REPORT
International Legal Highlights Korea | July 2022
July 2022
Read time: 2 min
By David Kiefer
Private investment in infrastructure, especially renewable energy projects, is surging across the globe. In fact, total new investment in renewable energy hit an all-time high during the first half of 2021. The resulting competition among investors has led funds to invest in riskier projects in the hopes of obtaining higher returns.
Risk on infrastructure projects comes in many forms. One of the more difficult risks to manage is the potential for cost overruns during construction and, the larger the project, the greater the risk for overruns. According to McKinsey & Company, 98% of megaprojects (projects with a total cost greater than US$1 billion) suffer cost overruns of more than 30%, and 77% of them are completed at least 40% behind schedule. Such cost overruns will significantly threaten an investorβs return, but this risk can be mitigated by ensuring that the owner of the project properly manages its relationship with its contractor. To that end, investors should be mindful of the following:
- Make time for a robust front-end design. The more design work done before putting a project out to bid, the more defined the scope will be for the project. This will reduce the risk of unforeseen conditions and growth in quantities of material and equipment.
- Shift the risk of cost overruns onto the contractor. A lump-sum or a guaranteed maximum price contract will provide the project with greater cost certainty than a cost-reimbursable contract. While a contractor will insist on a higher price to assume the risk of cost overruns, it may be better for investors to have that price negotiated up front in exchange for greater cost certainty moving forward.
- Insist on an engaged management team. Problems on construction projects tend to snowball if they are allowed to fester. During the project, the owner should employ an internal project management staff dedicated to monitoring costs, schedule and, most importantly, holding the contractor to the terms of its contract.
- Understand international dispute resolution. In the event the owner and contractor cannot resolve their dispute on delays and cost overruns, they will be forced to have their claims adjudicated by a tribunal. International projects often utilise arbitration for disputes, with the International Chamber of Commerce being the most popular venue.Β The benefit of these proceedings is that they allow the parties to avoid the idiosyncrasies of a local court, the eventual award is typically kept confidential, and it is internationally enforceable.
The decision to invest in a capital project does not always account for the intricacies of the construction process, even though it can torpedo key cost assumptions. A bit of diligence and discipline during this phase can help ensure an investorβs targeted rate of return.
By Julian L. AndrΓ©, Edward B. Diskant, Paul M. Thompson, Benton Curtis
In March 3, 2022, speeches at the American Bar Associationβs Annual National Institute on White Collar Crime (ABA White Collar Institute), US Attorney General (AG) Merrick GarlandΒ andΒ US Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division (AAG) Kenneth Polite Jr. addressed the US Department of Justiceβs (DOJ) increased commitment to investigating and prosecuting corporate crime.
As a testament to their commitment to these resource-intensive cases, AG Garland discussed plans to hire 120 new prosecutors and 900 new FBI agents; this announcement represents a substantial surge in resources. AG Garland and AAG Polite also addressed specific ways they intend to increase enforcement efforts, including through the expanded use of data analytics. Finally, in addition to outlining substantive enforcement priorities, AG Garland and AAG Polite emphasized DOJβs focus on individual accountability, with AG Garland reiterating that DOJβs primary goal is βobtaining individual convictions rather than accepting big-dollar corporate dispositions.β
As AG Garland warned, DOJβs white-collar enforcement efforts will further βaccelerate as we come out of the pandemicβ and DOJβs interest in corporate crime is clearly βwaxing again.β Companies must therefore take proactive steps to prepare for this increased enforcement activity.
Substantial Additional Resources for Corporate Crime Enforcement
In 2021, DOJ charged 5,521 individuals with βwhite collarβ crimes, which represented a 10% increase over 2020. During his speech, AG Garland announced that DOJ will be devoting even more resources toward its corporate crime enforcement efforts going forward. Specifically, DOJ will seek funding to hire 120 new prosecutors and 900 new FBI agents, all of whom would focus on white-collar crime. If DOJ obtains such funding, those new prosecutors and agents could supercharge DOJβs enforcement efforts. For example, 120 prosecutors is more prosecutors than there are in many US Attorneysβ Offices (including in the District of Massachusettsa district that is already active in corporate enforcement, particularly in the resource-intensive healthcare space). Adding 900 new FBI agentsβa number that is similarly larger than many existing FBI field officesβcould allow DOJ to pursue thousands of new corporate criminal investigations.
Expanded use of data analytics
For the past two years, DOJ and other federal agencies have increasingly relied on sophisticated data analytics tools to identify and prosecute corporate crime. AG Garland specifically identified data analytics as another βforce-multiplierβ for DOJ. DOJβs use of data analytics will undoubtedly expand going forward. Among other things, AG Garland announced that a new squad of FBI agents has been embedded within the Criminal Divisionβs Fraud Section to βfurther strengthen [DOJβs] ability to bring data-driven corporate crime cases nationwide.β As DOJ increasingly relies on βbig data,β including vast amounts of data from other state and federal agencies, companies must ensure that they are proactively using data analytics to further their own internal compliance efforts.
DOJ’s Priority Enforcement Areas
AG Garland and AAG Polite mentioned several of DOJβs specific white-collar criminal enforcement priorities during their remarks. In addition to traditional areas such as healthcare fraud, securities fraud and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, companies should expect increased DOJ scrutiny in the following areas:
- Antitrust: AG Garland highlighted DOJβs active investigations and prosecutions of alleged criminal antitrust violations and collusive activity in government procurement. DOJβs Antitrust Division ended the last fiscal year with 146 open grand jury investigationsβthe most in 30 yearsβand is trying or preparing to try 18 indicted cases against 10 companies and 42 individuals. AG Garland previously noted that βreinvigorating Antitrust enforcementβ was a top priority for DOJ, and he requested aΒ budget increase of 9% for the Antitrust Division Β (more than $200 million). Such significant additional resources will bolster the Antitrust Divisionβs aggressive pursuit of alleged violations in their current priority areas: government procurement, labor markets, consumer products and the healthcare industry. In addition, during separate remarks at the ABA White Collar Institute, Richard Powers, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement in the Antitrust Division, noted that the Division is also prepared to criminally charge individual executives for violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act (the provision prohibiting market monopolization). Charging Section 2 cases criminally is an exceedingly aggressive and controversial approach, and it something that the Division has not done in decades.
- COVID-19 Fraud: AG Garland reiterated DOJβs commitment to pursuing fraudulent conduct in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. As President Biden recently announced, AG Garland will be βnaming a chief prosecutor to lead specialized teams dedicated to combatting pandemic fraud.β The chief prosecutor will βbuild onβ the work of the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force announced in May 2021. Additional pandemic-related prosecutions and investigations will likely continue for years to come and may increase in scope and complexity.
- Cryptocurrency:Β AAG Polite specifically mentioned the βemerging cryptocurrency spaceβ as an area in which individual victims are particularly vulnerable to being βexploited by other market participants.β AAG Polite referenced the recent indictment of the founder of cryptocurrency platform BitConnect in connection with an alleged $2.4 billion Ponzi scheme. His remarks follow increased cryptocurrency enforcement and regulatory activity from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and other federal agencies during the past year, and they demonstrate that cryptocurrency remains squarely in the DOJβs crosshairs.
DOJ’s Renewed Focus on Individual Accountability
The remarks of AG Garland and AAG Polite focused heavily on DOJβs efforts to ensure that individuals are held accountable for corporate crime. AG Garland stated that DOJβs βfirst priority in corporate criminal cases is to prosecute the individuals who commit and profit from corporate malfeasances.β AG Polite in turn noted that DOJ βprioritize[s] prosecution of individuals responsible for corporate crimes to the fullest extent of the law.β
Although βindividual accountabilityβ has long been at the core of DOJβs Principles of Federal Prosecution, AG Garland and AAG Politeβs statements were noteworthy since prosecutions of individuals for corporate crime had waned during the past administration. AG Garland recognized that βobtaining individual convictions rather than accepting big-dollar corporate dispositions is a difficult and resource-intensive road,β but committed to marshalling the resources necessary for DOJ to pursue such prosecutions successfully.
AG Garland and AAG Polite also reemphasized DOJβs requirement that, to be eligible for cooperation credit, companies must provide DOJ βwith all non-privileged informationβ about βall individuals involved in or responsible the misconduct at issue,β regardless of βtheir position, status or seniority.βΒ First announced by Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Lisa Monaco last fall, AG Garland described this requirement and defense lawyers as a βforce multiplierβ for DOJ. DOJ now expects companies and their defense lawyers to βcome clean about everyone involved in the misconduct, at every level.β This is a change from the previous administration, which required only that companies make disclosures regarding those individuals the companies deem to have had βsubstantialβ involvement in the misconduct.
Key takeaways
With a surge of DOJ resources focused on corporate crime (and AG Garlandβs clear commitment to enforcement in that area), the importance of an effective corporate compliance plan cannot be overstated. In fall 2021, DAG Monaco reiterated the import of self-monitoring, a trend that has been gaining momentum at DOJ since it first issued comprehensive compliance guidance in 2017. AAG Polite reiterated the same on March 3, 2002, providing additional insight into what DOJ will be looking for when evaluating corporate compliance programs:
- DOJ wants to know βwhether you are doing everything you can to ensure that when that individual employee is facing a singular ethical challenge, he has been informed, trained and empowered to choose right over wrong.β
- When misconduct takes places, DOJ will be evaluating whether your company has in place βa system that immediately detects, remediates, disciplines, and then adapts to ensure that others do not follow suit.β
- Even when a CEO is not involved in wrongdoing, DOJ expects corporations to βexamine whether a change in leadership is necessaryβ and analyze whether current leadership βmodeled poor ethical behavior for the workforce, or fostered a climate in which subordinates committed wrongdoing with intent to benefit the company, or permitted weak internal controls that allowed the crimes of individuals to go undetected.β
By Paul M. Thompson, Claire E. Danberg
On March 2, 2022, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Powers revealed that the DOJ intends to investigate and pursue alleged criminal violations against individuals or companies who violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act.Β For more than 40 years, criminal enforcement of antitrust laws have focused nearly exclusively on hardcore, per se anticompetitive agreements (i.e., price fixing, output restriction or market allocation) among two or more horizontal competitors.Β Section 2 of the Sherman Act, on the other hand, primarily focuses on conduct by one firm or company with significant market power and, typically, is a means to bring a civil case for monopolization or anticompetitive use of the existing monopoly power.
LEGAL BACKGROUND
This marks a radical departure from longstanding DOJ antitrust enforcement of monopolization claims.Β In general, the DOJ has refrained from Section 2 criminal prosecutions.
Section 2 makes it illegal to acquire or maintain monopoly power through anticompetitive means and focuses primarily on unilateral or one-sided anticompetitive behavior.Β Courts (including the Supreme Court of the United States) generally have analyzed Section 2 cases under the βrule of reason,β which weighs both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of conduct.
Because the rule of reason imposes a balancing test that is akin to the preponderance of evidence standard, the higher criminal burden of proof could clash with existing jurisprudence and agency guidelines on Section 2 enforcement standards.Β In contrast, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive agreementsβwhere courts have automatically deemed certain types of agreements, such as agreements to fix prices, allocate markets or rig bidsβas illegal βper se,β because they (through ample judicial and economic experience) have been deemed to produce little or no procompetitive effects.
DOJβs HISTORY WITH SECTION 2
In the last 50 years, the vast majority of criminal cases that the Antitrust Division has brought involved per se illegal agreements under Section 1.Β The Antitrust Division appears to have initiated very few criminal Section 2 cases during that same period with mixed success.Β For instance, in United States v. Cuisinarts, the DOJ prosecuted the defendant under Section 2 for per se resale price maintenance agreements.1Β The defendant agreed to pay a $250,000 fine for a plea of nolo contendere.Β However, today, the per se criminal treatment of resale price maintenance is in serious doubt as the long line of Supreme Court decisions from GTE Sylvania to Leegin have firmly placed most vertical resale price restraints for Section 2 under the rule of reason standard.
WHATβS NEXT
In 2016, the Federal Trade Commission and the DOJ released a joint publication called the βAntitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionalsβ when announcing expanded criminal enforcement in labor markets for wage fixing and no-poaching agreements.2Β We expect the DOJ to release similar guidance with respect to criminal prosecution of Section 2 claims.
The policy shift raises a host of additional questions, such as what types of conduct under Section 2 the Division intends to focus on (i.e., conspiracy to monopolize), how the Division intends to prove elements like relevant market and criminal intent, and whether companies will be able to rely on any reasonably well-defined βsafe harbors.β Without clarity around these issues, DOJβs new approach may impair future competition and innovation- the very things that Section 2 was intended to encourage.Β In short, the lack of clear instructions for avoiding criminal exposure and ambiguous enforcement guidance could dampen significantly competitive conduct among firms and potentially increase the likelihood of companies facing criminal investigations that later choose to accept plea deals or civil settlements that may not be warranted by underlying facts.
This is only the latest wave of scrutiny in the DOJβs more aggressive approach to antitrust issues.
Powersβ remarks affirm an earlier promise made by DOJ Antitrust Division Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter in January 2022 that criminal prosecutions of Section 2 cases remain a top priority for the Antitrust Division.3Β The announcement is consistent with calls from members of US Congress and other policymakers for more stringent (and potentially criminal) enforcement of monopolization claims, particularly for large tech corporations.Β Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) repeatedly has urged the DOJ to deconcentrate companies and target corporate executives, publishing her most recent letter to the DOJ on February 8, 2022.4
McDermott Will & Emery lawyers continue to closely monitor DOJ enforcement of Section 2 claims to provide guidance amidst a radically changing antitrust environment.
1Β United States v. Cuisinarts, Inc.,Β No. H80-559, 1981 WL 2062, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 1981).
2Β Department of Justice press release, Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission Release Guidance for Human Resource Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to Employee Hiring and Compensation (20 October 2016) available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-trade-commission-release-guidance-human-resource-professionals.
3 Department of Justice press release, Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Antitrust Division Delivers Remarks to the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Section (24 January 2022) available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-jonathan-kanter-antitrust-division-delivers-remarks-new-york.
4 Senator Elizabeth Warren press release, Warren Calls On DOJ to Take Aggressive Action to Enforce Antitrust Laws As Giant Corporations Raise Consumer Prices to Highest Levels in Decades (8 February 2022) available at https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-calls-on-doj-to-take- aggressive-action-to-enforce-antitrust-laws-as-giant-corporations-raise-consumer-prices-to-highest-levels- in-decades.
The European Union (EU) has sounded the alarm: βclimate change and environmental degradation are an existential threat to Europe and the worldβ. To mitigate this threat, the EU recently presented the βEuropean Green Dealβ (EGD), which aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. While competition policy may not be the most obvious instrument to achieve this aim, it does in the authorsβ view have a role to play. This article seeks to offer some perspective on how the rules pertaining to Article 101(3) TFEU and the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR) could be applied differently and/or amended to effectively accommodate environmental benefits.
ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU: A PROVISION THAT RADIATES VERDANCY
Article 101(1), which catches restrictive practices, is set aside by Article 101(3) where such restrictive practices contribute to βimproving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefitβ, and neither βimpose[s] on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectivesβ nor βafford[s] such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in questionβ.
A strict interpretation of Article 101(3) suggests that the test enshrined therein is exclusively economic in nature. However, the European Commission (EC) has previously stated that the terms of Article 101(3) are sufficiently broad to include other policy objectives, and more specifically environmental protection objectives. The approach taken by the EC in this regard has, however, been relatively patchy, with much greater deference being given thereto under the now defunct Regulation 17 compared to under the current rules in force.
ARTICLE 101(3) UNDER REGULATION 17: AN ERA OF PERMISSIVENESS?
Regulation 17 endowed the EC with sole power to declare (now) Article 101(1) inapplicable to restrictive practices pursuant to Article 101(3). Under this system, the EC was amenable to accepting environmental benefits as a justification for the application of Article 101(3). A good example is Conseil EuropΓ©en de la Construction dβAppareils Domestiques (CECED) (1999). CECED involved an agreement amongst domestic appliance manufacturers to refrain from manufacturing and/or importing washing machines that did not meet certain energy efficiency criteria. The agreement was found to infringe Article 101(1). When undertaking its cost/benefit analysis under Article 101(3), however, the EC found that βthe future operation of the total of installed machines providing the same service with less indirect pollution is more economically efficient than without the agreementβ. Crucially, the EC appears to have put the reduction of pollution on a par with economic efficiency. Furthermore, the EC took into account the βcollective economic benefitsβ that CECED would engender to conclude that it would likely contribute significantly to technical and economic progress, whilst allowing consumers a fair share of the benefits.
ARTICLE 101(3) UNDER REGULATION 1/2003: AN ERA OF UNPERMISSIVENESS
Regulation 1/2003 introduced the direct application of Article 101(3), whereby competition authorities and Member State courts were given the power to also apply Article 101(3). Restrictive practices that satisfy the conditions of Article 101(3) are legally valid and enforceable ab initio without the need for an administrative decision to that effect. As a corollary, the onus now rests with companies to undertake a risk-based analysis of whether a restrictive practice is compliant with EU competition law. The EC issued a wealth of instruments to enable companies to perform such β(self-)assessmentsβ. Such assessments are, however, to be undertaken within βa legal framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practicesβ to the exclusion of factors extraneous to competition. This move to a purely economics-based approach under Article 101(3) was in the authorsβ view controversial in light of EC and EU Court precedent in particular.
While guidance was published to assist companies with the task of performing an economic assessment of whether Article 101(3) is applicable, there is currently very little scope for the successful invocation of Article 101(3) on the basis of environmental protection. The Guidelines on Article 101(3) allude to the fact that βgoals pursued by other Treaty provisions can be taken into account to the extent that they can be subsumed under the four conditions of Article [101](3)β. This has left little room for climate change abatement considerations to be taken into account:
First, EC guidance on the application of Article 101(3) is exclusively focused on the countervailing economic benefits that a restrictive practice leads to for consumers. As such, the Guidelines on Article 101(3) accentuate economic efficiencies over any other type of countervailing benefit, including environmental benefits.
Second, according to the EC, the economic benefits engendered by a restrictive practice in one market must, generally speaking, outweigh its restrictive effects in that same market (βin-market efficienciesβ). This approach sits uneasily with the dicta of the EU Courts. For example, in GSK v. Commission (2006), the General Court held that β[i]t is […] for the Commission, in the first place, to examine whether [ β¦ ] the agreement in question [ β¦ ] enable[s] appreciable objective advantages to be obtained, it being understood that these advantages may arise not only on the relevant market but also on other marketsβ.
Third, the Guidelines on Article 101(3) recognize that there may be cases where a certain period of time needs to elapse before any efficiencies emerge. However, the EC also states that β[ β¦ ] the greater the time lag, the greater must be the efficiencies to compensate also for the loss to consumers during the period preceding the pass-onβ. Therefore, even if climate change abatement were recognized as a countervailing factor under Article 101(3), the relative immediacy with which efficiencies must arise automatically rules out its successful invocation.
THE EUMR: EFFICIENCIES DO NOT, BUT COULD, RADIATE VERDANCY
The substantive test embedded in the EUMR is whether a concentration would significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position (SIEC).
In making its appraisal of whether there is an SIEC, the EC must take account of β[ β¦ ] the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumersβ advantage and does not form an obstacle to competitionβ (Article 2(1) EUMR). This provision forms the legal basis for the βefficiency defenceβ.
Invocation of the efficiency defence, even on economic grounds, has been largely unsuccessful, however. A closer look at some of the elements of the defence demonstrates that the ability to invoke countervailing environmental benefits, such as a lessening of carbon emissions, is inconceivable based on current practice. This is inter alia because efficiencies must in principle benefit consumers in those relevant markets where it is otherwise likely that competition concerns would occur. The approach towards the efficiencies defence, and the manner in which it is applied, is therefore arguably too rigid to achieve climate neutrality by 2050.
SECURING CLIMATE CHANGE ABATEMENT VIA THE EU COMPETITION RULES: A FEW SUGGESTIONS
Article 101(3)
The ECβs current approach to Article 101(3) does not as things stand permit the invocation of genuine out-of-market environmental benefits. Granted, the ECβs current draft Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines recognise so-called βcollective [sustainability] benefitsβ: βwhere consumers in the relevant market substantially overlap with, or are part of the beneficiaries outside the relevant market, the collective benefits to the consumers in the relevant market occurring outside that market can be taken into account if they are significant enough to compensate consumers in the relevant market for the harm sufferedβ. Moreover, according to the draft guidance, for collective sustainability benefits to be taken into account, parties should be able to: (a) describe clearly the claimed benefits and provide evidence that they have already occurred or are likely to occur, (b) define clearly the beneficiaries, (c) demonstrate that the consumers in the relevant market substantially overlap with the beneficiaries that are part of them and (d) demonstrate that part of the collective benefits occurring or likely to occur outside the relevant market accrue to the consumers of the product in the relevant market.
It is hoped, however, that the EC does not interpret this draft guidance too strictly when it enters into force on 1 January 2023 if it wishes to contribute to achieving the climate neutrality objective by 2050.
The EUMR
Many mergers bringing about environmental benefits do not pose competition problems. However, the parties to a merger would struggle to run a successful efficiencies defence based on environmental benefits because efficiencies must βin principle, benefit consumers in those relevant markets where it is otherwise likely that competition concerns would occurβ. The reference to βin principleβ means that the EC could, if it so desired, take out-of-market efficiencies into account in its assessment of an efficiency defence. Further, the EC could draw inspiration from the approach proposed by the Dutch competition authority in relation to Article 101(3), i.e., there should be no need to quantify the efficiencies where the harm to competition is, based on a rough estimate, obviously smaller than the benefits of the merger.
In summary, the EC is urged to ensure that EU competition law adequately takes into account the protection of the environment. Not doing so risks failing to avert the existential threat posed by climate change and environmental degradation.
By David Kiefer
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- μ λ΄ κ΄λ¦¬νμ μ€μμ±μ κ°μ‘°νλ€ β κ±΄μ€ νλ‘μ νΈμ λ¬Έμ λ κ·Έλλ‘ λλ©΄ λλ©μ΄μ²λΌ λΆμ΄λμ κ³ͺμν°μ§κΈ° μ½μ΅λλ€. νλ‘μ νΈ μ§ν κΈ°κ° λμ, μ¬μ μ£Όμ κ³μ½μ 체 λͺ¨λ λΉμ©κ³Ό μΌμ μ λͺ¨λν°λ§νκ³ , νΉν κ³μ½ 쑰건μ λ°λΌ νλ‘μ νΈλ₯Ό κ΄λ¦¬ν νλ‘μ νΈ κ΄λ¦¬ λ΄λΆ μ λ΄μ λμ΄μΌ ν©λλ€.
- κ΅μ λΆμ ν΄κ²° μ μ°¨λ₯Ό μ΄ν΄νλ€ β κ³΅μ¬ μ§μ° λ° λΉμ© μ΄κ³Ό κ΄λ ¨ λΆμμ μ¬μ μ£Όμ κ³μ½μ 체 μ€μ€λ‘ ν΄κ²°νμ§ λͺ»ν κ²½μ°, λ²μμ νλ¨μ λ°μμΌλ§ ν©λλ€. κ΅μ νλ‘μ νΈλ λ³΄ν΅ κ΅μ μ€μ¬ μ μ°¨λ₯Ό μ΄μ©νλλ°, κ΅μ μ곡νμμ(International Chamber of Commerce)λ₯Ό κ°μ₯ λ§μ΄ μ°Ύμ΅λλ€. μ€μ¬ μ μ°¨μ μ΄μ μ λΆμ λΉμ¬μλ€μ΄ κ°λ³ κ΅λ΄ λ²μμ νΉμ΄μ±λ€μ νΌν μ μκ² ν΄μ£Όλ©°, ν΅μμ μΌλ‘ μ΅μ’ νλ¨μ΄ μΈλΆμ 곡κ°λμ§ μκ³ λΉλ°λ‘ μ μ§λλ©°, κ΅μ μ μΌλ‘ μ§ν κ°λ₯νλ€λ κ²μ λλ€.
μλ³Έ νλ‘μ νΈ ν¬μ κ²°μ μ΄ μ£Όμ λΉμ© μΆμ°μ κ·Έλ₯΄μΉ μλ μμ§λ§, κ·Έλ λ€κ³ λ°λμ κ±΄μ€ νλ‘μΈμ€μ λκ΅μΌλ‘ κ·κ²°λλ κ²μ μλλλ€. μ΄ λ¨κ³μμ μ½κ°μ μ£Όμμ μμΉ μ€μ, κ·Έλ¦¬κ³ νμ‘° μ μ μ΄ κ²°ν©λλ€λ©΄ μμμΉ λͺ»ν μμ€ λ°μμ μλ°©κ³Ό λλΆμ΄ κ΄κ³μ μΌλμ μμ΅μ΄ 보μ₯λ©λλ€.
By Julian L. AndrΓ©, Edward B. Diskant, Paul M. Thompson, Benton Curtis
2022λ 3μ 3μΌ, μ°λ°© κ²μ°°μ²μ λ©λ¦ κ°λλ μ΄μ₯κ³Ό μΌλ€μ€ ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ μ£Όλμ΄ λΆμ΄μ₯μ λ―Έκ΅ λ³νΈμ¬ ννμ μ°λ‘ νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ μ¬ν¬μ§μμμμ μ°μ€μ ν΅ν΄ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ κΈ°μ λ²μ£ μμ¬ κ°ν μμ§λ₯Ό μ²λͺ νμμ΅λλ€.
λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ μ΄λ₯Ό μν΄ 120λͺ μ κ²μ¬μ 900λͺ μ μ°λ°©μμ¬κ΅ μμμ μΆ©μν κ³νμ μ€ν μ€μ΄λ©°, ν΄λΉ μ¬μμ νμΆ©μ ν΅ν΄ λ°μ΄ν° λΆμ μλμ κ°νλ₯Ό μ€μν μμ μ λλ€. λν, κ°λλ μ΄μ₯κ³Ό μΌλ€μ€ λΆμ΄μ₯μ λ°μΈμ λ°λ₯΄λ©΄, λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μ£Όμ λͺ©νλ κΈ°μ‘΄μ κΈ°μ μ λν μ΄κ΄μ λ²κΈ λΆκ³Όμμ λ²μ£μΈ κ°μΈμ λν μ± μ λΆκ³Ό λ° μ²λ² κ°νλ‘μ μ νμ΄ λ μμ μ λλ€.
ν΄λΉ μ§μΉ¨μ μ€ν λ Έλ ₯μ βλ―Έ μ¬νκ° ν¬λ°λ―Ήμ λ²μ΄λλ©΄μ μ μ κ°μν λ κ²βμ΄λΌκ³ κ°λλ κ²μ°°μ΄μ₯μ κ²½κ³ νμμΌλ©°, μ΄μ λν΄ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ κΈ°μ λ²μ£μ λν κ΄μ¬λ μ¬μ ν λ κ²μΌλ‘ μ λ§λ©λλ€. κΈ°μ μκ² μμ΄μ 2022λ μ κΈ°μ λ²μ£ μμ¬μ λν λ₯λμ μΈ λμ² λ₯λ ₯μ μνλ°κ² λ ν ν΄κ° λ κ²μΌλ‘ 보μ λλ€.
μμΈ
μμ¬ μμ νμΆ©
2021λ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ μ¬λ² 5521λͺ μ μ μ νμμΌλ©° μ΄ μμΉλ μ λ λλΉ μ½ 10%μ μμΉλ₯ μ κΈ°λ‘νμμ΅λλ€. μμμ μ€λͺ ν΄λλ Έλ€μνΌ κ°λλ κ²μ°°μ΄μ₯μ κΈ°μ λ²μ£μ λ°λ©Έμ μν μμμ νμΆ©μ΄ κ³μλ κ²μ΄λΌκ³ μ²λͺ νμκ³ , μ΄λ μΆκ°μ μΈ κ²μ¬ λ° μ°λ°©μμ¬κ΅ μμμ μΆ©μμΌλ‘ νμΈλκ³ μμ΅λλ€. μΆ©μ κ·λͺ¨μ λν μ€λͺ μ λ리μλ©΄, κ²μ¬ 120λͺ μ΄λΌλ μμΉλ λλΆλΆμ μ£Ό κ²μ°°μ² μμ μ΄ κ²μ¬ μλ₯Ό λ₯κ°νλ©°, μ°λ°©μμ¬κ΅ μμ 900λͺ λν λλ€μμ μ°λ°©μμ¬κ΅ νμ₯ μ¬λ¬΄μ μμ μ΄ μμ μλ₯Ό μ΄κ³Όν©λλ€. μ΄λ° μΈμ νμΆ©μ ν΅νμ¬ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ νμΈ΅ λ κ°λ ₯ν νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ μ‘°μ¬λ₯Ό μνν κ²μ λλ€.
λ°μ΄ν° λΆμ μλ νμΆ©
λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ κΈ°ν μ°λ°© κΈ°κ΄μ μ§λ μλ κ°, λ°μ΄ν° λΆμ μλμ νμΆ©μ μ§μ€ν΄ μμ΅λλ€. κ°λλ μ΄μ₯ λ³ΈμΈμ΄ ν΄λΉ μλμ κ°νκ° λ²λ¬΄λΆμ κΈ°μ‘΄ μμ¬λ ₯μ μ λ°° κ°νλ‘ μ΄μ΄μ§ κ²μ΄λΌ μΈκΈνμμΌλ©°, μ΄μ λν΄ μλ‘μ΄ μΆ©μλ FBI μμλ€μ λ²λ¬΄λΆ λ²μ£ μμ¬κ΅ μ¬κΈ° λ²μ£ μ λ΄ νμ μμλ¨μΌλ‘μ¨, λΉ λ°μ΄ν° λΆμμ ν΅ν λ―Έ μ μμ λ§λΌνλ κΈ°μ λ²μ£ νμ§λ₯Ό μ€ννκ² λ©λλ€. μ΄λ κ² μ λΆ κΈ°κ΄ μ¬μ΄μ νμ κ³Ό λ°μ΄ν° 곡μ λ₯Ό ν΅ν μμ¬μ λλΉνμ¬, κΈ°μ λ€ λν μ체 λ°μ΄ν° λΆμμ ν΅ν μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ λ Έλ ₯ μ¬κ³ κ° νμν©λλ€
μ°μ μμ¬ μν μμ
κ°λλ κ²μ°° μ΄μ₯μ μκΈ° λ―Έκ΅ λ³ν μ°λ‘ μ¬ν¬μ§μμμ κΈ°μ‘΄μ ν¬μ€μΌμ΄ λ° ν΄μΈλΆν¨λ°©μ§λ² λΆμΌ μ΄μΈ, νκΈ° λΆμΌμμλ νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ μ λ°μ μν μ°μ μ μμ¬κ° μ€μλ κ²μ΄λΌ 곡ννμμ΅λλ€:
- λ κ³Όμ : μ§λ 2021νκ³λ λ λμ λ²λ¬΄λΆ λ κ³Όμ μμ¬κ΅μ μ΄ 146κ°μ λλ°°μ¬ μμ¬λ₯Ό μ§ννμμΌλ©°, μ΄λ μ§λ 30λ κ°μ μ΅λ κΈ°λ‘μ λλ€. μ΄λ₯Ό ν΅ν΄ μ΄ 10 κ°μ κΈ°μ κ³Ό 42λͺ μ νΌκ³ μμΈμ λν 18건μ κΈ°μκ° μ§ν μ€μ λλ€. κ°λλ μ΄μ₯μ μ΄μ μλ λ κ³Όμ λ² μνμ΄ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μ΅μ°μ νλκ³Όμ λΌ λ°νν μ μ΄ μμΌλ©°, μ΄λ₯Ό μν΄ 2021λ 6μ 9μΌ, λ―Έ μμ μμ° μ§νμμ μ λ λλΉ μ½ 9% μμΉν 2μ΅ λ¬λ¬μ μμ° μΈμμ μ μ²ν λ° μμ΅λλ€. λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ μ΄λ¬ν κ°λ ₯ν μ‘°μΉλ₯Ό ν΅νμ¬ μ λΆ μ‘°λ¬, λ Έλ μμ₯, μ맀ν, ν¬μ€μΌμ΄ μμ₯ λ΄μμμ λ κ³Όμ μλ° νμλ₯Ό μ λ° μ€μ μμΌλ©°, μ΄μ λν΄ λ²λ¬΄λΆ λ κ³Όμ μμ¬κ΅ μμ 리μ²λ νμμ€ λ²λ¬΄μ°¨κ΄λ³΄λ μκΈ° λ³ν μ°λ‘ μ¬ν¬μ§μμμμ λ°μΈμ ν΅ν΄, μ λ¨Ό λ°λ μ λ² μ 2μ‘°λ₯Ό μλ°ν κ°λ³ κΈ°μ μμμ νμ¬ κ³ μν μ€λΉκ° λμ΄ μλ€κ³ λ°νμ΅λλ€. λ κ³Όμ μμ¬κ΅μ΄ μ λ¨Όλ² μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμμ λν νμ¬ κ³ μλ₯Ό μ§ννλ κ²μ μμλ κ° μ λ‘κ° μλ, λννκΈ°κΉμ§ ν νμλ‘ λ―Έ λ²μ‘°κ³μμ λ°μλ€μ¬μ§κ³ μμΌλ©°, μ΄κ²μ΄ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ λ κ³Όμ μμ¬ μμ§λ₯Ό μ€μ§μ μΌλ‘ λλ³νκ³ μλ€κ³ 보μ¬μ§λλ€.
- μ½λΉλ-19 κ΄λ ¨ μ¬κΈ°: λν κ°λλ μ΄μ₯μ μ½λΉλ-19 κ΄λ ¨ μ¬κΈ° νμμ λν λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μμ¬ μμ§λ₯Ό μ¬νμΈ νμμ΅λλ€. μ΄λ μ΅κ·Ό λ°μ΄λ λν΅λ Ήμ΄ λ°νν βμ½λΉλ-19 κ΄λ ¨ μ¬κΈ° νμμ μμ¬λ₯Ό μν νΉμ μ λ΄νκ³Ό μ΄λ₯Ό μ§νν κ²μ¬μ₯μ μλͺ β μμ§λ₯Ό λ°μνλ κ²μΌλ‘, ν΄λΉ κ²μ¬μ₯μ 2021λ 5μμ λ°μ‘±λ μ½λΉλ-19 μ¬κΈ° μμ¬ μ λ΄ νμ€ν¬ ν¬μ€ νμ μ 무λ₯Ό λ°νμΌλ‘ ν₯ν μλ κ°μ κ΄λ ¨ μμ¬μ κΈ°μλ₯Ό λ΄λΉν κ²μΌλ‘ μμλ©λλ€.
- μνΈνν: λ ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ μνΈνν κ±°λ νλ«νΌμΈ BitConnectμ μ°½μ μ μ¬ν°μ¬ μΏ°λ°λκ° κ°μ λ μ½ 24μ΅ λ¬λ¬ μλΉμ ν°μ§ μ¬κΈ°μ λν μΈκΈμ ν΅ν΄ κ°λ³ νΌν΄μκ° κΈ°ν μμ₯ μ°Έμ¬μμ μν μ°©μ·¨μ νΉλ³ν μ·¨μ½ν μνΈνν μμ₯μ λν λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ κ°μ μ λ°ννμμ΅λλ€. ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ λ°μΈμ λ―Έκ΅ μ¦κΆ κ±°λ μμν, κΈμ΅ λ²μ£ λ¨μλ§, κ΅μΈμ² λ±μμμ μ¦κ°λ μνΈνν κ·μ μμ§μκ³Ό κ·Έ κΆ€λ₯Ό κ°μ΄νκ³ μμΌλ©°, μ΄μ λΉμΆμ΄ λ³Ό λ, μνΈνν μμ₯ λν λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μ£Όμ λμμ΄ λμμμ μ μ μμ΅λλ€.
κ°μΈ κ·μ± μ¬μ μ λν ν¬μ»€μ€
κΈ°μ λ²μ£ μ²λ² κ²½ν₯μ λνμ¬, κ°λλ μ΄μ₯κ³Ό ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ μλ² νμμ κ°μΈμ λν κ°κ²½ν μ²λ²μ΄ μ£Όλ₯Ό μ΄λ£¨κ² λ κ²μ΄λΌ 곡μΈνμ΅λλ€. βνμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ νμ μ²λ²μ μ΅μ°μ μμλ λΆμ νμ λΉμ¬μβ λΌλ κ°λλ μ΄μ₯μ΄ λ°μΈμ΄ μμμΌλ©°, μ΄λ₯Ό μ΄μ΄ λ°μ ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ β(ν΄λΉ νμμμ λν) λ²μ΄ 보μ₯νλ μ΅λνμ μ²λ²μ ꡬνν κ²β μ΄λΌ λΆμΈνμμ΅λλ€.
μ΄λ―Έ μλ² νμ λΉμ¬μμ λν μ²λ²μ΄ μ°λ°© κ²μ°°μ κΈ°μ μμΉμ μ€μ¬μ μ°¨μ§νκ³ μμμΌλ, κ°λλ μ΄μ₯κ³Ό ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ λ°μΈμ΄ μ΄μ±λ‘κ² λ°μλ€μ¬μ§κ³ μλ μ΄μ λ, νΈλΌν νμ λΆ μκΈ°μλ νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ μμ¬μμμ μλ² νμ λΉμ¬μμ λν κΈ°μκ° κ³μ μ€μ΄κ°κ³ μμκΈ° λλ¬Έμ λλ€. κ°λλ μ΄μ₯μ βκΈ°μ μ체μ μ²λ²μ ν΅ν μΌκ΄μ μΈ λ²μΉκΈ λΆκ³Όλ³΄λ€ κ°μΈμ λν κΈ°μκ° λ μ΄λ ΅κ³ λ₯λ₯ μ΄ λ¨μ΄μ§βμ μΈμ νμμΌλ, λ²λ¬΄λΆλ νμλ₯Ό κ³μ μΆμ§ν΄ λκ°κ² λ€κ³ λ°μΈνμμ΅λλ€.
λν, κ°λλ μ΄μ₯κ³Ό ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ κΈ°μ μ΄ μμ¬ νλ ₯ κΈ°μ¬ μ μλ₯Ό μΈμ λ°κΈ° μν΄μλ, βμ§μ, μν, μ μ μμμ 무κ΄, νΌμμ¬ μλ² νμμ κ΄λ ¨λ λͺ¨λ μΈμ¬μ λν λΉνΉκΆμ μ 보λ₯Ό μ 곡βν΄μΌ ν¨μ λ°ννμμ΅λλ€. μ΄λ λ¦¬μ¬ λͺ¨λμ½ λ²λ¬΄λΆ μ°¨κ΄μ΄ 2021λ 10μ 28μΌ λ°ννμλ λ΄μ©μ μ¬νμΈνλ κ²μΌλ‘μ, λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆκ° κΈ°μ κ³Ό κΈ°μ λ³νΈμ¬μκ² νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ μμ¬μ λν μ λ°©μμ μΈ νλ ₯μ μꡬν μ μλ λ°νμ΄ λ κ²μ λλ€. μ΄λ, κΈ°μ‘΄μ βνΌμμ¬ μλ² νμμ κΉμ΄ κ΄λ ¨λ μΈμ¬λ€λ§βμ λν΄μ μꡬλλ μ 보 곡κ°μμ ν κ±Έμ λ λμκ° κ²μ΄λΌ λ³Ό μ μμ΅λλ€.
μ€μ ν¬μΈνΈ μμ½
μ΄μ κ°μ΄ λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ μ²λ² μμ§μ κ°κ²½νλ‘ λΉμΆμ΄ λ³Ό λ, κΈ°μ μ μ μ ν μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨ μ€μΉ λ° μ μ§λ μ΄μ νμκ° λμμ΅λλ€. 2017λ λ²λ¬΄λΆμμ λ°νλ μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ μ§μΉ¨κ³Ό κ·Έ μ€μμ μ€μμ±μ, 2021λ 2021λ 10μ λ¦¬μ¬ λͺ¨λμ½ λ²λ¬΄λΆ μ°¨κ΄μ΄ μΈκΈν κΈ°μ μ μ체 μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ λͺ¨λν°λ§μ μ€μμ±μμ μ¬νμΈλμμΌλ©°, λ λ€μ 2022λ 3μμ μλ κ°λλ μ°λ°© κ²μ°°μ΄μ₯κ³Ό ν΄λΌμ΄νΈ λΆμ΄μ₯μ λ°μΈμ ν΅ν΄ νκ³ ν΄μ§κ³ μμ΅λλ€.
- κΈ°μ μ μμ§μμ΄ λͺ¨νΈν μν©μμ μ€λ¦¬μ μ νμ ν μ μλλ‘ λμμ€ μλ΄, κ΅μ‘, κΆνμ λΆμ¬ν μλ¬΄κ° μμ΅λλ€.
- νμ΄νΈ μΉΌλΌ λ²μ£ μμ¬ μ, λ²λ¬΄λΆλ νΌμμ¬ κΈ°μ μμ βμλ² νμμ κ°μ§, μ‘°μΉ, μ¬λ°μ λ°©μ§βλ₯Ό μννλ μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨μ μ 무λ₯Ό νμΈν κ²μ λλ€.
- λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ μμ¬ λμ€, μ΅κ³ κ²½μμκ° μλ² νμμ μ°λ£¨λμ§ μμμ μ§λΌλ νΌμμ¬ κΈ°μ μ κ²½μμ§μ΄ βνΌκ³ μ© μμ§μμ μ€λ¦¬μ νν, λΆν μ§μμ λν 무μΈμ λΉλλμ νμ μλ°βμ μ§μ μ , κ°μ μ μν₯μ λΌμ³€λμ§μ λν μ‘°μ¬λ₯Ό μ§ννμ¬, μ΄λ₯Ό ν΅ν κ²½μμ§ κ΅μ²΄λ₯Ό μλ°ν μ μμ΅λλ€.
By Paul M. Thompson, Claire E. Danberg
μ΅κ·Ό λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆ λ°λ μ κ΅μ μ λ¨Ό λ°λ μ λ² μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμλ₯Ό νμ¬ μ μ¬ν μ μλ€λ μ μ₯μ λ°νμ΅λλ€. κ°κ²©λ΄ν©, μμ₯ λΆν κ³Ό κ°μ μ 1μ‘° μλ° νμμ λν΄ λ―Όμ¬ λ° νμ¬μ μ¬λ‘ λμνλ κ²κ³Όλ λμ‘°μ μΌλ‘ λ μ ν λ° λ μ 곡λͺ¨λ₯Ό ν¬ν¨ν μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμμ λν΄μλ κ±°μ νμ¬ μ²λΆνμ§ μμλ μ§λ 40μ¬ λ μ΄μ μ΄μ΄μ§ μ μ± μ κΈμ§μ λ³νλ₯Ό μκ³ ν κ²μ λλ€. μ΄λ¬ν μ μ± λ³νμ λ°°κ²½μλ νΉν ν ν¬ μ°μ μμ λκΈ°μ μ μμ₯ μ§μ€κ³Ό λ μ μ΄ μ¬νλλ λ± νμ¬μ μμ₯ νκ²½μ κΈ°μ‘΄μ λ°λ μ λ² μ§νμ΄ μΆ©λΆν λμ²νμ§ λͺ»νκ³ μλ€λ μΈμμ΄ κΉλ € μμ΅λλ€. λ§μ νκ΅ κΈ°μ λ€μ΄ λ€μν λ―Έκ΅ μμ₯μμ λ μ μ κ°κΉμ΄ μμ₯ μ§λ°°λ ₯μ κ°μ§κ³ μλ€λ μ μμ μ λ¨Ό λ°λ μ λ² 2μ‘°λ₯Ό λλ¬μΌ μ μ± λ³νλ νκ΅ κΈ°μ λ€μ μ€μν μμ¬μ μ κ°μ‘λ€ λ³Ό μ μμ΅λλ€. λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆ λ°λ μ κ΅μ΄ νκ΅ κΈ°μ μ λ μ μ μμ₯ μ§λ°°λ ₯μ μ 2μ‘° μλ°μΌλ‘ λ³΄κ³ μ‘°μ¬μ λμκ±°λ λ λμκ° νμ¬ κΈ°μνλ μν©μ λ°©μ§νλ €λ©΄ ν루빨리 μ μ ν μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨μ κ°λ°, μ΄νν΄μΌ ν©λλ€.
λ²μ λ°°κ²½
μ λ¨Ό λ°λ μ λ² μ 1μ‘°λ κ±°λλ₯Ό μ ννλ λͺ¨λ κ³μ½, νμ λ° κ³΅λͺ¨λ₯Ό κΈμ§νκ³ μμ΅λλ€. μ 2μ‘°λ κ±°λλ₯Ό λ μ νκ±°λ λ μ μ κΈ°λ λ° λ μ μ λͺ©μ μΌλ‘ νμΈκ³Ό 곡λͺ¨νλ κ²μ κΈμ§ν©λλ€. μ 1μ‘°μ μ 2μ‘°μ μλ° νμ λͺ¨λ νμ¬μ²λ²μ λμμ΄ λ μ μμΌλ©° λ²κΈκ³Ό μ§μνμ λ°μ μ μμ΅λλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ κ°κ²©λ΄ν©, μμ₯ λΆν λλ μ μ°° λ΄ν© λ± μ 1μ‘°μ μλ° νμλ€μ΄ βλΉμ°μλ²(per se illegal)βμΌλ‘ μλμΌλ‘ λ―ΌΒ·νμ¬ μ²λΆ λμμ΄ λλ κ²κ³Ό λ¬λ¦¬ λ μ μ μμ₯ μ§λ°°λ ₯μ μ μ§ λλ λ μ νλ₯Ό κ·μ νλ μ 2μ‘°μ μλ° νμμ λν νμ¬ μ²λΆμ μ§λ 40μ¬ λ μ΄μ κ±°μ μ΄λ£¨μ΄μ§μ§ μμμ΅λλ€.
μ 1μ‘°μ μ 2μ‘°μ μλ° νμμ λν μ κ·Όλ²μ΄ λ€λ₯Έ μ΄μ λ κ·Έ νμκ° κ²½μμ λ―ΈμΉλ μν₯μ λν μ΄ν΄κ° λ€λ₯΄κΈ° λλ¬Έμ λλ€. μ 1μ‘°μμ κΈμ§νλ κ°κ²©λ΄ν©, μ μ°° μ‘°μ, μμ₯ λΆν κ³Ό κ°μ νμλ κ²½μ μ΄μ§ ν¨κ³Όκ° κ±°μ μλ€λ λ°μ λͺ¨λκ° λμνμ§λ§, μ 2μ‘°μ λ°λ₯Έ λ μ ν κ΄λ ¨ μΌλ°© λλ 곡λ νμκ° κ²½μμ λ―ΈμΉλ μν₯μ μν©μ λ°λΌ λͺ ννμ§ μκΈ° λλ¬Έμ μ§μ€μ μΈ μ¬μ€κ΄κ³ λ° κ²½μ μ λΆμμ μν©λλ€.
κ·Έλ°λ° μ΅κ·Ό λ―Έ λ²λ¬΄λΆ λ°λ μ κ΅ μ± μμλ€μκ²μ λμ¨ μΌλ ¨μ λ°μΈλ€μ μ΄λ¬ν μ μ± μ κΈμ§μ λ³νκ° μμ κ²μμ 보μ¬μ€λλ€. μ§λ 1μ λ°λ μ κ΅μ₯ μ‘°λλ¨ μΉΈν°(Jonathan Kanter)λ μ·¨μ μ§ν κ²½μμ μ₯λ €νκΈ° μν΄ λͺ¨λ κ°λ₯ν λ°©μλ€μ λͺ¨μν κ²μ΄λΌλ©΄μ λ κ³Όμ νμλ₯Ό κΈμ§νλ μ λ¨Ό λ°λ μ λ² μ 2μ‘° μ§νμ μ΅μ°μ μν κ²μ΄λΌκ³ λ°νμ΅λλ€.1Β μ΄μ΄μ μ§λ 3μμλ λ°λ μ κ΅ κ²μ¬ 리μ²λ νμμ€(Richard Powers)κ° βμμ₯ μ§μ€κ³Ό ν΅ν©μ λ―Όμ¬μ μ μ¬μ λ¬Έμ λ§μ μλβλΌλ©° βμ¬μ€κ΄κ³ λ° λ²λ₯ μ λ°λΌ μ 2μ‘° μλ°μ κΈ°λ°ν νμ¬ κΈ°μκ° κ°λ₯νλ€λ κ²°λ‘ μ΄ λμ¨λ€λ©΄, κ·Έλ κ² ν κ²βμ΄λΌκ³ μ¬νμΈ νμμ΅λλ€.
ν₯ν μ λ§κ³Ό νκ°μ±
2016λ λΉμ μ°λ°© 무μ μμνμ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ, λ Έλ μμ₯μμμ μκΈ λ΄ν©κ³Ό λΆλ²μ ν€λ νν μ λν νλλ νμ¬ μ²λΆ μμ¦λ₯Ό 곡ννλ©°, μ΄μ λλΆμ΄Β βκΈ°μ μΈμ¬ λ΄λΉμ μν λ°λ μ λ² κ°μ΄λβλ₯Ό λ°°ν¬ νμμ΅λλ€.2 μ λ¨Ό λ°λ μ λ² μ 2μ‘°μ μ μ©μ λνμ¬λ μ΄μ λΉμ·ν κ°μ΄λλΌμΈμ λ°°ν¬κ° μμ κ²μΌλ‘ 보μ λλ€.
μ λ¨Ό λ μ λ² μ 2μ‘°λ λ μ μ체λ₯Ό κΈνλ κ²μ΄ μλλΌ βλ°°μ β νμμ κ°μ λ°κ²½μμ μλ¨μ ν΅ν΄ λ μ μ μ§λ°°λ ₯μ ν보νκ±°λ μ μ§νλ κ²μ λΆλ²μΌλ‘ κ·μ ν©λλ€. λ°κ²½μμ μν₯μ΄ κ±°μ μλ λ μ μ μ§μ λλ λ μ νκΉμ§ λΆλ² νμλ‘ λ³΄κ³ μ²λ²ν κ²½μ° μ 2μ‘°μμ μ₯λ €νκ³ μ νλ λ°λ‘ κ·Έ κ°μΉμΈ λ―Έλ κ²½μλ ₯κ³Ό νμ μ μ ν΄νλ κ²°κ³Όκ° λ μ μμ΅λλ€. μ΄λ€ νμκ° μ 2μ‘°λ‘ μ²λ² κ°λ₯ν λ°°μ μ νμμΈμ§λ₯Ό λΆμνκΈ° μν΄ λ²μμ κ·Έλ¬ν νμμ κ²½μ μ΄μ§ ν¨κ³Όμ κ²½μ μ ν΄ ν¨κ³Όλ₯Ό λΉκ΅νλ βν©λ¦¬ μμΉβ κΈ°μ€μ μ μ©ν©λλ€. μ΄μ²λΌ κ²½μκ³Ό μλΉμμ λ―ΈμΉλ μν₯μ΄ λͺ¨νΈνκ³ μ¬μ€μ§μ½μ λΆμκ³Ό κ²½μ μ λΆμμ΄ νμν μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμμ λν νμ¬ κΈ°μλ₯Ό μ§μνκ³ λ°κ²½μμ μ΄κ³ μλΉμμκ² ν΄λ‘λ€λ 곡κ°λκ° νμ±λμ΄ μλ μ 1μ‘° μλ° νμμ νμ¬ μ²λΆμ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μμμ μ§μ€ν΄μ¨ κ²μ λλ€.
κ²°κ΅, μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμμ λν λ²λ¬΄λΆμ νμ¬ μ²λΆ μμ§ κ°νμ, μ΄μ μλ°λλ νμ¬μ μ μ© λͺ¨νΈμ±μ, ν₯ν κΈ°μ μ΄ μ μ ν λ²μ μ΄μ μμ΄ νμ¬ μμ¬λ₯Ό λΉνκ±°λ, λλ μ΄λ₯Ό λ§κΈ° μν μ¬λ² κ±°λ λ΄μ§λ λ―Όμ¬ ν©μλ₯Ό μΉλ€μΌ ν μν©μ μΌκΈ°ν μ μμ΅λλ€.
μ°λ°© μ μΉκΆμμλ μ리μλ² μ€ μλ° μμμμ (λ―Όμ£Ό-맀μ¬μΆμΈμΈ ) λ±μ΄ λ²λ¬΄λΆ μ£Όλνμ 맀머λκΈ IT κΈ°μ μ λΆμ°μ μ§μ§νλ λͺ©μ리λ₯Ό λ΄κ³ μμΌλ©°, μ΅κ·Ό 2022λ 2μ 8μΌμλ λ²λ¬΄λΆλ₯Ό ν₯ν 곡κ°μνμ λ°ννμμ΅λλ€.3
μ΄λ¬ν μ μ± λ³νλ νΉν ν ν¬ λκΈ°μ μ ν¬ν¨ν λκΈ°μ μ λ°κ²½μμ λ μ νμλ₯Ό κ·Όμ νκ² λ€λ λ°μ΄λ νμ λΆμ 곡격μ μ κ·Όλ²κ³Ό λ§₯λ½μ κ°μ΄ νλ€κ³ λ³Ό μ μμ΅λλ€. λ²λ¬΄λΆκ° μ λ¨Όλ² μ 2μ‘°μ λ°λ₯Έ νμ¬ μ²λΆ κΆνμ μ€μ λ‘ μΈμ λΆν° μ΄λ»κ² νμ¬ν κ²μΈμ§λ λ μ§μΌλ³΄μμΌ νμ§λ§, κ·Έ λ°©ν₯μΌλ‘ μμ§μΌ κ²μ λΆλͺ ν©λλ€.
μ΄μ λ°λΌ νΉν μ£Όλμ μμ₯ μ§λ°°λ ₯μ κ°μ§κ³ μλ νκ΅ κΈ°μ λ€μ ꡬ체μ μΈ μ§μΉ¨κ³Ό κ³νμ΄ λμ¬ λκΉμ§ μ λκ³ κΈ°λ€λ¦΄ κ²μ΄ μλλΌ, λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μ‘°μ¬μ νμ¬ κΈ°μλ₯Ό μλ°©νκΈ° μν μ€λΉλ₯Ό μ§κΈλΆν° μμν΄μΌ ν©λλ€. κ·Έ 첫 λ¨κ³λ μ 1μ‘° μλ° νμλΏλ§ μλλΌ μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμμ λν λλΉλ ν¬ν¨νλ μ’ ν©μ λ°λ μ μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨μ κ°λ°νκ³ νλ ¨νλ κ²μ λλ€.
ν¨κ³Όμ μΈ μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨κ³Ό νλ ¨μ ν΅ν΄ κΈ°μ λ€μ μ 2μ‘° μ§νκ³Ό κ΄λ ¨ν λΆνμ€μ±μ λλΉνλ κ²μ λ¬Όλ‘ , μ¬μ μ λ΄λ¦¬λ λ€μν κ²°μ μ΄ μλΉμ, κ²½μμ, κΈ°ν μμ₯ μ°Έκ°μλ€μκ² λ―ΈμΉλ μν₯μ νκ°νλ©°, κ²½μμ μν₯μ λ―ΈμΉ μλ μλ κ²°μ μ κ΄νμ¬ ν©λΉνκ³ κ²½μ μΉνμ μΈ κ·Όκ±°λ₯Ό μ·¨ν©, κΈ°λ‘ν μ μμ κ²μ λλ€. ν¨κ³Όμ μ΄κ³ ννν μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨μ λ°λ μ μλ° νμμ λν κΈ°μ μ¬λΆλ₯Ό κ²°μ ν λ μ€μν μ£λκ° λλ©° μ΄λ μ λ¨Όλ² μ 2μ‘° μλ° νμ νμ¬ κΈ°μμμλ λ§μ°¬κ°μ§μΌ κ²μ λλ€. λν μ΄λ κ² νκ°νκ³ κΈ°λ‘ν μλ£λ λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μ‘°μ¬μ νμ¬ μ²λΆ λμμ΄ λ κ²½μ° βν©λ¦¬ μμΉβ λΆμμμ κΈ°μ μ μ 리ν μ¦κ±°κ° λ μ μμ΅λλ€. λ²λ¬΄λΆμ μ μ± λ³ν κ°λ₯μ±μ΄λΌλ λΆνμ€μ±κ³Ό μκΈ°λ₯Ό ν¨κ³Όμ μ»΄νλΌμ΄μΈμ€ νλ‘κ·Έλ¨μ ν΅ν΄ κΈ°νλ‘ λ°κΏλκ° λκ° μλ μ μμ΅λλ€.
1 Department of Justice press release, Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter of the Antitrust Division Delivers Remarks to the New York State Bar Association Antitrust Section (24 January 2022) available at www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-jonathan-kanter-antitrust- division-delivers-remarks-new-york.
2Β Department of Justice press release, Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission Release Guidance for Human Resource Professionals on How Antitrust Law Applies to Employee Hiring and Compensation (20 October 2016) available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and- federal-trade-commission-release-guidance-human-resource-professionals.
3Β Senator Elizabeth Warren press release, Warren Calls On DOJ to Take Aggressive Action to Enforce Antitrust Laws As Giant Corporations Raise Consumer Prices to Highest Levels in Decades (8 February 2022) available at https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-calls-on-doj-to-take-aggressive-action-to-enforce-antitrust-laws-as-giant-corporations-raise-consumer-prices-to-highest-levels-in-decades.
μ λ½μ°ν©(EU)λ βκΈ°ν λ³νμ νκ²½ νκ΄΄λ μ λ½κ³Ό μΈκ³μ μμ΄ μ€μ‘΄μ μνβμ΄λΌλ κ²½κ³ λ₯Ό λ°λ Ήνμ΅λλ€. μ΄λ¬ν μνμ μννκΈ° μνμ¬ μ λ½μ°ν©(EU)λ μ΅κ·Ό 2050λ κΉμ§ κΈ°ν μ€λ¦½μ λ¬μ±νλ κ²μ λͺ©νλ‘ νλ βμ λ½ κ·Έλ¦° λβ (EGD)μ λ°ννμ΅λλ€.Β κ²½μ μ μ± μ΄ μ΄λ¬ν λͺ©νμ λ¬μ±μ μ΄λ£¨κΈ° μν κ°μ₯ λΆλͺ ν μλ¨μ μλ μ§λΌλ, λ³Έ μ μλ€μ 견ν΄λ‘λ μλ―Έμλ μλ¨μΌλ‘μμ μνμ ν μ μλ€κ³ λ΄ λλ€.Β λ°λΌμ, λ³Έ κΈμ ν΅ν΄ TFEU μ 101μ‘° (3)ν λ° μ λ½μ°ν© ν©λ³ κ·μ (EUMR)κ³Ό κ΄λ ¨λ κ·μΉμ΄ νκ²½μ μ΄μ΅μ ν¨κ³Όμ μΌλ‘ μμ©νκΈ° μν΄ μ΄λ»κ² λ€λ₯΄κ² μ μ©λκ±°λ μμ λ μ μλμ§μ λν λͺκ°μ§ κ³ λ € μ¬νμ μ μνκ³ μ ν©λλ€.
TFEU μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ ν΄μ
μ 101μ‘°(1)νμ μ μλ μ νμ κ΄νμ μ 101μ‘° (3)νμ λͺ μλ λ°μ κ°μ΄ κ·Έλ¬ν μ νμ κ΄νμ΄ βμνμ μμ° λλ μ ν΅μ κ°μ νκ±°λ κΈ°μ λλ κ²½μ μ λ°μ μ μ΄μ§νλλ° κΈ°μ¬ν¨κ³Ό λμμ μλΉμμκ² κ³΅μ ν λͺ«μ κ²°κ³Όμ± μ΄μ΅μ μ°½μΆβνλλ° κΈ°μ¬νλ©°, βκ΄λ ¨ μ¬μ 체μ μ΄λ¬ν λͺ©μ μ λ¬μ±νλλ° νμμ μ΄μ§ μμ μ νμ λΆκ³Όβνκ±°λ βν΄λΉ μ νμ μλΉ λΆλΆμ λν κ²½μμ μ κ±°ν κ°λ₯μ±βμ μ΄λνμ§ μλ κ²½μ°λ ν¬ν¨νμ§ μμ΅λλ€.
μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ격ν ν΄μμ λ³Έ μ‘°νμ λͺ μλ ν μ€νΈκ° μ μ μΌλ‘ κ²½μ μ±μ λ°νμ λκ³ μμμ μμ¬ν©λλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ κ³Όκ±° μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ‘°κ±΄μ΄ λ€λ₯Έ μ μ± λͺ©νλ€, νΉν νκ²½ λ³΄νΈ λͺ©νλ₯Ό ν¬ν¨νκΈ°μ μΆ©λΆν κ΄λ²μνλ€κ³ μ견μ μ μν λ° μμ΅λλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ μ΄μ κ΄λ ¨λ μ λ½ μμν(EC)μ μ κ·Όλ°©μμ λΉκ΅μ μΌμ νμ§ λͺ»νκ³ νμ¬ μν μ€μΈ κ·μ λ€λ³΄λ€λ μ΄λ―Έ νμ§λ κ·μ 17μ‘° νμμ λ λ§μ΄ μ‘΄μ€λμμ΅λλ€.
κ·μ 17μ‘° νμμμ μ 101μ‘°(3)ν μ μ©
κ·μ 17μ‘°λ μ λ½ μμν(EC)μκ² μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μκ±°νμ¬ μ 101μ‘°(1)νμ μ μλ μ νμ κ΄νμμ μ μΈλλ€κ³ μ μΈν μ μλ μ μΌν κΆνμ λΆμ¬νμμ΅λλ€.Β μ΄ μμ€ν νμμ μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ νκ²½μ ννμ΄ μ 101μ‘°(3)ν μ μ©μ μ λΉν νλ€κ³ λ°μλ€μμ΅λλ€.Β μ’μ μκ° Conseil EuropΓ©en de la Construction dβAppareils Domestiques (CECED) (1999) μ¬λ‘μ λλ€.Β CECEDμλ νΉμ μλμ§ ν¨μ¨ κΈ°μ€μ μΆ©μ‘±νμ§ μλ μΈνκΈ° μ μ‘° λ° μμ μ μμ νκΈ°λ‘ νλ κ΅λ΄ κ°μ μ ν μ μ‘°μ 체κ°μ ν©μκ° ν¬ν¨λμ΄ μμμ΅λλ€. μ΄ ν©μμλ μ 101μ‘°(1)νμ΄ μ μ©λμ§ μλλ€κ³ κ²°μ μ λ΄λ Έμ΅λλ€.Β μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ μ©νμ¬ μ΄λ¬ν ν©μμ λΉμ© λ° νΈμ΅μ λΆμμ βκ°μ μ€μΌμ λ μ κ² μ λ°νλ λμΌν μλΉμ€λ₯Ό μ 곡νλλ‘ μ€μΉλ μ 체 κΈ°κ³μ ν₯ν μ΄μμ΄ ν©μκ° μλ κ²λ³΄λ€ κ²½μ μ μΌλ‘ λ ν¨μ¨μ βμ΄λΌκ³ νλ¨νμ΅λλ€.Β κ²°μ μ μΌλ‘ μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ κ²½μ μ ν¨μ¨μ±μ μ€μΌμ κ°μμ λλ±ν μ°¨μμμ κ³ λ €ν κ²μΌλ‘ 보μ λλ€.Β λν μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ CECEDμ ν©μκ° μΌκΈ°ν μ μλ βμ§λ¨μ κ²½μ μ μ΄μ΅βμ κ³ λ €νμ μ λ³Έ ν©μκ° μλΉμμκ² κ³΅μ ν λͺ«μ μ΄μ΅μ μ£Όλ λμμ κΈ°μ λ° κ²½μ μ λ°μ μ ν¬κ² κΈ°μ¬λ₯Ό ν κ²μ΄λΌκ³ κ²°λ‘ μ μ§μμ΅λλ€.
κ·μ 1/2003μ‘°λ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ§μ μ μ©μ λμ νμ¬ κ²½μ κΆνλΉκ΅κ³Ό μ λ½μ°ν© νμκ΅ λ²μμ΄ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ μ©ν μ μλ κΆνμ λΆμ¬νμ΅λλ€.Β μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ 쑰건μ μΆ©μ‘±νλ μ νμ κ΄νμ λ²μ μΌλ‘ μ ν¨νκ³ , κ·Έ μ·¨μ§μ λν νμ μ κ²°μ κ³Όμ μ΄ νμμμ΄ μ²μλΆν° μνμ΄ κ°λ₯ν©λλ€.Β κ²°λ‘ μ μΌλ‘, μ΄μ μ νμ κ΄νμ΄ μ λ½μ°ν©(EU) κ²½μλ²μ μ€μνλμ§ μ¬λΆμ λν μν κΈ°λ° λΆμμ μνν μ± μμ κΈ°μ μκ² μ κ°λμμ΅λλ€.Β μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ κΈ°μ μ΄ κ·Έλ¬ν β(μκ°) νκ°βλ₯Ό μνν μ μλλ‘ νλ μ¬λ¬κ°μ§ λ°©μμ μ μνμμ΅λλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ μ΄λ¬ν νκ°λ κ²½μκ³Ό 무κ΄ν μμλ₯Ό μ μΈνκ³ βμ νμ κ΄νμ κ²½μ μ νκ°λ₯Ό μν λ²μ νβ λ΄μμ μνλμ΄μΌ ν©λλ€. μ¨μ ν κ²½μ κΈ°λ° μ κ·Ό λ°©μμΌλ‘ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ μ©νλ μ΄λ¬ν μμ§μμ νΉν μ λ½ μμν(EC) λ° μ λ½μ°ν©(EU) λ²μ νλ‘μ λΉμΆμ΄ λ΄€μλ λ Όλμ μ¬μ§κ° μλ€λ κ²μ΄ μ μμ 견ν΄μ λλ€.
κΈ°μ μ΄ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ΄ μ μ©λλμ§μ μ¬λΆμ λν κ²½μ μ νκ°λ₯Ό μννλ μμ μ μ§μνκΈ° μν μ§μΉ¨μ΄ λ°νλμμ§λ§, νμ¬ νκ²½ 보νΈλ₯Ό κΈ°λ°μΌλ‘ νμ¬ μ±κ³΅μ μΌλ‘ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ μ©ν μ μλ λ²μλ μμ£Ό μμ΅λλ€. μ€μ λ‘ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ§μΉ¨μλ βλ€λ₯Έ μ‘°μ½ κ·μ μ΄ μΆκ΅¬νλ λͺ©νλ μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ 4κ°μ§ 쑰건μ ν¬ν¨λ μ μλ λ²μ λ΄μμ κ³ λ €λ μ μλ€βλ μ¬μ€μ μ μνκ³ μμ΅λλ€. μ΄λ¬ν μ μλ κΈ°νλ³ν κ°μλ₯Ό κ³ λ €μ¬νμΌλ‘ μ£Όμ₯ν μ¬μ§λ₯Ό κ±°μ λ¨κΈ°μ§ μμ΅λλ€:
첫째, μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ μ μ©μ λν μ λ½ μμν(EC)μ μ§μΉ¨μ μ νμ κ΄νμ΄ μλΉμμκ² μ£Όλ μκ³μ κ²½μ μ μ΄μ΅μ μ μ μΌλ‘ μ΄μ μ λ§μΆκ³ μμ΅λλ€.Β λ°λΌμ, μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ λν μ§μΉ¨μλ κ²½μ μ ν¨μ¨μ±μ νκ²½μ μ΄μ΅μ ν¬ν¨ν λ€λ₯Έ μ΄λ€ μ νμ μκ³ μ΄μ΅λ³΄λ€ μ€μμν©λλ€.
λμ§Έ, μ λ½ μμν(EC)μ λ°λ₯΄λ©΄ νκ°μ§ μμ₯λ΄μμ μ νμ κ΄νμΌλ‘ μΈνμ¬ μ λ°λλ κ²½μ μ μ΄μ΅μ μΌλ°μ μΌλ‘ λμΌν μμ₯μμ λ°μλλ μ νμ ν¨κ³Όλ³΄λ€ μ»€μΌ ν©λλ€ (βμμ₯ λ΄ ν¨μ¨μ±β). μ΄λ¬ν μ κ·Ό λ°©μμ μ λ½μ°ν©(EU) λ²μμ νκ²°μμ λνλ©λλ€. μλ₯Όλ€μ΄, GSK v. Commission (2007) μ¬λ‘μ κ²½μ°, μΌλ°λ²μμ βμμνλ μ°μ […] λ¬Έμ μ ν©μλ₯Ό ν΅ν΄ […] μλΉν κ°κ΄μ μΈ μ΄μ΅μ μ»μ μ μλμ§, λν μ΄λ¬ν μ΄μ΅μ΄ κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯λΏλ§ μλλΌ λ€λ₯Έ μμ₯μμλ λ°μν μ μλμ§λ₯Ό μ‘°μ¬ν΄μΌ νλ€βκ³ νκ²°νμ΅λλ€.
μ μ§Έ, μ 101μ‘°(3)νμ λν μ§μΉ¨μλ ν¨μ¨μ±μ΄ λνλκΈ°κΉμ§ μΌμ κΈ°κ°μ΄ κ²½κ³Όν΄μΌ νλ κ²½μ°κ° μμ μ μμμ μΈμ ν©λλ€. κ·Έλ¬λ μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ λν β[β¦] μμ°¨κ° ν΄μλ‘ κΈ°λ€λ¦¬λ κΈ°κ° λμ μλΉμμκ² μ§μμ§λ μμ€μ 보μνλ ν¨μ¨μ±λ μ»€μΌ νλ€βκ³ λͺ μν©λλ€.Β λ°λΌμ κΈ°ν λ³ν κ°μκ° μ 101μ‘°(3)ν νμμ μκ³ μμΈμΌλ‘ μΈμ λλλΌλ ν¨μ¨μ±μ΄ μλμ μΌλ‘ μ¦μ λ°μν΄μΌ ν¨μ μλμ μΌλ‘ μ΄μ μ±κ³΅μ μΈ μ μ©μ λ°°μ μν΅λλ€.
EUMR: ν¨μ¨μ±μ λ°©μ΄μ λν΄
EUMRμ ν¬ν¨λ μ€μ§μ μΈ ν μ€νΈλ μμ₯μ§μ€μ΄ νΉν μ§λ°°μ μμΉ (βSIECβ)μ μμ± λλ κ°νμ κ²°κ³Όλ₯Ό μ΄λν¨μΌλ‘ μΈνμ¬ ν¨κ³Όμ μΈ κ²½μμ ν¬κ² λ°©ν΄νλμ§μ μ¬λΆλ₯Ό κ²°μ νλ κ²μ λλ€.
SIECκ° μλμ§ μ¬λΆλ₯Ό νκ°ν λ, μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ β[…] μλΉμμκ² μ 리νκ³ κ²½μμ μ₯μ λ¬Όμ΄ λμ§ μλλ€λ μ μ νμ κΈ°μ λ° κ²½μ λ°μ μ μ±μ₯β μ¬λΆλ₯Ό μ°Έμ‘°ν΄μΌ ν©λλ€ (EUMR 2μ‘° (1)ν).Β μ΄ μ‘°νμ βν¨μ¨μ± λ°©μ΄βμ λν λ²μ κ·Όκ±°λ₯Ό νμ±ν©λλ€.
ν¨μ¨μ± λ°©μ΄μ μ¬μ©μ κ²½μ μ κΈ°λ°νμμλ λ체μ μΌλ‘λ μ±κ³΅μ μ΄μ§ λͺ»νμ΅λλ€.
ν¨μ¨μ± λ°©μ΄μ μΌλΆ μμλ₯Ό μμΈν μ΄ν΄λ³΄λ©΄ νμλ°°μΆ κ°μμ κ°μ μκ³μ μΈ νκ²½ μ΄μ΅μ μ£Όμ₯ν μ μλ κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ νμ κ΄ν μμΌλ‘λ κ±°μ μμμ 보μ¬μ€λλ€. μ΄κ²μ νΉν ν¨μ¨μ±μ΄ μμΉμ μΌλ‘ κ²½μ λ¬Έμ κ° λ°νν κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ μλ κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯ λ΄μ μλΉμμκ² μ΄μ΅μ΄ λμ΄μΌ νκΈ° λλ¬Έμ λλ€.Β λ°λΌμ ν¨μ¨μ± λ°©μ΄μ λν μ κ·Ό λ°©μκ³Ό μ μ© λ°©μμ 2050λ κΉμ§ κΈ°ν μ€λ¦½μ±μ λ¬μ±νκΈ°μλ λ무 κΉλ€λ‘μ΅λλ€.
μ λ½μ°ν©(EU) κ²½μλ²μ ν΅νμ¬ κΈ°ν λ³ν κ°μλ₯Ό ν보νκΈ° μν λͺκ°μ§ μ μ
μ 101μ‘° (3)ν
μ 101μ‘° (3)νμ λν μ λ½ μμν(EC)μ νμ¬ μ κ·Ό λ°©μμ μ§μ ν μμ₯ μΈ νκ²½ μ΄μ΅μ μ£Όμ₯μ νμ©νμ§ μμ΅λλ€.Β λ¬Όλ‘ μ λ½ μμν(EC)μ νμ¬ μνμ νλ ₯ μ§μΉ¨ μ΄μμ μμ βμ§λ¨μ [μ§μ κ°λ₯μ±] μ΄μ΅βμ μΈμ ν©λλ€: ν΄λΉ μμ₯μ μλΉμλ€μ΄ ν΄λΉ μμ₯ μΈλΆμΒ κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯ μλΉμλ€κ³Ό μλΉλΆλΆ μ€λ³΅λκ±°λ μλΉν μμ΅μλ€μ μΌλΆμΌ κ²½μ°, κ·Έλ¬ν μ§λ¨μ μ΄μ΅μ΄ ν΄λΉ μμ₯μ μλΉμκ° μ μ νΌν΄λ₯Ό 보μν λ§νΌ μΆ©λΆν μ€μν κ²½μ° κ³ λ €λ μ μμ΅λλ€.Β λν μ§μΉ¨ μ΄μμ λ°λ₯΄λ©΄, μ§λ¨μ μ§μ κ°λ₯μ± μ΄μ΅μ μ μ© λ°μΌλ €λ©΄, λΉμ¬μλ (a) μ£Όμ₯νλ ννμ λͺ ννκ² μ€λͺ νκ³ μ΄λ―Έ κ·Έλ¬ν ννμ΄ λ°μνκ±°λ λ°μν κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ μλ€λ μ¦κ±°λ₯Ό μ 곡ν΄μΌ νλ©°, (b) μνμλ₯Ό λͺ νμ΄ μ μν΄μΌ νλ©°, (c) κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯μ μλΉμκ° μ£Όμ₯νλ μ§λ¨μ μ΄μ΅μ μνμμ μ€μ§μ μΌλ‘ μ€λ³΅λ¨μ μ μ¦ν΄μΌ νκ³ , (d) κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯ μΈλΆμμ λ°μνκ±°λ λ°μν κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ μλ μ§ν©μ μ΄μ΅μ μΌλΆκ° κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯ λ΄ μ νμ μλΉμμκ² μκΉμ μ μ¦ν΄μΌ ν©λλ€.
κ·Έλ¬λ, μ λ½ μμν(EC)κ° 2050λ κΉμ§ κΈ°ν μ€λ¦½ λͺ©νλ₯Ό λ¬μ±νλλ° κΈ°μ¬νκΈ°λ₯Ό μνλ€λ©΄, 2023λ 1μ 1μΌμ λ°ν¨λ ν΄λΉ μ§μΉ¨ μ΄μμ λ무 μ격νκ² ν΄μνμ§λ μμκ²μ΄λΌ ν¬λ§λ©λλ€.
EUMR
νκ²½μ ννμ λλ°νλ λ§μ ν©λ³λ€μ κ²½μ λ¬Έμ λ₯Ό μΌμΌν€μ§ μμ΅λλ€.Β κ·Έλ¬λ, ν©λ³ λΉμ¬μλ€μ ν¨μ¨μ±μ΄ βμμΉμ μΌλ‘ κ²½μ μ°λ €κ° λ°μν κ°λ₯μ±μ΄ μλ κ΄λ ¨ μμ₯μ μλΉμμκ² μ΄μ΅μ΄ λμ΄μΌβ νκΈ° λλ¬Έμ, νκ²½ μ΄μ΅μ κΈ°λ°μΌλ‘ νλ κ²½μ ν¨μ¨μ±μ κ·Όκ±°ν λ°©μ΄μ μ±κ³΅νκΈ°λ μ΄λ €μΈ κ²μ λλ€.Β μ΄μ μμ΄ βμμΉμ μΌλ‘β λΌλ μΈκΈμ μ λ½ μμν(EC)κ° μν κ²½μ° ν¨μ¨μ± λ°©μ΄ νκ°μ μμ΄ μμ₯ μΈ ν¨μ¨μ±μ κ³ λ €ν μ μμμ μλ―Έν©λλ€.Β λν, μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ μ 101μ‘°(3)νκ³Ό κ΄λ ¨νμ¬ κ²½μμ λν νΌν΄κ° λλ΅μ μΈ μΆμ μ ν©λ³μ μ΄μ΅λ³΄λ€ λΆλͺ ν μμ κ²½μ°μλ ν¨μ¨μ±μ μ λνν νμκ° μλ€λ λ€λλλ κ²½μ λΉκ΅μ μ κ·Ό λ°©μμμ μκ°μ μ»μ κ°λ₯μ±λ μμ΅λλ€.
λ°λΌμ μ λ½ μμν(EC)λ μ λ½μ°ν©(EU) κ²½μλ²μ΄ νκ²½ 보νΈλ₯Ό μΆ©λΆν κ³ λ €ν μ μλλ‘ λ³΄μ₯νκΈ°λ₯Ό κΆκ³ ν©λλ€. κ·Έλ κ² νμ§ μλλ€λ©΄ κΈ°ν λ³νμ νκ²½ νκ΄΄λ‘ μΈν μ€μ‘΄μ μνμ νΌνμ§ λͺ»ν μνμ λΉ μ§κ² λ κ²μ λλ€.
Editorial Board:Β
ANDREW LEEΒ Β μ€λλ₯ 리 / μ΄μ€λ°°
PARTNER | WASHINGTON, DC
ajlee@mwe.com
EUNSOOK JUNG WILEYΒ Β μ -μμΌλ¦¬ μμ
STAFF ATTORNEY | CHICAGO
ejungwiley@mwe.com
EUNJI KANGΒ Β κ°μμ§
STAFF ATTORNEY | SINGAPORE
ekang@mwe.com
BAROM CHONΒ μ λ°λ‘¬
LEGAL SECRETARY | WASHINGTON, DC
bchon@mwe.com