee never made. Id., at *8. As the court explained, “Congress enacted §546(e) to prevent a large bankruptcy from triggering a wave of bankruptcies among securities businesses….Those dealing in securities have an interest in knowing that a deal, once completed, is indeed final so that they need not routinely hold reserves to cover the possibility of unwinding the deal if a counter-party files for bankruptcy in the next 90 days….[E]ven a short term lack of liquidity can prove fatal to a commodity broker or other securities business.” Id., at *9. In a separate unrelated holding, the court also ruled that the debtor’s court-authorized post-bankruptcy cash transfer to the commodity broker could not be set aside under Code §549.

    Relevance

    One of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe harbor provisions, §546(e), insulates from the trustee’s fraudulent transfer or preference attack a “settlement payment” or “margin payment” on a “securities contract,” “commodity contract” or “forward contract,” except when the debtor’s payment is made with “actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” creditors. The Courts of Appeals have consistently refused to accept policy arguments made by trustees and creditors, choosing instead to follow the Code’s plain language. In the past year alone, the Second Circuit held that payments by a debtor to a noteholder trustee for noteholders “in exchange for private placement notes clearly fell within the safe harbor for ‘transfers made…in connection with a securities contract.’” In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 719 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2013). The Fourth Circuit also held that commission payments to a stockbroker were shielded from recovery under the §546(e) “settlement payment” defense, finding no statutory exception for payments made in the context of a Ponzi scheme. In re Derivium Capital LLC, 716 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2013). Just six months ago, the Seventh Circuit also held that “shares of stock issued by crooked mutual funds or hedge funds are ‘securities’…for the purposes of [Code] §546(e).” Peterson v. Somers Dublin Ltd., 729 F.3d 741, 750 (7th Cir. 2013).

    Facts

    The debtor in Grede was an investment management firm that had apparently violated federal securities and commodities laws by commingling client funds across different segments of investors. It used the investors’ securities as collateral to take out large loans from a bank. After the subprime mortgage industry collapsed, when the bank demanded immediate payment, the debtor sought Chapter 11 reorganization relief. Immediately prior to bankruptcy, the debtor had improperly moved roughly $300 million from a liened account to a group of investors in its futures commission merchant (“FCM”) segment. The debtor also distributed $22.5 million to its FCM investors, including the defendant here. After filing its Chapter 11 petition, but before a trustee was appointed, the debtor, with court approval, also sold more than $300 million of securities it was holding and transferred the sale proceeds to the same FCM group that included the defendant.

    The trustee sued the FCM defendants in the district court, seeking to avoid both the pre-bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy transfers. The district court held, in a test case with just one defendant, that §546(e) did not protect from avoidance the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy transfer to the defendant. 2014 WL 1041736, at *8. In its view, “shielding the debtor’s distribution of sale proceeds to customers would destabilize the financial system because it would be impossible to predict who would receive money in the event of a bankruptcy.” The district court also held that the bankruptcy court’s authorization of the post-bankruptcy transfer of sale proceeds to the defendant was not a proper authorization under Code §549.

    The Court of Appeals

    The Seventh Circuit held that the pre-bankruptcy transfer “qualified as a ‘settlement payment’ under §546(e).” Id., at *7. Although the debtor’s customers had no “rights to specific securities,…they were entitled to pro rata shares of the value of the securities in their group’s portfolios.” Id. The debtor could thus sell securities from the portfolio or pay its customers “with cash it had on hand” to satisfy customer redemptions. Id. “Regardless of how [the debtor] chose to fund customer redemptions, the redemptions were meant to settle, at least partially, the customer’s securities accounts with [the debtor].” Id.

    The court also found a second “independent basis for applying the safe harbor of §546(e).” Id., at *8. Specifically, the debtor made the pre-bankruptcy transfer to the defendant “in connection with a securities contract.” Id. Because the FCM “investment agreements were contracts for the purchase and sale of securities,” the debtor’s cash redemption “still served in part to satisfy [its] obligations to [the defendant] under the investment agreement,” thus making the cash transfer a redemption “in connection with the investment agreement,” a “securities contract” referred to in Code §546(e). Id.

    The Seventh Circuit rejected the district court’s policy-grounded “reasoning [as] directly contrary to the broad language of §546(e).” Id. Because the safe harbor insulates preferences from attack, “[t]he presence of an exception for actual fraud makes sense only if §546(e) applies as far as its language goes.” Id., citing Peterson, 729 F.3d at 749. With §546(e),

    “Congress chose finality over equity for most pre-petition transfers in the securities industry — i.e., those not involving actual fraud. In other words, §546(e) reflects a policy judgment by Congress that allowing some otherwise avoidable pre-petition transfers in the securities industry to stand would probably be a lesser evil than the uncertainty and potential lack of liquidity that would be caused by putting every recipient of settlement payments in the past 90 days at risk of having its transactions unwound in the bankruptcy court.”

    Id., at *9. In other words, the safe harbor provision “protects the market from systemic risk and allows parties in the securities industry to enter into transactions with greater confidence.” Id., at *7.

    Comments

    1. The Seventh Circuit’s broad reading of Code §546(e) is consistent with its earlier decision in Peterson v. Somers Dublin Ltd., 729 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (held, pre-petition redemption payments made to investors by Chapter 7 debtor-hedge funds operating as a Ponzi scheme fell within Code’s safe harbor). In Peterson, the debtor funds “were not operating legitimately at the end and were conduits for the” debtor’s fraudulent scheme, causing the trustee to argue that “Code §546(e) is irrelevant.” Id., at 748. Although other courts “have been restive at the idea that people who receive money from a crooked enterprise can keep it, to the detriment of other investors who did not get out while the going was good,” causing them to “read §546(e) narrowly,” the Seventh Circuit claimed to be interpreting “the Code clearly and predictably using well established principles of statutory construction.” Id., at 749, quoting RADLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012). It would “apply the text…[but] not themes from a [legislative] history that was neither passed by a majority of either House nor signed into law.” 729 F. 3d at 748. The court disagreed with the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which refused to apply the safe harbor when “the operators of particular Ponzi schemes were not ‘stockbrokers’ for the purpose of the statute.” Id., at 749, citing In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2008); and In re Wider, 907 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1990). Instead, the Seventh Circuit followed two recent decisions from the Second Circuit. In re Quebecor World (USA) Inc., 719 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2013) (“transfer” has its normal meaning); and Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B.de C.V., 651 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2011) (“settlement payment” has its normal meaning).

    2. The lower courts are still wrestling with the Code’s safe harbor provisions. See, e.g., In re Tribune Company Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation, 499 B.R. 310, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (held, granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, “…§546(e) does not preempt the Individual Creditors’ [fraudulent transfer] claims, but…§362(a)(1) nonetheless deprives the Individual Creditors of standing to avoid the same transactions that the estate representative is simultaneously suing to avoid.”); Whyte v. Barclays Bank P.C., 494 B.R. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (held, trustee barred by Code §546(g) [safe harbor for transfer to swap participant or financial participant under swap agreement] from asserting claims of creditors that had been assigned to liquidation trust when trustee would otherwise be expressly barred by §546(g) from asserting those claims; trustee’s “clever” attempt to assert state law rights as “assignee,” but not as trustee, would “render section 546(g) a nullity.”); In re Lyondell Chemical Co., 503 B.R. 348, 358 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2014) (held, safe harbor of §546(e) did not bar unsecured creditors from seeking, under state fraudulent transfer law, to recover payments made to former shareholders of a company acquired in a leveraged buyout). Finally, the Second Circuit is expected to rule soon on another factually provocative safe harbor case. AP Services LLP v. Silva, 483 B.R. 63, 68-69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (held, §546(e) bars state common law claims such as unjust enrichment, aiding and abetting, or conversion when the underlying facts show that the plaintiff seeks to undo a transaction otherwise insulated by §546(e); dismissed fraudulent transfer complaint under New York law when failed LBO preceded bankruptcy by three years; debtor transferred funds “directly to [the selling shareholder defendants’] bank accounts and [the funds] did not pass…through a clearing house or [similar] intermediary;” “transaction fits within [the Code’s] safe harbor.”).

    Authored by  Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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