Content Type: Article

  • Competition Law – Classification of the best law firms

    ARTICLE

    Competition Law – Classification of the best law firms

    February – March, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Rankings are in French.

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  • Arbitrage International – Classement des meilleurs cabinets d’avocats

    ARTICLE

    Arbitrage International – Classement des meilleurs cabinets d’avocats

    February – March, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Yet another Health Reform and Seizure of Retiring Doctors’ Practices

    ARTICLE

    Yet another Health Reform and Seizure of Retiring Doctors’ Practices

    February 19, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Do You Need to Make Changes to Your UK LLP Agreement?

    Do You Need to Make Changes to Your UK LLP Agreement?

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Do You Need to Make Changes to Your UK LLP Agreement?

    19 February 2014

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In May 2013, HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) consulted on proposals in two areas to tackle perceived tax avoidance via partnerships. The first area was disguised employment in Limited Liability Partnerships (“LLPs”) and the second was the tax-motivated allocation of business profits and losses in partnerships (including LLPs), especially profit allocations to the corporate member of an LLP. The consultation has ended and HMRC issued final legislative proposals and a detailed draft Technical Note and Guidance (“Guidance”) in December 2013. The final form of the Legislation and Guidance is expected to be published in March 2014.

    The new legislation will be effective from 6 April 2014 and, in substance, will: (1) tax individual LLP members who are treated as salaried members under the tests in the new legislation (“Salaried Members”) as employees; and (2) remove in most cases the tax advantages gained through profit allocations to corporate partners (“Corporate Members”), loss allocation to individual partners, and transfers of assets or income streams through partnerships. The Salaried Member rules and allocations of profits to Corporate Members are explored in this Memorandum.

    In depth
    Authors

    Nick Fagge

    Partner

    London – One Eagle Place

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  • Fix It or Go Home: Revising the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act

    ARTICLE

    Fix It or Go Home: Revising the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act

    February 18, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Wide Ranging Changes to LLP Member Taxation to Come into Force on April 6, 2014

    ARTICLE

    Wide Ranging Changes to LLP Member Taxation to Come into Force on April 6, 2014

    February 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Subpart F Manufacturing Exception Applied to Products That Are Grown

    ARTICLE

    Subpart F Manufacturing Exception Applied to Products That Are Grown

    February 14, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Swaps Update: ‘Triangular Setoff’ Held Unenforceable in Bankruptcy Cases

    Swaps Update: ‘Triangular Setoff’ Held Unenforceable in Bankruptcy Cases

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Swaps Update: ‘Triangular Setoff’ Held Unenforceable in Bankruptcy Cases

    February 13, 2014

    Read time: 6 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Setoff provisions are commonly found in a variety of trading related agreements between hedge funds and their dealer counterparties. Last November, Judge Christopher Sontchi of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware held that “triangular setoff” is not enforceable in the context of a bankruptcy case.[1] “Triangular setoff” is a contractual right of setoff that permits one party (“Party One”) to net and set off contractual claims of Party One and its affiliated entities  against another party (“Party Two”). The setoff provision allows Party One to offset amounts it would otherwise owe Party Two against amounts owed by Party Two to Party One or to Party One’s affiliates under their various agreements.[2] 

    In the case, American Home Mortgage Investment Corp. (“AHM”) and Barclays Capital entered into a repurchase agreement dated February 2006.[3] Separately, in March 2006, AHM entered into an ISDA Master Agreement with Barclays Bank,[4] which contained a broad setoff provision that authorized Barclays Bank to set off any amounts owed to it or any of its affiliates, which included Barclays Capital.[5]

    In August 2007, Barclays Bank asserted that AHM was in default under the ISDA Master Agreement, and notified AHM of its intent to exercise its setoff rights. The following day, Barclays Capital asserted that AHM was in default and terminated the repurchase agreement. When Barclays Bank terminated the ISDA Master Agreement, there was a “surplus” because the amounts owed to AHM exceeded the amounts owed to Barclays Bank.[6] When Barclays Capital terminated the repurchase agreement there was a “shortfall” because the amounts owed to AHM were less than the amounts owed to Barclays Capital. When AHM filed for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Barclays Capital calculated its deficiency claim and applied the surplus to the shortfall (i.e., the surplus payable to AHM by Barclays Bank was eliminated based on the shortfall under AHM’s repurchase agreement with Barclays Capital).

    The court held that the contractual right of setoff that permits netting by multiple affiliates of the contract counterparty outside of bankruptcy may not be enforced after the commencement of a bankruptcy case. In addition, neither the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement nor the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code can, either explicitly or implicitly, override the obligation of “mutuality”[7] to effectuate a setoff. The court also concluded that the equitable distribution policy in the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme would be undermined if creditor-affiliates could contract around it.

    The court’s finding is consistent with an earlier decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, where Judge James Peck held that “once the parties to that contract are subjected to the constraints of the Bankruptcy Code,” triangular setoff provisions are not enforceable because netting of a debtor’s claim in this way will reduce the amount available to other creditors.[8]

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Craig Stein or Lawrence V. Gelber.


    [1] Sass v. Barclays Bank PLC (In re American Home Mortgage, Holdings, Inc.), No. 11-51851 (CSS) (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 8, 2013).

    [2] In the context of a fund structure, generally funds do not have affiliated entities and therefore this right generally only benefits the dealer counterparty. In addition, setoff rights are characterized as the “right, but not the obligation” of Party One, therefore providing an incentive of Party One to select to exercise a setoff right only when it would benefit Party One and its affiliates.

    [3] The repurchase agreement provided for, among other things, AHM (as seller) to transfer to Barclays Capital (as buyer) various securities and other assets (“Purchased Securities”) in exchange for the transfer of funds from Barclays Capital, with a simultaneous agreement by Barclays Capital to transfer to AHM such Purchased Securities as of a date certain or on demand in exchange for the transfer of funds from AHM (the “Repurchase Price”). Barclays Capital and AHM, for the most part, agreed on the Repurchase Price, but not the value of the Purchased Securities.

    [4] In connection with underwriting a securitization, Barclays Bank entered into interest rate cap options with AHM, which were governed by the ISDA Master Agreement (Multi-Currency-Cross Border), the Schedule to the Master Agreement, the ISDA Credit Support Index, and certain related Confirmations, and other related transactional documents. The ISDA Master Agreement with Barclays Bank provided, among other things, margin protection in the form of cash collateral or securities to be delivered to the counterparty upon demand and under certain circumstances.

    [5] We note that the introduction to the opinion incorrectly states that AHM was “a party to a Swap Agreement with Barclays Capital and a Repurchase Agreement with Barclays Bank.”

    [6] The surplus arose because the value of the collateral held by Barclays Bank under the ISDA Master Agreement exceeded the amounts AHM owed to Barclays Bank.

    [7] The Bankruptcy Code does not create an independent right of setoff. Rather, it preserves any right of setoff that may exist under applicable non-bankruptcy law. Section 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, however, provides that a creditor may only set off “a mutual debt” owed by the creditor to the debtor against a claim “of such creditor “against the debtor. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define “mutual debt,” a majority of courts have held debts are mutual only “if they are due to and from the same persons in the same capacity.”  See, e.g., In re SemCrude, L.P., 399 B.R. 388, 396 (Del. Bankr. 2009) aff’d, 428 B.R. 590 (D. Del. 2010) (“Semcrude”) (citations omitted in original). Because parties cannot contract around this statutory requirement, the court then considered whether the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code would apply.

    [8] In re Lehman Brothers Inc., 458 B.R. 134, 139 (2011). See also,SemCrude, 399 B.R. at 393-94(upholding mutuality requirement and denying triangular setoff).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Craig Stein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Fisker Part II: Delaware District Court Refuses to Hear Appeal of Controversial Bankruptcy Court Decision Capping Credit Bid

    Fisker Part II: Delaware District Court Refuses to Hear Appeal of Controversial Bankruptcy Court Decision Capping Credit Bid

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fisker Part II: Delaware District Court Refuses to Hear Appeal of Controversial Bankruptcy Court Decision Capping Credit Bid

    February 12, 2014

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    We recently wrote about the highly controversial decision of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court in In re Fisker Automotive capping a secured creditor’s right to credit bid its $168 million claim at $25 million.[1] The secured creditor immediately appealed to the District Court.[2] As a procedural matter, the secured creditor had an absolute right to have its appeal heard only if the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling was considered a “final order.” If it was not a “final order,” then the District Court had discretion on whether to hear the merits of the appeal. On Feb. 7, 2014, the District Court determined that the Bankruptcy Court order was not final and declined to hear the appeal. The District Court’s 11-page opinion is just as controversial as the Bankruptcy Court’s order.[3]

    The District Court found that there was no “controlling question of law as to which there exists substantial grounds for a difference of opinion” because the Bankruptcy Court’s controversial ruling was supported by the “plain text of 363(k)” (which permits a bankruptcy court to limit credit bidding for “cause”) and “relevant legal precedent.” The District Court effectively adopted the Bankruptcy Court’s rationale that “cause” to cap a credit bid incudes “foster[ing] a competitive bidding environment.” The Bankruptcy Court and District Court both cite a footnote in the Third Circuit’s Philadelphia Newspapers[4]decision to support their reasoning. The secured creditor argued that the footnote is not controlling law because two of the three judges in that case declined to adopt the portion of the opinion with the footnote. Thus, the creditor argued the premise that a court can limit a credit bid to foster competitive bidding is mere dicta. Furthermore, the Philadelphia Newspapers decision (which affirmed the denial of a right to credit bid for a sale of assets under plan, as opposed to a sale under Section 363)waslater overruled by the United States Supreme Court. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). The District Court did not address these issues in its decision.

    The District Court also dismissed the secured creditor’s argument that it would be without a remedy if the auction occurred while its credit bid was capped at $25 million. The District Court noted that the secured creditor could credit bid $25 million and continue bidding with cash. In that context, the secured creditor could receive either a cash return of the difference between a full credit bid and the $25 million cap on its credit bid were the Bankruptcy Court to conclude it was so entitled. If a third-party bidder won the auction, the secured creditor would receive its entitlement from the sale proceeds.

    Observations

    The Bankruptcy Court’s order purports to be “non-precedential” and the District Court’s ruling was not a decision on the merits, but rather a decision on the right to prosecute an appeal. Nevertheless, we expect that out-of-the-money constituents and potential bidders will in the future seek to rely on these decisions to challenge and/or cap credit bids. There are significant concerns about the correctness of these decisions, but market participants likely will have to endure a wave of litigation and wait until the issue is resolved (in this case or in other cases) by the Courts of Appeals.

    Authored by Adam C. Harris, David M. Hillman and James T. Bentley.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Click here for our prior Alert.

    [2] The secured creditor also sought a direct appeal to the Third Circuit.

    [3] Click here for the District Court’s decision.

    [4] Philadelphia Newspapers 599 F.3d 298, 315-16 fn. 14 (3d Cir. 2010).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Adam C. Harris

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • UPDATE: Broadridge Reverses Change in Vote Tally Reporting Policy

    UPDATE: Broadridge Reverses Change in Vote Tally Reporting Policy

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    UPDATE: Broadridge Reverses Change in Vote Tally Reporting Policy

    February 11, 2014

    Read time: 3 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Broadridge Financial Solutions, Inc. (“Broadridge”) announced that, in spite of its previous announcement, it will no longer be implementing the change in its policy on vote tally reporting in proxy contests. Broadridge will instead continue to rely on its long-standing policy of providing interim voting updates to both sides of a proxy contest, irrespective of which proxy contest participant’s ballot shareholders voted on. In its announcement reversing the policy change, Broadridge stated, “These procedures have been consistently applied for decades; they are understood by regulators and by the participants in the proxy process.” The effect of this policy statement reversal will allow for the continuation of an even playing field and maximum transparency in the vote tracking process that has been the long-standing norm.

    Authored by David E. Rosewater and Brandon S. Gold .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Brandon S. Gold

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    More insights