Overview
Global competition authorities scrutinized mergers closely in Q1 2026 across industrial, healthcare, energy, and services sectors. In the United States, the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) addressed deals in packaged ice, healthcare services, and medical technology, resulting in targeted divestitures and, in one case, deal abandonment following extended review. In the European Union, the European Commission applied the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) alongside merger control to impose remedies on a state-backed acquisition. In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) cleared a completed merger in the used vehicle auction sector after a Phase 2 investigation without imposing remedies.
These cases underscore a few clear themes: US agencies are pursuing targeted remedies, particularly in healthcare; close-competitor deals continue to face meaningful execution risk; the EU is ramping up scrutiny of foreign subsidies, including their impact on bidding; and the CMA remains willing to clear deals where competitive constraints are well supported, even in concentrated markets.
Notable US cases
DOJ requires divestiture of customer relationships to clear Reddy Ice’s acquisition of Arctic Glacier
Markets/structure
The merging parties, Reddy Ice and Arctic Glacier, are the first- and third-largest packaged ice producers in the United States. The DOJ alleged that the deal would combine the two largest packaged ice producers in local markets defined around two sets of targeted customers: (1) retail chains in Oregon, Washington, and Imperial and Riverside counties in California, and (2) airlines and airline caterers in the Boston and New York City metropolitan areas.
Summary and observations
On January 30, 2026, the DOJ entered into a settlement with Reddy Ice and Arctic Glacier, allowing the parties to proceed with their proposed deal with conditions.
The DOJ alleged the merger would eliminate head-to-head competition between Reddy Ice and Arctic Glacier in specific local markets, allowing the parties to raise price to targeted customers such as retail chains and to airlines and airline caterers.
For some markets, the parties agreed to divest ice manufacturing and distribution facilities and customer contracts. For others, the parties divested customer contracts without facilities. Each divestiture buyer is a co-packer for Reddy Ice that currently serves the divested customer.
FTC requires Sevita to spin off 168 facilities to clear acquisition of BrightSpring’s ResCare business
Markets/structure
Sevita and BrightSpring’s ResCare are the leading providers of home and community-based services for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). The FTC alleged that the deal would substantially lessen competition for services to individuals with IDD in intermediate care facilities (ICFs) in local markets in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas. In each of the local markets, the FTC alleged the companies had a combined share well over 30% and are each other’s largest competitor.
Summary and observations
The case is notable for alleging harm across non-price dimensions of competition. ICF services are, for the most part, paid through Medicaid according to fixed reimbursement rates, meaning parties compete on non-price factors. The FTC emphasizes that antitrust law “is not confined to price effects alone; it safeguards consumers – here, individuals with IDD – from a broader spectrum of harms.”
The FTC alleges that the deal would decrease quality and reduce or eliminate consumer choice. The parties compete on quality to attract referrals, convert referrals to residents, and retain residents. The elimination of competition between the parties would reduce incentives to maintain and improve the quality of facilities, staffing levels, safety, care, and service offerings. The deal would also reduce or deprive individuals with IDD choice when it comes to ICF providers.
To resolve the FTC’s competitive concerns, the parties agreed to divest 128 of Sevita’s facilities in Indiana, Louisiana, and Texas to Dungarvin Group.
Alcon and LENSAR terminate proposed deal after lengthy FTC review
Markets/structure
The FTC indicated that Alcon and LENSAR are “the two most significant players” in the femtosecond laser-assisted cataract surgery market.
Summary and observations
Alcon’s $365 million deal to acquire LENSAR was announced on March 25, 2025. Nearly a year later, on March 16, 2026, the parties agreed to terminate the proposed transaction, with Alcon attributing the decision to “the delay and associated costs of [the FTC’s] extended regulatory review.” The FTC appeared prepared to file suit to enjoin the deal. The merger agreement provided for a $10 million termination fee to LENSAR nine months after closing and an outside date of April 23, 2026.
The FTC found significant competition between the parties, which the FTC alleged resulted in lower prices and increased innovation in the femtosecond laser-assisted cataract surgery market. LENSAR’s annual reports indicated its innovative system allowed it to take substantial share. LENSAR’s compact system, unlike Alcon’s, allows for an entire laser-assisted cataract surgery to be performed in one room instead of two.
The FTC found a market comprised of laser-assisted cataract surgery systems, excluding traditional cataract surgery. Although the FTC did not address its reasons for doing so, it appears that commercial insurers use different reimbursement schemes for the two procedures and laser-assisted techniques offer unique benefits to patients over traditional surgery. The FTC’s investigation underscores that healthcare – innovation in healthcare, in particular – continues to be a focus at the FTC.
Notable EU case
European Commission imposes FSR remedies on ADNOC’s acquisition of Covestro
Markets/structure
The transaction involved the acquisition by ADNOC, the UAE state-owned energy and petrochemicals group, of Covestro, a leading German producer of high-performance polymers serving electronics, automotive, construction, and other industrial sectors. The relevant markets were global polymer and advanced materials, with Covestro maintaining a strong EU manufacturing and R&D presence.
Summary and observations
The acquisition of Covestro by ADNOC illustrates the emerging dual regulatory framework created by the EU Merger Regulation and the FSR. Under EU merger control, ADNOC obtained clearance from the Commission to acquire sole control of Covestro, while the Commission used the FSR to assess financial contributions from the United Arab Emirates. The Commission determined that ADNOC had benefited from a UAE state guarantee and a committed capital increase, which could distort market conditions within the EU.
For the FSR analysis, the Commission identified two main theories of harm: distortion of the acquisition process, enabling ADNOC to submit a higher bid, and potential post-transaction distortions through a strengthened investment position. Notably, this was the first case in which the Commission established that a distortion occurred during the transaction process itself, finding that foreign subsidies enabled ADNOC to offer an overvalued price and accept risks that a non-subsidized investor would not, potentially deterring other bidders. The Commission ultimately granted conditional clearance under the FSR in November 2025, requiring ADNOC to remove the effects of the state guarantee and to provide EU competitors with access to key Covestro sustainability-related patents for 10 years.
Notable UK case
CMA clears Constellation’s acquisition of Aston Barclay
Markets/structure
The transaction concerned Constellation Developments’ completed acquisition of ABVR Holdings (trading as Aston Barclay), both active in the business to business (B2B) used vehicle auction services market in Great Britain. Constellation is the largest operator in the sector through British Car Auctions (BCA), while ABVR is a significant independent competitor with multiple auction centers.
The CMA’s market investigation identified a relatively concentrated competitive landscape, with BCA as the leading national player and Aston Barclay positioned as the third-largest operator.
Summary and observations
The CMA opened a Phase 2 investigation on October 13, 2025, after concluding that the completed acquisition constituted a relevant merger situation requiring an in-depth investigation. In its interim report published on January 22, 2026, the inquiry group provisionally cleared the merger, finding no substantial lessening of competition in the supply of B2B used vehicle auction services across Great Britain. The CMA concluded that, despite the combination of two sizeable players, evidence did not show a materially adverse impact on competitive dynamics, vendor choice, or buyer outcomes. Following consultation and review of stakeholder submissions, the CMA issued its final report on March 5, 2026, formally clearing the merger without remedies and confirming that the acquisition is not expected to harm competition.
Overall, the CMA’s final findings underscore that existing competitive pressures, alternative auction channels, and customer switching options were sufficient to prevent the merged entity from exercising market power, despite notable concerns raised by rival auction groups and certain commercial vendors during the review.