CLIENT ALERT
Three years of Delaware General Corporation Law amendments: A working guide to the 2024, 2025, and 2026 amendments
Read time: 18 min
The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) is annually reviewed for potential improvements, with the last three years yielding significant changes. The 2024 amendments were a legislative response to Court of Chancery decisions that had unsettled transactional market practice. The 2025 amendments – the most consequential of the three – created statutory safe harbors for conflicted transactions and narrowed stockholder books and record inspection rights. The 2026 amendments are largely technical, but one of them resolves a certificate of incorporation interpretation trap affecting public companies.
This alert consolidates the three years, explains what each change was designed to fix, and identifies topics that counsel should revisit.
Amendment effective date | DGCL sections | Core subject matter |
August 1, 2024 | 122(5), 122(18), 147, 232(g), 261(a), 268 | Stockholder agreements; board approval of documents in substantially final form; merger remedies and approval mechanics |
March 25, 2025 | 144, 220 | Safe harbors for conflicted director, officer, and controlling stockholder transactions; scope and mechanics of books-and-records inspection |
August 1, 2025 | 102(f), 103(f), 109(b), 115, 132, 155, 252(c), 311, 312, 377 | Forum selection beyond internal corporate claims; fee-shifting prohibition; registered agents; filing mechanics and franchise tax conformity |
August 1, 2026 | 242(d), 275, 312(j) | Effect of Section 242(b)(2) opt-outs on the votes-cast standard; post-dissolution service of process; revival of nonstock corporations |
These amendments took effect on August 1, 2024.
In West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Moelis & Co., 311 A.3d 809 (Del. Ch. 2024), the Court of Chancery held that certain governance arrangements in an agreement between a corporation and a stockholder implicated the board of directors’ management responsibilities pursuant to DGCL Section 141(a) and needed to appear in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation to be valid. New Section 122(18) expressly empowers a corporation to enter into governance agreements with current or prospective stockholders whose validity was questioned following the Moelis decision (e.g., agreements with covenants to take or refrain from taking future action, to obtain specified approvals before acting, and to require certain other persons or bodies to take or refrain from taking specified action). Such arrangements do not, without more, violate Section 141(a).
Four limits deserve attention:
- The corporation must receive consideration.
- A provision is unenforceable against the corporation if it conflicts with the certificate of incorporation or would conflict with Delaware law if placed in the certificate of incorporation, with a carve-out for DGCL Section 115, which is what allows these agreements to designate an exclusive non-Delaware forum or arbitration.
- Section 122(18) does not permit the contract to directly bind the board or individual directors, or to impose penalties on them for noncompliance.
- Section 122(18) does not touch fiduciary duties, including duties implicated in causing the corporation to enter into, perform, or breach the contract.
Section 122(5) was amended in parallel to confirm that management contracts and other internal delegation arrangements remain subject to Section 141(a) and related case law. Thus, unless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation, the board may not delegate fundamental board-level functions to officers or agents.
Practice points
- Review stockholders’ agreements executed before August 2024 for any exposure.
- In board minutes, state affirmatively that the document was approved in final or substantially final form and identify the materials from which the material terms were determinable.
- Where a filing-related document is involved and the approval record is thin, use the Section 147 ratification mechanism before the filing becomes effective, rather than after.
- Confirm that merger agreements expressly address penalties or consequences for failure to close (if intended) and provide that schedules (or exhibits) are not part of the agreement consistent with Section 268(b).
The 2025 amendments were adopted in two tranches. The first, which took effect on March 25, 2025, contains the most substantive changes. The second, which took effect August 1, 2025, is technical but contains at least one change of strategic value.
March 2025 amendments
These amendments took effect on March 25, 2025, and apply both prospectively and retroactively, except with respect to any action or proceeding commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction and completed or pending on or before February 17, 2025, or, for Section 220, inspection demands made on or before that date.
Amended Section 144 codifies procedures that, if followed, shield directors, officers, and controlling stockholders from equitable relief and from damages for alleged breach of fiduciary duties. The required procedure depends on who is conflicted:
- Director or officer conflict: Requires (i) approval by a majority of the disinterested directors then serving or, if a majority of the board is not disinterested, a committee of at least two disinterested directors, acting in good faith and without gross negligence, or (ii) approval or ratification by a majority of the votes cast (as opposed to a majority of all outstanding shares) by disinterested stockholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote.
- Controlling stockholder transaction (other than a going private transaction): Requires (i) negotiation and approval by a committee of disinterested directors, or (ii) approval or ratification by a majority of the votes cast (as opposed to a majority of all outstanding shares) by disinterested stockholders in a fully informed, uncoerced vote (where the transaction is conditioned on such disinterested stockholder approval or ratification).
- Controlling stockholder going private transaction: Requires both the disinterested committee and disinterested stockholder approval noted above for non-going-private controlling stockholder transactions.
- Fairness alternative: Where the safe harbor procedures are not satisfied, the act or transaction must be fair to the corporation and its stockholders (i.e., entire fairness as determined by a court).
These safe harbor procedural mechanics are specific and the expectation is that Delaware courts will apply them strictly and as written. For example, a disinterested committee must consist of two or more directors, and each of those directors, at least when initially appointed, must have been determined by the board to be disinterested directors. Directors, in forming a disinterested committee and in making decisions, must act in good faith and without gross negligence. In a controlling stockholder transaction, the committee must be empowered to negotiate and to reject the transaction.
Section 144 contains important definitions, such as the following:
- A disinterested director is one who is not a party to the transaction and who has neither a material interest in it different from that of stockholders generally nor a material familial, financial, professional, employment, or other relationship with a party having such an interest.
- For public company directors, Section 144(d)(2) adds a heightened presumption: A director whom the board determines satisfies the applicable exchange independence criteria is presumed disinterested, rebuttable only by substantial and particularized facts.
- A controlling stockholder is a stockholder who (i) owns a majority of the voting power of stock entitled to elect a majority of the directors (or voting power of directors), (ii) has the right to cause the election of a majority of the directors (or voting power of directors), or (iii) holds at least one-third of that voting power and also has the power to exercise managerial authority over the corporation’s business and affairs.
Section 144 safe harbors do not displace common law protections. A process that complies with the prior case law but not the statutory safe harbor remains available.
Practice points
- Build the record the statute rewards: Minutes should show the committee’s composition, the board’s disinterestedness determination as to each member and its basis, the committee’s mandate, and the completeness of the information on which it acted.
- When multiple acts or transactions are being approved, consider separating those acts or transactions into separate board, committee, or stockholder approvals under Section 144 to avoid any one such approval that is not compliant with Section 144 causing the other approvals to be noncompliant.
- Determine early whether any stockholder crosses the one-third-plus-managerial-authority threshold and document the analysis; the definition is now statutory and testable.
- For controlling stockholder transactions, confirm the disinterested stockholder vote condition is in place no later than submission to stockholders.
- Keep independence questionnaires current and rigorous – they are now both an enumerated inspection category and the evidentiary foundation for the Section 144(d)(2) presumption.
- Adopt a standing books-and-records protocol: assess particularity and nexus, produce under a confidentiality and use agreement, redact by reference to the stated purpose, and request incorporation by reference.
- Maintain good corporate records, such as minutes, because a lapse in record-keeping could be a gateway to broader document production, and a complete record could undercut allegations that the corporation did not comply with Section 144.
August 2025 amendments
These amendments took effect August 1, 2025.
Since 2015, Section 115 had permitted forum selection provisions for internal corporate claims. Amended Section 115 now permits certificate of incorporation and bylaw provisions to prescribe the forum for claims that are not internal corporate claims, provided the claim relates to the business of the corporation; the conduct of its affairs; or the rights or powers of the corporation or its stockholders, directors, or officers. The provision must be consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements and must permit the stockholder to bring the claim in at least one court located in Delaware.
These amendments took effect on August 1, 2026.
Section 242(b)(2) requires a separate class vote to increase or decrease the authorized shares of a class but permits the certificate of incorporation to opt out of that requirement so that the change may be approved by a majority in voting power of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, irrespective of Section 242(b)(2). Section 242(d), added in 2023, provides that, for corporations whose shares of the class are listed on a national securities exchange, an increase or decrease in authorized shares of a class of stock may be approved if the votes cast for the amendment by holders of such class exceed the votes cast against, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise.
Prior to this amendment, it was not entirely clear whether a legacy Section 242(b)(2) opt-out (which typically recites a majority-of-outstanding-shares voting standard) also functions as an election out of the lower votes-cast standard. In Salama v. Simon, 328 A.3d 356 (Del. Ch. 2024), aff’d, 342 A.3d 373 (Del. 2025), the Court of Chancery found the statutory language ambiguous but resolved the ambiguity for the defendants, reasoning that treating widespread legacy opt-outs as elections out of Section 242(d) would handicap the provision’s purpose. The court noted, however, that it saw no indication that Section 242(d) was meant to override opt-outs adopted after its enactment.
This amendment closes that gap. A certificate of incorporation provision reciting that the authorized shares of a class may be increased or decreased by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the stock, or of the votes of such stock, irrespective of Section 242(b)(2) does not override Section 242(d). To override the Section 242(d) votes-cast standard, the provision must either state expressly that the corporation elects not to be governed by Section 242(d) or require a greater or additional vote than Section 242(b)(2) would require for such an amendment (e.g., two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock).
Practice points
- Closely review Section 242(b)(2) opt-outs in certificates of incorporation. A legacy opt-out no longer blocks reliance on Section 242(d), which may materially change the vote you need for an authorized share increase.
- Where a corporation wants the higher voting standard, amend to say so expressly or to specify a supermajority. Reciting a voting standard is no longer sufficient.
- Going forward, draft Section 242(b)(2) opt-outs without reciting a voting standard at all unless an opt-out of Section 242(d) is intended.
- Update certificate of dissolution forms and wind-down checklists to capture the service-of-process agreement and the forwarding address.
- Advise dissolving clients that the registered agent’s role ends at effectiveness and keep the forwarding address current for at least the five-year record retention period.
- For nonstock clients, revival no longer needs a member vote where a governing body is in place.
If you have any questions concerning the amendments, please reach out to the McDermott Will & Schulte Delaware team below.