Content Type: Article

  • Divided Ninth Circuit Directs Review of Lender’s Appeal from Cramdown Order

    Divided Ninth Circuit Directs Review of Lender’s Appeal from Cramdown Order

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Divided Ninth Circuit Directs Review of Lender’s Appeal from Cramdown Order

    July 24, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A lender’s appeal from an order confirming a Chapter 11 debtor’s cramdown reorganization plan is not equitably moot when the lender “diligently sought a stay” and the court could grant effective relief, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on July 1, 2015. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc.,2015 WL 3972917 (9th Cir. July 1, 2015) (2-1). Review of the lender’s appeal would not unfairly affect “third parties or entirely unravel the plan,” reasoned the court when reversing the district court’s dismissal and remanding to the district court for disposition of the merits.

    The court applied four established criteria to find that the lender’s appeal was not equitably moot: (1) whether the appellant sought a stay pending appeal; (2) “whether substantial consummation of the plan occurred”; (3) whether the relief sought would affect “third parties not before the court”; and (4) whether the relief sought would entirely unravel the plan. The case ostensibly deals with the standard of appellate review for the judicially created doctrine of “equitable mootness,” which allows an appellate court “not to reach the merits of a bankruptcy appeal.” But, as discussed in this Alert, the merit of the lender’s appeal from a questionable reorganization plan confirmation order undoubtedly influenced the Ninth Circuit’s holding.

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  • New Developments May Prompt Board Compliance/Risk Recalibration

    ARTICLE

    New Developments May Prompt Board Compliance/Risk Recalibration

    July 23, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Involuntary Bankruptcy Case Because of Creditors’ Legitimately Disputed Claims

    Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Involuntary Bankruptcy Case Because of Creditors’ Legitimately Disputed Claims

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Second Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Involuntary Bankruptcy Case Because of Creditors’ Legitimately Disputed Claims

    July 23, 2015

    Read time: 7 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    A bankruptcy court must dismiss a creditor’s involuntary bankruptcy petition when the debtor has raised a “legitimate basis” for disputing the petitioning creditor’s underlying claim, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 14, 2015. In re TPG Troy, LLC, 2015 WL 4220619, at *5 (2d Cir. July 14, 2015). The Second Circuit also affirmed the bankruptcy court’s award of $513,427 in attorney’s fees and costs to the vindicated debtor under Bankruptcy Code (“Code”) Section 303(i)(1). Id. at *6. According to the court, the fee award “serves to discourage the filing of involuntary bankruptcy petitions to force debtors to pay a disputed debt.” Id. at *5-6. This case represents creditors’ improper use of an involuntary bankruptcy petition. Practically, it also underscores the risks that a creditor faces when a court dismisses its petition.

    Relevance

    Creditors are often tempted to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against their debtor as a way to compel the payment of a debt. To file such a petition, however, the creditor’s claim must, among other requirements, not be “the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount.” Code § 303(b)(1). As the TPG case shows, the involuntary bankruptcy petition is not just another collection device.

    TPG deals only with the standing of a petitioning creditor. The Code, however, imposes other requirements for an involuntary filing. If the debtor has 12 or more creditors, at least three petitioning creditors are required. Code § 303(b)(1)-(2). The petitioner must be a creditor or serve as an indenture trustee for creditors. Code § 303(b)(1). A petitioning creditor’s claim must also be non-contingent. Id. All of the petitioning creditors must hold unsecured claims that total at least $15,325. Id. Farmers and nonprofit corporations are not eligible debtors. Id. § 303(a). Involuntary bankruptcy relief is available only under Chapters 7 and 11 of the Code. Id. Finally, the Code provides two alternative grounds for relief: (1) “the debtor is generally not paying” its “debts as [they] become due … ”; or (2) “a custodian … was appointed or took possession” of “substantially all of the property of the debtor” within the preceding 120 days. Id. § 303(h). In sum, these substantive obstacles are meant to ensure that only financially troubled debtors can be forced into bankruptcy involuntarily, balancing the interests of debtors and creditors.

    Facts

    Three creditors (“Creditors”) filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against two affiliated debtors (“Debtors”) to recover losses incurred when the Debtors’ partially-owned subsidiaries defaulted on $1.3 billion of their notes (“Notes”). The Debtors had not issued or guaranteed the Notes and had sold their interest in the issuing subsidiaries long before the default. After starting many suits against the Debtors, the Creditors then filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against them, asserting they were liable for the subsidiaries’ debts on an alter ego theory.

    The Bankruptcy and District Courts

    The bankruptcy court dismissed the involuntary petition on two grounds. First, it found a “bona fide dispute” as to whether the Debtors were liable to the Creditors. Alternatively, the bankruptcy court abstained under Code Section 305(a)(1) because the parties were already litigating the liability issue in other courts, implicating state, not federal, law. It stressed the “plethora of ongoing litigation” between the parties. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court in full. Id. at *1-2.

    The Second Circuit

    The Second Circuit first addressed the Creditors’ challenge to its jurisdiction under Code Section 305(c) (abstention order “not reviewable by appeal or otherwise by the court of appeals … or by the Supreme Court of the United States”). Although the court admitted its lack of jurisdiction to review the bankruptcy court’s abstention order, it still reviewed the bankruptcy court’s award of attorney’s fees and costs based on the legitimately disputed claims asserted by the creditors. Id. at *3.

    Legitimate Dispute

    The Second Circuit reviewed the bankruptcy court’s finding of a bona fide dispute solely for the purpose of deciding the propriety of the attorney’s fee award against the Creditors. Id. at *4-5. A court must, in the Second Circuit’s view, “determine whether there is an objective basis for either a factual or a legal dispute as to the validity of the debt.” Id. at *4 (citing In re BDC 56, LLC, 330 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2003)). If “there is either a genuine issue of material fact that bears upon the debtor’s liability or a meritorious contention as to the application of law to undisputed facts,” a good faith dispute exists. Id. As the court explained, “Congress intended to disqualify a creditor whenever there is any legitimate basis for the debtor not paying the debt, whether that basis is factual or legal.” Id. Moreover, “[a]n involuntary bankruptcy case cannot be the means of pressuring a debtor to pay a legitimately disputed debt.” Id. Although the petitioning creditor bears the initial burden of showing that no bona fide dispute exists, the debtor must then show the existence of a bona fide dispute. Id. The mere existence of pending litigation is insufficient to prove the existence of a bona fide dispute, but it does strongly suggest that one exists. Id. at *5. Here, the bankruptcy court properly considered the Debtor’s arguments that: alter ego liability did not apply to foreign entities; the Creditors had knowingly consented to the transactions at issue; and the Debtors had not engaged in a fraudulent redemption transaction. Id. Nor did the bankruptcy court have to resolve fact issues, reasoned the Second Circuit, because it only had to determine whether a bona fide dispute exists, not resolve it. Id.

    Attorney’s Fees

    The Second Circuit acknowledged a judicial presumption that costs and attorney’s fees will be awarded to the alleged debtor and that a creditor’s bad faith is not a prerequisite to a fee award. Id. at *5-6. “Most … courts” apply a “totality of the circumstances test,” taking into account: “(1) the merits of the involuntary petition; (2) the role of any improper conduct on the part of the alleged debtor; (3) the reasonableness of the actions taken by the petitioning creditors; and (4) the motivation and objectives behind the filing of the petition.” Id. at *6. According to the bankruptcy court, the “Creditors ha[d] put forward no evidence to rebut the presumption that the [Debtors] are entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees.” Id., citing In re TPG Troy, 2013 WL 3789344, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013).

    Comments

    The TPG case illustrates the risks for creditors in filing an involuntary bankruptcy petition. What it does not do, however, is explain why and when creditors would be justified in filing an involuntary petition. Bankruptcy is a collective process for the entire group of creditors. Creditors may, therefore, force a financially troubled debtor into bankruptcy to enable a trustee to recover fraudulent transfers and preferences, to challenge a defective lien on the debtor’s assets, or to pursue third parties who have caused the debtor’s downfall. As TPG shows, though, involuntary bankruptcy is not a way to resolve a two-party dispute.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or the author.


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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  • CMS Proposes Stark Law Amendments, Requests Comments on Whether Stark Law Is Barrier to Health Care Reform

    CMS Proposes Stark Law Amendments, Requests Comments on Whether Stark Law Is Barrier to Health Care Reform

    ARTICLE / REPORT

    CMS Proposes Stark Law Amendments, Requests Comments on Whether Stark Law Is Barrier to Health Care Reform

    July 21, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Overview

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) recently published a notice of proposed rulemaking to amend its regulations implementing and interpreting the Stark Law. CMS also used this proposed rule to state its positions on certain questions of Stark Law interpretation and application, and to solicit comments from the industry on whether the Stark Law is a barrier to health care delivery and payment innovation, and whether the industry needs more guidance on how the Stark Law applies to physician compensation. Notably, the proposed rule adds two new Stark Law exceptions—one for financial assistance to practices to recruit primary care non-physician practitioners and one for “time-share” arrangements. Comments on the proposed rule are due September 8, 2015.

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  • Fourth Circuit Rejects ‘Advice of Counsel’ Defense

    ARTICLE

    Fourth Circuit Rejects ‘Advice of Counsel’ Defense

    July 20, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Historic Agreement Reached with Iran in Exchange for Sanctions Relief

    ARTICLE

    Historic Agreement Reached with Iran in Exchange for Sanctions Relief

    July 19, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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  • The Health Care Governance Implications Of Tuomey

    ARTICLE

    The Health Care Governance Implications Of Tuomey

    July 16, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Equity Bridge Facilities Debut on the French Market

    Equity Bridge Facilities Debut on the French Market

    ARTICLE

    Equity Bridge Facilities Debut on the French Market

    July 16, 2015

    Read time: 1 min

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  • Divided Tenth Circuit Reverses Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination of Insider Secured Loan

    Divided Tenth Circuit Reverses Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination of Insider Secured Loan

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Divided Tenth Circuit Reverses Recharacterization and Equitable Subordination of Insider Secured Loan

    July 9, 2015

    Read time: 2 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    The claim of an insider lender (“L”) who invested “in a venture with substantial risk” and who loaned it additional funds on a secured basis to salvage its business should not be recharacterized as equity or subordinated on equitable grounds, held the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on June 12, 2015. In re Alternate Fuels, Inc., 2015 WL 3635366 (10th Cir. June 12, 2015) (2-1) (“AFI”). Reversing the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, the court found that L’s loans did “not meet our criteria for either recharacterization or equitable subordination.” Moreover, L had “satisfied his burden of proof as to the validity and amount of his claim.” The AFI decision shows how and why courts have reached inconsistent results in deciding whether to recharacterize secured loans.

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  • Fifth Circuit Certifies ‘Good-Faith-for-Value’ Issue to Texas Supreme Court in Golf Channel Case

    Fifth Circuit Certifies ‘Good-Faith-for-Value’ Issue to Texas Supreme Court in Golf Channel Case

    ARTICLE / CLIENT ALERT

    Fifth Circuit Certifies ‘Good-Faith-for-Value’ Issue to Texas Supreme Court in Golf Channel Case

    July 7, 2015

    Read time: 4 min

    Key takeaways
    Overview

    Is market value sufficient proof of reasonably equivalent value for purposes of the good-faith-for-value defense under Texas law? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified that question to the Texas Supreme Court on June 30, 2015, after vacating its earlier decision in Janvey v. The Golf Channel, Inc., 2015 WL 3972216, at *3 (5th Cir. June 30, 2015). The court’s controversial March 11, 2015 decision, 780 F.3d 641, held an advertising firm liable to a corrupt company’s receiver for $5.9 million that the firm had received in good faith from the company.[1] In that decision, the court found the defendant’s advertising services to have provided “no value to the debtor’s creditors” and reversed the district court, which had dismissed the receiver’s complaint, relying on the defendant’s “affirmative defense that it received the payments in good faith and in exchange for reasonably equivalent value (the market value of advertising on the Golf Channel).” In the view of the district court, the defendant looked “more like an innocent trade creditor than a salesman perpetrating and extending the [debtor’s] Ponzi scheme.” 2015 WL 3972216, at *2. Granting the defendant’s petition for rehearing, the Fifth Circuit also asked the Texas Supreme Court whether “value” under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“TUFTA”) should be measured from the standpoint of a debtor’s creditors or whether market value alone was sufficient to sustain the creditor’s affirmative defense. Id. at *7.

    Relevance

    The issue certified to the Texas Supreme Court is important to creditors. The defendant in Golf Channel undeniably provided its advertising services in good faith and relied on the market value of its advertising services. According to the Fifth Circuit, “TUFTA was designed to strike a balance between protecting the creditors of an insolvent business while at the same time ensuring that third-party merchants and transferees (who, ironically, may also be creditors post-bankruptcy) would have an affirmative defense to protect their earnings.” Moreover, “where TUFTA draws a line between the various interested parties is the difficult question that Texas courts have yet to answer.” Id.

    In framing the controversy, the Fifth Circuit noted that the relevant comment in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“UFTA”) (UFTA § 3 cmt. 2), which is not codified in TUFTA, states that “value” is measured “from a creditor’s viewpoint.” Id. at *4-5. In contrast, TUFTA’s statutory definition of “reasonably equivalent value” (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 24.004(d)) includes a “transfer … that is within the range of values for which the transferor would have sold the assets in an arm’s length transaction,” suggesting that value is measured “from the perspective of a buyer in the general marketplace, not from the perspective of creditors.” Id. at *5. As noted in an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, the “good-faith” defense contained in Bankruptcy Code Section 548(c) was meant to “protect … the [good faith] transferee from his unfortunate selection of business partners.” In re Positive Health Management, 769 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2014).

    We will continue to follow Golf Channel as it makes its way back to the Fifth Circuit.

    Authored by Michael L. Cook and Brian C. Tong.

    If you have any questions concerning this Alert, please contact your attorney at Schulte Roth & Zabel or one of the authors.


    [1] See our April 1, 2015 Alert analyzing the Fifth Circuit’s earlier decision, “Fifth Circuit Again Limits Meaning of ‘Value’ in Creditors’ Good Faith Fraudulent Transfer Defense.”


    This information has been prepared by Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP (“SRZ”) for general informational purposes only. It does not constitute legal advice, and is presented without any representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or timeliness. Transmission or receipt of this information does not create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Electronic mail or other communications with SRZ cannot be guaranteed to be confidential and will not (without SRZ agreement) create an attorney-client relationship with SRZ. Parties seeking advice should consult with legal counsel familiar with their particular circumstances. The contents of these materials may constitute attorney advertising under the regulations of various jurisdictions.

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