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Corporate Governance 2nd Edition – French Chapter
May 2015
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ARTICLE
May 2015
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ARTICLE
May 2015
Read time: 2 min
Dr. Gero Burwitz authored the article “Recent Developments in Tax Law: The “Base Erosion And Profit Shifting” Action Plan of the OECD”, featured in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG), p. 546-549 in May, 2015.
ARTICLE
May 2015
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May 2015
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
May 14, 2015
Read time: 2 min
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on May 4, 2015, affirmed U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Robert D. Drain’s decision confirming the reorganization plan for Momentive Performance Materials Inc. and its affiliated debtors. The Bankruptcy Court’s decision was controversial because it forced the debtors’ senior secured creditors to accept new secured notes bearing interest at below-market rates. The secured creditors are expected to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. This ruling is noteworthy (and troubling for secured creditors, especially those who provide financing to distressed companies) because it sets a road map for Chapter 11 debtors to pursue reorganization plans that seek to force secured lenders to accept new secured notes at below-market rates. And as troubling as that may be in a relatively low interest rate environment, this impact will be amplified as interest rates increase. Consequently, secured creditors will need to re-evaluate pricing to compensate for this increased risk.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
May 13, 2015
Read time: 10 min
“A corporate insider who personally guaranteed” the debtor’s loan was not liable on a bankruptcy trustee’s preference claim when the corporate debtor repaid its lender, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on May 6, 2015. In re Adamson Apparel, Inc., 2015 WL 2081575 (9th Cir. May 6, 2015) (2-1). The trustee had alleged that the insider guarantor defendant (“G”) had received an indirect benefit of $4.9 million when the debtor (“Adamson”) repaid its obligation to the lender and that this benefit was a preference under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) Section 547(b). According to the trustee, G had been relieved of his guarantee liability when Adamson repaid its primary obligation. Affirming the dismissal of the trustee’s claim by the bankruptcy court and the district court, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that G had “previously waived his indemnification rights against” Adamson in good faith and had taken “no subsequent actions to negate the economic impact of that waiver.” Id. at *1. Because G was not a creditor—an essential element of a preference claim (“to or for the benefit of a creditor”)—he could not be held liable.
Lower courts have long wrestled with the so-called “indirect preference” to corporate insiders. According to the Ninth Circuit, no other appellate court has addressed this “unresolved issue of bankruptcy law.” Id. The essential question in Adamson was whether G was a creditor, for Code Section 547(b)(1) requires that a preferential transfer be made “to or for the benefit of a creditor.” G had waived his rights to indemnification and reimbursement from the debtor for any payments he would have to make on his guarantee. Id. at *3. The legal effectiveness of this waiver has split the bankruptcy courts.
The debtor’s president and chief executive officer, G, personally guaranteed Adamson’s loan from a lender. He “would ordinarily have been entitled to have Adamson reimburse him for any amount that he was obligated to pay on [Adamson’s] behalf to settle the loan with [the lender], but the [relevant] agreements waived that right to indemnification,” which included G’s “rights to subrogation, reimbursement, or any other form of repayment.” Id. at *1. On Dec. 18, 2003, Adamson instructed its customer to pay $4.9 million to the lender in partial satisfaction of the debt owed by Adamson to the lender, thus reducing G’s guarantee obligation. Adamson filed a Chapter 11 petition nine months later. In the meantime, on March 31, 2004, G paid $3.5 million from his personal funds to the lender in order to pay the balance of the Adamson loan.
The bankruptcy trustee’s predecessor, the creditors’ committee, sued G to recover the $4.9 million paid by the debtor to the lender in December 2003, “arguing that [G] was a corporate insider who received a preference because he had guaranteed the loan from” the lender, thereby reducing his guarantee obligation and receiving a benefit. After years of litigation in the bankruptcy and district courts, including a bankruptcy court bench trial in 2010, the bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of G, holding that “he was exempt from preference liability because he was not a creditor of” Adamson. The trustee had later been substituted for the creditor’s committee after the Adamson case was converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7. Id. at *2.
G testified during the bankruptcy court trial “that he would never have any right to seek indemnification from [Adamson] for any funds that he expended to settle its debt to” the lender. He stressed that the lender “had required him to include the indemnification waiver” in his guarantee, “although his own preference would have been to retain the right to seek reimbursement.” G also “had never filed a proof of claim” in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. Id.
The bankruptcy court, said the Ninth Circuit, “had more than sufficient evidence to conclude that [G] had fully waived his right of indemnification from” Adamson. Id. at *4. Courts and Congress have recognized that “[i]nsiders pose special problems.” Id. at *5, citing In re Deprizio, 874 F.2d 1186, 1195 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Insiders will be the first to recognize that the firm is in a downward spiral. If insiders and outsiders had the same preference-recovery period, insiders who lent money to the firm could use their knowledge to advantage by paying their own loans preferentially, then putting off filing the petition in bankruptcy until the preference period had passed.”). For that reason, Congress extended “the preference-recovery period to one year for transactions that benefit insiders, where the insider is a creditor.” Id. at *6, quoting Code § 547(b) (emphasis added).
The Seventh Circuit held in Deprizio that when a lender makes a loan to a corporate debtor personally guaranteed by an insider, the trustee may avoid payments made to the lender during the extended insider preference-recovery period. Also, reasoned the Seventh Circuit, a “guarantor has a contingent right to payment from the debtor: if Lender collects from Guarantor, Guarantor succeeds to Lender’s entitlements and can collect from Firm. So Guarantor is a ‘creditor’ in Firm’s bankruptcy.” 874 F.2d at 1190. Although other appellate courts followed Deprizio, Congress amended the Code in 1994 to enable the trustee to seek recovery only from the insider, not from the lender. Deprizio’s basic insider guarantor-as-creditor analysis, though, still stands.
The Ninth Circuit in Adamson identified “[t]wo separate lines of cases” that had developed after the Deprizio decision, one “relied upon the Trustee and the other by [G].” One line of cases holds that good faith “indemnification waivers are valid and excuse an insider guarantor from preference liability … .They ‘apply the letter of the statute to the facts before [them]’ rather than focusing on broader concerns of public policy. … Because a guarantor has no legally cognizable claim against the borrower’s estate once he has waived his right to indemnification, these courts concluded that insider guarantors who have done so in good faith were not ‘creditors’ … and therefore were not subject to preference liability.” 2015 WL 2081575, at *6.
The trustee relied on the other line of cases holding that these “waivers are simply not valid” because the “insider could still obtain a claim against the debtor, simply by purchasing the lender’s note rather than paying on the guarantee.” In that way, the “waiver of subordination rights” would “be a sham provision, unenforceable as a matter of public policy.” Id. at *7, quoting In re Telesphere Commc’ns Inc., 229 B.R. 173, 176 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).
The Ninth Circuit rejected the trustee’s authorities, declining to “establish a bright-line rule based on a fear of what could happen.” Instead, it reasoned, “the sounder approach is to consider what actually has happened,” and to examine “the totality of the facts … for evidence of ‘sham’ conduct … .” In the case before it, “the record indicates that the waiver at issue was not a sham.” Id.
First, the lender’s lien on the debtor’s inventory and accounts receivables would have satisfied its claim “to the extent of the remaining inventory and accounts receivable even in the absence of [G’s] guarantee.” Id. Moreover, G “never filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case … . [T]he funds at issue here were not sufficient to cover Adamson’s entire debt to [the lender], and [G] personally paid [the lender] over $3.5 million to clear Adamson’s debt without ever seeking reimbursement.” G could have simply purchased the balance of the lender’s claim and then filed a claim as the lender’s successor. “Instead, he personally paid the debt without ever filing a claim against the estate.” Id. at *8.
G also “had no unilateral right to purchase the note from [the lender] if Adamson defaulted,” possibly explaining why G had not bought the lender’s note “rather than pay it off when called upon to do so.” Finally, the trustee presented “no evidence that the debt in question was the only debt that [G] guaranteed on Adamson’s behalf.” The court thus had “no reason to assume that he did not personally guarantee additional Adamson debts … . [G] would have received no benefit by satisfying [the lender’s] debt first rather than any other debts of equivalent magnitude that he might have personally guaranteed.” In sum, “the waiver … was not a sham … . [G’s] waiver prevented him from filing a claim to recover the amount that he personally paid to satisfy the balance of Adamson’s debt to [the lender] … . [A] waiver totally eliminating [G’s] right to recover over $3.5 million has … economic substance … .” Because G had no claim against the debtor’s estate, he was not “a creditor under the … Code.” Id. at *9.
“In order to be subject to preference liability,” added the court, “a person or an entity must be a creditor … . A person is a creditor only if he has a right to payment from the debtor … . Here, [G] waived any such right at the insistence of [the lender]. Nothing in the … Code prevented him from doing so, nor does any portion of the Code subject [G] to preference liability simply because he received a benefit—and a contingent one at that—from the [debtor’s] payment … to [the lender].” Id., citing Deprizio, 874 F.2d at 1190-92 (held, corporate insiders not “creditors” subject to preference claim when corporate debtor paid Internal Revenue Service for delinquent wage withholding taxes, despite benefit insiders received by being relieved of personal liability for taxes).
Although the trustee’s public policy concern is “far from frivolous,” Congress should address it, said the court. According to the Ninth Circuit, its “equitable powers are limited by the text of the Code as presently worded.” Id. at *10.
The dissent argued that insider guarantors are creditors “even if they nominally have waived their right to indemnity.” Id. In its view, the waiver had no economic significance because “the insider could still obtain a claim against the debtor simply by buying the lender’s note rather than paying on the guarantee.” The waiver thus “could only be seen as an effort to eliminate, by contract, a provision of the … Code.” It viewed the waiver as “a sham provision, unenforceable as a matter of public policy.” Id. (citations omitted).
Adamson is analytically sound, but this kind of litigation will continue. The trustee will probably seek en banc review by the entire Ninth Circuit because of the dissent and contrary lower court authority.
Outside the Ninth Circuit, Adamson is not binding, regardless of its persuasive reasoning. Also, trustees and creditors’ committees will stretch to find any facts showing bad faith by a corporate debtor’s insiders.
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.
ARTICLE
May 12, 2015
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ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
May 12, 2015
Read time: 9 min
Following the National Labor Relations Board’s (the “NLRB’s”) recent increased focus on employment policies and employees’ rights under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (the “NLRA”), the NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel (the “OGC”) on March 18, 2015 released a report addressing recent case developments relating to employee handbook rules as guidance for employers when creating or updating their handbooks and policies. Section 7 of the NLRA applies to both unionized and non-unionized employees, and it protects employees’ rights to engage in protected concerted activities, including those in which employees seek mutual aid or protection; seek to initiate, induce or prepare for group action; bring group complaints to management’s attention regarding the terms and conditions of their employment; or address workplace issues that are of concern to employees.
All employers with broad employee prohibitions in their employee handbooks must be aware of recent developments on potential liability for unfair labor practices. The policies that have been the focus of the NLRB and the OGC’s concern include those relating to confidentiality, employee conduct, employee interaction with third parties, the use of company logos and trademarks, use of photography and recording devices, conflicts of interest, and use of social media platforms.
The NLRB has interpreted Section 7 of the NLRA to provide that employees have a protected right to discuss their wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment with fellow employees and third parties. Therefore, the OGC views a confidentiality provision that in some way restricts that right as not compliant with the NLRA. Any policy or rule that includes “employee” or “personnel” information as part of its definition of “confidential information” is in danger of violating Section 7. For example, the OGC deems the following to be overly broad:
“Discuss work matters only with other [Employer] employees who have a specific business reason to know or have access to such information … . Do not discuss work matters in public places.”
The OGC opines that because an employee could reasonably understand the above to apply to information such as wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment, it is therefore unlawful. On the other hand, the OGC has approved the following because it does not reference information that could be interpreted to include an employee’s terms and conditions of employment:
“Do not disclose confidential financial data, or other non-public proprietary company information. Do not share confidential information regarding business partners, vendors or customers.”
The OGC advises that employers cannot prohibit an employee’s fair use of the company’s logo, copyrights or trademarks. Employees have a right to use their employer’s trademarks and logos on picket signs, leaflets and other protest materials. The OGC noted the following broad bans could be understood to ban fair use of the company’s intellectual property by employees:
“Do not use other people’s property, such as trademarks, without permission in social media.”
“Use of [the Employer’s] name, address or other information in your personal profile [is banned] … . In addition, it is prohibited to use [the Employer’s] logos, trademarks or any other copyrighted material.”
On the other hand, the OGC approved the following as not in violation of the NLRA because the provision does not broadly ban the use of copyrighted materials and only asks that copyright laws be respected:
“Respect all copyright and other intellectual property laws. For [the Employer’s] protection as well as your own, it is critical that you show proper respect for the laws governing copyright, fair use of copyrighted material owned by others, trademarks and other intellectual property, including [the Employer’s] own copyrights, trademarks and brands.”
The OGC notes that employees have the right to use their own mobile devices to photograph and make recordings on non-work time for the purposes of protected concerted activity. A total ban on personal devices could be interpreted by employees to prohibit the taking of photographs on non-work time. The OGC found the following rule overbroad because an employee could read the rule to prohibit the taking of photographs to document health and safety violations of the employer:
“Taking unauthorized pictures or video on company property is prohibited.”
The OGC stresses that a contextual analysis is necessary when determining whether a ban on personal devices violates an employee’s Section 7 rights. For example, if the employer bans the use of recording devices to protect patient rights, an employee would not reasonably understand the ban to prohibit photographs used to further protected concerted activity.
Another focus of recent litigation and of the OGC are employees’ postings to social media sites that discuss the terms and conditions of employment with, or seek advice from, other employees. Based on developments in this area, when employees discuss job performance, supervisory actions, or concerns about workplace responsibilities or policies, employers should be wary of disciplining the employees or terminating their employment, even if their postings contain insulting or offensive language. The OGC even found a policy that instructs employees not to “pick fights online” to be unlawful because it could be construed to prohibit a heated conversation about unionization or the employer’s treatment of employees.
The OGC references the following policies as overbroad and/or ambiguous:
“[S]how proper consideration for others’ privacy and for topics that may be considered objectionable or inflammatory, such as politics and religion.”
Do not send “unwanted, offensive, or inappropriate” e-mails.
“Material that is fraudulent, harassing, embarrassing, sexually explicit, profane, obscene, intimidating, defamatory, or otherwise unlawful or inappropriate may not be sent by e-mail … .”
The OGC further advises that employers should be careful when instructing employees to not make false or misleading representations about credentials or work because it is only “maliciously false” statements that lose protection. Notably, the OGC approved the following social media policy:
“Be thoughtful in all your communications and dealings with others, including email and social media. Never harass (as defined by our anti-harassment policy), threaten, libel or defame fellow professionals, employees, clients, competitors or anyone else. In general, it is always wise to remember that what you say in social media can often be seen by anyone. Accordingly, harassing comments, obscenities or similar conduct that would violate Company policies is discouraged in general and is never allowed while using [Employer’s] equipment or during your working time.”
Some employers have added a “savings clause” to their policies to avoid running afoul of the NLRA. However, the NLRB advises that a savings clause does not cure otherwise unlawful provisions of a policy because employees may not understand from the disclaimer that protected activities are permitted. For example, according to a May 30, 2012 guidance from the OGC, the NLRB found the following savings clause did not cure an otherwise unlawful provision:
“National Labor Relations Act. This policy will not be construed or applied in a manner that improperly interferes with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act.”
However, if language is added at the end of a specific policy and is unambiguous about the types of activities that are permitted, the NLRB may not object. For example, the following policies (the first regarding a confidentiality provision and the second a no-camera provision) were approved by the OGC:
“Nothing in this section prohibits employees from discussing terms and conditions of employment.”
“An exception to the rule concerning pictures and recordings of work areas would be to engage in activity protected by the National Labor Relations Act including, for example, taking pictures of health, safety and/or working condition concerns or of strike, protest and work-related issues and/or other protected concerted activities.”
The crux of the OGC’s position is that policies that are overbroad are unlawful. Overly broad policies are those that may be reasonably interpreted as restricting an employee’s Section 7 rights. For example, policies that prohibit employees from discussing the company, its management or its employees; prohibit employees from posting pictures depicting the employer; or prohibit employees from making any disparaging remarks or engaging in any inappropriate discussions, without defining what is inappropriate, may be unlawful. The OGC also opined that policies that prohibit employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or the employees’ superiors, co-workers, or competitors are unlawful if the policies do not contain limiting language to inform employees that the prohibition does not apply to Section 7 activity.
Employers should review their rules and policies to ensure compliance with the NLRB’s emerging interpretations regarding employee handbook policies.
Authored by Mark E. Brossman, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss, Scott A. Gold and Joseph Gallagher.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT
May 11, 2015
Read time: 7 min
An undersecured creditor (“C”) intending to credit bid at a sale of the debtor’s unencumbered property must give “notice” of its intent to the bankruptcy trustee, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 23, 2015. In re R.L. Adkins Corp., 2015 WL 1873137 (5th Cir. April 23, 2015). Affirming the bankruptcy and district courts’ denials of C’s belated request, the Fifth Circuit held that C “failed to exercise” its right to credit bid at a sale of its collateral. As discussed in this Alert, however, the case really dealt with a secured creditor’s right under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) Section 1111(b) to “elect” a nominally large secured claim in exchange for waiving its unsecured deficiency claim.
The reorganization plan in this case provided for the sale of the debtor’s mineral leases and several wells to a third party for cash. The plan recognized C’s “lien on four of these mineral leases and one well,” but “[f]our other creditors [also had] secured interests in the … well.” Id. at *2. C was essentially in the position “of a third lien creditor on real property.” Id. at *3. Despite C’s electing “to promote its unsecured claim to secured status” under Code Section 1111(b), id. at *1, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the lower courts’ rejection of C’s election because the encumbered property was being “sold under the plan”—an explicit statutory exclusion from Section 1111(b) election rights. Code § 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii).
C never opposed confirmation of the plan, never appeared at the confirmation hearing and never appealed from the order confirming the plan. Because the plan recited that the asset sale was being done under Code Section 363 with an opportunity for secured creditors like C to credit bid, in the court’s view, C had effectively waived not only its right to credit bid but also to obtain a ruling on its purported right to make the Section 1111(b)(2) election. It was only after the bankruptcy court had confirmed the reorganization plan that C asserted a lien on the property held by the asset purchaser.
The Adkins decision is noteworthy for at least two reasons. First, the asset purchaser correctly argued that the trustee’s sale of the debtor’s property “under § 363 … or … under the Plan … preclude[d] an undersecured lender from making the § 1111(b) election.” 2015 WL 1873137, at *1.
The concurring judge in Adkins explained that C’s “practical position seems at odds with its claim to having been ‘denied’ a right to credit bid. Given the nature of [C’s] liens, exercising a credit bid … would not have been feasible … [C] might theoretically credit bid … but [was] unlikely to do so because [it] would have to pay off the senior liens before [it] could take possession … [C is apparently] trying to take advantage of the bankruptcy court’s error in failing to rule on the § 1111(b) election before it confirmed the Chapter 11 Plan.” Id. at *3. In the concurring judge’s view, the “argument that [C] waived its § 1111(b) election by failing to pursue it at the confirmation hearing is persuasive.” Id.
Why did C seek to make the Section 1111(b) election? An undersecured creditor such as C has the opportunity under Section 1111(b)(2) to have its “entire secured claim treated as an allowed secured claim,” regardless of the collateral’s value, when there is no sale of the debtor’s property. Chas. J. Tabb, The Law of Bankruptcy § 11.32, at 1162 (2d ed. 2009). But the “quid pro quo for making the election” is that “the undersecured creditor must give up its unsecured [deficiency] claim.” Id. Had C been able to elect Section 1111(b)(2) treatment in Adkins, its allowed secured claim would have been $321,506, instead of the trustee’s $38,753 valuation of C’s collateral. The practical effect of this election, had it been available, would be to protect C against the risk that the trustee would cram down its secured claim at a low valuation. For purposes of cramdown under Code Section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II), C would also have an allowed secured claim with the face amount of $321,506, requiring the reorganized debtor to pay C the full $321,506.28 over time. The Section 1111(b) election “ensures essentially that the debtor must resolve the secured claim for the maximum value from the collateral.” 2015 WL 1873137, at *4. Code Section 1129(b)(2)(A), though, requires only that the present value of these deferred cash payments “as of the effective date of the plan” equal the judicially determined value of the lender’s collateral, presumably $38,753 in the Adkins case. But C’s secured claim would still be secured by a lien of $321,506. C could thus benefit if the debtor later defaulted or sold the property. As noted, however, under Code Section 1111(b)(1)(B)(ii), the trustee’s sale of C’s collateral precluded any election right C might have had.
Second, and more important, C’s right to credit bid provided an alternative protection when it could not make the Section 1111(b) election. A recourse secured creditor like C can “bid in its claim when the collateral is [to be] sold” and “offset his full allowed claim against the purchase price.” K. Klee, “All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code,” 53 Am. Bankr. L. J. 133, 153 and n.127 (1979), citing Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). In Adkins, the Fifth Circuit recognized the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding that “debtors may not sell their property free of liens without allowing a lienholder to credit bid.” 2015 WL 1873137, at *1, citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). As the concurring opinion in Adkins noted, “secured creditors are [thus] assured of being able to credit bid for their collateral and retain the benefit of their bargain … .” Id. at *4. C, however, failed to timely exercise its credit-bidding rights.
Authored by Michael L. Cook.
If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.
This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.
ARTICLE
May, 2015
Read time: 2 min
Deniz Tschammler authoured the article “Die Drittanfechtung einer Generikazulassung durch den Originalhersteller nach der „Olainfarm“-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs” (with Prof. Dr. Dirk Uwer), in PharmR 2015, p. 209-215, in May 2015.