Content Type: Article

  • Seeking Clarity at the Crossroads of Legal and Compliance

    ARTICLE

    Seeking Clarity at the Crossroads of Legal and Compliance

    September 18, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Sanctions Update: Sectoral Sanctions Against Russia Escalate

    Sanctions Update: Sectoral Sanctions Against Russia Escalate

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Sanctions Update: Sectoral Sanctions Against Russia Escalate

    September 18, 2014

    Read time: 11 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    This is an update to Schulte Roth & Zabel’s July 30, 2014 Client Alert titled “Threatened Sectoral Sanctions Against Russia Become Reality.”

    On Sept. 12, 2014, the United States and European Union (“EU”) implemented increased Ukraine-related sanctions against the Russian Federation (“Russia”). The U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”) and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) imposed new sanctions and strengthened existing sanctions in Russia’s financial and energy sectors and also determined that persons operating within Russia’s defense and related materiel sector may now be subject to targeted sanctions under Executive Order 13662 (“E.O. 13662”).[1] In this regard, OFAC issued new directives and general licenses in connection with the sectoral sanctions regime and added several entities to the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (the “SSI List”), including Sberbank — Russia’s largest bank. In addition, OFAC added five Russian defense firms to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”) for operating in the arms and related materiel sector in Russia under Executive Order 13661.[2] The prohibitions recently imposed by OFAC complement restrictions administered by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) and similar measures published by the EU.

    Russia’s Financial Services Sector: Directive 1

    OFAC issued Amended Directive 1 under E.O. 13662, prohibiting the following in the financial services sector of the Russian economy: “(1) all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity or new equity of persons determined to be subject to this Directive, their property, or their interests in property; and (2) all activities related to debt or equity issued before the date of this Directive 1 (as amended) that would have been prohibited by the prior version of this Directive 1.” Amended Directive 1 supersedes the prior version of Directive 1 issued on July 16, 2014, thereby tightening the debt financing restrictions by reducing from 90 days to 30 days the maturity period for new debt issued by financial institutions subject to such restrictions.

    Pursuant to Amended Directive 1, the entities on the SSI List in the financial services sector now include six Russian banks: Bank of Moscow, Gazprombank OAO, Russian Agricultural Bank, Sberbank, VEB and VTB Bank. As noted above, Sberbank, the only financial institution added to the SSI List last week, is Russia’s largest bank.

    Russia’s Energy Sector: Directives 2 and 4, and General License No. 2

    OFAC issued Amended Directive 2 under E.O. 13662, prohibiting the following in the energy sector of the Russian economy: “(1) all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 90 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to this Directive, their property, or their interests in property; and (2) all activities related to debt issued before the date of this Directive 2 (as amended) that would have been prohibited by the prior version of this Directive 2.” Amended Directive 2 supersedes the prior version of Directive 2 issued on July 16, 2014, which prohibited the same activities for debt issued on or after July 16, 2014.

    Pursuant to Amended Directive 2, the entities on the SSI List currently include: (1) Novatek, Russia’s largest independent natural gas producer; (2) Rosneft, Russia’s largest petroleum company and third-largest gas producer; (3) Gazprom Neft (majority-owned by Gazprom), an integrated Russian oil company engaged in the exploration, development, production, transportation and sale of crude oil and gas, and also involved in oil refining, marketing of petroleum products, oil field services, and construction and development of exploration wells; and (4) AK Transneft OAO, a Russian government-owned pipeline company that provides oil transport services via trunk pipeline systems within Russia and abroad.

    OFAC issued Directive 4 under E.O. 13662, prohibiting certain technology, goods and services in the energy sector, with respect to so-called frontier or unconventional oil resources: “the provision, exportation, or re-exportation, directly or indirectly, of goods, services (except for financial services), or technology in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil in the Russian Federation, or in maritime area claimed by the Russian Federation and extending from its territory, and that involve any person determined to be subject to this Directive, its property, or its interests in property.” Under General License No. 2, U.S. persons have until Sept. 26, 2014 to wind down all activities subject to the prohibitions of Directive 4.[3]

    Pursuant to Directive 4, the entities on the SSI List currently include: (1) Rosneft (see above); (2) Gazprom Neft (see above); (3) Gazprom OAO (one of the largest joint stock companies in Russia), a Russian government-owned global energy company engaged in gas exploration, production, transportation, storage, processing and sales; (4) Lukoil OAO, a Russia-based integrated oil and gas company engaged in the business of oil exploration, production, refining, marketing and distribution, and also the owner of refineries, gas processing, petrochemical plants and gas station networks located in Russia and abroad; and (5) Surgutneftegas, a Russian oil company involved in oil and gas production and exploration, gas processing, power generation, output and marketing of petroleum products, petrochemicals and gas products.

    Russia’s Defense and Related Materiel Sector: Directive 3

    OFAC issued Directive 3 under E.O. 13662, prohibiting the following with respect to the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian economy: “all transactions in, provision of financing for, and other dealings in new debt of longer than 30 days maturity of persons determined to be subject to this Directive, their property, or their interests in property.” At this point in time, the SSI List only includes one entity under Directive 3, i.e., Rostec, a Russian government-owned “conglomerate” holding company for Russia’s defense industry that produces, develops, manufactures and exports civil, military and dual-purpose high-technology goods. This listing could have a substantial impact on the Russian economy, and perhaps on foreign policy, because subsidiaries held by Rostec manufacture and export military products valued in the billions.

    General License No. 1A

    General License No. 1A dated Sept. 12, 2014, which replaces and supersedes General License No. 1 dated July 16, 2014, authorizes all transactions by U.S. persons, wherever located, and transactions within the United States involving derivative products whose value is linked to an underlying asset that constitutes: “(1) new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days or new equity issued by a person subject to Directive 1 under Executive Order 13662, (2) new debt with a maturity of longer than 90 days issued by a person subject to Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662, or (3) new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days issued by a person subject to Directive 3 under Executive Order 13662.”[4] General License No. 1A only allows specified derivative transactions and does not authorize the holding, purchasing or selling of underlying assets otherwise prohibited by Directives 1, 2 or 3 under E.O. 13662.

    Compliance Considerations

    Directives 1 through 4 are targeted in scope, explicitly permitting “[a]ll other activities with these persons or involving their property or interests in property” — so long as such activities are not prohibited by any other Executive Order or OFAC sanctions program. Even though the sectoral sanctions regime only prohibits specified activities, OFAC has made clear that the U.S. government will not tolerate inchoate offenses relating to entities on the SSI List. Accordingly, all four of the Directives described above also prohibit: “(1) any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions contained in this Directive; and (2) any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions in this Directive.”

    For compliance purposes, it is important to remember that OFAC’s so-called “50 Percent Rule” applies to persons named on the SSI List, their property and their interests in property, including their 50-percent-or-more-owned subsidiaries. See FAQ 373 (the prohibitions under E.O. 13662 also extend to debt and equity issued by entities owned 50 percent or more by the identified entities). The application of the 50 Percent Rule to the SSI List imposes significant compliance obligations on U.S. persons and companies because the names on the SSI List (e.g., Rostec) are large entities with substantial holdings in other entities.

    Bureau of Industry and Security Expands Export Restrictions

    The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) adjusted its export licensing policies towards Russia alongside OFAC’s tightening of economic sanctions. Over the months, as OFAC added individuals and entities to the SDN List and SSI List, BIS added similar names to the BIS Entity List. Designation on the Entity List imposes a license requirement for the export, re-export or foreign transfer of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) to the designated entities, with a presumption of denial. The BIS Entity List includes entities located in Russia, Ukraine and occupied Crimea, Russian defense and technology entities, and other entities involved in activities contrary to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

    With respect to the defense sector, BIS implemented a policy of denying pending applications for licenses to export or re-export any high technology items subject to the EAR to Russia or occupied Crimea that contribute to Russia’s military capabilities, revoking existing licenses that meet such criteria, and evaluating all other pending applications and existing licenses on a case-by-case basis to determine their contribution to Russia’s military capabilities.[5] On Sept. 12, 2014, BIS added several defense and technology entities to the Entity List and announced that BIS will require licenses for certain items destined to military end users or end users in Russia.[6]

    Last month, BIS  implemented aggressive licensing restrictions on the export, re-export or transfer of items subject to EAR and intended for use in the exploration or production of deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil or gas in Russia.[7] To enhance these restrictions, on Sept. 12, 2014, BIS added five energy companies to the Entity List. These five energy companies (Gazprom, Gazpromneft, Lukoil, Rosneft and Surgutneftegas) are the same five energy companies subject to Directive 4 of the SSI List.[8]

    EU Escalates Sanctions

    The EU has taken restrictive measures similar to the United States, including but not limited to: (1) subjecting additional persons to asset freezes and visa bans; (2) subjecting additional entities to asset freezes; (3) prohibiting EU nationals and companies from buying or selling new bonds, equity or similar financial instruments with a maturity of 30 days, issued by designated Russian stated-owned banks or major Russian energy and defense companies, as well as services related to issuing such financial instruments; (4) prohibiting EU nationals and companies from providing new loans to designated Russian state-owned banks; (5) restricting the import and export of dual-use goods and technology, arms and related military equipment; (6) restricting the export of certain energy-related equipment and technology, and prohibiting the provision of services necessary for deepwater oil exploration and production, artic oil exploration and production or shale oil projects; (7) restricting imports originating from Crimea and Sevastopol and prohibiting certain investments in these non-recognized regions; and (8) other diplomatic measures.[9]

    Conclusion

    The United States and EU have demonstrated, with this recent round of sanctions, that they are closely cooperating in dealing with the crisis in Ukraine. Unless Russia pulls its troops out of Ukraine, it is likely that the United States and EU will escalate sanctions further, deepening the impact of sanctions in sectors that are currently targeted and expanding into additional strategic sectors. Accordingly, U.S. and EU companies should continue to carefully monitor these increasing sanctions.

    Authored by Betty Santangelo, Gary Stein, Lisa A. Prager and Nora Lovell Marchant.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Executive Order 13662, Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine (Mar. 20, 2014) (hereinafter “E.O. 13662”).

    [2] Executive Order 13661, Blocking Property of Additional Persons Contributing to the Situation in Ukraine (Mar. 16, 2014).

    [3] General License No. 2, Authorizing Certain Activities Prohibited by Directive 4 under Executive Order 13662 Necessary to Wind Down Operations (Sept. 12, 2014).

    [4] General License No. 1A, Authorizing Certain Transactions Related to Derivatives Prohibited by Directives 1, 2, and 3 under Executive Order 13662 (Sept. 12, 2014).

    [5] See BIS Press Release, Commerce Department Announces Expansion of Export Restrictions on Russia (Apr. 28, 2014).

    [6] See BIS Press Release, U.S. Commerce Department Expands Export Restrictions Aimed at Russia’s Defense Sector (Sept. 12, 2014).

    [7] 79 Fed. Reg. 45675-01 (Aug. 6, 2014) (Russian Oil Industry Sanctions and Addition of Person to the Entity List).

    [8] See BIS Press Release, U.S. Commerce Department Expands Export Restrictions Aimed at Russia’s Defense Sector (Sept. 12, 2014).

    [9] See European Union External Action, Fact Sheet: EU-Ukraine Relations (Sept. 12, 2014).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Betty Santangelo

    Counsel

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • The O’Bannon Decision and the ‘Ancillary Restraints’ Doctrine

    ARTICLE

    The O’Bannon Decision and the ‘Ancillary Restraints’ Doctrine

    September 17, 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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  • CFPB Issues Larger Participants Rule for International Money Transfer Market

    CFPB Issues Larger Participants Rule for International Money Transfer Market

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    CFPB Issues Larger Participants Rule for International Money Transfer Market

    September 17, 2014

    Read time: 5 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    On Sept. 12, 2014, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or “Bureau”) issued a final rule amending 12 C.F.R. Part 1090, titled “Defining Larger Participants of the International Money Transfer Market” (“Final Rule”).[1] Broadly, the Final Rule establishes the Bureau’s supervisory authority over nonbank larger participants in the international money transfer market and is effective Dec. 1, 2014.

    Background

    Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the CFPB has the authority to supervise all nonbank covered persons in the residential mortgage, private education lending and payday lending markets.[2] The Dodd-Frank Act also permits the Bureau to supervise nonbank “larger participants” of other consumer financial products or services, as the Bureau defines by rule. The CFPB has previously issued final rules covering larger participants of markets for consumer reporting, consumer debt collection and student loan servicing. Under the Final Rule, the CFPB now establishes its authority to supervise nonbank larger participants of the international money transfer market.

    Threshold

    The Final Rule provides that a nonbank provider of international money transfers is a “larger participant” if the provider (including its agents) conducted at least one million international money transfers in the previous calendar year.[3] Many of the defined terms of the Final Rule are related to the terms of Subpart B of 12 C.F.R. Part 1005 (“Remittance Transfer Rule”), but there are some differences. For example “international money transfers” are similar to remittance transfers but include transactions of $15 or less. Further, transactions conducted by affiliates are aggregated for purposes of determining whether a person is covered under the Final Rule. The test for determining the threshold amount was simplified from the proposed rule in order to ease the compliance burden.

    Supervision of Larger Participants

    The Bureau estimates that about 25 entities would be covered as nonbank larger participants of the international money transfer market. The Bureau will notify those entities when it begins its supervisory activities. The CFPB supervises nonbank covered persons for compliance with all applicable federal consumer financial law and to detect and assess risks to consumers and consumer financial markets. The CFPB conducts examinations and may request information from supervised entities. The Bureau notes that it may supervise smaller affiliates as part of the larger affiliate’s examination or it may examine the affiliates separately. As it does with other supervised nonbank entities, the Bureau will conduct its supervisory authority over smaller affiliates using a risk-based approach and will coordinate with appropriate state regulators. While agents would not normally be supervised, the CFPB can supervise such agents as service providers.

    Some commenters had recommended broadening the scope of coverage. For now, the CFPB has rejected lower thresholds, and it has rejected defining larger participants on the basis of the domestic money transfer market. The Bureau notes, however, that it can use an array of tools to encourage compliance throughout the industry, including revisiting its threshold test, supervising entities based on a determination of risks to consumers, conducting enforcement investigations, and coordinating with state regulators, state attorneys general and the Federal Trade Commission.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the following attorneys: Donald J. Mosher, Joseph P. Vitale, Jessica Sklute, Kara A. Kuchar or Melissa G.R. Goldstein.


    [1] The final rule has not yet been published in the Federal Register.

    [2] The Bureau has primary supervisory and enforcement authority over very large depository institutions for compliance with federal consumer financial laws and certain supervisory authority over other depository institutions.

    [3] The person would remain a larger participant for two full tax years (as defined) after the person no longer meets the applicable test.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Donald J. Mosher

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Melissa G.R. Goldstein

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Tax Controversy 2015 – Germany

    ARTICLE

    Tax Controversy 2015 – Germany

    September 2014

    Read time: 1 min

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    Dr. Gero Burwitz

    Partner

    Munich

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  • ECJ: Representation of the Design of a Sales Area is Basically a Trade Mark

    ARTICLE

    ECJ: Representation of the Design of a Sales Area is Basically a Trade Mark

    September 15, 2014

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  • Fifth Circuit Vacates DIP Financing Order for Lack of Good Faith

    Fifth Circuit Vacates DIP Financing Order for Lack of Good Faith

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Vacates DIP Financing Order for Lack of Good Faith

    September 15, 2014

    Read time: 12 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, on Sept. 3, 2014, vacated bankruptcy court and district court Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing orders due to: (1) the lender’s lack of good faith in relying on a third party’s shares of stock as collateral; and (2) the bankruptcy court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re TMT Procurement Corp., 2014 WL 4364894 (5th Cir. Sept. 3, 2014). To vacate the orders, the Fifth Circuit rejected the debtors’ argument that the consolidated appeals were moot because of the lower courts’ repeated findings “that the DIP Lender … extended financing to the Debtors in good faith and was entitled to the full protections of sections 363(m) and 364(e) of the Bankruptcy Code [“Code”].” Id. at *3. Significantly, the court of appeals never found that the DIP lender acted in bad faith, but only that it lacked the statutory “good faith” to prevent the court from hearing the merits of the appeal.

    Relevance

    This decision is important to DIP lenders. Code sections 364(e) and 363(m) ordinarily will “moot … an appeal” from a financing or a Section 363 sale order when “the purchaser or lender acted in good faith,” unless the appellant “obtain[s] a stay” pending appeal. Id. at *4.[1] The appellant here had not obtained a stay, making the lender’s good faith a threshold issue.

    The Code does not define “good faith,” requiring courts to rely for guidance on standards employed in other contexts. See, e.g., In re Ellingsen MacLean Oil Co., Inc., 834 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir. 1987) (court looked to definition of good faith contained in Uniform Commercial Code). As shown below, TMT provides a new test regarding the Code’s “good faith” requirement for lenders and acquirors in reorganization cases — a test based on the lender’s knowledge of possible insider manipulation of the bankruptcy process.

    The Unrelated Vantage State Court Litigation

    Facts

    Vantage Drilling Company (“Vantage”) appealed from three district court and two bankruptcy court orders entered during the course of the debtors’ Chapter 11 cases. Vantage had unsuccessfully challenged court orders directing the deposit of Vantage stock (“Vantage Shares”) with the clerk of the court by the debtors’ non-debtor affiliate (“A”) to, among other things, secure the debtors’ obligations to the independent DIP lender.

    Vantage had sued the debtors’ sole shareholder (“P”), an individual, in the Texas state courts (the “Vantage Litigation”) in 2012 for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, unjust enrichment and related claims, asserting material misrepresentations that had allegedly induced Vantage to contract with P’s affiliates. As a result, alleged Vantage, it had issued “approximately 100 million shares of Vantage stock to [A], an entity solely owned and wholly controlled” by P, and had also granted P three seats on Vantage’s Board of Directors.” Vantage sought a “[j]udgment imposing a constructive trust upon all profits or benefits, direct or indirect, obtained by [P],” presumably including the Vantage Shares. Id. at *1. A was not a party to the Vantage Litigation, where P was the sole defendant.

    The Chapter 11 Cases

    P’s wholly-owned marine shipping companies filed Chapter 11 petitions one year later in the Southern District of Texas. When creditors moved to dismiss the reorganization cases on the ground of bad faith, the bankruptcy court held an evidentiary hearing. P “offered [at the hearing] to place approximately 25 million shares of Vantage stock held by” A, its non-debtor affiliate, “into an escrow to be administered by the bankruptcy court to secure” not only the debtors’ “compliance with court orders,” but also “to serve as collateral for post-petition borrowing or working capital.” Id.

    Through a series of later procedural moves between the bankruptcy court and district court, both courts ultimately entered interim and final orders approving secured DIP loans to the debtors by an independent, unrelated bank (“Bank”). All of the DIP financing orders, entered over Vantage’s strong objections, recited the Bank’s “good faith” in making the DIP Loan, entitling it to “the full protection of sections 363(m) and 364(e) of the … Code.” Most significantly, both courts had required A to deposit a total of 29.9 million shares of Vantage stock in order to secure the DIP Loan and the debtors’ use of cash collateral. A and P represented to the bankruptcy court that the court in the Vantage Litigation had not enjoined them from depositing the Vantage Shares with the bankruptcy court clerk as collateral for the DIP Loan. The bankruptcy court then found that: (1) A owned the stock; and (2) the stock was not subject to any constructive trust as a matter of law. Id. at *2-3.

    Vantage was not a creditor in the pending Chapter 11 cases. It appeared in the bankruptcy and district courts as a “party in interest” to protect its rights in the unrelated Vantage Litigation,[2] where, among other things, it sought the return of the Vantage Shares.

    Lack of Good Faith

    Court of Appeals

    The Fifth Circuit consolidated Vantage’s direct appeals from the bankruptcy court orders and appeal from the district court orders. It first addressed the debtors’ statutory mootness arguments seeking dismissal of the appeals because of Vantage’s failure to obtain a stay pending appeal. The debtors relied heavily on the lower courts’ repeated good faith findings. According to Vantage, however, it had challenged the DIP Lender’s good faith by “repeatedly asserting that [A] had fraudulently obtained the Vantage Shares; Vantage had an adverse claim to the Vantage Shares; and Vantage’s right to assert a constructive trust over the Vantage Shares would survive any attempt to pledge, sell or transfer the Vantage Shares to a purchaser or lender who was on notice of Vantage’s adverse claim, including the DIP Lender” (emphasis added). Agreeing with Vantage, the court held that the Bank had not acted in good faith within the meaning of Code sections 363(m) and 364(e) because of what it knew at the time of its DIP loan. No party even suggested, however, that the Bank was guilty of bad faith by engaging in “fraud, collusion, or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage,” but only that it “was on notice of Vantage’s adverse claim to the shares.” Id. at *4-5.

    No Subject Matter Jurisdiction

    The Vantage Shares never belonged to the Chapter 11 debtors. The court agreed with Vantage that even if the debtors had somehow acquired an interest in the stock, it did not constitute “property of the [debtors’] estate under [Code] § 541(a)(7) because that provision is limited to property interests that are themselves traceable to ‘property of the estate’ or generated in the normal course of the debtor’s business.” As the court explained, the shares “were not created with or by property of the estate, they were not acquired in the estate’s normal course of business, and they are not traceable to or arise out of any [pre-bankruptcy] interest included in the bankruptcy estate.” Id. at *7.

    Nor could the debtors rely on the financing orders entered by the lower courts to support subject matter jurisdiction. In the words of the Fifth Circuit, the lower courts “could not manufacture in rem jurisdiction over the Vantage Shares by issuing orders purporting to vest” the debtors with an interest in the stock. These orders could not constitute “jurisdictional bootstraps” enabling the lower courts to “exercise jurisdiction” that was non-existent. Id. at *8.

    The court also rejected the debtors’ argument that the financing orders were based on the “related to” language contained in the jurisdictional provision of the Judiciary Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). According to the debtors, the granting of the lien on the Vantage Shares was somehow “related to” the pending bankruptcy cases. Not only was the dispute over the Vantage Shares unrelated to the pending cases, but the lower courts “lacked jurisdiction to interfere with [Vantage’s] rights” in the stock, which was “the subject of the Vantage Litigation,” the outcome of which “could not conceivably affect the Debtors’ estates.” (emphasis added). In short, bankruptcy jurisdiction does not extend to state law disputes “between non-debtors [Vantage and P] over non-estate property. By requiring P and A to deposit Vantage Shares with the clerk of the court, the lower courts “interfered with the [unrelated and independent] Vantage Litigation.” Id. at *8-9 (emphasis added).

    The court further rejected the debtors’ argument that the financing orders here were “core” proceedings. Because the lower courts had “adjudicated a non-debtor’s [i.e., Vantage’s] right in non-estate property [Vantage Shares],” and “because there was no ‘related to’ jurisdiction in this case,” the debtors could not “confuse” the issue by making this argument. Id. at *9. The problem here was best summarized by the Fifth Circuit as follows:

    [T]he orders authorized the imposition of liens on the Vantage Shares, subordinated Vantage’s rights in the Vantage Shares to those of the DIP Lender, prevented the … court in the Vantage Litigation from impairing the [Bank’s] interest in the Vantage Shares, and held that the Vantage Shares were not subject to a constructive trust as a matter of law.

    Id. at *10 (emphasis added).

    Comment

    The DIP lender, according to the record, was wholly unaffiliated with the debtors, P and A. It was not a pre-petition lender; it made a new DIP loan knowing not only about Vantage’s objections but also about the existence and status of the pending Vantage Litigation. Regardless of any apparent manipulation and forum shopping by the debtors and their affiliates, the DIP lender here was apparently in the wrong place at the wrong time.

    Another relevant appellate decision on the subject of a lender’s good faith in the financing context is In re EDC Holding Co., 676 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1982). It held that the DIP lender had acted in bad faith because the purpose of its loan was to pay creditors’ attorneys, an improper use of the loan proceeds. In the court’s view, it was improper for the lender to have made the loan with the ulterior purpose of reducing the cost of settlement. The creditor in EDC was a union that wanted its legal fees paid ahead of the claims of other creditors. In the words of the Seventh Circuit: 

    We assume the statute [Section 364(e)] was intended to protect not the lender who seeks to take advantage of a lapse in oversight by the bankruptcy judge but the lender who believes his priority is valid but cannot be certain that it is, because of objections that might be upheld on appeal. If the lender knows his priority is invalid but proceeds anyway in the hope that a stay will not be sought or if sought will not be granted, we cannot see how he can be thought to be acting in good faith.

    Id. at 947.

    Because the loan agreement in EDC stated that $77,000 of the proceeds would be used to “pay the union for attorneys’ fees and other legal expenses incurred in the prosecution of the union’s action for the unpaid wages of its members,” the lender’s “priority meant that the burden would be borne by the bankrupt estate, in effect the general creditors, rather than by [the lender] itself.” Id. In TMT, though, the DIP lender had no such improper purpose. Nothing in the record even suggested that the intended use of the new loan proceeds was improper.

    The real problem for the DIP lender, having nothing to do with its own conduct, was the bankruptcy court’s and the district court’s “interference” with the Vantage Litigation, apparently engineered by P for his own benefit. The Fifth Circuit stressed that point. 2014 WL 4364894 at *8. And, in the Fifth Circuit’s view, the DIP lender’s knowledge of the litigation and the importance of the Vantage Shares to that litigation were sufficient to deprive the lender of good faith status under Code Section 364(e). Significantly, the court of appeals never described the DIP lender’s conduct as bad faith. Instead, it found that it lacked the statutory “good faith” required by Section 364(e).

    Third parties, such as insiders and corporate affiliates, should not be discouraged from using their assets to secure DIP loans in other cases. In TMT, the third-party collateral was the subject of litigation outside the bankruptcy court. P and A wrongly misrepresented to the lower courts that they had the power to transfer or otherwise encumber the Vantage Shares. That, however, is small comfort to the lender in TMT. It has no rights in the Vantage Shares.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    [1] According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, however, an appeal from a DIP financing order, when “a stay is not granted,” will not be mooted by Code Section 364(e) if the “lender … has not disbursed” funds on the DIP loan. In re Swedeland Dev. Group, Inc., 16 F.3d 552, 561 n.7 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).

    [2] The Vantage Litigation began in the Texas state courts. P removed it to the federal court; after a successful appeal by Vantage, the Fifth Circuit ordered the district court to remand the suit back to the Texas courts. 741 F.3d 535 (5th Cir. 2014).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • The Broader Governance Lessons of the “Valukas Report”

    ARTICLE

    The Broader Governance Lessons of the “Valukas Report”

    September 12, 2014

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  • JOBS Act Update: CFTC Relief Removes Impediment to General Solicitation

    JOBS Act Update: CFTC Relief Removes Impediment to General Solicitation

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    JOBS Act Update: CFTC Relief Removes Impediment to General Solicitation

    September 11, 2014

    Read time: 11 min

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    Overview

    On Sept. 9, 2014, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission staff granted broad relief intended to remove an obstacle to the ability of market participants, under rules previously promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to utilize general solicitation and general advertising in conducting placements of hedge fund and private equity fund interests (and other securities). This relief has certain conditions and does not represent a resolution of all of the questions and concerns surrounding the use of general solicitation and general advertising, as highlighted in this Alert.

    Background

    On July 10, 2013, the SEC approved final rules to comply with a Congressional mandate under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”)[1] to permit general solicitation and general advertising in certain private offerings of securities made pursuant to an exemption from registration under Rule 506 or Rule 144A[2] of the Securities Act of 1933.[3] This development was codified in new Rule 506(c).

    With the promulgation of Rule 506(c), hedge fund and private equity fund managers — in theory at least — were able to employ general solicitation and general advertising in conducting Regulation D offerings (subject to that Rule’s limitations and certain additional obligations). This rulemaking effort, however, did not result in a widespread adoption of general solicitation and general advertising activities for private funds; in fact, during the last 14 months, use of Rule 506(c) by both emerging and established private fund managers has been rare.

    The non-adoption of Rule 506(c) by the marketplace has several causes, but the most prominent impediment was the fact that certain commonly-claimed exemptions under the rules of the CFTC required compliance with private offering limitations contained within the CFTC rules, which were not affected by the Congressional mandate to the SEC or by the promulgation of Rule 506(c).

    In particular, most observers concluded that commodity pool operators (“CPOs”) relying on the Regulation 4.13(a)(3) de minimis exemption from CFTC registration, as well as registered CPOs relying on the Regulation 4.7 exemption from certain disclosure and financial reporting obligations, could not dispense with the traditional private offering constraints because:

    • Under Regulation 4.13(a)(3), interests must be “offered and sold without marketing to the public in the United States” (which is a concept hostile to the concept of general solicitation and general advertising);
    • Under Regulation 4.7, offerings may be made solely to qualified eligible persons (“QEPs”) (which puts general solicitation activities, i.e., to QEPs and to non-QEPs, outside of that exemption); and
    • Under Regulation 4.7, offerings must qualify for registration exemptions “pursuant to” Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act (as the genesis of Rule 506(c) is a JOBS Act-mandated amendment to Regulation D — and not to Section 4(a)(2) itself — there is a concern that a Rule 506(c) offering is not conducted under an exemption that is “pursuant to” Section 4(a)(2)).

    2014 CFTC Relief

    Formal and informal industry requests for harmonization of Regulation 4.13(a)(3) and Regulation 4.7 with Rule 506(c) had been tabled numerous times in 2013 and 2014, and on Sept. 10, the CFTC’s Division of Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight (“DSIO”) concluded that “it is appropriate to address [these] issues … by granting exemptive relief.”[4] DSIO’s relief specifically includes the following provisions:

    • For Rule 506(c) offerings in which the CPO seeks to claim the reporting relief of Regulation 4.7, relief from the requirements: (1) that an offering be exempt pursuant to Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act; and (2) that interests be offered solely to QEPs; and
    • For Rule 506(c) offerings in which the offering entity seeks to claim the de minimis registration exemption of Regulation 4.13(a)(3), relief from the requirement in Regulation 4.13(a)(3)(i) that securities be “offered and sold without marketing to the public.”

    (These provisions are subject to the conditions summarized below.)

    This relief is effective immediately. It has no stated period of effectiveness nor does it set forth a predetermined or estimated expiration date; however, the letter noted that the relief may be modified or revoked in DSIO’s discretion. DSIO also indicated that it may address this issue in the future through formal rulemaking, in which case the relief in this letter would expire.

    Conditions of the CFTC Relief

    The CFTC’s JOBS Act relief is narrowly tailored to address “the discrepancy between marketing restrictions in current [CFTC] regulations and Reg D and Rule 144A, as amended pursuant to the JOBS Act.” Therefore, the relief granted is strictly limited to CPOs involved in 506(c) offerings. (It does not, for example, extend to other Section 4(a)(2), Regulation D or Regulation A offerings.)

    This relief is not self-executing; to take advantage of it, relying CPOs — irrespective of whether they are registered or exempt from registration with the CFTC—are required to file a notice with DSIO; this filing will elicit “basic information” on the claiming funds. Claims are effective upon the filing of a “materially complete and accurate” notice.[5]

    Remaining JOBS Act Hurdles

    Although the resolution of the SEC-CFTC discrepancy is a substantial step forward for private fund managers seeking to take advantage of Rule 506(c)’s general solicitation and general advertising liberalization, significant challenges and uncertainty still surround a Rule 506(c) offering, including the following:

    Verification Requirements. As noted in earlier SRZ publications,[6] managers will only be in a position to opt in to Rule 506(c) general solicitation and general advertising if they take reasonable steps, as required by the final rules, to verify that all investors meet the accredited investor standard. The SEC’s final rules provide for both a “principles-based” approach to verification — which takes into account the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the nature of the investor and the size of the investment — as well as specific examples of documentation that will provide sufficient verification that individuals meet the accredited investor tests. Managers seeking to utilize general solicitation or general advertising under Rule 506(c) will need to be sure that they have a satisfactory verification process in place.

    Uncertainty on Regulation D Amendments. In 2013, the SEC proposed (and subsequently re-opened a comment period for the discussion of) amendments to Regulation D and Rule 156 that would:

    • Require the filing of a Form D in Rule 506(c) offerings before the issuer engages in general solicitation and amend the Form D itself to solicit additional information about offerings conducted in reliance on Regulation D;
    • Require the filing of a closing amendment to Form D after the termination of any Rule 506 offering;
    • Require written general solicitation materials used in Rule 506(c) offerings to include certain legends and other disclosures;
    • Extend the anti-fraud guidance contained in Rule 156 to the sales literature of private funds;
    • Require the submission, on a temporary basis, of written general solicitation materials used in Rule 506(c) offerings to the Commission; and
    • Disqualify an issuer from relying on Rule 506 for one year for future offerings if the issuer, or any predecessor or affiliate of the issuer, did not comply, within the last five years, with Form D filing requirements in a Rule 506 offering.

    These proposed amendments could, individually or in the aggregate, constitute a material change in the private funds offering process and could require material changes in the preparation, distribution, review and approval of advertising and marketing materials and other documentation. There is considerable uncertainty with respect to these proposed rules because, at this time, there is no obligation that the SEC issue final rules on these matters and it is possible that some may be adopted while others are modified or dropped.

    Uncertainty on Future CFTC Requirements. As noted above, the DSIO guidance is interim relief. If and when formal rulemaking to address Rule 506(c) offerings is instituted, it is possible that there would be additional disclosure or substantive requirements; statements by CFTC staff officials indicate that additional requirements are a distinct possibility. 

    Inconsistent Foreign Offering Requirements. Also, in addition to U.S. requirements, many managers conduct concurrent foreign offerings. In other capital centers, U.S. managers may have no option under local law other than to conduct a private placement; in these cases, managers will have to ascertain (well) in advance — perhaps through the advice of local counsel — whether public advertising and general solicitation for the U.S. leg of an offering will taint or adversely affect the offshore offering. 

    Examination Risks. The SEC has stated that OCIE examinations will in particular focus on compliance by managers utilizing general solicitation or general advertising under Rule 506(c). The conventional wisdom is that conducting a 506(c) offering may materially increase the risk of being selected for an examination and that the ensuing examination will have a deeper and more thorough than average review of marketing processes, procedures and materials.

    Enforcement Inquiries and Actions. With this liberalization of the offering process comes SEC concerns (expressed publicly) about the potential for fraud. There are existing anti-fraud rules applicable to private fund marketing materials, and those rules will continue to apply to any marketing materials used as part of a general solicitation. Marketing activity itself can also be scrutinized on anti-fraud grounds.

    Next Steps

    With the CFTC’s relief, a significant impediment to a general solicitation and general advertising regime for private fund placements has been eliminated, but challenges and questions remain. Managers that seek to take advantage of general solicitation or to engage in general advertising will need to extensively prepare and design bespoke supervisory and compliance procedures and will also, given the uncharted nature of this regime, need to be flexible in their approach.

    Authored by Brian T. Daly and Marc E. Elovitz.  

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] Section 201(a)(1) of the JOBS Act requires that “[n]ot later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall revise [Rule 506] … to provide that the prohibition against general solicitation or general advertising contained in [Rule 502(c)] … shall not apply to offers and sales of securities made pursuant to [Rule 506], provided that all purchasers of the securities are accredited investors. Such rules shall require the issuer to take reasonable steps to verify that purchasers are accredited investors using such methods as determined by the Commission.”

    [2] While the general solicitation developments under the JOBS Act, the SEC rulemakings, and the new CFTC relief apply to Rule 144A offerings as well as to Rule 506(c) offerings, the remainder of this Alert will focus only on the impact on Rule 506(c) offerings.

    [3] Release No. IA-3624, Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings (July 10, 2013).

    [4] “Exemptive Relief from Provisions in Regulations 4.7(b) and 4.13(a)(3) Consistent with JOBS Act Amendments to Regulation D and Rule 144A,” CFTC Letter No. 14-116 (September 9, 2014).         

    [5] The claim of exemptive relief must:

    a. State the name, business address and main business telephone number of the CPO claiming the relief;

    b. State the name of the pool(s) for which the claim is being filed;

    c. State whether the CPO claiming relief is a 506(c) Issuer or is using one or more 144A Resellers;

    d. Specify whether the CPO intends to rely on the exemptive relief pursuant to Regulation 4.7(b) or 4.13(a)(3), with respect to the listed pool(s) and: (1) if relying on Regulation 4.7(b), represent that the CPO meets the conditions of the exemption, other than that provision’s requirements that the offering be exempt pursuant to section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act and be offered solely to QEPs, such that the CPO meets the remaining conditions and is still required to sell the participations of its pool(s) to QEPs; and (2) if relying on Regulation 4.13(a)(3), represent that the CPO meets the conditions of the exemption, other than that provision’s prohibition against marketing to the public;

    e. Be signed by the CPO; and

    f. Be filed with DSIO via email using the email address dsionoaction@cftc.gov and stating “JOBS Act Marketing Relief” in the subject line of such email.

    [6] See “General Solicitation and General Advertising to be Permitted in Private Placements Starting September 23” (Aug. 13, 2013); “The SEC’S JOBS Act Rulemaking: What It Means for Private Fund Managers” (July 24, 2013); “The Long View: How Hedge Fund Advertising Has Been Impacted by the JOBS Act” (August 2012); and “The JOBS Act: Provisions Relating to Private Funds and Facilitating Access to Capital” (Mar. 28, 2012).


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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    Marc E. Elovitz

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Possibility to Preclude the Contestation of Direct Payments by the Principal to Suppliers of the Contractor

    ARTICLE

    Possibility to Preclude the Contestation of Direct Payments by the Principal to Suppliers of the Contractor

    September 10, 2014

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