Content Type: Article

  • Sixth Circuit Reinstates Antitrust Challenge to Hospital Joint Operating Agreement

    ARTICLE

    Sixth Circuit Reinstates Antitrust Challenge to Hospital Joint Operating Agreement

    April 8, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Jeffrey Brennan wrote this bylined article on The Medical Center at Elizabeth Place v. Atrium Heath System, in which the Sixth Circuit held that a Sherman Act antitrust case against a hospital joint operating agreement (JOA) could proceed. “The ruling is important for its analytical approach and interpretations of facts going to the central issue on appeal: whether the hospital parties to the JOA are subject to conspiracy allegations for actions taken through the joint venture, or instead are a single entity beyond the reach of [the Act],” Mr. Brennan wrote.

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  • Federal Labor Court: Using the Employer’s Resources to Create Pirated Copies May Justify Termination Without Notice

    ARTICLE

    Federal Labor Court: Using the Employer’s Resources to Create Pirated Copies May Justify Termination Without Notice

    April 8, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview
    In depth

    Dr. Thomas Gennert wrote this bylined article analyzing and welcoming the German Federal Labor Court’s decision that a cause for immediate termination of employment may be that a worker copied private video or audio recordings during working hours.

    Authors

    Dr. Thomas Gennert

    Partner

    Düsseldorf

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  • Federal Court Finds Private Equity Funds Liable for Pension Liabilities of Portfolio Company

    Federal Court Finds Private Equity Funds Liable for Pension Liabilities of Portfolio Company

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Federal Court Finds Private Equity Funds Liable for Pension Liabilities of Portfolio Company

    April 8, 2016

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    In a much-anticipated decision addressing the reach of multiemployer pension plans in imposing withdrawal liability, a U.S. District Court ruled on March 28, 2016 that three private equity funds were engaged in a “trade or business” and their investment in a portfolio company was made through a “partnership-in-fact,” thereby subjecting the funds to withdrawal liability. The ruling in Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund by the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts comes almost three years after the high-profile decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that one of the funds managed by Sun Capital Advisors (“Sun Capital”) was engaged in a “trade or business,” setting the stage for the district court’s recent decision.

    First Circuit’s 2013 Decision

    As described in a previous SRZ Alert , Sun Capital involves the 2007 investment in Scott Brass Inc. (“SBI”) by three private equity funds (“SCP Funds”) established and managed by Sun Capital. Sun Capital Partners IV, LP (“SCP IV Fund”) owned 70 percent of SBI and two “parallel funds” — Sun Capital Partners III, LP and Sun Capital Partners III QP, LP ( “SCP III Funds”) — owned the remaining 30 percent of SBI. In October 2008, SBI stopped contributing to the New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension Fund, a multiemployer pension plan, which triggered withdrawal liability. The Teamsters Plan assessed withdrawal liability on SBI and the SCP Funds. The Teamsters Plan’s position was that the SCP Funds were members of SBI’s ERISA-controlled group. Under ERISA, to be liable as a member of a contributing employer’s controlled group, the entity must be: (1) a “trade or business”; and (2) under “common control” with the obligated entity through ownership of at least 80 percent.

    On appeal, the First Circuit set forth an “investment plus” standard to evaluate whether a private equity fund was engaged in a “trade or business,” which includes analysis of the profit-making purpose, the involvement in portfolio company management and operations, governance control, and any direct economic benefit received by the fund. Based on “the sum of all of these factors,” the First Circuit held that the SCP IV Fund satisfied “the ‘plus’ in the ‘investment plus’ test.”The First Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the SCP III Funds also constituted trades or businesses and, if so, whether SBI was under the “common control” of the SCP Funds.

    District Court Decision

    Using the First Circuit’s “investment plus” test, the district court found that the SCP IV Fund and the SCP III Funds were trades or businesses based on the economic benefits they received from their management activities with respect to SBI. The SCP III Funds’ economic benefit was offsets from the management fees that each owed to Sun Capital by certain fees (such as management fees, directors’ fees, corporate services fees, investment banking fees and any net fees) that Sun Capital and its affiliates received from SBI. The SCP IV Fund argued that the First Circuit’s holding that the fund was a trade or business was based on an erroneous factual determination. The SCP IV Fund asserted there was no economic benefit because it never utilized any offset due to SBI’s bankruptcy and Sun Capital’s waiver of fees. The district court rejected the argument, holding the economic benefit was a potential offset that could be carried forward to reduce the fund’s future management fees.

    As to “common control,” the district court determined that the three SCP Funds should be deemed to have formed a de facto partnership — a “partnership-in-fact” — in connection with their investment in Sun Scott Brass LLC (“TopCo LLC”), which, in turn, owned SBI. The district court rejected the SCP Funds’ argument that the choice of organizational form under state law should be determinative of treatment under federal law. In reaching its conclusion, the district court found that:

    • An intent to form a partnership was evident from the SCP Funds’ decision to split SBI’s ownership to address the SCP Funds’ different investment life cycles, income diversification preferences and desire to avoid common control under ERISA. The decision showed a “coordination” and “joint action” that “stem from top-down decisions to allocate responsibilities jointly” and was not the action of “independent funds choosing, each for its own reasons, to invest at a certain level.”
    • The SCP Funds engaged in a “period of joint investigation and action prior to the formation of an LLC” to identify potential investments.
    • The SCP Funds are closely affiliated entities and “part of the larger ecosystem” of Sun Capital entities created and directed by general partners, each of which is controlled by the co-CEOs of Sun Capital.
    • The SCP Funds were not passive investors in SBI that invested “by happenstance, or coincidence,” but the SCP Funds created the TopCo LLC to invest in SBI — a form of investment structure that the SCP Funds used to invest in five other companies between 2005 and 2008.
    • There was no record of any actual independence of the SCP Funds with respect to their co-investments, such as co-investments with outside entities or evidence of disagreement between the SCP III Funds and SCP IV Fund over how to operate the TopCo LLC, as might be expected from independent members. “The smooth coordination is indicative of a partnership-in-fact sitting atop the [TopCo] LLC: a site of joining together and forming a community of interest.”

    The district court also determined that the partnership-in-fact created by the SCP Funds was engaged in a trade or business. The SCP Funds already have appealed the district court’s decision.

    Conclusion

    The decision marks the first time that a court has held that private equity funds, each owning less than 80 percent of a portfolio company, were liable for the pension obligations of the portfolio company. As a result of the decision, we expect that multiemployer pension plans and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation will become more aggressive in pursuing private equity funds for a portfolio company’s withdrawal liability. We also expect that private equity funds will undertake additional precautions in structuring and managing portfolio company investments to prevent being held liable for a portfolio company’s withdrawal liability. 

    Authored by Ian L. Levin, Ronald E. Richman, Holly H. Weiss and Scott A. Gold.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP and Schulte Roth & Zabel International LLP (‘SRZ’) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

    In depth
    Authors

    Ian L. Levin

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Ronald E. Richman

    Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

    Holly H. Weiss

    Retired Partner

    New York – 919 Third Avenue

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  • Texas Supreme Court Resolves Fraudulent Transfer Value Defense for Fifth Circuit

    Texas Supreme Court Resolves Fraudulent Transfer Value Defense for Fifth Circuit

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Texas Supreme Court Resolves Fraudulent Transfer Value Defense for Fifth Circuit

    April 6, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    “Reasonably equivalent value” as a defense to a fraudulent transfer suit “can be satisfied with evidence that the transferee (1) fully performed under a lawful, arm’s-length contract for fair market value, (2) provided consideration that had objective value at the time of the transaction, and (3) made the exchange in the ordinary course of the transferee’s business,” held the Supreme Court of Texas on April 1, 2016, in response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Janvey v. Golf Channel, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2016 WL 1268188, at *2 (Tex. April 1, 2016), responding to Janvey v. Golf Channel Inc., 792 F.3d 539, 547 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Golf Channel II”). The Fifth Circuit, on March 11, 2015, had initially held an advertising firm in an SEC receiver’s Texas fraudulent transfer suit liable for $5.9 million it had received in good faith from a Ponzi scheme debtor. Janvey v. Golf Channel Inc., 780 F.3d 641, 646-47 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Golf Channel I”) (advertising services had “no value” to Ponzi scheme creditors although services might be “quite valuable” to creditors of a legitimate business).

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  • State Tax Auditors Descend on Corporations with Novel Conclusions

    ARTICLE

    State Tax Auditors Descend on Corporations with Novel Conclusions

    April 4, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Arthur Rosen was the author of this bylined article which considered the unusual situation in which New York corporate taxpayers are being “overwhelmed” by state tax refunds. In such instances, Mr. Rosen wrote, “the auditors have reviewed the business operations and believe that applying the standard statutory rate results in too much income being attributed to the state and thus, because of the application of alternative apportionment, the taxpayer is due a refund.”

    In depth
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    Arthur R. Rosen

    Senior Counsel

    Miami, New York – One Vanderbilt Avenue

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  • Reasonableness of Web-Blocking for an Internet Access Provider

    ARTICLE

    Reasonableness of Web-Blocking for an Internet Access Provider

    April 4, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Ralf Weisser and Claus Färber wrote this bylined article regarding two German Supreme Court rulings on the closing of content to Internet access providers (ISPs), the so-called “web-blocking” process used to prevent copyright infringement. According to the authors, the Court ruled that an ISP can be required to block sites which infringe on copyright, even though the ISP has no relationship with them.

    In depth
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    Dr. Claus Färber

    Counsel

    Munich

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  • Proposed Code Sec. 367 Regs Attempt to Tax Foreign Goodwill and Going Concern Value

    ARTICLE

    Proposed Code Sec. 367 Regs Attempt to Tax Foreign Goodwill and Going Concern Value

    March – April 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Lowell Yoder wrote in this bylined article that proposed changes in Code Sec. 367 regulations will attempt to tax all transfers to a foreign subsidiary of goodwill and going concern value for use in a trade or business outside the United States. Mr. Yoder urged that such “extra-legislative proposed regulations should be withdrawn. There is no basis for taxing foreign goodwill or going concern value under Code Sec. 367(d) because those items are not within the definition of Code Sec. 936(h)(3)(B) intangible property.”

    In depth
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    Lowell D. Yoder

    Partner

    Chicago

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  • Managing the Risks Embedded in Embedded Marketing: Five Things Every Manufacturer of FDA-Regulated Products Should Consider

    ARTICLE

    Managing the Risks Embedded in Embedded Marketing: Five Things Every Manufacturer of FDA-Regulated Products Should Consider

    March/April 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Vernessa Pollard co-authored this bylined article on the FDA rules governing embedded marketing: the use of branded pharmaceuticals in entertainment programming. The authors asked, “Does this practice … constitute advertising and if so, to what extent can the manufacturer of Brand Drug A be held liable for the fictionalized representation of its drug and its effects in [a] TV show?”

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  • Inconsistent and Confusing Specification Language Does not Support Broad Claim Construction

    ARTICLE

    Inconsistent and Confusing Specification Language Does not Support Broad Claim Construction

    March 31, 2016

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Alexander Ott wrote this bylined article on the Federal Circuit Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp case, which addressed various claim constructions that led to a stipulated judgment of non-infringement and partial invalidity. The Court affirmed two claim constructions and a related indefiniteness holding, but reversed a third construction.

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  • Seventh Circuit Holds Diversion of Asset Sale Proceeds to Be Fraudulent

    Seventh Circuit Holds Diversion of Asset Sale Proceeds to Be Fraudulent

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Seventh Circuit Holds Diversion of Asset Sale Proceeds to Be Fraudulent

    March 30, 2016

    Read time: 8 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A corporation’s asset sale “was structured [by its insiders] so as to fraudulently transfer assets in order to avoid paying [a major creditor] what it was owed,” held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on March 22, 2016. Continental Casualty Co. v. Symons, 2016 WL 1118566, at *6 (7th Cir., March 22, 2016). Affirming the district court’s 136-page order and judgment against the corporate defendant and its insiders, the Seventh Circuit held: (1) the defendant liable for breach of contract; (2) the insiders “liable as transferees under” Indiana’s version of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”); and (3) two individual insiders “liable under an alter-ego theory.” Id. at *1.

    Relevance

    The asset sale in Continental yielded a fair price. Two other bidders offered roughly the same amount as the ultimate buyer paid, but the other bidders rejected the insiders’ terms “for how the purchase price would be structured and paid.” Id. at *3. Continental thus deals with the issue of whether the debtor actually received reasonable value, not whether the asset buyer paid a fair price. See, e.g., In re Craig, 144 F.3d 587, 593 (8th Cir. 1998) (debtor made indirect fraudulent transfer to spouse when he directed that loan funds pay for house titled in wife’s name). Because the corporate defendant received only $16.5 million of the $40 million sale proceeds, the court dealt with the issue of who was liable for the diversion of roughly $24 million of sale proceeds.

    Facts

    The corporate defendant (“D”) bought a crop insurance business in 1998 from Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”). Under the contractual formula, D owed Continental roughly $25 million. Shortly thereafter, D sold the business to “A” for $40 million. The insiders insisted that the purchase price be paid as follows: $16.5 million to D; and the remaining $24 million to insiders. A agreed. The “key questions in this protracted litigation are whether the payments to [the insiders] were fraudulent transfers undertaken to evade [D’s] debt to Continental, and if so, which entities and persons may be held liable.” Id. at *1.

    The district court held that certain insiders were liable to Continental, along with D, for breach of contract; the insiders were liable as transferees under the UFTA; and at least two of the insiders were “liable under an alter-ego theory.” Id. at *5.

    Fraudulent Transfer

    The Seventh Circuit affirmed the findings that D had diverted the sale proceeds with actual intent to defraud Continental. In any event, said the court, D had received less than reasonably equivalent value when it was insolvent, making the diversion constructively fraudulent.

    Constructive Fraud

    A paid $40 million for D’s insurance business, but D received only $16.5 million of the purchase price, with the remainder being “siphoned off” to insiders. In short, “this was a diversion of purchase-money funds, leaving [D] with less than reasonably equivalent value.” Id. at *6. Moreover, “the structure of the transaction — specifically, the sham non-competes and overpriced reinsurance treaty,” ostensibly the rationale for the diversion of sale proceeds, “had been ‘proposed and driven’ by [the insiders].” Id. Because D “received less than half the value of what it was selling, with the rest of the money going to insiders instead,” the deal “thus met all the elements of” a constructively fraudulent transfer — “an open claim, insolvency, and a sub-value transfer.” Id. at *7.

    Actual Intent to Defraud

    The district court found that D had diverted the sale proceeds with actual “intent to defraud a creditor [i.e., Continental].” Id. at *7. The Seventh Circuit accepted the district court’s reliance on circumstantial evidence to show the requisite intent. First, D had diverted the proceeds after Continental had threatened legal action unless it was paid. Id. at *7. Second, D was insolvent. Id.Third, because D “received less than half the value of [the assets sold, it was left] unable to satisfy any execution of its debt to Continental.” Id. at *8. Fourth, the transaction was extraordinary. It “differed from customary methods by transferring purchase-price consideration to unjustified non-competes and reinsurance.” Id.Fifth, D “received inadequate consideration [for] the transfer, “less than 50% of the going market price.” Id.Finally, the diversion of sale proceeds “was essentially between family members,” D’s affiliates. “The existence of several of these [so-called ‘badges of fraud’] may warrant an inference of fraudulent intent” under applicable Indiana law. Id. at *7, citing Hoesman v. Sheffler, 886 N.E.2d 622, 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

    The purported “non-competes” for which two of the insolvent insider affiliates had received sale proceeds “were a sham.” Id. at *9. As the court explained, “the non-competes only make sense as a fraudulent diversion of the purchase money for the crop-insurance business, not as a purchase of good will and legitimate protection from competition.” Id.

    The diversion of sale proceeds for a “reinsurance treaty” was also a sham. The insiders “suggested” this $15-million diversion that was “outside industry norms,” making it “unjustified and overpriced.” Id. at *10.

    Transferee Liability

    Two of the individual insiders argued that they could not be held liable because the UFTA “does not account for ‘participation’ liability.” Id. at *11. Instead of resolving whether the two individuals could be liable as “transferees” under the UFTA, the court instead relied on “veil-piercing principles,” placing the two individuals “on the hook without broadening beneficiary liability under the [Indiana] UFTA to include vicarious or participatory liability.” Id. at *12.

    Substance over Form

    The court rejected the insiders’ “very formalistic argument that the money paid to” them “never belonged to [D] so it couldn’t really have been transferred fraudulently.” Id. Although they had essentially argued that D had not disposed of its own property, the court relied on the UFTA’s definition of a transfer: “Disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, whether the mode is direct or indirect.” Id., citing Indiana UFTA 32-18-2-10 (emphasis added); HBE Leasing Corp. v. Frank, 48 F.3d 623, 638 (2d Cir. 1995) (lower court “correctly disregarded the form of this transaction and looked instead to its substance”); In re Unglaub, 332 B.R. 303, 316 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005) (“For purposes of the [UFTA], equity looks to the substance of the transaction rather than its form.”) Because the transaction here “was structured to keep more than half the purchase price away from [D] and in the hands of the [insiders],” their “sleight of hand … was the very means of the fraud.” Id. at *13.

    Alter-Ego Liability

    Two of the individual insider defendants challenged “their alter-ego liability,” but the Seventh Circuit deferred to the district court’s fact finding. First, the entire transaction was unfair. The insiders “structured the sale of the business to [A] to syphon assets away from [D] to evade the debt to Continental, which is what the non-competes and reinsurance … accomplished.” Id. at *14. Second, the insiders “ignored, controlled, and manipulated the corporate forms” of the various insider affiliates and “operated the corporations as a single business enterprise such that these entities were mere instrumentalities” of the insiders. The court agreed that veil-piercing is often “applied to closely held corporations,” but a company’s non-private status “isn’t a necessary condition for an alter-ego claim.” Id. at *16. Not only have other courts disregarded the form of public companies, but the public company insiders here, in any event, had “been delisted from the NASDAQ.” Id.

    Finally, the record supported the district court’s alter-ego liability findings. “Corporate formalities were both cosmetic and ignored,” said the Seventh Circuit. The corporate affiliates “all gave regulators the same address in Indiana as their actual base of operations … , assets were comingled — indeed, the corporations all seem to have aided one another with some degree of impunity. [Insider] family members received millions of dollars in no-interest, unsecured loans from their companies. Finally, [one individual insider] was the principal agent of all the relevant companies and the architect of the sale.” Id. In short, because the individual insiders were easily liable under an alter-ego theory, the court never had to reach the issue of whether they were liable as transferees under the UFTA.

    Comment

    Continental is consistent with other appellate decisions that look “to substance, rather than form, and protect creditors from any transaction … that [has] the effect of impairing [creditors’] rights.” Boyer v. Crown Stock Dist., Inc., 587 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir. 2009); Orr v. Kinderhill Corp., 991 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1994) (when transfer only a step in a general plan, court must view whole plan with all implications); Voest-Alpine Trading USA Corp. v. Vantage Steel Corp., 919 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1990) (collapsed sham transactions intended to defraud creditors).

    Authored by Michael L. Cook .

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author. 


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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